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Abstract 
This thesis presents a theological approach to the relationship between ethics and emotion. 
Part One canvasses some modern attempts to relate ethics and emotion. A cluster of 
scientific approaches to the relationship is compared to the more philosophical and 
cognitive approaches of Solomon and Nussbaum. Each set of approaches derives 
respectively from competing Kantian and Nietzschean legacies, but both sets are 
problematic. 
Part Two is a theological investigation, which examines ethics and emotion in Augustine, 
Aquinas, Calvin, and Kierkegaard. The theological approach discerned in these theologians 
is called a 'logic of love'. This multivalent term describes, firstly, the grounds of our ethical 
deliberations as subjects who love various moral goods. It also describes, secondly, a 
'theologic' of grace and command for the 'reordering' of love. 
For Augustine, our inalienable propensity to respond in love to the goods of creation is a 
constitutive element of our humanity. However, such love is disordered: some goods are 
sought voraciously, while others are ignored without concern. The reordering of the Holy 
Spirit brings enjoyment of God and of one another in God. Aquinas extends Augustine's 
account by extensively analysing the responses of love in a complex moral field. Calvin 
emphasises the problem of disordered love, and its consequences for thought. For 
Kierkegaard, the subjective nature of deliberative logic demands a fundamental shift in the 
affections. 
The theological investigation culminates in a theological theory of virtue. Drawing from the 
four theologians and from New Testament virtue lists, virtues are found to represent richly 
emotional and multifaceted responses to the complexities of reality. 
Part Three examines some social implications. The logic of love uncovers the distortions of 
the consumer economy, and a series of consequent distortions in ethical discussion. It also 
offers some directions for debate with liberal political philosophy. 
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Explanatory Notes 
The thesis is written as three Parts, which embrace Chapters and Sections. I will endeavour 
to summarise each at their beginning. 
Stylistic conventions follow the Chicago Manual of Style (Fourteenth Edition), which the 
University of London stipulates among its acceptable stylistic conventions. Some stylistic 
decisions might require further clarification: 
0 Where words and phrases in original quotations are emphasised, the emphasis is 
always original, and in the style used by that author (or their translator). Since no 
emphases have been added to quotations by this author, it was not thought 
necessary always to signal that emphasis is original. 
0 In quotations, closed ellipsis ( ... ) represents omissions made from the original by 
this author. Spaced ellipsis (. ) reflects ellipsis used as a stylistic device by the 
original author. (It is favoured particularly by Nietzsche. ) 
0 "Double quotation marks" are used to quote specific authors, while 'single 
quotation marks' are used for unusual terms. For consistency, this practise has been 
extended to block-quotes from other authors (regardless of their own practice), 
since block quotations in this work include a very large number of special terms, 
and comparatively few quotations from other authors. Thus it was judged best to 
reserve the single quotation for these frequent special terms, to enhance readability. 
(Quotations within a quotation appearing in the main text will of necessity employ 
single quotation marks. ) 
For many of the primary sources, a generally agreed first publication date is given 
in brackets after the title of the work in its first footnoted reference. Circa should 
always be understood. 
0 In the interests of readability, traditional Roman-Arabic references to Aelred's 
05'viritual Friendship, Aquinas' Summa, Calvin's Institutes (and to a lesser extent, P 
Augustine's Confessions and City of God), have generally been retained in the 
main text, while other references occur in footnotes. This was judged to aid 
readability in two ways. Firstly, general practice in theological literature seems to 
prefer in-text references for these works. Secondly, readers may appreciate the 
opportunity instantly to note the reference's relation to the architectonics of these 
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larger works. (This consideration is less relevant for other authors, where works 
consulted embody a wider corpus. ) 
* However, also to enhance readability, references to these works may occur in 
footnotes if details specific to some edition of the work are relevant, and/or because 
pagination seemed a more helpful referent than the traditional reference. (These 
two considerations were also relevant to Augustine's Confessions and City of God) 
Because of these factors, and given nature of this thesis, strict consistency (with all 
references either in footnotes, or in main text) was judged to be a liability. 
0 For consistency and readability, references for block quotations are by footnote, 
except as per the previous point. 
9 All biblical quotations are from the New Revised Standard Version. Abbreviations 
follow Chicago 14'h, as do both the retention of unabbreviated references in the 
main text and the restriction of abbreviations to parenthetical references. 
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Introduction 
(Tears in the kitchen. ) "Let's bandage it, and then I'll kiss it better. " 
(Oneftiend to another. ) "You make me so mad I could hit you"' 
(orperhaps instead. ) "Let's make love. " 
(At the market. ) "I must have it! How much do you want? " 
(In an office. ) "She'll pay-I'll destroy her. " 
A brief thought about some everyday scenarios quickly reveals how intricately intertwined 
are our actions and our emotions. 
In this introduction, I will make some observations about this intertwining, and will suggest 
that modern thought seems deeply unable to make it intelligible. I will then indicate how the 
three Parts of the thesis offer a more satisfactory theological account of the relationship 
between ethics and emotion. 
a) Ethics and emotion: some modern difficulties 
If it is obvious that our actions are intricately connected to our emotions, then it seems 
equally obvious that ethical reflection might straightforwardly assess the interaction 
between these actions and their associated emotions. Ethical reflection might seek to answer 
such questions as these: 
e Are emotions subject to moral evaluation? If so, how? 
e When should emotion help direct my action? 
Should action ever 'go against' an emotion? 
In acts highly charged with emotion, are agents always responsible? 
The recent renaissance of virtue- and character- oriented ethics warns us against a 
preoccupation merely with actions, and invites further considerations: 
9 Do 'virtues' and 'vices' involve emotional dispositions? 
0 Should certain emotions be cultivated? 
0 Can one's desire be shaped by oneself'? Can desire's emotional dimension so be shaped? 
To open up the relationship, a heuristic beginning may be to consider emotion loosely as 
'that which moves us'. This would surely provide a handy, if imprecise, starting point for 
ethical reflection: what should be our moral understanding of 'that which moves us'? When 
Page 11 
should we be so moved? When should we remain 'unmoved'? In framing the matter thus, 
the implicit connotation of emotion for ethics is made explicit-and by more than merely a 
play on the verb 'to move'. For 'emotion' and 'movement' flow together down the same 
river of Western thought. 
The Stoic Chrysippus understood that literal 'movements' of the soul inside the chest 
caused the tuggings and sensations associated with (what we would call) emotion. For 
Aquinas, passion reflected a kind of passivity in the soul, but also a kind of 'movement' as 
the soul drew toward humanity's true end. Movement is reflected in the etymology of the 
English word 'emotion'. In OED what begins as a "moving out" becomes a physical 
disturbance or agitation, and then "[a]ny agitation or disturbance of the mind ... any 
vehement or excited mental state". Of course this history is retained in the embedded 
'-motion'; ' and even if the emphasis is probably on 'motions' conceived as internal, only a 
hairsbreadth would seem to separate "I'm moved" from "I'm moved to action". We need 
not hold that all external or all internal movements are respectively causes or effects of the 
other; yet surely something like this is often the case. 
But although the general locus of enquiry would seem uncontroversially to lie within the 
broader ambit of ethics, the matter has not been at all straightforward for Westerners. For 
most people, questions such as the ones above are new and surprising (even if a surge of 
interest is now causing them to be asked more often). 
The legacy of a Kantian account' has been the widespread view that decisions to action 
should never be touched by emotion. Reciprocally, a parallel minority view held ethics only 
to consist in "extrascientific"I emotive utterance, conveying only attitudes of approval or 
disapproval. In the first kind of view, a rift lies between ethics and emotion; while in the 
second, the rift is between ethics and reason. Both views rely upon a basic fissure between 
reason and emotion, with this fissure grounding various pejorative terms that are deployed 
to render some ethical arguments suspect. 
Thus in popular parlance, an 'emotive' ethical argument is considered unsound by 
definition; just as arguments called 'rational isations' are allegedly driven by an 
'irrational'-that is emotional-impetus, which is to be unmasked and condemned. Both 
forms of pejorative would seem clearly to evidence the post-Kantian rift, where only 
' OED s. v. "emotion". OED etymology gives a Latin origin mediated via French, with 'movement' as a key historical 
component. 
See below, 46. 
Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), 2 1. See also below, 29. 
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ýreasonable' utterances are welcome. Concomitant to this negative account of emotion is a 
conception of their unruliness, the suspicion of which has ancient antecedents and a long 
lineage in Western thought. Decisions made about the mode and magnitude of this 
unruliness predicates optimism or pessimism about the possibility of 'emotional control' (or 
some related idea), so as to live with the 'rifts' on view. 
However, a recent and very different legacy, inaugurated by Nietzsche, also lays claim 
(somewhat subversively) to ancient antecedents. 4 It celebrates the 'unruliness' and even 
seeks to assert excellence as intrinsic to it. On this basis, negative accounts of emotion for 
ethics are challenged, so much so that a sea-change is currently in process against the older 
negativity. Accounts arising from this newer legacy seek to affirm the place of emotion in 
ethics and do not seek to close the rifts we have mentioned. Rather, they declare as fictive 
all and every conception of this landscape as being 'fissured' at all. 
Given this turbulent history, it has become very difficult for moderns to articulate the 
interconnections between emotion and ethics. Consider this example, in a journal grappling 
with the intersection of public policy, legal responsibility and anthropology. Sidney 
Callahan argues for (what we might call) a recursive relationship between (what he calls) 
the "tutoring roles" of reason and emotion. Callahan's summary will deserve further 
attention; but for now, what is of interest is the high level of complexity involved in joining 
these two realms for the sake of ethics: 
If one would decide wisely and well, the best strategy would include both 
trusting and skeptical awareness of all of one's capacities and reactions. An 
individual is far too complex and personal consciousness (and pre- 
consciousness) operates too instantaneously, for simple linear processing. It 
is essential to engage in fully extended, fully inclusive, circular, parallel 
processing of the dynamic interplays of consciousness. 
While I am assessing my reasoning and arguments by rational criteria, I 
should pay attention to emotions, even those fleeting negative feelings that 
may be most in danger of defensive suppression. In the same process my 
emotional responses are in turn being rationally and emotionally assessed for 
appropriateness, or for their infantile or qualitative characteristics. Deficits 
and numbness should also be considered. As rational argument proceeds I 
can seek to enrich the process with emotional intuitions and associations, 
imagined moral scenarios, and the testimony of the wise and good. Can these 
emotions become universal, can they produce good consequences, are these 
feelings consistent with my other best emotions? Communication about my 
feelings with others would be a further test. Certainly, I should also 
continually compare my rational arguments to the critical reasoning of 
reflective experts, as found, say, in analytic articles or ethical guidelines. 
New ideas, arguments, or emotions should be continually checked and 
mutually adjusted. ' 
' See below, 52. 
5 Sidney Callahan, 'The Role of Emotion in Ethical Decisionmaking, " Hastings Center Report 18 (1988): 13. 
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While there are elements of wisdom to this advice, what is most striking is the sheer 
complexity of the procedure. Is anyone really up to the task of "fully extended, fully 
inclusive, circular, parallel processing of the dynamic interplays of consciousness"9 Or is 
the problem simply that modem thought is cumbersome? Here is cause to fear that modem 
attempts to reunite thought, emotion and ethics might simply have run aground. 
b) A theological approach to ethics and emotion 
This thesis presents a theological approach to the relationship between ethics and emotion, 
and will hold the Kantian and Nietzschean legacies against the theological account. The two 
legacies will be reviewed in Part One, and the theological investigation will form the 
substantive body of the thesis, in Part Two. Part Three is much briefer, and will offer some 
social implications arising from the theological investigation. I will now summarise the 
course of the argument throughout these three Parts. 
Part One canvasses some modern attempts to relate ethics and emotion. Word-usage sheds 
no light upon the relationship of emotion to ethics, because definitions of 'emotion' are too 
broad to be useful, and 'passion' seems to span the moral spectrum. Scientific approaches to 
emotion offer little clarification to a definition of emotion, and are deleterious to the 
understanding of emotion insofar as they do not address human 'goals' or 'ends'. On the 
face of it, neither emotions nor ethics can be understood without some teleological 
conception; but the scientific accounts, and Kant from whom they derive, share an inability 
to relate emotions to telos and to ethics. Indeed, the way Kant signals his respect for some 
emotions serves to threaten his view that they have no place in ethics. 
By contrast, the philosophical and cognitive approaches to emotion of Robert C. Solomon 
and Martha C. Nussbaum, deriving from Nietzsche, are certainly more concerned with ends. 
Nietzsche celebrates various 'intoxicating' excellences that are intrinsic to emotion, and 
building upon Nietzsche's view, Solomon understands emotion as a means of constructing 
reality for the advancement of personal self esteem. Nietzsche represents to Nussbaum the 
culmination of an 'ascent' of love, by which she means a progressive improvement in 
historical understandings of love. Nietzsche's view of emotion allows untrammelled delight 
in the body and its various sensations. With Nietzsche, both thinkers regard Augustinian 
Christianity as fundamentally hostile to the body and its emotions. But unlike Nietzsche, 
whose celebration of emotion entails a caste society ranked by excellence without reference 
to justice, Solomon and Nussbaum prefer the justice of egalitarian societies and do not 
engage with this Nietzschean limitation. 
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Part Two develops a theological account of the relationship between emotion and ethics. In 
this account, the delighted 'intoxications' of emotion are embraced in a point of epistemic 
and ethical agreement with Nietzsche, since in the theological account, emotions are 
certainly required for knowledge and ethics. However Christian theology also retains Kant's 
commitment to justice, and finds the account of emotion in Nietzsche's chaotic 'system' to 
be lacking. The theological account effectively relates emotions to ethics, celebrates the 
centrality of emotion, and retains justice, so making it a more satisfactory account than that 
of the other two legacies. 
The theological account of emotion is called a 'logic of love', and the investigation of it 
proceeds by reference to Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, and Kierkegaard. The 'logic of love' 
is a multivalent term describing, firstly, the grounds of our ethical deliberations as subjects 
who love various moral goods. It also describes, secondly, a 'theologic' of grace and 
command for the 'reordering' of love. 
For Augustine, people are situated within an ordered ecology of interdependent goods, and 
humans are the kind of beings who respond to those goods with various desires, interests, 
cares, concerns and attractions that Augustine is content simply to call 'love'. Even though 
various 'aspects' to love can be identified (since the term covers many kinds of response to 
the plethora of goods that surround people), people's basic and inalienable propensity to 
respond in love to the goods of creation is a constitutive element to their being human. 
However, such love is disordered. Some goods are sought voraciously, to the exclusion of 
others that are ignored without concern. Augustine does not object to bodily appetites as 
such, and his conception of disorder is not a hatred of the body or of bodily life. The real 
problematic is the hegemonic expansion of various desires so as to exclude any contented 
love and any real enjoyment of others. In contrast, the divine gift of reordered love brings 
about a fitting appreciation of the various goods that surround us, and a loving enjoyment of 
human others. (Both postures are integral to Augustine's account of a restored and proper 
love for God. ) The reordering is an adventitious divine activity in which we are invited (by 
command) to participate. 
Aquinas brings detail to Augustine's account by extensively analysing the responses of love 
in a complex moral field. He shows that with love, certain structures can be discerned. Love 
refracts into a series of emotional responses that reflect the complex array of goods within 
moral order, and the responses are in complex recursive relationship with moral reasoning. 
Augustine had already said as much; but Aquinas tells more of the array of goods, the 
responses to them, and the relationship between these responses and moral reasoning. 
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For Thomas, each human is an array of parts and powers. Their 'will' operates as an 
amalgam of 'intellect' and 'appetite', and human will reaches for humanity's proper end by 
making intellectual assessments about that end whilst being affected by emotional responses 
to immediate circumstances. The emotional responses that affect the will reflect the 
complexity of the moral field, and can be ordinate or inordinate, depending upon their 
fittingness to humanity's true end. Therefore virtue necessarily becomes a central element 
in moral life. Virtues help people toward their true end, and each virtue is an amalgam of 
thought, habit and ordered passion. But if people are to become properly ordered to 
humanity's true end, virtue must itself be ordered by the divine Spirit and Word. 
Aquinas equips us better to see how moral reasoning can be misled in various ways by 
emotion, or can itself mislead emotion (through what Thomas calls certa malitia). Drawing 
upon my own experience, a painful personal example (where my emotions, thoughts and 
actions seemed viciously to run amok) is used to highlight the strengths and possible 
shortcomings of Aquinas' conception. 
Calvin responds to possible misreadings of Aquinas by emphasising the problem of 
disordered love. Calvin addresses a faithless unconcern towards God (Thomas's malitia) 
and its consequences for thought. His response reinforces Augustine's anti-Pelagian stance 
on the depths of human bondage to disordered love, and apropos my personal example, 
reminds me that I am claimed and loved by God even while I am deep within errors of 
thought, emotion and action. Calvin's response reiterates with Aquinas and Augustine the 
greatness of divinely reordered love. The restoration effected by God is fundamentally an 
affective reorientation, which entails a heartfelt enjoyment of God and of others. 
In different ways, Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin all understand that a chasm of sorts must 
be crossed. For Augustine, the voracious heart must finally rest in God. For Aquinas, 
malitia can only be overcome by the work of God. For Calvin, faithless unconcern must 
come under the claim of divine love. For each, only when this chasm is crossed can there be 
a proper consonance between emotion and ethics. 
While perhaps an unlikely theologian, Soren Kierkegaard explicates this chasm and its 
crossing. For Kierkegaard, movements of the affections are always central to moral 
deliberation. The subjective nature of deliberative logic demands a fundamental shift in the 
affections, from random passion and 'objectivity' to a primal affection toward God. In 
Kierkegaard's understanding, forms of so-called 'Christian emotion' resolve the unsatisfied 
yearnings of aesthetes, moralists and rigid religionists. Although his proposed 'Christian 
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emotions' are somewhat inadequate, the cumulative effect of his project counters 
Nietzschean objections to a moral theology of emotion 
The theological investigation suggests that a good account of affective deliberative logic 
can be embodied in a theological theor of virtue. Virtue theories deal with the habits and Y 
emotional dispositions of agents, and do not rate objectivity over subjectivity. A theological 
theory of virtue retains the best kinds of 'Christian emotion', while giving more detail for 
the task of deliberation. The logic of love brings unique elements to theological virtue 
theory as compared to other virtue theories. Drawing from the four theologians and from 
New Testament virtue lists, virtues are found to represent richly emotional and multifaceted 
responses to the complexities of reality, which assist action (rather than discerning moral 
order as such). Virtue terms give a descriptive language for the confluence of an agent, his 
or her affections, and the order of reality. This supple, varied, creative, and brief language 
simultaneously presents an act and a commensurate emotional posture in the heated 
moment of decision. Emotions and ethical commitments become intelligible alongside one 
another,, and various virtues emerge as the mind 'fuses' an emotion to an ethical 
commitment. But the possibility of so joining the virtue's components inheres already 
within the order of reality; and so the various virtues generated by a theological theory of 
virtue translate the logic of love into normative practises for individual s-certainly more 
accessibly than is Callahan's "fully extended, fully inclusive, circular, parallel processing of 
the dynamic interplays of consciousness". ' 
Part Three of the thesis considers implications of the logic of love for a modem polis. The 
consumer economy is a form of life by which moderns seek 'peace', but the logic of love 
uncovers how it serves a dubious end in a state of constant voracity. Consequently, a series 
of ethical discussions are distorted when the problems under consideration, and even the 
interpersonal relationships with which they are concerned, come to be construed as 
problems of consumption. The logic of love can recover aspects of the moral field that have 
been missed by this warped consciousness. 
After some brief suggestions for debates to be had with liberal political philosophy, the 
thesis ends when its findings are used to attempt an answer to the questions that commenced 
this introduction. 
See above, 13. 
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PART 1: 
DISCERNING THE PROBLEM 
In Chapter One, I will outline some scientific approaches to emotion, showing that these are 
not able to interpret emotion in any ethical sense. By way of a scientific thinker who admits 
this limitation (William Lyons), I proceed to two thinkers (Robert Solomon and Martha 
Nussbaum) who seek to surpass the limitation. For them, the operation of reason is threaded 
with emotion. Clear implications for ethics follow. In Chapter Two, I show that the 
scientific approaches to emotion, and that of Solomon and Nussbaum, are respectively 
traceable to a Kantian and a Nietzschean legacy. Chapter Two closes with the outline of a 
theological approach that actually has much in common with the Nietzschean legacy whilst 
retaining a key aspect of Kant. 
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Chapter 11: Approaches to Emotion 
In this chapter, I will use five subsections to show a range of modem views about emotion. 
These largely resolve into two broad movements that have implications and limitations for 
ethics. 
After showing in Section One how general definitions for 'emotion' and 'passion' embrace 
a wide range of meanings, I will then describe in Section Two some scientific approaches to 
emotion, especially in psychology, where a 'cognitive' approach seems promising. 
However, I will also to show that scientific accounts of emotion cannot be meaningfully 
connected to ethics, despite the attempt to do so in ethical emotivism. Rather, ethics seems 
necessary for a proper understanding of emotion. A 'broader canvas' is required, going 
beyond scientific terms of reference. One scientifically oriented thinker (William Lyons, in 
Section Three) implicitly admits this, since his account requires the concepts of 'telic order' 
and 'moral field' to succeed. 
In Sections Four and Five, I will introduce two other thinkers whose 'broader canvas' 
reintegrates reason and emotion. In Robert C. Solomon's project, emotion becomes morally 
ordered around 'self-esteem'. In Martha Nussbaum's 'ascent of love', a series of historical 
'discoveries' about love bring love into harmony with general social aims, making love 
basic to a 'universalist' ethic. Both thinkers single out Augustine for disagreement. 
We shall see in Chapter Two that the two broad movements represented in the preceding 
two paragraphs largely derive, respectively, from the competing legacies of Kant and 
Nietzsche. (The exception here is Lyons' theory, which has older antecedents. ) 
1. What is an emotion? 
I will begin here by showing that general definitions for 'emotion' and 'passion' embrace a 
wide range of meanings. 
Although ethics and emotion might seem straightforwardly interconnected, the matter is 
actually thoroughly controverted. We might at least hope to begin by answering an 
innocently simple question: what, actually, is an emotion? Kant warned about the 
inadvisability of basing moral law upon something as imprecise and subjective as feeling- 
and his view seems vindicated by the sheer volume and extraordinary range of twentieth- 
century attempts at a definition. 
Some argue that emotions are a kind of experience that is primarily 'feelingful', while 
for 
others they are a complex kind of judging-thought that 
is not a feeling; and a spectrum of 
views prevails between these poles. Given this 
imprecision, on one recent view 'emotion' is 
merely a false categorisation, an obsolete and 
inappropriate word for three quite different 
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domains. These three, roughly, are: autonomic bodily reflexes; strongly expressed personal 
concerns; and social performances. Calling all these 'emotion' is as false a grouping as the 
'superlunary objects' of ancient astronomy (where everything beyond the orbit of the moon 
was held to be of the same kind). ' 
The term 'passion' also confounds us by spanning the moral spectrum. The ten senses 
supplied by OED for 'passions' include "an eager outreaching of the mind towards 
something; an overmastering zeal or enthusiasm for a special object; a vehement 
predilection"! This would seem to describe what we have when our awe is inspired. But if 
ýpassion' is also "an outburst of anger or bad temper", then sometimes it is a form of 
unmitigated evil. Yet 'passion' can sometimes be used value-neutrally, to describe "[a]ny 
kind of feeling in which the mind is affected or moved; a vehement, commanding, or 
overpowering emotion"-which is simply a broad initial description of feelingful 
experience. None of these definitions enable us to settle whether or not 'passion' is a moral 
category. 
The difficulties of definition are summarised in Robert C. Solomon's introductory essay in 
the Handbook of Emotions, a collaborative volume responding to recent proliferation in the 
scientific study of emotions. Solomon is cautionary: 
It would be a mistake ... to put too much emphasis on the term 
'emotion', for 
its range and meaning have altered significantly over the years, due in part to 
changes in theories about emotion. So too, the word 'passion' has a long and 
varied history, and we should beware of the misleading assumption that there 
is a single, orderly, natural class of phenomena that is simply designated by 
different labels in different languages at different times. The language of 
'passion' and 'emotion' has a history in which various feelings, desires, 
sentiments, moods, attitudes and more explosive responses enter and from 
which they exit, depending not on arbitrary philosophical stipulation but on 
an extensive network of social, moral, cultural and psychological factors. ' 
2. Ethical limitations ofscientific definition 
I will describe in this section some scientific approaches to emotion, especially in 
psychology, where a 'cognitive' approach seems promising. I will also show how some 
scientific accounts of emotion fail to make a meaningful connection to ethics, despite the 
attempt to do so in ethical emotivism. Rather, an account of ethics seems necessary for a 
proper understanding of emotion. A 'broader canvas' is required, going beyond scientific 
terms of reference. 
' Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories (Chicago: 1997), 14-17 & 
passim. 
I OED s. v. "passiOn, '. The following quotations are meanings 10,7 and 
6a respectively. 
I Robert C. Solomon, "The Philosophy of Emotions, " in Handbook of Emotions: Second Edition, eds Michael Lewis 
and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, (New 
York; London: Guilford Press, 2000), 4. 
Page 20 
a) A brief comment on some scientific approaches 
The Handbook highlights the degree to which the study of emotion is strewn across the 
academy. Each contributor enunciates the intellectual space of their discipline for emotion 
theory, and one offers this helpful overview: 
[I]n primacy of interest, disciplinary seemliness, and volume of empirical 
work, psychologists 'own' the topic of emotions. Yet, given the scope, span, 
and ramifications of emotion phenomena, many other disciplines are also 
legitimately concerned with affective life. Physiologists link emotions to 
anatomical structures and processes; anthropologists tie emotions to 
particular cultural logics and practices; historians trace emotions of today to 
emotions of the past; ethologists seek what is phylogenetically given as well 
as distinctively human in emotions; and sociologists examine how emotions 
are triggered, interpreted, and expressed by virtue of human membership in 
groups. " 
A quick foray into the scientific quest for emotion (using the Handbook and some other 
sources") will repay us, by orienting us to some basic terms. We can then be more alert to 
the limitations of scientific 'emotion' for ethical enquiry. 
Neuroscientific approaches observe regions deep within the brain that are the major 
neurological substrate for emotional processes. For Joseph LeDoux, emotional responses 
represent a kind of whole-brain 'networking'; " while for Jaak Panksepp, there are certain 
domains, or 'natural kinds', of emotion that congregate around various parts of the brain. " 
These parts are "necessary albeit not sufficient neural substrates for distinct types of 
emotional processes. " 14 Their positions reflect a dispute over emotions as subsisting largely 
in neurologically localities (Panksepp), or largely in brain-wide systems (LeDoux). But 
Panksepp does not dispute the brain's massive interconnection, from which one implication 
is clear. 
Damage to the cortex only modulates the degree of emotionality, not the 
ability to have emotional feelings. In general, decorticate animals are just as 
emotional as, and perhaps more emotional than, normal ones. Clearly, what 
the cortex allows is ever more sophisticated ways for organisms to regulate 
their emotions-to extend and shorten emotional episodes in time, to focus 
" Theodore D. Kemper, "Social Models in the Explanation of Emotions, " in Handbook of Emotions: Second Edition, 
eds Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, (New York; London: Guilford Press, 
2000), 45. 
" Given the vastness of this literature, the other sources are necessary eclectic. Interested readers should note the 
extensive bibliography in each Handbook article. 
12 This material is summarised in Joseph E. LeDoux and Elizabeth A. Phelps, "Emotional 
Networks in the Brain, " in 
Handbook of Emotions: Second Edition, eds Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, 
(New York; London: 
Guilford Press, 2000); and at a more popular level, in Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter 
More Than I. Q. (London: Bloomsbury, 1996), 13-29; 297-300; 312-14; & 339 n. 7. 
13 Jaak Panksepp, "Emotions as Natural Kinds within the Mammalian Brain, " in Handbook of Emotions: Second 
Edition, eds Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, (New York; London: Guilford Press, 
2000). 
" Jaak Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience. - The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions (New York; Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), ix. 
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their emotional resources via leaming, and in humans to parse basic 
emotional concepts in increasingly sophisticated ways. " 
So, whatever is found out about the basic functioning of emotion (and however the dispute 
about neurological substrates is decided), the handling of emotion is returned to all who 
consider this "sophisticated" regulation and learning. This obviously includes all who have 
a functioning human brain, whether the non-specialist folk who navigate through life, or the 
philosophers, counsellors, psychologists or theologians who reflect further upon such 
things. Panksepp and LeDoux would not disagree-although for Panksepp, a robust debate 
is to be had against "ultrapositivistic" positions in neuroscience. 11 
The 'ownership' of emotion by psychology is better represented as a sprawling tussle that 
has continued for about a century among various competitors. Longstanding tensions 
between behavioural and cognitive approaches have generated a vast twentieth-century 
literature on emotion, with a range of disputes among proponents of the various views. This 
landscape is competently, if briefly, surveyed by William Lyons, " who places those 
twentieth-century approaches against an older backdrop. 
Lyons rightly observes the inestimable effect of Descartes upon modern psychology. "From 
the seventeenth century to roughly the end of the nineteenth century, the Cartesian theory 
was the orthodox theory. ",, While theologians criticise Descartes' strong soul-body dualism 
(since there are other ways to conceive of a soul), psychologists and philosophers" find 
against the private, 'mentalist' nature of Descartes' 'emotions', which are 'hidden' in an 
immaterial soul. 
William James sought to ring an important change upon Descartes, by shifting the locus of 
the emotion from the hiddeness of the soul, to the body's actual physiological disturbances. 
Lyons cites the "core" of James' theory (which, after being independently propounded 
by 
Carl Lange, came to be known as the James-Lange thesis): 
[B]odily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and ... 
ourfeeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion. Common-sense 
says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep ... The 
hypothesis here to be 
defended says ... that we 
feel sorry because we cry. " 
11 Panksepp, "Emotions, " 152. 
16 Ibid., 141 & 340, where he outlines the respects in which LeDoux agrees. 
" William Lyons, Emotion (Aldershot: Gregg Revivals, 1993; originally published Cambridge: 
Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), 1-52. 
" Ibid., 2. 
" Lyons cites Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1963), 13-16. 
Lyons, 13, citing William James (dated 1884). 
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It is only a short step to twentieth-century behaviourism, which was only interested in 
physiological changes, effectively forbidding reference to inner states (and thus not 
reckoning itself as Cartesian). The behaviourist interest exclusively in measuring 
physiological and behavioural responses reflected the positivist milieu, and behavioural 
psychology was at best agnostic, and at worst hostile, to the feelingful inner world of 'folk 
psychology'. 
However, behaviourism was unable satisfactorily to account for emotion in any sense. 
(Lyons recounts behaviourist J. B. Watson's "shiningly honest"" failure to do so. ) This 
absence of an account, and a trenchant resistance against consideration of inner mental 
events, gave rise to attempts to shift blame for the failure to 'emotion' itself. "The 
4emotions' are excellent examples of the fictional causes to which we commonly attribute 
behaviour", declared eminent behaviourist B. F. Skinner; " and "an attempt to define emotion 
is obviously misplaced and doomed to failure". " This unrealistic scepticism, and the 
extreme unreality, of behaviourist approaches to emotion, led in turn to a "cognitive 
revolution" in psychology. 24 
'Cognitive' theories of emotion have a very useful central feature that behaviourism could 
not offer, a feature best illustrated by a trivial example. Lately, my own life has involved 
much cycling, usually in the rain, covered in plastic clothing. When the run-off from my 
plastic trousers begins to soak my socks, I experience-what? Disgust? Annoyance? 
Anger? The actual name of the emotion, if helpful, is less important than the fact of it. What 
is easier follows: that I am one of these things, because my socks are wet, and at the 
prospect of a day's reading with damp feet. 
To speak about my emotions in this way is to understand the cognitions associated with 
them as integral to them, so generating a 'cognitive' theory of emotion. To speak of 
emotions as somehow being 'cognitive' may, or may not, be to smuggle 'rationality' 
into 
the centre of 'emotion', so displacing it, or feelingful elements of it. But it is at 
least simply 
to notice that very often, something about an 'emotion' is immediately and obviously 
'thinkable' and articulable. My emotion is certainly 'irrational' insofar as directed, say, 
against the plastic trousers (which are, after all, keeping everything else 
dry). But its focus 
21 Ibid., 19. 
" Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience, 9; citing B. F. Skinner (dated 1953). 
23 Ibid., 25 n. 14, citing behaviourist George Mandler. 
24 Ibid., 10. 
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upon the sock is completely 'rational' given the purpose of the sock, the good of the foot 
that wears it, and their relation to the day ahead for the owner of both. 
That all this happens in a moment in no way detracts from its rationality. As Lyons sees it, 
"a cognitive theory of emotion is one that makes some aspect of thought, usually a belief, 
central to the concept of emotion and, at least in some cognitive theories, essential to 
distinguishing the different emotions from one another. "" Critics point to difficulties in 
ascribing judgments to those who know their emotion to be 'irrational'-with, say, a phobia 
of insects, or an aggressive moment towards a wounding tin opener, or ongoing affection 
toward an abusive partner. 26 Nevertheless, the cognitivist claim that emotions often, or 
usually, have their own kind of logic is hard to refute. Again, as with the sock, the 
'irrational' moment toward the tin opener reflects a profoundly rational moment toward the 
thumb; phobias might sometimes concern what 'could happen'; and love for abusive 
partners might include (forlorn) hopes for what could be in a relationship. 
For Robert C. Roberts, "a family of views" hold in common that "an emotion is an 
intrinsically intentional mental state" (against James' nonintentional view) and that "an 
emotion's object is constitutive of the emotion". " Various nuanced descriptions emerge. 
Roberts describes emotions as "focused actualizations, episodic versions of ... prior 
dispositional concerns [or] perceptual instances of ... respective cares. 
"" They are, in his 
main catch-phrase, "concern-based construals". 19 
Of course, cognitive approaches can also be fallaciously reductive. "[W]hile emotions can 
be said to be unreasonable, unjustified or inappropriate, feelings cannot, therefore emotions 
are not feelings". 10 This "therefore" forgets that equally possibly, emotions could 
both 
incorporate and be more than feeling. Moreover-and in implicit agreement, oddly, with 
behaviourism-the claim simply begs the question of whether bodily feelings are a genus of 
which emotional feelings are species. The claim trades upon feelings that are not emotions 
(such as itchiness), to make a claim against those that might be (such as sadness). 
25 Lyons, 33. 
2' Rosalind Hursthouse, "Virtue Ethics and the Emotions, " in Virtue Ethics, ed. Daniel Statman, (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 109-10. Hursthouse names these as two critiques among many, and without 
necessarily agreeing with them. 
" Robert C. Roberts, "Emotions Among the Virtues of the Christian Life, "Journal of 
Religious Ethics 20 (1992): 48. 
28 Ibid., 39. 
21 Ibid., 48; based on Robert C. Roberts, -What an Emotion Is-a 
Sketch, " Philosophical Review 97 no. 2 (1988). 
30 Lyons, 8. 
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There is great variance among cognitive theories in the degree to which they admit 
emotions as 'feelingful'. The matter is a storm-centre of dispute. Claim and counter-claim 
over the nature of 'affect', over various 'feelings' qualified or disqualified as emotions, and 
over various judgments qualified or disqualified as feelingful, become difficult to track. (In 
this respect, the Cartesian legacy seems still to be with us. ) We will not deal directly with 
this debate, as trenchant rebuttals already exist against cognitive views where emotion is 
essentially feelingless. 11 I am largely persuaded by these. 
Emotions admit of a cognitive account, then. But clearly, discussion about cognitions is not 
restricted to the domain of psychology. We shall see Lyons and others open up this 
discussion. " Also, cognitive accounts are like a pre-Cartesian classical tradition; and a kind 
of cognitive account will emerge from our theological investigation in Part Two. 
Science, then, can help us understand various emotional phenomena. But there are 
fundamental differences in the interpretation of data, and scientists can tend to claim that 
their own field of study explains all of the others. This 'balkanisation' results from the 
complexity of the world-there are many ways to describe how things are. It derives also 
from a scientific insouciance toward any 'final cause' (which is to say, science is 
unconcerned about what things are finally for). Unconcern about final cause is an 
appropriate basis upon which to discover how things are, but can predispose pundits toward 
unwarranted assertions that nothing is finally for anything. The non-te leo logical nature of 
science makes scientific views of emotion particularly unhelpful to discover the relationship 
of emotion to ethics, since ethical concepts are intrinsically teleological. 
The next subsection will expand upon this 'balkanisation', and the following subsection will 
draw out the ethical implications of an abrogated telos. 
b) 'Balkanisation'among the sciences 
'Balkanisation' is reflected in the Handbook, which includes contributions from all the 
fields listed by Kemper.,, This scientific research-whether neuroscientific, psychological, 
or sociological-largely consists in observing others emote, and so the many perspectives 
of the Handbook include much that is intriguing and perceptive. However, given that the 
" David Pugmire, Rediscovering Emotion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 104 & passim; Michael 
Stocker, Valuing Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xvii, xix, 17f., 25f., & passim; cf. Justin 
Oakley, Morality and the Emotions (London: Routledge, 1992) for a thorough survey and a similar position. 
Stocker's mood is summed up in his quotation from anthropologist R. 
Shweder: "Three-year olds, Ifaluk islanders, 
and psychoanalysts (in other words, almost everyone, except perhaps the staunchest of positivists) recognize 
that 
emotions arefeelings. " (Stocker, 17-18. ) 
" See below, 31 ff. 
33 See quotation above, 21. 
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same basic phenomena are under review, severe interpretative dissonance among the 
various approaches remains hard for the onlooker to fathom. 
The irreducible core of Panksepp's position is that "basic emotions are 'natural kinds' that 
have specifiable neural substrates". 
34 But fundamental to Nico Frijda's psychology is that 
1115 "'[e]motion' is not a natural class. We wonder what the neuroscientists might make of 
this trenchant social constructivism: "Even the capacity of the mind to reflect and to 
rehearse alternative courses of action-that is, the ability to think-is socially given . 1131 But 
this hardly represents an alliance between psychologists and sociologists, else one 
contributor would not need to plead that there is "little to be gained ... in characterizing 
entire socioemotional systems as either individual or social (collective) in orientation. "" 
Similarly, data concerning facial expressions is bitterly contested. " Not only are they 
contested taxonomically (is each emotion 'discrete', or do they occur across a 
continuum? )-there is a more disturbingly basic disagreement over those who grimace. Do 
they do so over concerns unique to themselves and their communities, or over matters that 
can be regarded as generally intelligible? Into this discussion, cultural psychologists must 
insert that somehow, both are true. 19 
These fundamental disputes go beyond mere data collection and interpretation. Some 
deeper malaise is evidently at work. This condition strongly resembles that 
"[flragmentation" of the sciences that is, for Oliver O'Donovan, "the hallmark of scientific 
knowledge itself, which has become balkanized into a multitude of 'sciences' laying 
conflicting claims upon the same territory of experience. 9540 So for example Panksepp lays 
claim to the common territory of emotional experience when "a brain-systems analysis is 
finally providing a 'gold standard' for all other levels of theorizing. 
9541 It is "a missing piece 
" Panksepp, "Emotions, " 137. 
35 Nico H. Frijda, "The Psychologists' Point of View, " in Handbook of Emotions: Second Edition, eds Michael Lewis 
and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, (New York; London: Guilford Press, 2000), 59. 
Kemper, 45. 
Geoffrey M. White, "Representing Emotional Meaning: Category, Metaphor, Schema, Discourse, " in Handbook of 
Emotions: Second Edition, eds Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, (New York; London: Guilford 
Press, 2000), 43. 
3' Dacher Keltner and Paul Ekman, "Facial Expression of Emotion, " in Handbook of Emotions: 
Second Edition, eds 
Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, (New York; London: Guilford Press, 2000). 
" Richard A. Shweder and Jonathan Haidt, "The Cultural Psychology of the Emotions: Ancient and New, " 
in 
Handbook of Emotions: Second Edition, eds Michael Lewis and Jeannette 
M. Haviland-Jones, (New York; London: 
Guilford Press, 2000), 399-402. 
40 Oliver M. T. O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Leicester: 
Apollos, 
1994), 50. 
41 Panksepp, "Emotions, " 47. 
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that can bring ... together" the disciplines of ethology, behaviourism, cognitive science, 
4 
-2 sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, clinical psychology, psychiatry, and philosophy. 
His 'affective neuroscience' is a "cornerstone" to "heal and solidify psychology as a unified 
discipline. 1'543 
Panksepp is quite interested in interdisciplinary co-operation. But when science is 
'balkanized' in this way, there follows within each science the supposition "that the key 
which it carries ... will fit every door". " O'Donovan is dubious toward such 
hegemonic 
claims, and the various hegemonic disputes of the Handbook arm us with ample reason to 
agree with him. We will do well to note his explanation for the malaise. 
The logic of science requires the provisional disuse of traditional teleology, to help goad 
thought toward the perception of new generic relations. Science then proceeds by its 
discernment of various patterns within the universe's generic order. Such is the complexity 
of this order that various helpful descriptions of it are conveyed through the various 
scientific disciplines. " Thus in psychology, for example, 'emotion' begins as an 
uncontroversial descriptive tool-a marker for some behaviours and experiences, described 
apart from teleology. 
But in modern science, the provisional disuse of traditional teleology often hardens into an 
ontological denial of all teleological order. This becomes the Achilles' heel for its final 
claim to truth, for "[k]nowledge of the world without ends can never become unified 
knowledge. "46 And since no discussion of ethics can avoid a conception of ends, we can 
now comprehend the striking absence of any sustained ethical reflection in the Handbook of 
Emotions. 
c) Ethical implications of abrogated telos 
It is obvious to many of the Handbook's contributors that ethics is somehow related to 
emotion. "The moral work done by emotion language is reflected in the preponderance of 
negative terms in emotion lexicons across cultures. 
9947 But despite the recurrence in many 
papers of terms such as lust, jealousy, guilt, shame, and contempt, little effort 
is made to 
11 Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience, 5. 
43 Ibid., 10. 
44 O'Donovan, 50, quoting Karl Rahner. 
45 Ibid., 49. 
46 Ibid., 50. 
47 White, 40. 
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unravel the nature of this moral 'work'. Primafacie, this would seem to evidence generic 
relations run amok. After rescuing emotion from its effluvial status, ethics becomes the 
unsayable detritus instead. When science insists that emotion (like everything else) is 
ontologically non-te leo logical, the scientific account of emotion cannot meaningfully be 
joined to ethics. Having begun by suspecting the importance of emotion for a proper 
understanding of ethics, we now begin to suspect the importance of ethics for a proper 
understanding of emotion. 
These difficulties should remind us of MacIntyre's apocalyptic vision of ethics itself, where 
our reflections occur within the chaotic ruin of moral visions long since abandoned. 48 In this 
bleak view, piecemeal appropriations from systems that made sense in their time now 
contradict other such borrowings, although reasons for each contradiction seem opaque. For 
Maclntyre, 
the abandonment of any notion of a telos leaves behind a moral scheme 
composed of two remaining elements whose relationship becomes quite 
unclear. There is on the one hand a certain content for morality: a set of 
injunctions deprived of their teleological context. There is on the other hand a 
certain view of untutored-human-nature-as-it-is. 11 
50 MacIntyre seeks to reinstate such a telos, so that evaluative claims can function again as a 
particular type of factual claim .51 For MacIntyre, overtly teleological evaluative claims 
make plausible the justification of particular policies, actions and judgments, and build 
toward a moral theory and practise that includes 'objective' standards. But within the 
theoretical vacuum of lost telos, ethics can only be secured by ethical emotivism. 
Historically, emotivist theories are a last resort, when no other basis can be agreed upon, 
and where the emotional component is a residual reminder of older, teleologically oriented 
evaluations . 51 The appearance of emotivist theories represents a malfunction 
in the nature of 
evaluation itself, an unravelling of 'evaluation'per se, so that it becomes possible to see it 
as a project either emotive or ratiocinative. 
As this thesis proceeds, we shall see how an 'evaluation' was once constituted as much by 
its affective tones as by its rational overtones. The post-enlightenment split between fact 
and value will prove largely to consist in the distillation of something called 'emotion' from 
" Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 1-22 & passim. 
49 Ibid., 55. 
51 Ibid., 127,158,184 & passim. This first attempt is along Aristotelian lines, in response to Miss Anscombe's 
challenge; but Macintyre will later argue for an overtly Thomist telos. (See below, 244-246. ) 
" Ibid., 77. 
52 Ibid., 18-19. A similar conclusion is drawn elsewhere concerning the situation in which eighteenth century moral 
sense theorists found themselves. (See Paul McReynolds on 
Hutcheson, below, 49. ) 
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something called 'reason'. Science, once the junior partner in this unravelling, has now 
become the enforcer. For it will admit of no ends for emotion. 
d) The needfor a broader canvas 
It is interesting to see just how ambitious is Charles Stevenson's emotivism, which 
attempted to account for ethics within the bounds of scientific epistemology. Contra 
caricature, he does not deride ethics or emotion: both are highly valued, and he strains to 
retain both from within the strange givens of the positivist self. This much is to his credit. 
But his strategy and suppositions are deeply wanting. Ethics and emotion are hermetically 
sealed off from 'beliefs' or 'cognitions', in a kind of capsule called 'attitude', where 
4approval' or "disapproval' happens. (Stevenson would not endorse my 'capsule' metaphor, 
since we are asked not to hypostasise what is meant only as a theory of language use. ) 
However, what begins as a straightforward difference (between belief and attitude) becomes 
a highly complicated clinch. When beliefs about facts impinge upon attitude, a kind of 
miracle happens: approvals change. (I say 'miracle' because unfortunately, 'cognition' and 
'attitude' admit of no real definition other than by usage, which Stevenson acknowledges is 
44not an agreeable admission". " They are related tentatively by "continual interplay" , 54 
where beliefs are somehow "intermediarieS"51 between one attitude and another. "But 
56 however this may be, we must forego any further analysis of this type". ) The legitimate 
work of normative moral philosophy is exhaustively to offer ever radiating networks of 
causality, drawn in detail from every science, to affect attitudes toward "focal aims", " even 
though after this "formidable" task, 51 "[a]greement in attitude may not arise, even 
if 
1151 
agreement in belief is secured. 
Of course the mistake was to leave the positivist self unquestioned: the overall 
impression is 
of a project doomed by the lack of necessary resources. By the final paragraph of 
Ethics and 
Language, the major premise lies undone. "The demand for a final proof springs less 
from 
5 60 hopes than from fears" the paragraph begins, alluding to a prior comment about the 
53 Stevenson, 67. 
54 Ibid., 71. 
5' Ibid., 115. 
56 Ibid. 
" Ibid., 329-30. 
" Ibid., 329. 
Ibid., 332. 
60 Ibid., 336, as for quotations following. 
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ýconsolations' of deontology. "When the basic nature of a subject is poorly understood, one 
must conceal his insecurity, from himself as much as from others, by consoling pretenses. " 
But this is to admit, both in the 'poor understanding' and the 'consoling pretences', of a 
cognitive strand to emotion-precisely the kind of thing has been hen-netically sealed out of 
the 'capsule' of emotive approval. Whatever purpose has been served in the distinction 
between a belief and an attitude is now entirely overthrown, if it hasn't been already by the 
inseparable clinch between giving reasons and persuading. The best account all along has 
been that emotions and reasons are deeply intertwined. "There need be only that temper of 
mind which, abiding firmly by the conclusions that seem at the time most trustworthy, is 
still sensitive to the fact that living questions are too rich in their complexity to be answered 
by a formula. " This final sentence of Ethics and Language would seem to exemplify 
precisely the inability to refrain from unwarranted conclusions that, for Charles Taylor, 
typifies modern 'ethics of inarticulacy' which hide their fundamental goods. 61 We certainly 
need some kind of broader canvas, some wider terms of reference than science is usually 
prepared to allow. 
The editors of the Handbook are somewhat aware of this, given their inclusion of 
philosophy, historical emotionology and cultural-psychology among the other largely 
scientific approaches. But to what kind of 'non-scientific' approaches should something like 
the Handbook attend? A debate could be had with them here. The editors do go beyond the 
bounds of science, but they privilege a few particular complementary approaches over other 
non-scientific accounts, and then underprivilege their whole class of account by making 
these alternative accounts to be so few. 
What follows in this thesis could be thought of as a reply to their restraint. In this chapter, 
we shall go on to examine three thinkers-William Lyons, Robert C. Solomon, and Martha 
C. Nussbaum-who include more in their accounts of emotion than scientific terms of 
reference allow. The first will insist that a scientist's data on emotion can make no sense 
apart from the subject's report of their evaluations; the second contrasts the scientist's 
concern over the "technology of experience"62 with his own interest in the 
"politics of 
experience"; and the third looks to a hybridised Aristotelian-Nietzschean account of 
love to 
sustain ethics. These are spokespersons for a more 'unified theory' of emotion-one which 
takes seriously the fragmentation we have seen, and which seeks to mend 
it with some 
" Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self. - The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 
1989), 84 & 53-90 passim. 
62 Robert C. Solomon, The Passions. - Emotions and the Meaning of Life (Second Edition) (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 
1993), 125; see below, 36. 
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decisions in favour of a kind of telos. These accounts will lead inexorably into ethical 
terrain, sometimes intentionally, sometimes unwittingly 
3. Lyon's 'causal-evaluations' 
We have seen the need for a broader canvas than science supplies. I will now show that 
William Lyons, a scientifically oriented thinker, would agree, since he is able to take 
seriously the way that evaluations are central to emotions, and emotions help to cause 
behaviours. The implication of this is, again, that ethical understanding is required for 
proper emotional understanding. Lyons also realises that his theory cannot explain 
everything he sees. 
After outlining the 'classic' theories of psychology, Lyons offers his own "causal- 
evaluative" theory of emotion. 63 It is of considerable interest for ethics, and represents a 
significant departure from the disputes of psychology, though remaining firmly in that fold. 
He expounds the view in a series of six propositions (where the second is easily the most 
central). Their painstaking manner is necessitated by the sometimes strange views with 
which he is in dialogue. The propositions are as follows: 
Specific occurrences of emotion are the paradigmatic unit of consideration (rather than 
emotions as dispositionally considered). Dispositions are logically founded upon 
whatever we make of these specific occurrences. 
2. These occurrences involve an evaluation that brings about significant physiological 
change. (Although he calls these changes "abnormal", he means by this "unusua 
15ý64 or 
'out of the ordinary'. ) These two facets of an emotion are necessarily constitutive to it; 
and the evaluations usually have a 'personal twist'-that is, they relate specifically to 
the person doing the evaluating. That an evaluation is involved delineates emotional 
experiences ftom other physiological experiences. That a physiological change is 
involved delineates emotional thoughtftom otherforms of thought. 65 
63 Lyons, 52-69. 
64 Ibid., 60. 
65 Perhaps we should clarify that the 'physiological change' might only be 'measurable' to the person concerned, 
even if not to the psychologist or onlooker, and that such ýmeasurements' are a part of what people report 
as their 
'feelings'. We can agree with at least this aspect of the James-Lange thesis: that when people register certain 
physiological changes within themselves, they know these 'feelings' to constitute some aspect of 
their 'emotions'. 
Obviously, only a (behavioural) psychologist's hubris would require that psychologists must also register 
them before 
they are bona-fide. But against James-Lange, people are not 
fooled into thinking they have an emotion on the basis of 
these feelings; rather, they causally correlate these feelings with given emotions. 
This is not to deny that people 
sometimes self-deceive or are emotionally unaware. 
(Cf. ibid., 115-155. ) 
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3. It is by their different evaluative aspects that different emotions are discerned. That is, 
while a similar set of physiological (and even behavioural) changes might seem to be 
involved, these might relate to quite different emotions, depending on whatever 
evaluations the person is making at that time. His refreshingly clear illustration is worth 
quoting at length: 
Let me show that it does work, that the evaluative factor does differentiate 
the emotions, by means of an example. I am standing talking with a man at a 
party when a third person, a woman, joins us. The man gets edgy, shifts from 
foot to foot, fidgets with his glass ... and is suddenly much brusquer in 
manner and tone of voice. He doesn't reveal in his conversation or expression 
what is upsetting him, except that it is associated with the woman's suddenly 
joining us. It could be that he hates the woman, or is in love with her, or is 
angry with her, or afraid of her, or embarrassed. I cannot tell what emotion he 
is undergoing till I work out how he sees, that is, evaluates, the situation. If, 
afterwards, I learn that she was his ex- wife, I'm still not much the wiser. But 
if I learn that he believes that she betrayed him to the Gestapo during the war, 
I would be fairly safe in assuming that he probably despises her utterly and so 
his emotion is hate. If I learn, on the other hand, that he believed that she was 
going to reveal that he had stolen the silver, then his emotion was most 
probably fear because he probably believed that he would be publicly 
shamed. If I learn, however, that she has just rejected his offer of marriage, 
then I would guess that his emotion was embarrassment, as he probably 
considered the situation to be very awkward. 
The point is that, to work out what emotion is in question, I seek clues as to 
what is this person's view of the situation, that is, how he evaluates it. 
Behaviour, facial expressions, gestures, words, the interplay of persons in a 
group, may all function as clues to differentiating the emotions, yet they are 
not themselves the differentiator. They are clues to how the subject of an 
emotion evaluates his situation, and this is the differentiator proper. When we 
jump straight from observing behaviour or gestures or facial expressions to 
concluding that such and such an emotion is in question, it can only be 
because the behaviour or gesture or expression is typically the 
manifestation-the deliberate sign or ... symptom-of some evaluative 
attitude. " 
4. Some (but not all) emotional states may be constituted by certain desires along with the 
evaluation and physiological state. It does not follow from this that these emotions 
should be given over to behaviourism, as if the person who felt fear but acted bravely is 
therefore to be considered unafraid. 
5. The central evaluative aspect brings about emotional behaviour through a rational, and 
causal, link with desire. Behaviour arises, rationally and causally, from the evaluative 
aspect via desire . 61 That 
is, while feelings do not of themselves provide good reasons for 
action, evaluations do. Desires pursuant to evaluations will then promote various 
behaviours. Thus responses to three different 'fear' situations--of dogs, of getting fat, 
of being found out-are handled well by a causal-evaluative theory: I will erect a 
fence, 
" Lyons, 62-63. 
67 Ibid., 92-98. 
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or stop eating, or go to America due to differing evaluative and appetitive aspects of my 
'fear', as required by the different circumstances. Against this, behaviourist theories 
could make no sense of the very different behaviours that arise from 'fear'. 
6. By making evaluations central in this way, it does not follow that emotions are 
intangible and non-objective. Lyons hopes this point can be defended (again against 
behaviourism, it seems) by the kind of neuroscientific study that observes emotional 
activity in the working brain. (This field of study was unavailable to him at his time of 
writing. ) 
Qualifications in the fourth and sixth propositions reflect the degree to which behaviourist 
readers needed assistance. His first stipulation deflects debate over where an 'emotioný 
might merge into a 'mood'. Likewise, he is interested to assert that emotions are essentially 
feelingful, but without becoming bogged down in boring debates over feeling. The sixth 
point, although difficult, gives prominence to desire while rendering it intelligible within 
the wider context of evaluation toward ends. 
As we shall see, the entire theory bears strong resemblance to that of Aquinas (with whom 
Lyons is sympathetically familiar, though understanding his own theory to differ in key 
aspects). But as interesting as his six propositions are, there are points where Lyons 
withholds comment, as is appropriate when the logic is inductively empirical. 
Why ... should one ever suggest that an evaluation 
is the cause of the 
physiological change? ... It 
is quite simply a matter of the evaluation being 
the best claimant in the circumstances for being the cause of the observed 
physiological effects. 
I do not think it is a weakness ... that I cannot give an account of 
how an 
evaluation can cause physiological changes. " 
The price Lyons is willing to pay toward his causal-evaluative theory, is the implicit 
inclusion of telos-embedded in his notion of evaluation. Consider also this interesting, 
tantalising qualification: 
Considered epistemologically, evaluations are not really cognitive at all. 
Etymologically, 'cognitive', from Latin cognoscere, implies perception, 
knowledge or, in general, becoming acquainted with. But to evaluate is not to 
gain knowledge but to relate something already known or perceived to some 
rating scale. In the context of certain emotions, such as love, for example, this 
scale seems to be of a very personal and subjective sort, for what is 
loveable 
is very much in the eye or mind of the lover. With other emotions, such as 
fear, the scale will turn out to be reasonably objective, for what is rated as 
dangerous is more or less what it is or has been shown to be in the past. Yet 
even here the rating of the perceived situation as dangerous is 
done with a 
personal twist. The situation is seen in relation to me, as primarily one which 
is threatening to me (or those close to me), where I am the final arbiter of 
68 Ibid., 61-62. 
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whether it is really threatening or not. Hence a good proportion of fears are 
rated by others as phobias. " 
In the climate of current literature, his straightforward and conversational style will seem 
unguarded. "Rating scale", "subjective", "objective", "close to me" will elicit a groan from 
whoever prejudges ethics as beyond fit terms of reference. But Lyons has penetrated to 
something of great significance, which lends his theory explanatory force: that emotional 
evaluations are not merely in the business of seizing upon various particulars or specific 
objects-rather, intrinsic to them is a matter of discerning the relationships between things. 
The ethical task is, in part, about looking upon a sprawling 'moral field' constituted by 
various relationships, somehow to discern how to act among those relationships. If 
emotions are to be understood along lines at all similar to Lyons' causal -evaluative theory, 
then they are at the very heart of such an ethical task. This in turn coheres with the 
irreducibly ethical nature of such terms as "rating scale", "close to me" and 'evaluation'. 
(Such a 'moral field' is integral to the thesis of O'Donovan's Resurrection. The moral field 
is real and we are each situated in it both as an agent and as a constitutive element. The field 
is a unified set of pluralities, thus 'pluriform'; and the resurrection of Jesus Christ is the 
paramount Christian distinctive in the epistemology of discernment. I will utilise this 
concept frequently. ) 
What we have, then, is a theory of emotion, which emphasises an agent's telos and her 
engagement in a moral field. The theory also has an overt break in continuity. Lyons knows 
what he sees in emotion, and knows what he cannot explain there. But this does not 
discredit what he thinks he sees. 
4. Solomon"s 'politics of experience' 
In this section, I will examine Robert C. Solomon's account of emotion, where each 
emotion is a 'constitutive judgment'. His account seeks to defend subjectivity, 
by mending 
what he takes to be a vice in Western thought: the rift between reason and emotion. 
I will 
show how this account morally orders emotion around whatever is required 
for an agent's 
'self esteem', and that a tension exists between this ordering and Solomon's 
interest in 
'intersubjectivity' between people. Augustine is singled out for disagreement(s), as an 
exponent of a Christian account. 
Our tentative proposal above to construe emotion as 'that which moves us"o came 
from 
Solomon, who uses 'passion' as a "generic term to cover the entire range of those 
69 Ibid., 59-60. 
10 See above, II- 
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phenomena (a neutral word for the moment) that may be said to 'move' us. "" Central to 
Solomon's career-long philosophical interest in emotion is his sustained and forceful 
attempt to reintegrate 'passion' and 'reason'. The recent re-release of his main work on 
emotion reaffirms a thesis first presented three decades ago., ' 
"It is the web of our emotions that defines human subjectivity. "73 Solomon seeks "to return 
to the passions the central and defining roles in our lives that they have so long and 
persistently been denied, " and also seeks "to limit the pretensions of 'objectivity' and self- 
demeaning reason which have exclusively ruled Western philosophy, religion, and science 
since the days of Socrates . 
9974 On his view, ratiocination is the approved thought-form of 
Western philosophy, lauding reason as antithetical to passion's 'brutality'. But this demeans 
the self, for passions "are not those primitive ragamuffins and the refuse of our psychic life 
that Western rationalism has always warned us against with thinly veiled repulsion; they are 
the high court of consciousness, to which all else, even reason, must pay tribute. 5575 
Emotions are 'intentional', and each emotion essentially has a logical connection with its 
object, which is something in the world "experienced through our concerns and values". 
76 
The object as conceived by the emotion has no existence apart from the emotion, just as an 
77 
emotion is inseparable from its object. Thus emotions are "the defining structures of our 
existence ... identical to the 
intellectual structures . "71 He argues 
for "a kind of 'hardheaded 
Romanticism "579-a new, "rational Romanticism" where emotions are themselves "the 
source of most of our values", and "are responsible for" reality (rather than a source of its 
distortion). On this view an emotion cannot be said to be resultant upon a judgment; rather, 
it is the judgment. 10 These judgments are self-involved, relatively intense evaluations of the 
" Solomon, Passions, 68. 'Passion' includes emotions, moods, and desires (70). 
72 Ibid., passim. 
73 Ibid., 71. 
74 Ibid., xiv. 
75 Ibid., xvii. 
76 Ibid., 116. 
77 Ibid., 118. 
" Ibid., 5. 
79 Ibid., xxi. 
Ibid., 126-7. Some evaluative judgments are not necessarily emotions. Solomon offers arbitration as an example. 
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personal significance of their object. "An emotion is a (set of) judgment(s) which constitute 
our world, our surreality". 11 
Solomon is unsurprised if his account sounds odd to Westerners, since they are steeped in a 
'Myth of the Passions'. The myth entails a false antithesis, where reason and emotion are in 
conflict, with reason controlling a horde of suspect emotions. Solomon sets his face against 
almost all Western thought, since the 'myth' is evident in a startlingly long list of Western 
thinkers. (He is especially unimpressed by Kant. )" Psychological sciences are also 
compromised by their adherence to this 'myth'; " and even neurological accounts become 
suspect when neurological causes of an emotion are used to constitute an ethical "excuse 
system" (since on Solomon's view, emotions themselves attract praise or blame). 84 
Solomon believes his defence of subjectivity to be a different interest than that pursued by 
neurobiologists and psychologists: 
One might say that their interest, not ours, is the 'technology of the 
experience, ' the discovery of techniques and instruments to alter our 
consciousness 'from the outside. ' As a philosopher, however, I am only 
interested in what R. D. Laing has called the 'politics of experience, ' 
changing oneself from within. The strategies of politics and ideology are 
persuasion, changing the object of passion rather than the cause. ... 
[I]t is 
only self-overcoming that interests me here. ... 
[T]o change oneself is to 
grow. 85 
And this is the key point for what follows. Solomon believes his new understanding makes 
it possible to work toward personal change. In this 'politics of experience', Solomon 
outlines an ethical vision. 
Since reason and passion constitute the world, passions can in themselves be morally sound 
or unsound; and they can be altered. "The unexamined passion may not be worth having; a 
passion examined must earn its place in our personality. "86 Solomon repeatedly opposes 
conceptions of emotion that place emotions beyond the range of each agent's 
responsibilities. 87 Rather, he finds the intricate relationship between emotion and ethics to 
be 
" Ibid., 126. 
" Ibid., 10; cf ibid., II- 12, for a useful 'manifesto' of Solomon's view. 
" Ibid., 91-97. 
84 Ibid., 94. 
" Ibid., 125. 
86 Ibid., 8& passim. 
17 Ibid., 87; cf 25,94,109. 
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perfectly obvious. We should ask of an emotion "not 'What causes me to feel thisT but 
always 'What reason do I have for doing thisT 
ý388 
Our emotions are not only projections; they are our projects. They are not 
only directed towards intentional objects; they are laden with intentions to 
act. Emotions are concerned not only with 'the way the world is' but with the 
way it ought to be. Every emotion, in other words, is also a personal 
ideology, a projection into the future, and a system of hopes and desires, 
expectations and commitments, intentions and strategies for changing our 
world. " 
Even social ethics might feel the impact, were Solomon's account widely accepted: 
It is not capitalism that teaches greed and alienation; it is our greedy and 
alienated conceptions of ourselves that lay the foundation for capitalist 
ideology. We must change ourselves before we change society; and we must 
understand ourselves in order to change. " 
Thus 'the meaning of life', which is found in "the supposedly subphilosophical swamps of 
our passions", 91 naturally involves other people. "[T]he passions are precisely those 
structures which commit us and bind us to other people" for "nearly all ... of our emotions 
essentially include other people, not only as their objects but as a contributing source of 
their values and as shared subjects in what is called intersubjectivity. "91 
At first, it would seem that this is what makes Solomon's account significant for ethics. The 
passions are not regarded as antisocial, selfish or self-indulgent as such; 91 however, they can 
be 'childish' and so morally culpable, and are the result of specific choice by the subject. 
"Reason makes contact with human values only through the passions. "94 In Solomon's 
'rational Romanticism', responsibility of each agent for her own passions is heavily 
emphasised, and 'wisdom' becomes "a matter of living both thoughtfully and 
passionate ly". 15 
But his seemingly odd examples of thoughtful, passionate living include the drunkenness of 
Socrates, T. E. Lawrence's "self-inflicted hardship and torture", and Goethe's promiscuity. 
Such lives are straightforwardly exemplary for him, with no oddness, since reason's task 
is 
" Ibid., 108-9. 
'9 Ibid., 153. 
9' Ibid., 9. 
" Ibid., 24. 
92 Ibid., 20. 
9' Ibid. 
94 Ibid., 58. 
95 Ibid., 65, including next two quotations. 
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"nothing other than the selection and encouragement of what Nietzsche called the 'life- 
enhancing passions'-the maximization of personal dignity and self-esteem. " 
For a philosopher, this "nothing other" surely deserves closer attention. But the equation of 
'life-enhancing' with 'personal dignity and self-esteem' is of greater interest here. After this 
sudden appearance, 'self-esteem' repeatedly reappears as the ordering principal. This 
unsubstantiated assertion,, and the meaning of the term itself, also deserve closer scrutiny 
than he gives. But we can still be more pointed: if Solomon orders the usefulness of a 
passion around this maxim, it remains to be seen how it is exemplified in drunkenness, self- 
'torture' and promiscuity, and how the easy use of 'life-enhancing' applies to them. 
In addition. ) the pro-social ethical tone 
is now displaced, and a tension exists between two 
ordering principles for emotion. Self-esteem ethically orders emotion; yet at the same time, 
emotions reflect an intersubjectivity between persons. The tension is evident elsewhere. 
"[T]he Self is an essential pole of emotional judgment, the standpoint from which our 
judgments of the world and other people begin"-so most emotions both involve other 
people, and evaluate a relationship . 96 Yet his next sentence repeats the self-esteem principle: 
The ultimate object of our emotional judgment is always our own sense of 
personal dignity and self-esteem. Whatever its particular project and strategy, 
whether it is committed to collecting butterflies or to ruling Asia, an emotion 
is ultimately concerned with personal status, self-respect, and one's place in 
his or her world. Insofar as an emotion is 'about' another person, as in love or 
hate, anger or pity, it is the constitution of an intersubjective identity, a 
relationship of one sort or another, perhaps competition or comparison, 
within which one attempts to elevate his self-esteem. " 
Again, there are unsubstantiated assertions here worth questioning. But more important is 
that Solomon has moved from an obvious and largely epistemological point-that "the Self 
is an essential pole of emotional judgment"-to a moral ordering of emotion based upon 
the same point. At a stroke, Solomon's interesting and insightful "subjective theory of the 
emotions" becomes an egoistic, if not a solipsistic, morality of emotion. Despite 
Solomon's 
explicit denial of solipsism, 91 his uncritical acceptance of Oscar Wilde's 
"[a]nything worth 
doing is worth doing to excess"99 points to such a trend. 'Reality' is only 
discussed in two 
aspects: firstly, insofar as it impinges upon the agent's internal 'Surreality'-an 
inner world 
mediated by cons itutive ly-j udgi ng emotions; and secondly, insofar as emotionally 
derived 
intentions commit the agent to courses of action that alter 'Reality' 
(and thus the agent's 
" Ibid., 128-9. 
9' Ibid., 129. 
" Ibid., 135. 
9' Ibid., 66. 
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own 'Surreality'). We are left to ourselves in determining ethical implications of 
intersubjectivity. 
Given this tension between self-esteem and intersubjectivity, and given also the trend to 
order emotion egoistically, it therefore becomes quite unclear which emotions an agent 
should settle on, let alone what criteria of judgment should be employed to settle upon 
them. In bewilderment, we might ask-whence cometh order? Indeed, how might we ever 
fight free from any mass-consciousness we are immersed in? Solomon sermonises upon 
this: 
The fact that our emotional surrealities are so tediously similar and often 
degrading and our projections so uniformly defensive speaks to the fact that 
we have, because of the reflective myths (in the derogatory sense) in which 
our emotions have been couched, taken poor advantage of our most powerful 
and most personal instruments for making our lives meaningful-our 
emotions. "' 
Pelagius held that the laws of God are enough straightforwardly to guide us into good 
behaviour. It seems that for Solomon, the emotions can do this. Our emotions can 
themselves surmount any false mass-consciousness in which those same emotions "have 
been couched". What began as a promising and insightful analysis certainly seems to be 
wallowing. 
Throughout his work, Nietzsche is the only Western thinker in whom Solomon finds a 
satisfying relation between passion and reason. Warmly quoting Nietzsche throughout, he 
finds shafts of insight in that thinker's iconoclastic, passionate polemic against the 
diminution of passion. Nietzsche's passions are variegated: some are 'life-enhancing', 
others 'I ife- stultifying', and each "has its quantum 'of reason". Reason is best used to 
distinguish between passions rather than to react to them as a class. 101 
Nietzsche is basic to Solomon's defence of subjectivity and his egoistic ordering of 
emotion. As this thesis progresses, it will become clear that Solomon also draws upon 
Aristotle for a social ethic based in intersubjectivity; and that he does not show 
how 
deliberation might proceed when this social approach conflicts with Nietzschean order of 
self-esteem. 
Nietzsche's assessment, that Christianity is in mood a 'destroyer' of the passions, also 




In most of Christianity the passions in general were denied even a subservient 
place; they were distractions from belief, 'temptations of the flesh', spurs to 
Sin. Certain selected passions survived, of course-faith, naturally, and a 
peculiarly emaciated and universally expanded notion of 'love'. Augustine, 
for example, summarizes the case in his Confessions: "Thou hast created us 
for thyself, and our heart cannot be quieted till it may find repose in Thee. " 
Fifteen hundred years later, Nietzsche sarcastically recapitulated: "Thus it is 
ever, only the emasculated man is the good man". "' 
But Christian theology is not necessarily indicted by this quotation from Augustine. As this 
thesis proceeds, I will show that Solomon misunderstands the deep emotional literacy of 
Augustine's theology. 
5. Nussbaum's 'ascent'of love 
A related theory, but an altogether different approach, is found in Martha C. Nussbaum's 
far-reaching amalgam of literary, philosophical, religious, legal, and cross-cultural interests. 
I will now examine Nussbaum's 'ascent of love', a series of historical 'discoveries' about 
love that bring love into harmony with general social aims, making love basic to a 
ýuniversalist' ethic. She also singles out Augustine for disagreement, but is more 
sympathetic to him in some aspects than is Solomon. 
Nussbaum, whose "ethical intuitions lie powerfully with Aristotle", 101 ranges across these 
fields to find centrally human "grounding experiences" 104 of human need and capability, and 
a "universalist" liberal ethic based upon them, to inform her proposals for judicial and 
developmental ethics around the world. But the "single human question[s]" that are put, as 
it were, by these "grounding experiences", generate "rival human answers" in the various 
traditions of thought. Clearly then, "religious and metaphysical difference" is the main 
threat to "derail this [universalist] enterprise". 
She is aware that her "allegedly universal account of the good is less neutral than some 
liberal theories of justice would wish. " She is also aware that "grounding experiences" as 
conceived by her are open to cultural prejudice. But she nonetheless pursues this 
universalist ethic unapologetically, and her sympathies are with the causes of women, and 
with the acceptance of bodily sexual expressions of adult love-and she will 
frankly oppose 
any traditional culture that might hinder the advance of these concerns. 
She also seeks for 
expressions of public mercy and compassion, 101 and is hostile to forms of thought 
that create 
102 Ibid., 10. 
"' Martha C. Nussbaum, "Comparing Virtues, " Journal ofReligious Ethics 21 no. 2 (1993): 
364. 
104 Ibid., 353-55, for this and quotations following. 
Martha C. Nussbaum, "Equity and Mercy, " Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 no. 
2 (1993). 
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and exclude classes of outsider. 
106 The importance of emotion within such a normative ethic, 
is immediately apparent. 
But outlining this ethical standpoint in advance risks obscuring her method-an "ethical 
criticism of literature""'-an approach to texts in an Aristotelian mood, as it were, to 
exhume emotions, ethics, and virtues from key texts in philosophy and literature, toward the 
synthesis of the 'universalist' ethic. Thus the main body of her work consists in expositions 
of texts ancient and modern-which are, in turn, measured and judged against the 
increasingly defined normative ethic. (At best this is a kind of recursive process; at worst, it 
is a globally hegemonic absorption of the texts. We would be best to reserve judgment for 
the moment. ) 
Her Therapy of Desire begins with Aristotle, Epicurius, Lucretius and the Stoics to show 
Hellenistic philosophy's combination of logic and compassion, alongside "its advocacy of 
various types of detachment and freedom from disturbance. ""' The Stoics understood 
emotions to be judgments concerning the uncontrollable, and the Stoic quest for apatheia 
represented a strategy to decrease emotion by re-evaluating external things, and lessening 
any attachment to them. 101 This Stoic problematic has elicited repeated engagements-both 
for it and against it-in the Western tradition. 110 But it stands in contrast to an alternative 
view, originating with Aristotle, where human flourishing and the good life are constituted 
within the world and not beyond it, within the everyday activities of daily human life. "' 
Nussbaum's most major contribution appears in a volume published near the end of my 
own time of writing, "' so I will outline her thesis using previously published material. "' She 
'0' E. g. Martha C. Nussbaum, "Wuthering Heights: The Romantic Ascent, " Philosophy and Literature 
20 no. 2 
(1996): 366,372,375,377. Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, "Objectification, " Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 no. 4 
(1995), where she analyses 'objectification' to find which versions of it actually seem respectful, given that other 
versions are reprehensible. 
107 See Nussbaum, "Objectification, " 255 for a brief description of it. 
"' Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton, N. 
J.; 
Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1994), 9. 
... Martha C. Nussbaum, "Morality and Emotions, " in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig. 
10 
vols., vol. 6 (London: Routledge, 1998), 558,560; Martha C. Nussbaum, "Emotions as 
Judgements of Value and 
Importance, " in Relativism, Suffering and Beyond, eds Purusottama Bilimoria and Jitendra N. Mohanty, 
(Oxford; 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 234; cf. Nussbaum, Therapy. 
"' Cf Nussbaum, "Morality and Emotions, " 560-62, where this is the central organising thesis. 
... Nussbaum, "Comparing, " 364-65; cf, Nussbaum, Therapy, 363, and Martha C. Nussbaum, "The Transfiguration of 
Everyday Life, " Metaphilosophy 25 no. 4 (1994): 238-39 & 259-60. 
112 Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University 
Press, 2001). 
... This includes Nussbaum, "Emotions as Judgements, " an early version of chapter 1; Martha 
C. Nussbaum, -The 
Ascent of Love-Plato, Spinoza, Proust, " New Literary History 25 no. 
4 (1994), for chapter 10; Martha C. 
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openly aligns herself with cognitivist theorists of emotion, including Kenny, Lyons and 
Solomon, "' their conclusions forming her point of departure. Emotions are highly 
discriminating responses to matters of value and importance, especially represented in 
matters over which we feel we have little control. "Emotions are ... acknowledgements of 
neediness and lack of self-sufficiency", and will become apparent toward some valuable 
object, in a seeing that has intentions towards the object, and that is threaded with (often 
complex) beliefs-"' (The similarity to Lyons and Solomon is clear. ) She is wholly in favour 
of this aspect of Stoic analysis, against twentieth century behaviourism. '', 
For Nussbaum, Hellenistic thinkers knew too well the "depredations of emotion in 
politics". "' But even so, no ethical theory-including theories of politics, law or public 
policy-can be called adequate in the absence of an adequate theory of emotion. Therefore 
she explores cultural sources, and childhood histories, of various emotions. Compassion and 
love then come under special scrutiny as necessarily integral to public life, despite 
movements to extirpate these from public decision-making. (Thus against legal 
retributivism and judicial behaviourism, she will picture a kind of merciful judge who is 
like the reader of a novel-emotionally involved in the web of circumstance governing each 
character, but personally neutral. "') 
This brings Nussbaum to the most innovative part of her thesis, where she "attempts to 
imagine a reform or ascent of love, one that will render love more han-nonious with general 
social aims. "119 Various forms of love, as reflected in a series of appreciations on various 
texts, are held aloft to discover how each might expand a proper vision of love. 110 The broad 
course she traces is of love as conceived through contemplative, Christian, Romantic, and 
Nussbaum, "Augustine and Dante on the Ascent of Love, " in The Augustinian Tradition, ed. Gareth B. Matthews, 
(Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1999), for chapters 11; Martha C. Nussbaum, "Beatrice's Dante: 
Loving the Individual?, " Apeiron 26 no. 3 -4 (1993), for chapter 12; Nussbaum, " Wuthering 
Heights, " for chapter 13; 
and Nussbaum, "Transfiguration Everyday, " for chapter 16. 
"' Nussbaum, "Morality and Emotions, " 562; and Nussbaum, "Emotions as Judgements, " 248 n. 2. 
... Nussbaum, "Emotions as Judgements, " 234; & 237-38. 
116 Ibid., 235. 
117 Nussbaum, "Morality and Emotions, " 560. 
"' Nussbaum, "Equity and Mercy, 59 passim. This article, with Martha C. Nussbaum, "Compassion: 
The Basic Social 
Emotion, " Social Philosophy & Policy 13 no. 1 (1996), seems representative of Upheavals Part II, concerning public 
compassion. 
"' Nussbaum, " Wuthering Heights, " 3 82. 
120 "Ascents of Love" forms Part III of Upheavals, where Nussbaum considers 
firstly the contemplative approaches to 
love found in Plato, Spinoza and Proust, followed by the Christian approaches of Augustine and 
Dante, proceeding to 
the Romantic approaches of Br6nte and Mahler, to finish with the modern 'democratic' approaches 
of Whitman and 
Joyce. See n. 113 for papers corresponding to some of Nussbaum's chapters. 
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'democratic' traditions. Each of these is considered to represent an advance over the one 
preceding it. The general movement of the 'ascent' is as follows. 
Nussbaum is deeply interested in Christianity, and its Augustinian contribution to the 
6ascent of love'. Against a contemplative Platonic tradition, the Christian thought of 
Augustine and Dante restores the emotions to a valued place in the good human life. ", 
Contrary to pagan thought, Christian love reopens a space for all the most intense emotions, 
"locating the most urgent good things outside the self rather than within it. " Indeed, love 
requires the intensification of the most intense emotions. "' She is highly appreciative of 
Augustine's almost erotic passion in his declarations of love for God in Confessiones; 111 and 
she notices in the logic of the more analytical De civitate Dei how love is given to all 
humanity, but that the pilgrims toward the City of God differ in the objects of their strong 
emotions. "' After further 'ascents' are found in Dante, she finds that Christian thought 
contributes to love's ascent by taking seriously the subject's agency, their receptivity, and 
the particularity of individual loves., " But she will finally set all this aside as wanting, 
believing Augustine to fail in his account of human eros, since the contrite soul advances 
toward the nonerotic life of heaven. 126 
Thus she proceeds to Emily Brontd's critique of Christianity, a critique primarily of its 
degenerate institutional form-it is hypocritical; hierarchical; unimaginative; and given to a 
static eschatology that denigrates movement and striving, and attenuates any impetus to 
ameliorate this-worldly concerns. "Would a keenly alive, surgingly erotic Augustinian 
Christianity""' be free from this? Augustinian Christianity should be more inclusive of the 
alien and stranger, and more able to accommodate liberty and imagination. This is "a 
serious reformulation of the ideal, not just a criticism of people who fail to live up to it. " 
But it is damned by something far deeper: a fear and shame in being wholly given to and 
for others-"a total exposure of the self to another's touch and gaze"-which shame makes 
the body and its erotic passions to be its object. 
So there is ultimately, [Brontd] suggests, a deep inconsistency between 
radical Augustinian openness to grace and the Augustinian attitude to the 
"' Nussbaum, "Augustine and Dante, " 61. 
122 Ibid., 62. 
123 Ibid. & 71-73 
124 Ibid., 70. 
125 Ibid., 83. 
126 Ibid., 85. 
12' Nussbaum, "Wuthering Heights, " 376-79 for this and quotations following. 
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body and the worldly person. We cannot give our bodies to the world like 
Christ if we cannot manage, first, to inhabit them and make them ourselves. "' 
But apart from this uncovering of a fundamental Augustinian aporia (allegedly), Nussbaum 
finds in BronW no positive contribution to love's ascent. Thus she turns elsewhere for loWs 
final ascent, arriving (by now unsurprisingly) at an account of love that has no static 
eschatology and no shame in the body or its erotic passions. She finds this in James Joyce, 
where 
there is an Aristotelian kind of philosophy that is capable of including and 
accepting the surprises of the body and its sexuality, as many other-worldly 
philosophies, whether secular or religious, cannot. "' 
This matters for philosophy, she seeks to argue, for connected to this acceptance is the 
overcoming of hatred and revenge. The long day of Mr. Leopold Bloom becomes a tender, 
if impudent, celebration of the sensual, the visceral, the earthy, the everyday-"the way real 
people are", 110 and devoid of all shame. "The comedy of the body ... contains the hope both 
of justice and love. ""' 
This means,, firstly, that real-life love is inconstant, imperfect, and comic in its realisations 
of the Romantic ideal (such as BronWs): and to this Joyce (through Molly) says, "Yes". "' 
And for Nussbaum it follows secondly, that Joyce has a political stance. "' (It is effectively 
coextensive to her own 'universalist ethic'. ) Joyce has been sexually explicit in order to 
claim that it is the refusal to accept erotic neediness, rather than that neediness itself, which 
generates revenge, localism, and hatred. A converse acceptance 
is the essential basis for a sane political life, a life democratic, universalist, 
and also liberal ... The other-worldly metaphysical traditions, with 
their 
exorbitant demands, are ... accomplices of revenge, 
"dream(ing) their 
dreamy dreams" at the expense of the intensities of the real. When, against 
those traditions, one can embrace the real-life object with love-then one has 
not annihilation but joy, not the death of compassion but its fairest 
possibility. "' 
Nussbaum is as first-rate an evangelist as any good Christian missionary. Like the Apostle 
before her,, her universalist ethic will gladly "demolish arguments and every pretension" to 
"take captive every thought" (2 Cor. 10: 5), even if her key allegiances differ from those of 
"' Ibid., 379. 
`9 Nussbaum, "Transfiguration Everyday, " 239. 
"0 Ibid., 25 1. 
"' Ibid., 260. 
112 Ibid., 259. 
113 Ibid., 259-60. 
134 Ibid., 260. 
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the Apostle (who sought "the knowledge of God", "to obey Christ"). Nussbaum's 'ascent' 
of love finally terminates upon the self-our judgments, our bodies, and the Joycean 
transfigurations of everyday life-in a rejection of any other metaphysical or other-worldly 
conceits. But there is no embarrassment about a human telos in Nussbaum's project, nor as 
a result, any difficulty in relating ethics to emotion, especially love. We will return to 
Nussbaum throughout the thesis. 
In this chapter, I have shown that general definitions for 'emotion' and 'passion' embrace a 
wide range of meanings. The range of views I discussed began with some scientific 
approaches to emotion, and psychology's 'cognitive' approach seemed promising. 
However, we also saw that scientific accounts of emotion cannot be meaningfully 
connected to ethics, despite Stevenson's attempt to do so in ethical emotivism. It rather 
seems that ethics is needed for a proper understanding of emotion. That a 'broader canvas' 
is required, beyond scientific terms of reference, was seen in William Lyons' scientifically 
oriented account, which requires the concepts of 'telic order' and 'moral field' to succeed. 
I introduced Solomon and Nussbaum as two thinkers whose 'broader canvas' reintegrates 
reason and emotion. Solomon's project turns out morally to order emotion around 'self- 
esteem'. The 'love' to which Martha Nussbaum 'ascends' is bodily and sexual, and forms 
the basis of a 'universalist' ethic. We have seen both thinkers single out Augustine for 
disagreement. 
We shall see in Chapter Two that the two broad movements we have seen (excluding 
Lyons, who parallels older conceptions) derive, respectively, from the competing legacies 
of Kant and Nietzsche. 
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Chapter III: Two Competing Legacies 
We have seen both a lack of relationship between emotion and ethics (in science), and the 
attempt to relate them (in Nussbaum and Solomon). I will now outline Kant's and 
Nietzsche's views on the matter, which respectively anticipate the modem accounts. 
In Section One I show how, on Kant's view, emotions have no place in ethical deliberation; 
but I will also show that Kant respects emotion, and cannot hold his view with complete 
consistency. He shares a bewilderment about emotion with the scientific approaches of the 
previous chapter. 
I will then canvas in Section Two Nietzsche's rejection of this Enlightenment approach. 
Excellences are intrinsic to 'passion'; emotions energise and enhance life; and attempts 
morally to evaluate emotion are decadent. Emotions should be allowed free expression in a 
caste society ranked by excellence, irrespective of 'justice'. I will demonstrate Solomon's 
and Nussbaum's allegiance to Nietzsche's vision in reference to individuals, although they 
remain silent on the negative implications for a social system. We will also see that both 
agree with Nietzsche's assessment of Christian morality: it is 'other-worldly', 'life- 
denying', and hates the body and the 'passions'. (Nietzsche, as I will show, resorts to 
special pleading to sustain this judgment. ) 
In Section Three of this chapter I will make some comments preparatory to the theological 
investigation of Part Two. Firstly, theology's use of 'passion' and 'affection' enables 
Christian theology to speak more specifically than does the modern general term, 'emotion'. 
Secondly, a heuristic principle is offered against the misconception that modern 
neuroscience leaves 'no room for the soul'. Thirdly, a theological account of the emotions 
embraces delighted 'intoxications', and in a point of deep agreement with Nietzsche, is also 
unimpressed by Enlightenment ethics; but I also challenge Nietzsche's special pleading 
against Christian theology, and indicate what in Kant can be retained in a theological 
approach. Finally, I outline what is meant in this thesis by the multivalent term, 'the 
logic of 
love'. 
1. The Kantian legacy 
In this section I will show that for Kant, emotions have no place in ethical 
deliberation. I 
will show also that he respects emotion to the point where the consistency of 
his view 
comes under threat. He shares a bewilderment about emotion with the scientific approaches 
of the previous chapter. 
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In Kant's evocation of the 'hardened scoundrel', 'inclinations' and 'impulses of sensibility' 
(the language of emotion in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals) are self-evidently 
distinct from matters of ethics: 
There is no one-not even the most hardened scoundrel, if only he is 
otherwise accustomed to use reason-who, when one sets before him 
examples of honesty of purpose, of steadfastness in following good maxims, 
of sympathy and general benevolence ... does not wish that he might also be 
so disposed. He cannot bring this about in himself, though only because of 
his inclinations and impulses; yet at the same time he wishes to be free from 
such inclinations, which are burdensome to himself. 135 
Although we might smile at the sense of burden carried by this scoundrel, that is not the 
point. Kant wishes to demonstrate that ethics constitutes "an order of things altogether 
different", and continues: 
Hence he proves, by this, that with a will free from impulses of sensibility he 
transfers himself in thought into an order of things altogether different from 
that of his desires in the field of sensibility, since from that wish he can 
expect no satisfaction of his desires and hence no condition that would satisfy 
any of his actual or otherwise imaginable inclinations (for if he expected this, 
the very idea which elicits that wish from him would lose its preeminence); 
he can expect only a greater inner worth of his person. "' 
That is, implicit in his "wish" to be honest, steadfast, and benevolent, is the recognition that 
betterment of the "inner worth of his person" would prevail against his wants and desires. 
Fundamental to this account is a distinction between a world of "understanding" and a 
world of "sense": 
This better person, however, he believes himself to be when he transfers 
himself to the standpoint of a member of the world of understanding, as the 
idea of freedom, that is, of independence from determining causes of the 
world of sense, constrains him involuntarily to do; and from this standpoint 
he is conscious of a good will that, by his own acknowledgements, 
constitutes the law for his evil will as a member of the world of sense-a law 
of whose authority he is cognizant even while he transgresses it. "' 
This is of course Kant's continuation, for practical reason, of his groundbreaking project in 
the first Critique (published four years earlier) to knit together the epistemologies of 
empiricism and rationalism. 'Inclinations' and 'impulses' (and elsewhere, 'desires') are 
uncontroversially a part of the world of sense; and any resignation to the world of sense is a 
capitulation to heteronomy, and thus unacceptable, given the freedom Kant understands to 
135 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), ed. Mary J. Gregor and Allen W. 
Wood, tr. 
Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1996), 101 (AK 4: 454). The Cambridge Edition's cross-references to the Berlin Academy Edition of 
Kant's 
works are shown here as 'AK volume: page number'. 
136 Ibid. (AK 4: 454). 
137 Ibid. (AK 4: 454-55). 
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be distinctive to rational agents. "' Even the scoundrel knows this, when he 'steps in and ouf 
of the "intelligible world": 
The moral 'ought' is then his own necessary 'will' as a member of an 
intelligible world, and is thought by him as 'ought' only insofar as he regards 
himself at the same time as a member of the world of sense. 139 
To put it crudely: when he thinks, he is autonomous and free, knowing and willing the good. 
It is only when hefeels, that this good forecloses against him, unpleasantly, as an "ought". 
This 'scoundrel' is offered by Kant merely as an illustration, "[t]he practical use of common 
human reason", to confirm at this point in the Groundwork his synthetic a priori deduction 
of the categorical imperative. But the scoundrel offers a cameo of some persistent themes in 
the Groundwork. At the outset, in the preface to the work, Kant announces his intention "to 
work out for once a pure moral philosophy, completely cleansed of everything that may 
only be empirical and that belongs to anthropology", since "that there must be such a 
philosophy is clear of itself from the common idea of duty and moral laws". 110 It was never 
likely to be the case that such an approach would consider the emotions as a part of its 
ambit, and it becomes less so once Kant introduces his formidable claims for the 
universality of any true moral law. The universal isab i lity of maxims, and so the categorical 
imperative, is founded upon the absolute equality of all persons; thus there can be no place 
for vague and varied feelings. Therefore it follows that the emotions are at best irrelevant: 
To be beneficent where one can is a duty, and besides there are many souls so 
sympathetically attuned that, without any other motive or self-interest they 
find an inner satisfaction in spreading joy around them and can take delight 
in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work. But I assert that in 
such a case an action of this kind, however it may conform with duty and 
however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth but is on 
the same footing with other inclinations ...... 
Kant goes on to imagine the philanthropist overcome by grief, in whom all sympathy is 
extinguished. "[S]uppose that now, when no longer incited to it by any inclination, he 
nevertheless tears himself out of this deadly insensibility and does the action without any 
inclination, simply from duty; then the action first has genuine moral worth. " 142 Only this 
view can render intelligible the scriptural command to love the enemy, since 
love as an inclination cannot be commanded, but beneficence from duty- 
even though no inclination impels us to it and, indeed, natural and 
"' Ibid., 99 (AK 4: 452). 
119 Ibid., 10 1 (AK 4: 455). 
140 Ibid., 44 (AK 4: 389). 
141 Ibid., 53 (AK 4: 398). 
142 Ibid., 54 (AK 4: 399). 
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unconquerable aversion opposes it-is practical and not pathological love, 
which lies in the will and not in the propensity of feeling, in principles of 
action and not in melting sympathy; and it alone can be commanded. "' 
That this love "lies in the will" relies upon Kant's primary assertion that "[i]t is impossible 
to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed beyond it, that could be considered good 
without limitation except a good Wi 
11.9 5144 This 'will' is the fundamental locus of Kant's 
good, and operates in league with the intellect to bring human action into the world of 
sense. We shall see that this resembles an account of the human person also found in 
Aquinas. But whereas Aquinas' universe is theonomous, good and ordered, Kant's universe 
is stripped of any such 'heteronomous' predicates. 
But this extreme separation of feeling from thought has not come from nowhere. Twenty- 
three years prior to the Groundwork, Kant held to a moral-sense theory (that goodness is 
apprehended directly, as a feeling), in which he is thought to have been influenced by the 
Scottish philosopher Frances Hutcheson. 145 Indeed, just as Kant's philosophical enquiries 
represent a mediation between rationalism and empiricism, so also do his ethical enquiries 
represent an arbitration within an eighteenth century crucible of ethical disagreement. Paul 
McReynolds grasps the milieu within which the moral sense theorists found themselves 
(and which, as we have seen, is still current): 
Hutcheson lived in an age when there was tremendous interest in ethical 
questions. The moral superstructure that had lent stability throughout the long 
medieval period had lost its effectiveness some time before, and the need in 
his time was to discover, or to develop, a new and more stable moral 
paradigm. Though a number of systematic proposals, including that of 
Hutcheson, were put forth, none of these, as it turned out, gained general 
acceptance-nor indeed, have any of the metaethical systems developed 
since that time, and the moral crisis that we face today is fundamentally a part 
of the same crisis that conftonted Hutcheson's era. 146 
On this account, 147 disputants such as Hobbes and Mandeville (and perhaps Locke) argue 
pragmatically that social order is founded upon the co-operation of desires among selfish 
and self-interested agents: 
Vast Numbers thronged the fruitful Hive; 
Yet those vast Numbers made 'em thrive; 
"' Ibid. (AK 4: 399). Gregor glosses pathologische as 'dependent upon sensibility' (note J). 
144 Ibid., 49 (AK 4: 393). 
"' Allen Wood, introduction to ibid., xiii-xiv. 
... Paul McReynolds; in Frances Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and 
Affections: 
With Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1742), with a foreword by Paul McReynolds, 
(Gainsville: Scholars' Facsimiles 
and Reprints, 1969), ix. 
147 With the older account of W. R. Sorley, "Berkeley and Contemporary Philosophy, 
" in The Cambridge History of 




Millions endeavouring to supply 
Each other's Lust and Vanity 
Thus every Part was full of Vice, 
Yet the whole Mass a Paradice; 
Flatter'd in Peace, and fear'd in Wars 
They were th'Esteem of Foreigners ... 
Against this are the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Bishop Joseph Butler, and Frances 
Hutcheson, all of whom oppose theories of self-interest and argue for a human nature that 
includes natural social 'affections' from which morality derives. 
This dispute among Britons, then, assumes the affections to be centrally significant for 
ethics, turning on a presumption that human affections are either primarily selfish or 
disinterested, constituted in fundamental self-interest or benevolence. But the shared 
presumption-that the good is accessed by affection-is jettisoned by Kant. Just two years 
after his initial endorsement of moral-sense theory, Kant begins to back away, precisely 
because feelings are not uniform and no agreement about them can be reached. 149 
That his initial sympathies lay with Hutcheson underlines his antipathy to Hobbes and 
Mandeville, which is retained in his trenchant hostility to all forms of utilitarianism. But 
this distancing indicates his dissatisfaction with a moral-sense kind of solution, even if he 
retains with moral-sense theory the same impetus to find a moral law independent of self- 
interest. But if readers of Kant are initially scandalised by the exclusion of emotion from the 
calculation of moral worth, 110 then his clarification of the moral-sense issue (near the end of 
the Groundwork) is an additional surprise. For an appropriate set of feelings, which he 
denotes as "interest" and even "pleasure", might follow from duteous exaction of the moral 
law, even if it must insistently be denied that any explanation can be offered for this 
experience, or that a heteronomous morality can be derived from it: 
The subjective impossibility of explaining the freedom of the will is the same 
as the impossibility of discovering and making comprehensible an interest 
which the human being can take in moral laws; and yet he does really take an 
interest in them, the foundation of which in us we call moral feeling, which 
some have falsely given out as the standard for our moral appraisal whereas it 
must rather be regarded as the subjective effect that the law exercises on the 
will, to which reason alone delivers the objective grounds. 
In order for a sensibly affected rational being to will that for which reason 
alone prescribes the 'ought', it is admittedly required that his reason have the 
148 Bernard Mandeville, The Grumbling Hive (1705), edited by Jack Lynch (HTML e-text, transcribed from the 
1705 
edition, accessed April 6th 2003; available from http: //andromeda-rutgers. edu/-ilynch/Texts/hive. 
html; consult 
jlynch@andromeda. rutgers. edu), 11.31-34 & 155-59. CE below, 271. 
149 Mary J. Gregor and Allen W. Wood, eds., Immanuel Kant. - Practical Philosophy, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), xiii-xiv. 
151 Ibid., xix-xx. 
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capacity to induce a feeling of pleasure or of delight in the fulfilment of duty... But it is quite impossible to see, that is, to make comprehensible a 
priori, how a mere thought which itself contains nothing sensible produces a 
feeling of pleasure or displeasure ... [flor us human beings it is quite impossible to explain how and why the universality of a maxim as law and 
hence morality interests us. This much only is certain: it is not because the 
law interests us that it has validity for us (for that is heteronomy and 
dependence of practical reason upon sensibility, namely upon a feeling lying 
at its basis, in which case it could never be morally lawgiving); instead, the 
law interests us because it is valid for us as human beings. " I 
Thus unlike caricatures of his position, Kant is deeply perceptive of the way emotions and 
dispositions can somehow become allied to ethics. We wonder if he even hopes for this in 
people, recalling his famous and more personal manner of saying something similar. "Two 
things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often 
and more steadily one reflects upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law 
within me. ""' But he is genuinely mystified by this, knowing only that it can form no sound 
basis for ethics. As in the Groundwork, so in the final emphasis of the second Critique: 
"though admiration and respect can indeed excite enquiry, they cannot supply the want of 
it. " 153 
Even so, we note that in his discussion of the scoundrel, "sympathy" has slipped in among 
that which is set before the scoundrel as morally upright. 154 We wonder if even Kant can 
keep watertight the distinction he seeks to assert-----ý'thus calling into question the harshness 
of his ruthlessly divided self. " 155 In this respect, Solomon also observes how rationalist 
notions of human dignity "are sometimes suggested to be matters of feeling as well as of 
reason"; how the Critique of Judgment celebrated 'intersubjective' feeling; and Kant's own 
utterance, that "nothing is ever done without passion". 156 
Kant commands the majority position in modern ethics, not in that the majority of modern 
ethicists are Kantian, but certainly in that the majority of modern ethics adopts his strategy, 
against intuitionism and emotivism, of sidelining matters of emotion (even, now, among 
utilitarians). 
"' Kant, 105-06 (AK 4: 460-61). 
152 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788), ed. Mary J. Gregor and Allen W. Wood, tr. Mary J, 
Gregor, 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, (Cambridge: University Press, 1996), 
269 
(AK 5: 162). 
"' Ibid., 270 (AK 5: 162). 
15' Kant, Groundwork, 10 1 (AK 4: 45 4); see above, 47. 
"' Solomon, "Philosophy of Emotions, " 8. 
156 Ibid. 
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I will not attempt to draw laborious connections between Kant and the scientific approaches 
of the previous chapter; but both obviously reflect the same general rationalistic 
Enlightenment approach to emotion. The scientific account of emotion cannot meaningfully 
be joined to ethics, and the ethics of Kant cannot meaningfully be joined to emotion. I will 
risk some further assertions in passing. The post-enlightenment split between fact and value 
(from which the so-called the 'naturalistic fallacy' in ethics derives) seems largely to consist 
in the Enlightenment distillation of 'emotion' from 'reason'. Kant and Stevenson represent 
opposing rationalist views on the place of emotion in ethics, because both share an 
Enlightened bewilderment about emotion. 
Solomon's sound objections owe their intellectual allegiance to Nietzsche's rejection of the 
Enlightenment approach that I have outlined. 
2. The Nietzschean legacy 
I will now canvas Nietzsche's rejection of the Enlightenment approach. In his alternative 
approach to the relationship between ethics and emotion, excellences are intrinsic to 
'passion', and emotions energise and enhance life. Therefore attempts morally to evaluate 
emotion are decadent, and emotions should be allowed free expression. The ideal social 
order for Nietzsche's view is a caste society ranked by excellence, irrespective of 'justice'. I 
will go on to demonstrate Solomon's and Nussbaum's allegiance to Nietzsche's vision for 
individuals,, although they remain silent on the negative implications for a social system. 
We will also see that both agree with Nietzsche's assessment of Christian morality: it is 
'other-worldly', 'life-denying', and hates the body and the 'passions'-judgments that are 
sustained by special pleading. Nietzsche's notorious unsystematicity calls for a more 
discursive approach, which will resolve itself into a series of themes that bear directly upon 
our concerns. 
a) Disagreement with Kant but appropriation of science 
Much of Nietzsche's polemic is overtly directed toward a Kantian-style deontology: 
A word against Kant as a moralist. A virtue has to be our invention, our most 
personal defence and necessity: in any other sense it is merely a danger. What 
does not condition our life harms it: a virtue merely from a feeling of respect 
for the concept of 'virtue', as Kant desired it, is harmful. 'Virtue', 'duty', 
'good in itself, impersonal and universal-phantoms, expressions of decline, 
of the final exhaustion of life, of K6nigsbergian Chinadom. The profoundest 
laws of preservation and growth demand the reverse of this: that each one of 
us should devise his own virtue, his own categorical imperative. A people 
perishes if it mistakes its own duty for the concept of duty in general. An 
action compelled by the instinct of life has in the joy of performing 
it the 
proof it is a right action: and that nihilist with Christian-dogmatic bowels 
understands joy as an objection ... 
"I 
15' Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ (1895), tr. Reginald J. Hollingdale, with a foreword 
by Michael Tanner, 
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So much for Kant (and the Chinese). But Nietzsche's engagement with science and 
scientists is a contrasting study of balletic ambivalence. In one key respect, he is 
unimpressed with science: 
[W]hen we view it physiologically ... science rests on the same base as the 
ascetic ideal: the precondition of both the one and the other is a certain 
impoverishment of life, -the emotions cooled, the tempo slackened, 
dialectics in place of instinct, solemnity stamped on faces and gestures 
(solemnity, that most unmistakable sign of a more sluggish metabolism and 
of a struggling, more toiling life). "' 
The rise of scientific consciousness, then, depreciates humanity. "Gone, alas, is [man's] 
faith in his dignity, uniqueness, irreplaceableness in the rank-ordering of beings". 119 (We 
will see this 'rank ordering' to be a primary Nietzschean concern). But there is 
ambivalence, because the 'physiology' in this complaint, which figures widely in 
Nietzsche's thought, is the scientific basis upon which he will revalue all values. "[E]very 
table of values, every 'thou shalt' known to history or the study of ethnology, needs first 
and foremost a physiological elucidation and interpretation, rather than a psychological one; 
and all of them await critical study from medical science. " 160 Science thus serves to kick the 
struts out from under dogmatic Christianity, whose scrupulous morality-its "confessional 
punctiliousness" as translated into "intellectual purity at any price"-founded it. This is 
"Europe's bravest and most protracted self-overcoming"; but it is to continue into the 
overthrow of Christian morality. 161 
How is this balletic ambivalence to be understood? Probably in terms of the "history of an 
error"-Nietzsche's descending history of the notion of the 'real world' . 16, The access to the 
'real world' supplied by classical wisdom was wrested from it by Christianity, which 
promises the 'real world' to all, but only in the eschaton. Kant's transcendently 
metaphysical 'real world' follows; it is the Christian ideal "grown sublime, pale". Kant is in 
turn supplanted by positivist scepticism, the consciousness of science, for which the 
impetus is a 'real world' unattained and unknown. But even this gives way to that place 
Penguin Classics edition, including Twilight of the Idols, (London: Penguin, 1990), 134 (§ 11). 
"' Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality (1887), ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, tr. Carol Diethe, Canibridge 
Texts in the History of Political Thought edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 121 
(§111.25). 
159 Ibid., 122 0111.25). Cf. 116-17 (§111.23) where scientific consciousness is variously described as an "abyss", "a 
hidingplace" for "ill-humour, unbelief, nagging worms, ... bad conscience", 
"a means of self-anaesthetic", in view 
of its lack, basically, of ideals and passion. 
160 Ibid., 37 (§1.17, concluding note). 
"' Ibid., 126-27 (§111.27); cf. Nietzsche, Anti-Christ, 48 (§48) for God's own 'fear' of science. 
"' Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols (1889), tr. Reginald J. Hollingdale, with a foreword 
by Michael Tanner, 
Penguin Classics edition, including The Anti-Christ, (London: Penguin, 1990), 50-51 ("How the 
'Real World' at last 
Became a Myth"). 
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where "all free spirits run riot", where the 'real world', and then even the apparent world, 
are abolished-and Zarathustra (which is to say, Nietzsche) begins. Within this history, the 
virtue of science is in its liberations; but a superficial timidity is its vice. 
The "history of an error" might seem to support the view that Nietzsche promoted 
anarchism or nihilism. But whatever we eventually make of such readings, they are neither 
supported nor denied by his attitude to emotion. 
b) Emotions as 'enhancement of life' 
Nietzsche's demand on behalf of the emotions is simply to let them be, since they are about 
what we purpose; and what we purpose concerns our deepest instincts for life. (This is the 
point of the objection to Kant. "') Even seriously negative moods are to be reckoned along 
theselines: 
Let us be careful not to pull gloomy faces as soon as we hear the word 
'torture': in precisely this case, we have plenty to put down on the other side 
of the account, plenty to deduct-we even have some reason to laugh. For we 
must not underestimate the fact that Schopenhauer, who actually treated 
sexuality as a personal enemy (including its tool, woman, that 'instrumentum 
diaboli') needed enemies to stay cheerful; that he loved wrathful, bilious, 
bitter-black words; that he got angry for the sake of it, passionately; that he 
would have become ill, a pessimist (-because he was not one, however 
much he wanted to be) without his enemies ... 
"' 
Thus emotions, whatever their hue, can energise and enhance 'life'. Any attempt, then, to 
police or codify or otherwise morally to evaluate emotion, represents decline or decadence 
or sickness. Moreover, the attempt will be toward some ulterior motive, which will resolve 
itself as a (now perverse) exercise of the same will to power. Emotions are so ceaselessly 
active, and so energisingly powerful, that physiology makes intelligible certain phenomena 
that have been generally overlooked until Nietzsche. Emphatically unlike Schopenhauer, 
every sufferer instinctively looks for a cause of his distress ... 
for a living 
being upon whom he can release his emotions, actually or in effigy, on some 
pretext or other: because the release of emotions is the greatest attempt at 
relief, or should I say, at anaesthetizing on the part of the sufferer, his 
involuntarily longed-for narcotic against pain of any kind. "' 
The problem here is not the negativity of the emotion-rather, it is the attempt to 
anaesthetise or sublimate it in a 'sickly' manner. The same passage continues: 
In my judgment, we find here the actual physiological causation of 
ressentiment, revenge and their ilk, in a yearning, then, to anaesthetize pain 
through emotion ... The sufferers, one and all, are 
frighteningly willing and 
inventive in their pretexts for painful emotions; they even enjoy being 
"' See above, 52. 
164 Nietzsche, Genealogy, 80 (§111.7). 
165 Ibid., 99 (§111.15). 
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mistrustful and dwelling on wrongs and imagined slights: they rummage 
through the bowels of their past and present for obscure, questionable stories 
which will allow them to wallow in tortured suspicion ... I" 
Indeed this is the substratum of ressentiment used with skill by the ascetic priest, who learns 
"to detonate this explosive material without blowing up either the herd or the shePherd"5 167 
by changing its object from anyone near the sufferer, to the self of each sufferer. This is 
why Nietzsche considers the Christian account of 'sin' to be fictive ("not a fact, but rather 
the interpretation of a fact, namely a physiological upset"161). Likewise, he holds Christian 
'love' merely to represent the avoidance of pain ("The fear of pain, even of the infinitely 
small in pain-cannot end otherwise than in a religion of love ... 95169 )- 
A better way would be to let these emotions simply to be, and nobly to accept pain, with no 
search for any culprit. The attack by a noble upon an enemy, 110 like any reflexive outburst of 
emotion to prevent pain or loss, "' is fundamentally healthier. To allow this kind of 
beastliness will prevent us becoming bestial. 172 
c) Nietzsche's societal order 
However, it is hard to see how this last claim coheres with Nietzsche's florid celebration of 
prowling nobles, "exultant monsters" who commit "murder, arson, rape and torture", each 
one a "magnificent blond beast" who is convinced that bards will sing of his exploits. "' 
Scholarship tends beatifically to absolve Nietzsche of extraordinary inconsistencies such as 
this, with the questioner's requirement for the resolution of inconsistency somehow 
devolving into a critique of the questioner. Nevertheless, we are forced to wonder if this is 
an account of emotion that promotes such 'beastly' despotisms as Nazism. Continuing and 
immediately following the quote against science, his playful polemic reaches a (for us) 
stomach-churning climax: 
Look at the epochs in the life of a people during which scholars 
predominated: they are times of exhaustion, often of twilight, of decline, - 
gone are the overflowing energy, the certainty of life, the certainty as to the 
future. The preponderance of the mandarins never indicates anything good: 
166 Ibid. (§ 111.15). 
167 Ibid. (§111.15). 
168 Ibid., 100 (§111.16); cf Nietzsche, Anti-Christ, 177-78 (§49). 
"'Nietzsche, Anti-Christ, 154 (§30). 
17' Nietzsche, Genealogy, 24-25 (§§1.10- 11). 
171 Ibid., 99 (§111.15). We need see no contradiction between the acceptance of pain and the avoidance of 
it (noting 
that in each case, Nietzsche refers to physical pain, not some 'psychic' version). 
172 Ibid., 69 (§11.22). 
173 Ibid., 25 (§1.11). 
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any more than the rise of democracy, international courts of arbitration 
instead of wars, equal rights for women, the religion of pity and everything 
else that is a symptom of life in decline. "' 
Elsewhere, Nietzsche describes an ascetic lifestyle, sought by philosophers, for the self- 
interested purpose of enhancing philosophical reflection. The requisite environment 
includes "freedom from compulsion, disturbance, noise, business, duties ... good, thin, 
clear, free, dry air" 115 -which might equally pass for a description of his own retreats to 
idyllic rural Sils-Maria. In itself, this is not a problem. Indeed, though he would rather 
describe himself as a psychologist than a philosopher, perhaps this mode of existence just 
honestly describes his own simple joys. 
But no modern reader can evade that he wrote in such a place during a time of ordered 
tranquility. To deride democracy, courts, equal rights and religious 'pity' is affordable to 
him in a way that is closed to us. The tyranny and war of twentieth-century memory-even 
just the Taliban oppressions that have recently come to light-render embarrassing, even 
obscene, the predication of his examples as "life in decline". (This is particularly so for the 
last two-"equal rights for women, the religion of pity"-in the case of the Taliban. ) Can 
this attempt at transvaluation ("never ... anything good") 
be respected, on any reading? In 
this connection, Philippa Foot cites Thomas Mann's rueful 1947 comment: "How bound in 
time, how theoretical too, how inexperienced does Nietzsche's romanticizing about 
wickedness appear ... today! 
We have learnt to know it in all its miserableness. ""' She 
weighs the usual attacks and defences of Nietzsche alongside passages that deride tyranny 
and affirm gentleness. Notwithstanding, she finds that "Nietzschean teaching is inimical to 
justice. 99177 
In actuality, it certainly does notfollowftom this that Nietzsche is anarchistic, or nihilistic, 
or a naively romantic adulator of tyranny. ", The debate over this is too extensive to pursue 
here, but one aspect of it is central to our purpose. This is the degree to which Nietzsche is 
hostile to, or an apologist for, certain kinds of 'order'. It is easily argued that a positive 
project is found amongst Nietzsche's polemic, toward a deeply rigid and 'life enhancing' 
natural order that has been tragically lost. To call this a 'positive project' may 
be an 
"' Ibid., 121 (§111.25). 
"' Ibid., 82 (§111.8). 
"' Cited in Philippa Foot, "Nietzsche's Immoralism, " in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality Essays on 
Nietzsche's 
GenealogE of Morals, ed. Richard Schacht, (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: 
University of Califorma Press, 1994), 7. 
177 Ibid., 13. 
"' See Robert C. Solomon, "Nietzsche, Nihilism and Morality, " in Nietzsche: A Collection of 
Critical Essays, ed. 
Robert C. Solomon, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980; originally published 
Anchor/Doubleday, 
1973), 206-207,233-24 & passim for a nuanced and very persuasive statement of this point. 
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overstatement, since it is present only in prototype. But present indeed it is; and its order is 
ofrank. 
As a foil to his hostility against the New Testament, Nietzsche praises the ancient Indian 
Code of Manu. 119 Again, there is inconsistency here, since the Code is not really a paragon 
of freedom from the asceticism he so abhors. 110 But he admires there the strength of the 
Code's society, founded upon a natural order of rank (in this case, the caste system), 
exemplifying how "the noble orders, the philosophers and the warriors, keep the mob under 
control: noble values everywhere, a feeling of perfection, an affirmation of life". "' To be 
sure, there are "holy lies" here, since "[n]ature, not Manu" separates the spiritual, the 
muscular and the mediocre as different castes. "' Nevertheless, such a "grand organization of 
society" is "the supreme condition for the prosperity of life". "' Noble morality (as rejected 
by Christian ressentiment) is "all that represents the ascending movement of life, well- 
constitutedness, power, beauty, self-affirmation on earth", "' "the expression of the 
conditions under which a nation lives and grows... a nation's deepest instinct of life". "' 
Thus his oft-repeated rejection of "moral order" 186 cannot be understood as a rejection of 
order as such. Morality is not to be transvalued into despotism; that is a misreading-and on 
this basis, the argument that Nietzsche would have scorned the ignoble, ressentiment driven 
disorders of Nazism, could be made deeply persuasive. Rather, the re-evaluation is to be 
remapped to a rigid naturalist social hierarchy of excellence. Christianity's offence is in its 
sabotage of the possibilities for the kind of life together that could follow: 
So to live that there is no longer any meaning in living: that now becomes the 
'meaning' of life. ... What 
is the point of public spirit, what is the point of 
gratitude for one's descent and one's forefathers, what is the point of co- 
operation, trust, of furthering and keeping in view the general welfare? ... So 
many 'temptations', so many diversions from the 'straight path'-"one thing 
187 is needful". ... 
"'Nietzsche, Anti-Christ, 187-92 (§56-58). 
"' "Hunting, gambling, sleeping by day, censoriousness, (excess with) women, drunkenness, (an inordinate 
love for) 
dancing, singing, and music, and useless travel are the tenfold set (of vices) springing from love of pleasure. 
" Indian 
History Sourcebook: The Laws of Manu (c. 1500 BQ, translated by G. Buhler (HTML e-text, accessed April 
6th 
2003; available from http: //www. fordham. edu/halsall/india/manu-full. html), VII. 47. 
... Nietzsche, Anti-Christ, 187 (§56). 
182 Ibid., 189-90 (§57). 
183 Ibid., 192 (§58). 
184 Ibid., 147 (§24). 
"' Ibid., 148 (§25). This glimpse of Nietzsche's positive project occurs in an argument against Christianity's 
denial of 
it; thus negating clauses have been omitted. 
Ibid., passim (§§25-26; 38; 49). 
187 Ibid., 168 (§43), and quoting Luke 10: 42. 
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The rejection of Kant is complete, and if Nietzsche is "inimical to justice", then so much for 
justice. It is in any case an inflated version of slave morality, and the product of a sickly 
herd. The enhancement of life, and democratic justice, cannot stand together. 
It is worth pausing to notice the degree to which Nietzsche's thought affects the positions 
we have seen. 
Solomon's and Nussbaum's debt to Nietzsche 
Robert C. Solomon's debt to Nietzsche is overt. We have seen his affirmation of 
Nietzsche, "' which is particularly clear in the equation between the enhancement of life, and 
4personal dignity and self-esteem'. That Socrates' drunkenness, T. E. Lawrence's "self- 
inflicted hardship and torture", and Goethe's promiscuity are of interest to him in this 
makes vastly more sense once Nietzsche's project has been reckoned with. In this reading 
of Nietzsche, any 'passionate' life is of more interest than the Kantian opposite that 
Solomon (with Nietzsche) ranges himself against. We can also see the impetus for basing a 
moral ordering of emotion upon whatever enhances life, dignity, self-esteem. But we should 
note in passing, for we shall return to it in a moment, that whereas Nietzsche was concerned 
(in the early works, at least) with the life, dignity and self esteem of a people, Solomon's 
reading makes Nietzsche's point to revolve around the 'surreality' of a person. 
Nussbaum's debt to Nietzsche is less overt, but fundamental nonetheless, even given her 
general neo-Aristotelian tendencies. One complex article develops "Nietzsche's remarkable 
account of the ways in which the intoxication of passion transfigures the self', finding a 
"power of love"119 that "transforms the subject into a being who seems stronger, richer, 
deeper. "190 
Love's magic is illusion, in the sense that it corresponds to no preexisting 
reality in the order of things. And yet it is its own this-worldly reality, and its 
fiction-making makes fictions that are gloriously there. Nietzsche adds, as 
elsewhere, that this intoxication of the erotic is a great motive to the 
affirmation of life in general. "' 
While formally descriptive, the conclusion acts as a piece of 'ethical criticism' in service of 
Nussbaum's 'ascents of love'. Other affirmations of Nietzsche are numerous. Augustine's 
alleged concern to "dredge up the past rather than sever himself from it" has been 
"' Cf also Solomon, "Nihilism, " and Solomon's editorial appreciation in his introduction to the same volume 
(Robert C. Solomon, ed. Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays, (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 
1980; originally published Anchor/Doubleday, 1973), 1-8). 
"' Martha C. Nussbaum, "The Transfigurations of Intoxication: Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Dionysus, " Arion 





192 perceptively analyzed" by Nietzsche in his treatment of 'bad conscience'. She notes how 
Joyce was an admirer of Nietzsche, and as we have seen, Nussbaum is an admirer of 
Joyce. 191 Like Nietzsche, she is contemptuous of conservative concern toward "threats to 
order and morals". 191 There are strong parallels between Nietzsche's "history of an error" 
(where the 'myth' of the 'real world' moves from contemplatives to Christians through to 
modern "free spirits" who abolish the notion), and her own "ascents of love" (where thinly 
contemplative love moves through Christianity to become the earthly, this-worldly love of 
each agent). 
Both of these liberal appropriations of Nietzsche find attractive that morally speaking, "[w]e 
want to be the poets of our own lives". 191 But whereas 'equal rights' were abhorred by 
Nietzsche as one of the many sickly aspects of herd morality, neither is interested to 
endorse that point, nor to show any solidarity with Nietzsche's admiration of caste society. 
Solomon is certainly aware that, as we have seen, Nietzsche's complaint is not against 
moral order as such, but against Christianity's particular, and universalist, view of it;, 96 and 
Solomon even quotes Nietzsche's declaration that "[m]y philosophy aims at an ordering of 
rank; not an individualist morality". 191 Nevertheless, Solomon prefers to side-step this to 
find an existentialist reading: different people require different "self-overcomings" to live 
their will to power and "become who [they] are"191-although Nietzsche is not, apparently, a 
relativist. 199 
But pointedly, the question to be put to these readings is whether it is possible to take hold 
of the life-enhancing, power-of-love, poets-of-our-soul dimensions of Nietzsche, without 
giving an account of the social order (or disorder) within which persons shaped by these 
Nietzschean conceptions might find themselves situated. (Nussbaum's position is 
particularly curious here. The sabotage of local metaphysics is somewhat Nietzschean, but 
her project to impose a universalist ethic at the expense of traditional hierarchical cultures- 
certainly a commitment to moral order, rigidly conceived-is profoundly anti-Nietzschean. 
"' Nussbaum, "Augustine and Dante, " 69. 
"' Nussbaum, "Transfiguration Everyday, " 255 n. 28. 
"' Martha C. Nussbaum, "A Classical Case for Gay Studies-the Softness of Reason, " New Republic 207 no. 3-4 
(1992): 27. 
"' Nietzsche, Gay Science §299; cited in Foot, 6. 
196 Solomon, "Nihilism, " 223-24 & passim. 
197 Nietzsche, Will to Power §287; cited in ibid., 208. 
'9' Ibid., 222 & 225 respectively. 
'99 Ibid., 217. 
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She appropriates Aristotle to ground a universal and rational ethic, but as we proceed, we 
will have cause to question the validity of this ground. ) Nazi readings of Nietzsche required 
radical selectivity to support anti-Semitism and Aryan supremacy. Nussbaum's and 
Solomon's modern liberal readings also require radical selectivity, differing only in what is 
selected. Selective appropriation will always give Nietzsche's thought several outcomes; the 
material is particularly susceptible to it. Solomon knows this: "There is so much here that 
everyone can find his own Nietzsche. This is not to say that there is no distinction between 
responsible and reproachable Nietzsche scholarship"100-Upon what grounds, though, we are 
left to wonder. 
e) Theology as 'world denying'and 'body hating' 
Most striking in both authors is their uncritical acceptance of Nietzsche's mediation to them 
of Christianity. Examples of this are legion, but almost all references to Christianity revolve 
around variations on two main complaints: Christian morality is "other-worldly" and 
therefore 'life-denying', and it involves a deep hatred of the body (and therefore of the 
'passions'). Consider the complaint in Nietzsche's words: 
[H]atred of the senses, of the joy of the senses, of joy in general is 
Christian. "' 
We others, who have the courage for health and also for contempt, what 
contempt we have for a religion which teaches misunderstanding of the body! 
which does not wish to get rid of the soul superstition! which makes a 'merit' 
of eating too little! which combats health as a kind of enemy, devil, 
temptation! which has persuaded itself that a 'perfect soul' could be carried 
about in a cadaver of a body, and to do so needed to concoct a new 
conception of 'perfection', a pale, sickly idiot-fanatic condition, so-called 
'holiness'-holiness itself merely a symptom-syndrome of the impoverished, 
enervated, incurable corrupted body! "' 
Read from a distant planet, the majuscule script of our earthly existence 
would perhaps seduce the reader to the conclusion that the earth was the 
ascetic planet par excellence, an outpost of discontented, arrogant and nasty 
creatures who harboured a deep disgust for themselves, for the world, for all 
life and hurt themselves as much as possible out of pleasure in hurting: - 
probably their only pleasure. 'O' 
This last follows the crescendo of his already acerbic attack on the 'ascetic priest', who is 
hostile to life (but to the end of his own self-preservation), by mastering the "deepest, 
strongest, most profound conditions" of life-"in particular the manifestation of this in 
beauty and joy; while satisfaction is looked for and found in failure, decay, pain, 
... Solomon, ed. Collection, 7. 
"' Nietzsche, Anti-Christ, 143 (§2 1). 
202 Ibid., 180 (§5 1). 
"' Nietzsche, Genealogy, 90 (§111.11). 
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misfortune, ugliness, voluntary deprivation, destruction of selfhood, self-flagellation and 
self-sacrifice. 
"204 
This priest "does not belong to any race in particular; he thrives everywhere; he comes from 
every social classý 
ý205 
-though of course, the invective is crafted to serve the wider argument 
against the Christian version. One Reformation response to this problem, that the ascetic 
ideal is not in truth a Christian one, is met with an ironic approval. "Luther's achievement is 
nowhere greater than precisely in having had the courage of his own sensuality (-at the 
time it was delicately referred to as 'evangelical freedom' .. . 
). "206 But lest it be thought that 
some Christianity is intrinsically life-affirming, Nietzsche will damn it with faint praise: the 
ascetic priests sometimes offer "the most cautious dose" of small pleasures-life-affirming 
impulses such as help, gifts, encouragement, comfort, praise, honour-as modest titbits to 
201 keep his sickly herd together. 
Clearly, an epic argument is to be had here. Christian theology, in at least some expressions 
of it, evidently loves the body, celebrates sensuality as potentially finding its summit 
experiences in marriage, and enjoys all the goods and 'blessings' of this-worldly life. 
Nietzsche cannot evade these expressions, and must resort to a form of special pleading in 
response. 
But for Nussbaum, Nietzsche's version of Christianity is straightforwardly to be accepted. 
"Surely Nietzsche is right" that Christianity confers despair upon its followers. 101 Brontd's 
point is Nietzsche's point and is Nussbaum's point: Christianity "teaches people to look to a 
static paradise in which all movement and striving cease. It thus teaches them to denigrate 
their own movement and striving". 109 She enjoys Nietzsche's exposition of art "in an age 
that lacks the disfiguring self-hatred caused by a notion of original sin. "110 "Centuries of 
Christian teaching have left us with so little self-respect for our bodies and their desires that 
we are convinced that anything we ourselves make up must be disorderly and perhaps even 
204 Ibid., 90 (§111- 1 ]). 
215 Ibid., 90-91 (§111.11). 
206 Ibid., 73 (§111.2). 
207 Ibid., 106-07 (§111- 18). 
"' Martha C. Nussbaum, "Our Pasts, Ourselves, " review of Sources of the Self- The Making of Modern 
Identity, by 
Charles Taylor, New Republic 202 no. 15 (1990): 3 1. Nietzsche's claim is endorsed against Charles Taylor's 
'hunch' 
that a theistic account is the best account of moral identity. 
2" Nussbaum, " Wuthering Heights, " 3 75. 
2" Nussbaum, "Transfigurations: Nietzsche, " 108. 
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evil. "", These themes even govern her appreciation of Augustine's exposition of love. 
Likewise Solomon accepts uncritically "the other-worldly foundations and goals of 
Christianity". 212 
3. The response of Christian theology 
I have shown that scientific definitions of emotion, and their limitation for ethics, reflect a 
Kantian legacy. On the other hand, the competing Nietzschean legacy gives rise to 
Solomon's and Nussbaum's al I -encompassing approach to emotion. 
In this section I will make some comments preparatory to the theological investigation of 
Part Two. Firstly, a procedural linguistic point about theology's use of 'passion' is made, 
contra Solomon. The terms 'passion' and 'affection' enable Christian theology to speak 
more specifically than does the modern general term, 'emotion'. Secondly, a heuristic 
principle is offered against the misconception that modern neuroscience leaves 'no room for 
the soul'. Thirdly, a theological account of the emotions embraces delighted 'intoxications', 
and in a point of deep agreement with Nietzsche, is also unimpressed by Enlightenment 
ethics; but I also challenge Nietzsche's special pleading against Christian theology. I 
indicate what in Kant can be retained in a theological approach. Finally, I outline what is 
meant in this thesis by the multivalent term, 'the logic of love'. 
a) A linguistic complication 
To set aside emotion as morally irrelevant is a modem feature of Kant's thought. But unlike 
modems, Kant draws his language for emotion from antiquity. This difference is important, 
for post-Kant, our own difficulties in talking about emotion have been compounded by a 
widespread flattening in the very language of emotion itself. 
The point was well-made in Thomas Dixon's recent essay offered in response to Milbank, 
Webster and others. "' Dixon adopts an eirenic posture toward some narratives of modern 
science and proposes that rather than being 'anti-theo logical', they are more properly 
'atheological'. 214 As a specific instance of this, Dixon summarises the eighteenth century 
displacement of Christian psychology, which understood 'passion' and 'affection' within a 
trinitarian and soteriological framework. Secular psychology collapsed 'passion' and 
'affection' into the single, anthropologically self-referential word 'emotion'. This case 
211 Ibid., 101. 
212 Solomon, "Nihilism, " 207; cf 220. 
2" Thomas Dixon, "Theology, Anti-Theology and Atheology: From Christian Passions to Secular Emotions, 
" 
Modern Theology 15 no. 3 (1999). 
"' Ibid., 299. The term is understood value-neutrally and equated with 'untheo logical'. 
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study is offered as one example of an 'atheological' narrative supplanting a 'theological' 
one. "' Both the validity of this main claim and the usefulness of the case study to illustrate 
it would have to be pursued elsewhere. But for our purposes, the case study itself is most 
illuminating. 
Dixon distinguishes overtly theological approaches to psychology from those often called 
216 theological, but which Dixon regards as relying only upon a 'thin theism'. He then 
proposes four distinctive characteristics of eighteenth century theological psychology: the 
absence of a reason/passion dichotomy; 
2 11 
a distinction between 'passion' and 'affection'; ", 
a moral and social contextual isation of the passions and affections (as seen in the opposition 
of Butler, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Smith to Hobbes and Mandeville) ;2 
11 
and the 
220 importance of the soul (with the relative unimportance of the body). 
In reaction to the last distinctive characteristic (the relative importance of the soul), late 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century behaviourist approaches and their associated theories of 
emotion (commencing with James) re-emphasise the body. To this end, "involuntary 
appetites, passions and commotions of animal nature as well as moral sentiments and 
voluntary affections, were all lumped together under the undifferentiated concept of 
ý emotions'. ""' 
According to Dixon, Solomon is unwittingly trapped within this movement. Solomon's 
thorough synonymy of passion with emotion as 'that which moves us', is precisely 
[where] the mistake lies. Solomon is quite on his own in the history of 
thought in taking 'the passions' to "cover the entire range of those 
phenomena that may be said to move us". The passions, in traditional 
Christian psychology, form only a subset of those phenomena that move us. 
The affections, i. e., the voluntary movements of the soul, are the crucial 
second half of the traditional Christian picture. It is because Solomon 
erroneously supposes that the twentieth-century term 'emotions' can be used 
as a near-synonym for the classical word 'passions' (when in fact it covers 
many phenomena that used to be separated into passions on the one hand and 
115 A plea is then made that each specific issue in 'science' and 'religion' should be evaluated along similar 
lines, as 
against more traditional approaches that characterise the relationship monolithically, whether in terms of 
compatibilism or hostility. 
216 Dixon, 300. 
217 Ibid., 301. 
211 Ibid., 302. 
211 Ibid., 304; cf. above, 50. 
220 Ibid., 303. 
"' Ibid., 302. Dixon traces rise of 'emotion' from Brown's 1820 lectures through Bain and Darwin, and culminating 
in James' seminal 1884 article. In this way, emotions became bodily manifestations understood simply 
as a part of 
our animal heritage (305-309). 
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affections on the other) that he makes these mistakes in his readings of the 
Christian tradition. 222 
Thus Dixon takes Solomon to task in connection with the first two distinctive characteristics 
of eighteenth-century Christian psychology (the absence of a reason/passion dichotomy; 
and a distinction between 'passion' and 'affection'), "' believing him frankly to be mistaken 
in his attack upon the whole of Western history and Christian tradition under his 'myth of 
the passions' rubric. Although affection was regarded as the positive face of something that 
is referred to as 'passion' in its negative aspect, Solomon simply ignores it. Then, the 
cognitivist project poorly "reinvent[s] the richer and more balanced view of the passions 
and affections that was lost as a consequence of the predominance of a narrow scientific 
view during the period between c. 185 0 and c. 193 0.59224 
Various projects in Solomon may still deserve recognition: that 'Passions' provide meaning 
(against their previously understood 'de-meaning' role); that in some sense they are 
choices; that not all passions are equal for whoever lives the 'good life'; and the hope that 
they become part of a 'harmonious strength' in humanity. But if these are reinventions, it is 
now clear how Solomon's work highlights my 'MacIntyrean' proposal. The very language 
of emotion is, for ethics, seriously defective. Thus in the blasted landscape of MacIntyre's 
vision, Solomon's reconstruction is unable to sustain ethical intelligibility. 
b) Body and soul 
For some people (perhaps at a more popular level), a query remains outstanding. Does the 
theologian have any place once the claims of neuroscience are before us? Perhaps 
neuroscience leaves "no room for the soul", as one prominent neurobiologist and 
philosopher of mind declared in a recent radio interview. This is thought to follow from the 
materialist underpinnings of neuroscience, and from its alliance with evolutionary biology, 
and from certain views of the Christian 'soul'. Repeated references to 'the soul' will follow 
in this work, so a brief digression is in order, if only to offer a heuristic method for readers 
troubled by such a complaint. (It is important to realise, however, that this complaint is not 
important enough to set our subsequent agenda. ) 
This 'soul' for which there is no longer 'room' in modern discussion, must of necessity 
be 
the soul of Cartesian dualism. Whether or not this is the same 'soul' considered 
by the 
thinkers in this work, we shall nonetheless see lively debates raging about the relationship 
222 Ibid., 303. 
"I it appears an error has occurred in Dixon's first reference to Solomon 
(ibid., 326 n. 19), where the specific work is 
not cited; however this and subsequent references seem to follow our edition of 
Solomon, Passions. 
224 Dixon, 311. 
Page 64 
of the soul to its body. Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin all strenuously attack some views in 
favour of others, though with a conscious level of 'slippage' in their final position (since 
some matters remain a mystery). Generally, they opt for a 'hylomorphic' view, where the 
soul is totally grounded in the body, and indeed is so 'stitched' into the body-so much 'the 
spouse of the body, in Augustine's metaphor-that it is not comprehensible without its 
body. 
The conversation here could drift off into the theological debate over body-soul dualism, or 
into philosophical debate about the mind. That is not our purpose here. The point is simply 
to suggest, as a method of heuristic engagement with these older texts, that we are not 
entirely out of place to think of the soul as doing the work that 'central nervous sYstemý 
(CNS) does in our modem conception. (Usually the CNS is taken to include both the brain 
and the peripheral nerves. ) 
At first it might seem that modern 'mind' is the 'soul' of older thinkers. But the wider field 
covered by the CNS offers better parallels to what these older writers included in the 'soul'. 
The CNS, though not an incorporeal substance, has emergent properties that cannot always 
be easily located corporeally. It is responsible for the animation of the body, is yet the seat 
of the self, and mediates the 'feelings' and stirrings that Chrysippus took to be the actual 
movements of the soul. There are even parallels to the 'faculties' of the soul that we shall 
later see in the psychology of Aquinas: the CNS has its structures for reason, appetition and 
apprehension; and Aquinas' 'irascible' and 'concupiscible' emotions bear uncanny 
resemblance to some of Panksepp's "basic emotional systems". Without a doubt, the 
thinkers we are considering were very interested to offer, among other things, an empirical 
account of the functions of (what we call) the CNS; and the neurobiologist who found "no 
room for the soul", had rather perhaps not found the wood for the trees. Of course the 
correspondence between soul and CNS is not total, and there is no need that it should be; 
indeed, we press the parallel too far at our peril. 
Even given modem knowledge of the CNS and its psychological correlates, the ancient 
problem of akrasia-that we can 'war' even with 'ourselves', not doing what 'we' want-is 
just as mysterious and no closer to a solution. This alone should humble us enough to read 
ancient wisdom considerately. Even if for the sake of argument we granted every 
last given 
of the etiology offered by evolutionary biology, the requirement to unravel the conundrum 
of how to live is still upon us, since natural selection will take us nowhere soon. 
But moderns will worry, perhaps rightly, when ancient thought drifts toward 
its penchant 
for dualism; and the 'immortality of the soul' might be thought to have no correspondence 
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with the CNS. On these points, Christian theology has no need for embarrassment in its use 
of 'soul'. The Christian tradition has had its own reasons for fighting off the excesses of 
dualism (mainly, that the body is a created good). Indeed, Hans Wolff has shown how in its 
earliest Judeo-Christian usage 'soul' referred to the deepest needs of a human being, 
holistically understood. "' This conception is retained in NT Christianity when the 
'immortality of the soul' is in fact a 'resurrection of the body', as guaranteed by that of 
Jesus. Until such a resurrection, God is held somehow to hold the 'souls' of people safe; the 
emphasis here is on the power of God, not the incorporeality of substance. A God such as 
this can remember and keep each person, perhaps like the melody of a song, and for the 
early Christian writers, the resurrection of Jesus was sufficient grounds not to worry. 
Whether or not there is more to say about dualism, the findings of modern neuroscience are 
certainly no embarrassment to Christian theology. The theologians surveyed in Part Two 
each seek to describe many of the same phenomena that modern neuroscience tries to 
explain. 
In this connection, we might gently note a welcome self-revelation by Panksepp. Relating 
the painful loss of his teenage daughter Tiina, and the devastating effect of her loss upon his 
life for some time (a "grief that has no end"226) , he then recounts the delightful story of a 
younger Tiina once giving him an insight into the nature of the emotions. In keeping with 
the dedication of his book, an afterword to the story is, "Thanks, Tiina, wherever your spirit 
may be 
! 99227 
It is impertinent to speculate about the sense a bereaved father might mean for the 
interesting term 'spirit'. It must certainly have been brave for this particular father so to 
speak, given the likelihood of some colleagues alleging an aporia here-as if a 
neuroscientist cannot believe in a 'spirit' of whatever form. But we should rather credit this 
scientist for leaving open the way for such a term, and his final gesture toward possibilities 
that science is less able to comprehend. "One hopes there will eventually be a world 
religion that will help us all, together, pay our respects to these abiding mysteries. ""' 
Perhaps it has already come amongst us; perhaps the authors we shall here discuss would be 
22' Hans Walter Wolff, Anthropology of the Old Testament tr. Margaret Kohl, (London: S. C. M., 1974), 17-18, 
& 
ch. 11 passim, on (nepesh). 
226 Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience, frontispiece. 
227 Ibid., xi. 
228 Panksepp, "Emotions, " 339. 
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very sympathetic to much of this man's professional world, and to the deepest yearnings of 
his personal world. 
c) Agreeing with Nietzsche (whilst challenging him) 
But this is to move ahead too quickly, because the Nietzschean legacy places more primary 
challenges against Christian theology. These challenges are very different to the 'scientific' 
concern over 'soul', and are potentially far more damaging. We could frame the challenges 
as questions. Can Christianity theology defend itself against the charge that by being other- 
worldly, it is poorly equipped to express an ethic for the present? Or can it defend against 
the charge that being body-hating, it is unable to accept emotions as goods? 
It is premature to attempt an answer to these charges without the investigation of Part Two, 
but we can certainly form the outline of an answer, beginning with a recollection of the 
scenarios I began with: 
(Tears in the kitchen. ) "Let's bandage it, and then I'll kiss it better. " 
(Oneftiend to another. ) "You make me so mad I could hit you! " 
(orperhaps instead. ) "Let's make love. " 
(At the market. ) "I must have it! How much do you want? " 
(In an office. ) "She'll pay-I'll destroy her. " 
Under Kant's categorical imperative, the attempt would be made to side-step the emotive 
component of these scenarios. C. S. Lewis makes the Kantian sidestep all the more apparent 
when he discusses a theological tension in this further 'scenario': 
(In a Psalm. ) "More to be desired are they than gold, even much fine gold; 
sweeter also than honey, and drippings of the honeycomb. " 
The Psalmist is not difficult to comprehend, says C. S. Lewis, if the gold and honey were 
being compared to God's mercies, or to his attributes, or to his visitations. But instead, the 
comparison is to 'statutes' and 'decrees'-in fact, to the entire Pentateuchal law. In the 
same Psalm, these "rejoice the heart" (Ps. 19: 8). 
This was at first to me very mysterious. "Thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not 
commit adultery"-l can understand that a man can, and must, respect these 
'statutes', and try to obey them, and assent to them in his heart. But it is very 
hard to find how they could be, so to speak, delicious, how they exhilarate. If 
this is difficult at any time, it is doubly so when obedience to either is 
opposed to some strong, and perhaps in itself innocent, desire. A man 
held 
back by his unfortunate previous marriage to some lunatic or criminal who 
never dies from some woman whom he faithfully loves, or a hungry man 
left 
alone, without money, in a shop filled with the smell and sight of new 
bread, 
roasting coffee, or fresh strawberries-can these find the prohibitions of 
adultery or of theft at all like honey? They may obey, they may still respect 
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the 'statute'. But surely it could be more aptly compared to the dentist's 
forceps or the front line than to anything enjoyable and sweet. "' 
So on one hand, passion is somehow unpleasantly restrained by Law. But on the other hand, 
Law can be enthusiastically celebrated. Putting this tension to a respected Christian scholar. 
Lewis is told how the 'pleasure' was that of obedience, of a good conscience-Of the 
ýsmile% as it were, upon Duty's face. But this Kantian interpretation will not suffice for 
Lewis. "The difficulty is that the Psalmists never seem to me to say anything very like this. " 
Karl Barth has also noticed the same difficulty-evidenced, interestingly enough, also 
within the Psalms. Aims, and desires, of the will are not 
to be summarily discredited and set aside. And when one of the widespread 
and constantly re-emerging moral systems-hedonism, utilitarianism or 
eudxmonism, the so-called ethics of value-tries to use these natural aims as 
a basis for its presentation of the ethical, Christian ethics must be careful not 
to adopt at once towards this system the well known and purely negative 
attitude of Kant and the Kantians. Where the obligatory is to be understood as 
the content of the divine command, we cannot refuse absolutely to interpret it 
also as that which is supremely pleasing and useful and valuable. That "he 
shall give thee the desires of thine heart" (Ps. 37: 4), "upholding thee as thou 
desirest, " and that He does this by giving us His command-this is also true 
in its own place and sense, and it must be stated, and justice must be done to 
it, in Christian ethics. 230 
Lewis will go on to suggest (in a questionable Platonic phrase) that the Psalmist uses "the 
language of a man ravished by a moral beauty. "23 1 The beauty is of a kind of order revealed 
to the Psalmist in the extensive material of the Pentateuch. This 'ravishment' "involved 
exact and loving conformity to an intricate pattern"232 -an intricacy seen within and across 
the law, as reflected by the Psalmist's own intricate poetry (with Lewis now considering the 
long acrostic Psalm 119). 
It would appear that in some fundamental way, Lewis, Barth and the Psalmists agree with 
Nietzsche against Kant. All have a vision of emotion as somehow integral to evaluative 
judgments. Even Kant is against himself, positing 'sympathy' (like our "let's bandage 
it ... ") as self-evidentially 
'reasonable' to the hardened scoundrel. Solomon even corrects 
Nietzsche at this point, approving that no 'hydraulic model' or evasion of emotion is 
evident in early Christianity. This approval seems to be Solomon's one and only point of 
agreement with early Christianity: - 
229 C. S. Lewis, Reflections on the Psalms (London: Fount; HarperCollins, 1958), 47, as for quotation 
following. 
2" Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics Vol. 2: The Doctrine of God (second haýflvolume) tr. G. W. Bromiley, 
(Edinburgh: 
T. & T. Clark, 1957), 650. 
23 'Lewis, 5 1. 
232 Ibid., 50. 
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Nietzsche objects to the biblical teaching that a man is responsible not only for what he does but for what he 'feels' as well. Nietzsche argues that this 
thesis is unintelligible; but here, for once, we must violently disagree with him and defend an insight of Christian psychology that has too long been lost 
under the metaphysics of its theology. "' 
Even so famous a biblical passage as Galatians 5: 19-22 contrasts Just, jealousy, anger and 
envy (and more) against love, joy, peace, kindness and faithfulness (among others). Only 
the most extreme rationalist could hold that these last are free of affection. Nietzscheans 
might attempt to sustain the view that they are emaciated or 'emasculated'. Such attempts 
proceed either by fiat or, as we have seen, by special pleading (a strategy of some 
importance to sustain the 'unmasking' of Christianity) . 211 But presumably, Psalmists would 
find these attempts to be unintelligible at best, and at worst bombastic (or in their terms, the 
ý mockery' of 'scoffers'). 
It appears prima facie that there is a robust theological account of the emotions. We shall 
see how the 'intoxications' of Christian theology certainly draw upon a vision of an 
eschatological world, which brings a renewed estimate of its importance and preciousness 
of 'this' world's goods, and from which is derived a different kind of deep love for the body 
and its responses to the 'world'. The life-affirming impulses of Christianity that Nietzsche 
seeks to neutralise by special pleading, might rather prove constitutive to Christian 
theology's approach to 'this' world. 
Christian ethics continues to embrace these 'intoxications' in the moral field, such as food 
enjoyed in goodfaith with shopkeepers, or sexual enjoyment actually enhanced by good 
faith with a spouse. These delights can even touch Lewis's hungry man in the bread shop, 
and the person contemplating illicit romance. This willingness for delighted 'intoxication' 
leaves Christian theology unimpressed by Enlightenment ethics, for reasons similar to 
Nietzsche's, thus constituting a point of deep agreement with Nietzsche. (There is also an 
agreement here with Nietzschean epistemology: true knowledge is subjective, emotion- 
threaded knowledge. ) But disagreement with Nietzschean naturalism also follows: Christian 
theology's delighted 'intoxications', rather than denying the body or this-worldly life, will 
challenge the emaciation inherent to the disorder of Nietzsche's chaotic 'system'. 
As we have seen, conceptions of 'order' arouse extreme suspicion and contempt among 
Nietzscheans. 235 We will postpone our engagement, other than to recall Nietzsche's 
Solomon, Passions, 132 nt. 
234 See above, 61. 
See on Nussbaum above, 59. Also see above (56, n. 186) for the kind of order to which 
Nietzsche objects. 
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alternative hierarchical order. This was an order inimical to justice, and therefore certainly 
to any project such as Nussbaum's. In this respect Barth went on to observe the point of 
Kant's project: 
On the other hand, we have to admit that Kant has expressed the essential 
concern of Christian ethics by pointing out that of itself the concept of what is pleasing and useful and valuable does not give us the concept of what is 
obligatory. "' 
Without putting too fine a point on it, this leaves Kant able to sustain a form of justice. 
Despite Nietzsche's mockery of ordered and just societies, a moment of reflection on social 
ethics leaves us unwilling to cast aside justice. 
d) 'The logic of love': a multivalent concept 
Christian theology is able to respond to Kantian and Nietzschean legacies by making sense 
of the relationship between emotion and ethics in a 'logic of love'. This will become 
apparent in the theological investigation of Part Two. Throughout the thesis, I will be using 
'logic of love' in two broad senses. Within each broad sense are two complementary facets. 
To make this multivalence clearer, I will numerically list the two senses and their 
complementary facets: 
1. The first broad sense concerns a dipolar relationship between object and subject. 
Various 'objects' reside in the moral field, and human subjects respond to them in love. 
That is, given the existence of a pluriform 'moral field', 'love' is a set of evaluative 
responses (such as desire, interest, care, concern and attraction) to all of its goods. 
Hence love is the friend of moral knowledge. I will use the following two points to 
show how the dipolar relationship delivers a 'logic of love' that assists moral 
knowledge. 
a) Ontologically grounding our knowledge of the moral field are the many telic and 
generic relationships that constitute it.,,, The intricate order of this field is the true 
substance of deliberative logic, and various goods intrinsic to this field elicit our 
love. Love responds to the goods of the moral field, and does not spring de novo 
from humanity. Indeed whether or not these goods are existentially apprehended in 
love, they remain present as goods. (It is on this kind of basis that Christian 
theology can defend Kant's commitment to justice, since justice is in part the 
recognition of a real ordering that exists irrespective of anybody's loves. To 
defend 
236 Barth, 650. 
"' My indebtedness to Oliver O'Donovan for this conception and for what follows will be noted as the thesis 
develops. 
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justice is to commend this order, possibly in the face of indifference to it. ) Since 
love is a series of responses to a plethora of goods, it becomes appropriate to 
describe love as having its own 'logic'. This is a logic that pertains to the already 
existing order of the moral field, rather than being a logic of the lover's own 
making. The 'logic of love' is, in this sense, a reference to love's basis in an order 
that precedes the lover's love of this order. We might summarise the objective and 
ontological basis of love by saying that love has an ordinant logic. 
b) But if moral order is ontologically prior to love, it follows that love is an 
existentially prior element in deliberative logic. That is, deliberative logic proceeds 
strongly in reference to what is loved, since love is among the first experiential 
moments of moral awareness. Central to any deliberative 'logic' are various 'loves' 
toward various goods in the moral field. These loves are always present, even if 
covert, and are integral to our naming of various 'goods' as 'good'. In this sense, 
then, the 'logic' of our deliberation is inescapably imbued with these loves. (It is on 
this kind of basis that Christian theology can reject, like Nietzsche, Kant's 
dichotomy of ethics and emotion. Thus theological ethics takes deliberative logic to 
be subjective to a degree; it further asserts that all deliberative logic is subjective in 
this way, despite protestations such as Kant's to the contrary. ) We might summarise 
this epistemological and subjective element of love by saying that deliberative logic 
has its love(s), but noting how in this phrase, the referent for 'logic' has changed. 
Whereas in point (a) 'logic' alluded to the order of the moral field, in point (b) the 
'logic' on view is our deliberative, epistemic discovery of the moral field. The 
process of this discovery is deeply coloured, tinged and touched by love-and it 
cannot be any other way, if love is indeed the response to the many goods of the 
moral field. 
2. But theological investigation uncovers the necessity to understand 'the logic of love' in 
a second broad sense. Human love is not congruent to those goods that should rightly 
elicit love; which is to say, human love is 'disordered'. (In mentioning 'indifference' to 
j ustice, 238 1 alluded briefly to such incongruence. ) The promise of the gospel includes a 
divine 'reordering', by the Spirit, of love. In this second broad sense, then, I will tell of 
a 'logic', or grammar, of reordered love. Again, two complementary 
facets are 
envisaged to form a 'theologic' of grace and command: 
See above, 71. 
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a) There is a logic of love poured in. In theological understanding, humans are helpless 
to reorder their own loves. The work of divine reordering is adventitious; the 
Spirit's approach is, to us, like wind. Yet it is possible theologically to examine 
some means of this divine approach-such as, for example, divine revelation (e. g. 
OT laws, or the teachings of Christ), which highlights goods within the moral field 
that were previously veiled to us. The adventitious work of the Spirit is in concert 
with this revelation, to elicit our love towards those goods that we were formerly 
indifferent towards (or worse). 
b) However though adventitious, this reordering is accessible to all because a 
constitutive element of divine reordering is an invitation (by command) for us to 
participate in the reordering. This is a logic of love commended. The love that is 
commended to us includes the loving worship of God; the enjoyment of the 
neighbour and an embrace of their beauty; and the curtailment or adjustment of 
loves (and behaviours) that are inimical to the loved persons. 
When a given 'logic of love' is mentioned in the thesis, context should make the relevant 
sense clear. I will only refer the reader back to this section occasionally. 
We have now seen an Enlightenment approach and a Nietzschean approach to the 
relationship between ethics and emotion, including their limitations. Kant's respect for 
emotion threatens his view that emotions have no place in ethics; and Nietzsche's 
celebration of the excellences intrinsic to emotion requires a caste society ranked by 
excellence, irrespective of justice. In their alliance with Nietzsche, Solomon and Nussbaum 
do not engage with this limitation. 
I have asserted that a theological account of the emotions embraces delighted 
'intoxications' in a point of deep agreement with Nietzsche. The agreement is epistemic and 
ethical: emotions are required, somehow, for knowledge and for ethics. But I have further 
asserted that Nietzsche's chaotic 'system' is emaciated in a way that Christian theology will 
challenge (so retaining Kant's commitment to justice). The theological investigation of Part 




FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM 
Having seen two modern approaches to the relationship between ethics and emotion, the 
investigation of this part will establish a theological approach, by reference to major texts in 
four theologians: Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, John Calvin and Soren 
Kierkegaard. 
In the first instance, Augustine is commended to our investigation by the rejection of him in 
Nussbaum and Solomon. The rejections differ. Solomon finds his approach to emotion 
pusillanimous. Nussbaum appreciates a depth of engagement in his love, but rejects it as 
'other worldly' and 'body hating'. 
But which of these different objections (if either) is correct? Why should Augustine be 
chosen in this way, in discussions of emotion? Opening Augustine's corpus almost 
anywhere, his deep emotional literacy becomes immediately apparent. He continually 
attempts to understand his own emotional life in reference to his ever-increasing scriptural 
and theological understanding. This aspect of his prodigious corpus commends him, prima 
facie, to my investigation. 
The investigation quickly yields rich rewards. There is an extended engagement with 
Stoicism (which Nussbaum saw); and his early and late engagements serendipitously 
develop an interesting dialectic. The early Manichean views he opposes locate evil 
primordially in the body and its desires, while in later Pelagian views, control of desire is 
unproblematic and evil merely a dysfunction. His balanced and rich theological alternative 
to these two accounts is, in part, a fortuitous outcome of their polarity. 
Subsequent and secondary literature makes apparent the inestimable influence of this body 
of theological thought about emotion. Augustine is foundational to this thesis. I have chosen 
the other three theologians because they develop Augustine in various ways. 
Aquinas, in an Aristotelian milieu, set himself an interesting question. What 
if both 
Aristotelian science and Augustinian theology are true? The result, perhaps to the 
amazement of Aristotelian onlookers, became a sophisticated theological account of ethical 
behaviour that completed Augustine's broad brushstrokes in fine detail. 
Clearly, my 
investigation could not afford to ignore this detail. Aquinas is most strikingly 
insightful 
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about the extent to which our emotions respond to and so shed light upon our (possibly 
inarticulate) moral commitments. In our emotions, we discover what we construe to be 
good. 
But we also experience moments of intense emotion with highly unethical results. I recount 
one such moment in my own life. This recalls another facet of Augustine's thought, a 
melancholic aspect, which was amplified by John Calvin. Calvin's engagement with some 
version of Aquinas caused him to think it necessary to give voice again to this other 
Augustinian emphasis. It is melancholy reading, yet satisfying, given the depth of Calvin's 
diagnosis. And even Calvin retains the same hopes as powered Augustine; there is no 
Manicheism here. 
I turn to Kierkegaard because of his Augustinian diagnosis of modernity. I make no 
judgment over the degree to which Kierkegaard thought himself an Augustinian, although 
obviously, he was no Sartrean existentialist. The more interesting point in Kierkegaard is 
that he radically challenges the 'objectivity' of the Enlightenment in a way that is deeply 
consonant with Augustine's understanding of the emotions in their relation to the world. 
But this celebration of subjectivity (properly understood) also equips Kierkegaard to refute 
Nietzsche-and on the grounds of Nietzsche's choosing. (We can only wish they had lived 
at the same time. ) 
To these four-the one foundational, the other three developing his approach-I will now 
turn, to discern theology's logic of love. I will finally draw upon all four of these thinkers to 
propose a theological theory of virtue as a promising means of surnmarising the relationship 
between ethics and emotion. 
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Chapter IV: Treasures of Augustine's Heart 
We need not at present give a careful and copious exposition of the doctrine 
of Scripture, the sum of Christian knowledge, regarding these passions. it 
subjects the mind itself to God, that He may rule and aid it, and the passions, 
again, to the mind, to moderate and bridle them, and turn them to righteous 
uses. In our ethics, we do not so much inquire whether a pious soul is angry, 
as why he is angry; not whether he is sad, but what is the cause of his 
sadness; not whether he fears, but what he fears. For I am not aware that any 
right thinking person would find fault with anger at a wrongdoer which seeks 
his amendment, or with sadness which intends relief to the suffering, or with 
fear lest one in danger be destroyed. "' 
We have seen representatives of the Nietzschean approach use Augustine as a foil for their 
rejection of theology's approach to ethics and emotion. In the five subsections of this 
chapter, I will show the extent of Augustine's deep emotional literacy, since for Augustine, 
love is somehow central to an account of ethics. In this chapter, I will describe Augustine's 
'logic of love', and its centrality to an account of ethics, as follows. 
Love is fundamental to our knowledge and behaviour (Section One); but love is disordered 
by voracity and 'selective sight' (Section Two). But this conception of disorder does not 
constitute a hatred of the body or of bodily life (Section Three); indeed, love for human 
others is integral to Augustine's account of love for God (Section Four). Reordered love is a 
divine gift, formed in part by our willing participation in the divinely ordered moral field 
(Section Five). I will now pause to outline these sections in slightly more detail. 
In Section One I describe how for Augustine, people are constituted in being, knowledge 
and love, so that all knowledge has affective tones. The soul unifies mind and body, and the 
soul is directed by its loves. The soul then directs behaviour accordingly. 'Freedom' is 
therefore contingent upon the affections of the soul (where 'affection' goes beyond the 
bodily disturbances of emotion). I also outline Augustine's attack upon Stoic attempts to 
eliminate emotional 'disturbances'. 
Section Two outlines the disordering of love. Voracity and selective sight cause plenitude to 
be perceived as scarcity, when some goods are loved to the exclusion of others. Augustine 
names the hegemonic claims of voracious love as 'concupiscence', and shows how 
disordered love generates both pride and despair. Humanity's helpless bondage is revealed 
in Christ's death for sin, but right responses to God and to the abundant moral field are 
secured by the pneurnatological reorientation of love. Throughout, I introduce Manichean 
239 Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans (413-25), tr. R. W. Dyson, Cambridge Texts in the 
History of 
Political Thought edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 365 (IX. 5). This translation of 
De civ. 
Dei is used throughout unless otherwise indicated. 
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and Pelagian opponents, against whose opposing accounts of evil (as, respectively, 
primordium and dysfunction) Augustine forges his account of evil as the privation of good. 
In Section Three I will detail Augustine's high view of the body, and I will clarify 
Augustine's treatment of marital 'concupiscence'. I show that Nussbaum is mistaken about 
Augustine's 'hatred' of the body; rather, Augustine's condemnation of hegemonic hungry 
love threatens her own system and highlights Nietzschean incomprehension of contented 
love. She observes Augustine's lack of confidence in human choice, but fails to engage his 
melancholy reasons: that under voracity and selective sight, choice-making brings cruelty 
and chaos. Ironically, Augustine seems much more interested in using concupiscentia to 
describe the will to power. 
In Section Four, I address the charge that Augustinian theology does not need human 
others. Grounds for this might reside in the impassibility of God (if humans are imago dei); 
or in Augustine's unfortunate early formulation that people may be used (uti) for the 
enjoyment (frui) of God; or in the eudaernonist substructure of his thought. But in each 
case, I offer a 'thick' theological defence against the charge. Humanity is to be 'enjoyed in 
God'; and Augustine's strenuous campaigns against social evils evidence his living 
according to this view. 
I examine reordered love in Section Five. It connotes worship of God, enjoyment of 
neighbour, and the exclusion of certain behaviours toward those loved. In a logic of 'love 
poured in', affections cannot be commanded. The Spirit pours a love for God into the 
human heart, and God's 'embrace' reorders our loves. Though not ours to control, 
participation is accessible in a logic of 'love commended', where love for God stretches our 
horizons, and requires the curtailment of voracious selective sight. I then recount some 
'aspects' of the agent's loving participation in moral field, and suggest that the Psalmist's 
love of 'the Law' is a delight in instruction about the aspects of love. I finally suggest that 
Augustine's project reflects Christ's 'treasures of the heart'. 
Before turning to these sections, a word is required on the chronological perspective that 
must inform any discussion of Augustine, since the intellectual developments of his 
long 
life are evident throughout his prodigious corpus. In this respect, Peter Brown's 
biography... 
remains a work of major importance, since it maps the changes in Augustine's thought. 
240 Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (London: Faber, 1967). A recent new edition 
is Peter Brown, 
Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (A New Edition with an Epilogue) (London: 
Faber, 2000). In the citations from 
Brown which follow in this thesis, the second pagination in brackets refers to the new edition. 
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Augustine's vocation shapes him, as the theoretician without responsibilities becomes the 
overseer with souls at stake. His discourse is shaped by his conflicts, with the late fourth- 
century threat from gnostic Manichean speculations giving way to the harsh, urgent 
imperatives of Julian and the Pelagians during Augustine's later years in the second and 
third decades of the fifth century. Scripture, increasingly regarded by him as normative, 
gradually supplants some habits of his philosophical heritage. After the self-confessed 
sexual obsession of his youth, the normal physical changes of ageing seem to cast different 
lights. And this life spans an epic and cataclysmic backdrop, as the late Roman empire 
moves inexorably from its Indian summer during Augustine's youth, to the first of its death- 
throes in his old age. In the topic areas of interest to us, we can easily see a movement from 
preoccupation with the metaphysics of human essence, toward more experiential and 
pastoral emphases. 
Our investigation will require the use of texts both early and late, and Brown's framework 
will largely be assumed. 241 It would only distract us to discuss each sitz im leben or to 
defend Brown's history. However, Brown's biography has recently been re-released, 242 with 
an epilogue by the author that takes into account over fifty major new Augustinian 
documents (the DiyJak letters and the Dolbeau sermons), all lost since the middle ages but 
rediscovered recently. The discoveries have dramatically enhanced Augustine scholarship, 
and have caused Brown radically to revise his picture of a harsh older Augustine in decline. 
It will sometimes become appropriate to mention Brown's mature thought. 
1. Epistemology and the affections 
In this section I will describe how for Augustine, people are constituted in being, 
knowledge and love, so that all knowledge has affective tones. The soul unifies mind and 
body, and the soul is directed by its loves. The soul then directs behaviour accordingly. 
'Freedom' is therefore contingent upon the affections of the soul (where 'affection' goes 
beyond the bodily disturbances of emotion). I also outline Augustine's attack upon Stoic 
attempts to eliminate emotional 'disturbances'. 
241 Furthermore, to assist in placing the texts chronologically, Brown's dating will appear in brackets after the name 
of the text in its first citation. These are drawn from the chronological tables in Brown, 
Augustine, 16,74,184,282, 
378 (3,64,178,280,380). But circa is always to be understood, given comments in Brown, Augustine 
(new edn. ), 
viii. 
See above, n. 240. 
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a) The 'weight'of the soul 
As a starting point, we need to notice the striking way that 'love' is for Augustine an 
essential constituent of being human. Love directs the soul, so metaphorically speaking, the 
soul can be said to have 'weight'. 
Augustine's statement regarding the importance of emotions, quoted at the start of the 
chapter, "' is clear enough. It parallels modern 'cognitive' views, and describes how 
Christian theology ("our ethics") is not against emotion per se. The statement occurs in the 
sprawling engagement with Stoics (and Platonists) of De civitate Dei, during which 
Augustine methodically distances himself from Stoicism. Though significant in its own 
right, the statement builds toward something even more fundamental. A broad consensus in 
ancient Philosophy held that philosophy investigates the physical, the logical and the ethical 
(XI. 25-28). Augustine agrees, then goes much further, to find the very deepest levels of 
human being. 
If the universe comprises the physical, the logical and the ethical, then each person 
incarnates three personal correlates: being, knowledge and love. People exist, know, and 
love; and these are the most properly basic attributes of humanity. "In our present state, we 
believe that we possess these three things-being, knowledge and love-not on the 
testimony of others, but because we ourselves are aware of their presence, and because we 
discern them with our most truthful inner vision . 
ý5244 In an amusing pre-Cartesian twist, 
Augustine toys with the Academics along lines that 'even if I am mistaken, therefore I am! ' 
But the real point concerns Augustine's correlation of 'love' with ethical existence. Ethics 
concerns a form of love. Humanity's deep care about right and wrong, and people's 
insistence upon various acts, signal a fundamental human capacity to love. Augustine does 
not mean that people necessarily love other people. Rather, each person simply has the 
capacity for delight, or love, directed toward various things. By 'love', Augustine has in 
mind a range of interested responses (including desire, care, concern, attraction, lust, etc. ); 
and he will have much to say about the 'various things' known and loved (or not loved). 
The primary point, though, is that ethics derives from this human given. 
Love is formally contingent upon knowledge: to love something, it must first be known. But 
materially, there is no knowing without love. Our knowledge relationship to the world 
is 
See above, 75. 
244 Augustine, 488 (XI. 28). 
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irreducibly touched or imbued or tinged, with love. That deliberative logic has its love(s) is 
true for all humanity, whether Christian or pagan. 
Moreover, love tends toward a telos. Were humanity cattle, "we should love the camal and 
sensual life, and this would be our sufficient good". Just as a stone is "carried by its weight 
wherever it is carried, " so also "the soul is carried by its love . 
"241 Though an odd image for 
moderns., ancients meant by this 'weight' "a momentum by which each part of the universe 
sought out its place of rest, with the mute insistence of a homing pigeon seeking to regain 
211 its nest". 
If the self was proper 'gravity' for this 'weight', then people would be "blessed" when their 
love terminated upon themselves and all would be well. But such blessing is so often tried 
and found wanting, that Augustine suspects the proper 'gravity' of our love to have lain 
elsewhere all along. "[O]ur nature has God as the author of its being, [so] we must beyond 
doubt have Him as our teacher, that we may be truly wise; and Him also to bestow spiritual 
sweetness upon us, that we may be blessed indeed . "241 This proper telos becomes the proper 
criterion for evaluating various loves. 
b) The soul as a rallying point 
It is worth pausing to note an aspect of Augustine's understanding of the soul. 
His statement on emotion 248 occurs in a strange context. To erode pagan confidence in the 
worship of demons as divine-human intermediaries, Augustine proceeds by sparring with 
the demonology of the Platonist Apuleius. Augustine's own demonology is unimportant 
here, because the Apuleian demon functions as an anthropological counterfactual, to show 
what constitutes true humanity. The truly human is then utilised as a 'counter- 
counterfactual' to debunk the worship of these Apuleian demons. Our interest here is in 
Augustine's anthropological claim. 
In Apuleius' account, demons have a powerful ethereal 'body' and a rational mind; but their 
mind is tossed upon a sea of passion, unbridled by virtue (cf. VIII. 14-17 and IX. 3,6). What 
constitutes the crucial difference between a demon and a human? The counterfactual point 
supplied by this demon is relatively straightforward. 
245 Ibid., 487 (XI. 28). 
24' Brown, Augustine (new edn. ), 512. Interestingly, Brown describes how this is the same 'weight' of 
'glory' which 
God places into hearts (2 Cor. 4: 7), making Christians "the heavy people, 
held on course, despite the high winds of 
the world, by the gathering momentum of a 'gravity of love'. " 
Augustine, 483 (XI. 25). 
See above, 75. 
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Their minds, then, are tossed upon a sea, as Apuleius puts it; nor have they in 
any part of their souls the truth and virtue by which such turbulent and depraved passions might be repulsed. 249 
Their mind, as Apuleius says, is a sea tossed with tempest, having no rallying 
point of truth or virtue in their soul from which they can resist their turbulent 
and depraved emotions. "' 
[I]psius quoque mentis, ut iste appellauit, salu fluctuant, nec in ueritate atque 
uirtute, qua turbulentis et prauis affectionibus repugnatur, ex ulla animi parte 
consitunt. " 
Humans do possess this 'rallying point'. The human mind and soul are in league with the 
252 direction of affectatio (for adfectatio). The body is the locus of action for the soul's 
adfectiones-but the unitive element between mind and body, is the soul (elsewhere called 
'the spouse' of the body. 211) The storminess of (what we call) 'emotion', and the 
commitments of the mind, are recursive in their relation. This recursion takes place 'at' the 
ýrallying point', the soul-which, we recall, has a 'weight' of love. The soul brings together 
its mind and body, and is directed in this by its loves, and action results. 
But 'free will' is bonded, because 'freedom' is contingent upon what is loved and hated. 
Even a great ruler cannot be said to be free if "they lay waste their own souls by their 
greater licence in wickedness". The tyrant's subjects may be freer, since "the good man is 
free even if he is a slave, whereas the bad man is a slave even if he reigns: a slave, not to 
one man, but, what is worse, to as many masters as he has viceS. 
"254 This reflects both 
ancient wisdom and the teaching of Scripture (here, 2 Pt. 2: 19, where "people are slaves to 
whatever masters them"; cf. I Cor. 6: 12. ) 
Hence the soul unifies the weight of love and the actions of the body, and the soul is 
constrained by whatever is loved. 
c) Stoic perversity 
But Augustine's view runs counter to contemporary Stoic accounts, which rather sought to 
deny love as essential to the soul. 
... Augustine, 361 (IX. 3). 
250 Augustine, The City of God (413-25), ed. Philip Schaff, tr. Marcus Dods, NPNF 1, including On Christian 
Doctrine, vol. 11 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988; originally published New York, 1886), 167 (IX. 3). 
25 1 Augustine, De Civitate Dei Contra Paganos (Vol. I) ed. J. E. C. Welldon, (London: SPCK, 1924), 373. 
252 Dods' 'emotions' more likely picks up on the traditional English sense of 'turbulence' or 'commotion', rather than 
our modern value-neutral 'feeling'. 
See further below, 98. 
Augustine, De civ. Dei, 147 (IV-3). 
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Stoic views parallel other ancient received wisdom (IX. 4), where an uncontroversial 
consensus held that "the mind is master of all [emotional] disturbances, and, by withholding 
its consent from them and resisting them, exercises a reign of virtue. ", " ('Disturb' functions 
here as a technical term, around which ancient discussions of 'passion', or 'emotion', were 
organised and conducted. 256 ) The apologia for the Christian Scriptures follows straight- 
forwardly. "It subjects the mind itself to God, that He may rule and aid it, and the passions, 
again, to the mind, to moderate and bridle them, and turn them to righteous uses. "257 The 
Scriptures do for the mind what the mind does for the body. This apologia modifies the 
ancient consensus without upsetting it-until Augustine suddenly 'ambushes' Stoicism. 
When Stoics screen out even compassion from the disturbance-free-zone of their mind, they 
become emotionally and ethically perverse. 
[W]hat is compassion but a kind of fellow feeling in our hearts for the misery 
of another which compels us to help him if we can? This impulse is the 
servant of right reason when compassion is displayed in such a way as to 
preserve righteousness, as when alms are distributed to the needy or 
forgiveness extended to the penitent. ... [But] the Stoics are not ashamed to 
number [compassion] among the vices ... "I 
The Stoic denies the soul's 'weight' of love. By deploying strategies to eliminate 
'disturbance', he curtails love, including what Augustine will later evaluate as 'right love'. 
(A scouring ad hominem attack amusingly describes a Stoic facing shipwreck. Though free 
from 'disturbance' over the fate of fellow-passengers, he remains highly 'disturbed', since 
his love terminated upon his own most valuable self. ) Augustine is heavily opposed to 
ancient denigration of 'disturbance', and elsewhere he wrests 'disturbance' away from 
philosophers into the realm of normalcy. Desire, joy, fear and grief are not problematic per 
se, even if they are depressingly and regularly corruptible: 
A righteous will, then, is a good love; and a perverted will is an evil love. 
Therefore, love striving to possess what it loves is desire; love possessing and 
enjoying what it loves is joy; love fleeing what it is adverse to is fear; and 
love undergoing such adversity when it occurs is grief. Accordingly, these 
feelings [pronominal: ista] are bad if the love is bad, and good if it is good. "' 
d) Emotion, passion, affection 
Augustine's disagreement with Stoicism demonstrates his thought about the integral nature 
of love for human beings. But for moderns, his discussion can be obscured by the terms 
... Ibid., 365 (IX. 4). 
256 Augustine comments upon the relevant lexical field at the start of IX. 3. 
21' Augustine, De civ. Dei, 365 (IX. 5). See full quotation above, 75. 
211 Ibid., 365-66 (IX. 5). 
251 Ibid., 592 (XIV. 7). In this quotation, 'good' and 'bad' rely upon a prior scriptural excursus, where the 
love of 
violence, money or 'the world' is contrasted to love for the Father. 
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4emotion', 'passion' and 'affection'. We learn more about Augustine's position by 
clarifying his use of them. (This clarification will partially vindicate Dixon's insights. To 
reprise Dixon's basic points, 'passion' and 'affection' were overthrown by the late-modern 
term 'emotion'; and Solomon is mistaken to speak only of 'passion' as 'movingý us without 
reference to 'affection'. 260) 
Augustine ends XIV. 5 by countering the Platonists: 
[I]t is not only under the influence of the flesh that the soul experiences 
desire, fear, joy and sorrow; it can also be disturbed by such emotions arising 
from within itse If . 
261 
Unde etiam illis fatentibus non ex came tanturn adficitur anima, ut cupiat 
metuat, laetetur aegrescat, uerum etiam ex se ipsa his potest motibus 
agitari. 262 
Dyson's use of 'emotion' here for motus is hardly controversial. Traditional English usage 263 
uses 4emotion' to describe inner and outer 'stirrings' or 'movements'. Thus 'emotion' 
appropriately renders ancient 'disturbance'; and Augustine uses motus and perturbatio 
synonymously in this connection. (Even if they were not synonymous for the philosophical 
schools, Augustine repeatedly brushes aside any distinctions. ) The terms are value-neutral; 
but Augustine has more to say. 
What is important here is the quality of a man's will. For if the will is 
perverse, the emotions [motus] will be perverse; but if it is righteous, the 
emotions [pronominally antecedent to verb erunt] will not only be blameless 
but praiseworthy. "' 
Augustine begins to describe a fundamental shift in these 'motions'-not an ontological 
change, but a change in how they are regarded, depending upon the orientation of the will 
(voluntas). He continues, "The will is engaged in all of them; indeed, they are no more than 
acts of the will. " If modems think Augustine only conceives a cold, calculating 'will', they 
forget how love integrates human being: the soul that 'rallies' mind and emotion is not 
neutral, but has a 'weight' of love. Indeed, Solomon's 'constitutive judgments' almost seem 
reliant uPon Augustine's account: 
For what is desire and joy but an act of the will in agreement with what we 
wish for? And what is fear and grief but an act of will in disagreement with 
what we do not wish for? When this agreement manifests itself as the pursuit 
of what we wish for, it is called desire; and when it manifests itself as 
enjoyment of what we wish for, it is joy. By the same token, when we 
260 Dixon, 303. 
26 'Augustine, De civ, Dei, 590 (XIV-5). 
262 Augustine, De Civitate Dei Contra Paganos (Vol. II) ed. J. E. C. Welldon, (London: SPCK, 1924), 
90 WV-5). 
263 OED s. v. "emotion". 
264Augustine, De civ. Dei, 590 (XIV. 6). 
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disagree with something that we do not wish to happen, such an act of will is 
fear; but when we disagree with something which happens against our will, 
that act of will is grief. "' 
Augustine seeks to show that these 'motions' cannot properly be understood apart from the 
ýethical commitments', or better the 'loves', that govern them: 
And, universally, as man's will is attracted or repelled by the variety of 
things which are pursued or avoided, so it changes and turns into emotions 
[adfectus] of one kind or the other. "' 
Et omnino pro uarietate rerum, quae adpetuntur adque fugiuntur, sicut 
adlicitur uel offenditur uoluntas hominis, ita in hos uel illos adfectus mutatur 
et uertitur. "' 
And generally in respect of all that we seek or shun, as a man's will is 
attracted or repelled, so it is changed and turned into these different 
affections. "' 
Augustine is doing his utmost to signal a fundamental shift. Something happens when the 
will incorporates these 'motions'-they become affections. 269 Although Augustine is not 
particularly interested in the differences between various motus, his distinction between 
motus and adfectus is highly important. Human 'disturbances' become so completely fused 
within the loves of the soul as to become something we can call 'affections'. These 
'affections' are 'motions' that help propel the will-'mixtures', somehow, of our primary 
love with the motus of our body. In the same way that being, thinking and loving comprise 
Augustine's essential basics of humanity, so also are these affections central to human 
being. Affections are 'ethico-emotional postures' in the most indivisible sense of that 
admittedly clumsy label. 
Like moderns, Augustine struggles at the edge of language. But unlike moderns, he realises 
that to denote these 'ethico-emotional' postures as mere 'emotions' (motus) is a significant 
loss. In using 'emotion' both for motus and adfectus, Dyson's late modern translation has 
missed a crucial turn, and Dixon's thesis shows why Dods' older translation is 
straightforward by comparison. 110 This is not to harangue Dyson over an otherwise excellent 
265 Ibid. (XIV. 6). 
266 Ibid. (XIV. 6). 
267 Augustine, De civ. Dei (Welldon H), 90 (XIV. 6). 
268 Augustine, De civ. Dei (Dods), 266 (XIV. 6). 
... The choice of the two verbs, their passive tense, and the in with accusative ("in 
hos uel illos adfectus mutatur et 
uertitur") all seem to emphasise the point. 
... Indeed, there is further interesting affirmation of Dixon's idea. William James' epochal statement 
for modern 
'emotion', published in 1884, is unlikely to have made much impact during the compilation of 
A Latin Dictionary 
(1896), where for entries under adfectatio, adfectus, commotus, motus, passio, perturbatio 
(and cognates), ýemotion' 
appears only once, under motus, and in the traditional sense we have already 
described (s. v. Charlton T. Lewis and C. 




translation, for English lexical stock is no fault of his. The point is simply that modern 
translations can easily confound this investigation. Consider another example: 
Will, caution, gladness, then, are common to both good and evil men; and- 
to make the same point in different words-good and evil men alike feel 
desire, fear and joy. But the good feel these emotions in a good way, and the 
bad feel them in a bad way, just as the will of men may be righteous or 
perverse. "' 
Proinde uolent, cauent gaudent et boni et mali; adque ut eadem ahis uerbis 
enuntiemus, cupiunt timent laetantur et boni et mali; sed illi bene, isti male, 
sicut hominibus seu recta seu peruersa uoluntas eSt. 272 
Although desire and will, fear and caution, joy and gladness reside in all, the pivotal clause 
is the distributive sed illi bene, isti male, quite precisely conveying how these are directed 
toward comparatively different ends given 'righteousness' or 'perversity'. We might debate 
with Augustine over 'righteousness' or 'perversity', but the basic claim is framed with 
striking clarity: desire and will, fear and caution are fundamentally ethical. 
However, the translator has thought it necessary to introduce 'emotions' and the threefold 
'feel' for modem readers. Presumably, these psychological labels are intended as middle 
terms to make the thought intelligible. But the reverse might occur if moderns were to ask, 
against Augustine, "How can an emotion befelt in a way either 'good' or 'bad"? " Once this 
question is put, Augustine's point is overthrown, and an opportunity lost for Augustine to 
subvert our own value-free conception of emotion through his own understanding that these 
same experiences are actually ethically bound, and that our loves are integral to them. 
Dods' version seems better (although the substitution of 'good' and 'bad' for 'righteous' 
and 'perverse' is Perhaps a diminution): 
So that good and bad men alike will, are cautious, and contented; or, to say 
the same thing in other words, good and bad men alike desire, fear, rejoice, 
However less than thirty years later, Welldon's note on De civ. Dei IXA explains how adfectiones uel adfectus are 
"words indistinguishable in meaning, so that [Augustine] uses adfectiones alone immediately afterwards. " That is 
reasonable, of course; but he continues that "[flf it is necessary to translate both, some words like ... 'affects' may 
perhaps be coined as an equivalent of adfectus; but 'emotions or motions' would probably be near enough. " 
(Augustine, De civ. Dei (Welldon 1), 374 n. 2). 
Certainly at IX. 4 Augustine is himself content to loosely group adfectiones uel adfectus along with Tr609, 
perturbationes and passiones under all 'those motions of the soul' (his animi motibus). This might seem completely 
to destroy our point made in reference to XIV. 6, until it is remembered that in IX. 4 Augustine 
is setting up the 
6ancient consensus' we have already seen, from whose Stoic version he will so radically differ. 
Thus because this is 
the nature of Augustine's argument at IXA, his use of adfectiones uel adfectus there neither confinns nor 
denies the 
point we are making about his use of it at XIV. 6, at which point the argument has progressed 
far beyond the loose 
grouping of IXA. 
The main point is simply that the shift toward a late modem use of 'emotion' seems evident 
in Welldon's easy 
substitution. His "probably ... near enough" 
does not seem to derive from Augustine's reference to animi motibus; 
we are suggesting that it is "probably ... near enough" 
because of the early twentieth century loss of what constitutes 
an 'affection' (which are now, for Welldon, merely 'affects'). 
271 Augustine, De civ. Dei, 596 (XIV. 9). 
272 Augustine, De civ. Dei (Welldon 11), 95 (XIV. 9). 
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but the former in a good, the latter in a bad fashion, according as the will is 
right or wrong. "' 
A rigid semantic field is not being claimed for ad/ectiones in Augustine. A 'turbulent and 
disordered affection' (turbulentis etprauis affectionibus) is synonymous with a ýpassion'. 111 
Sustaining the point that both are more than motus or 'emotion' requires no rigid semantic 
distinction between 'affection' as good and 'passion' as evil; Dixon's distinction along 
these lines applies conceptually in Augustine, but not semantically. The main point is that 
passion and affection are much more than motus, because they pertain to ethically related 
disturbance. "' 
Having now seen Augustine's analytic basis for understanding the affections and their 
relation to knowledge and behaviour, we will turn to his account of the derangement of 
these affections. Passion and disordered affection reflect a 'disordering' of love. 
2. The tragedy of disorder 
In this section I will outline the disordering of love. I will show how voracity and 'selective 
sight' cause plenitude to be perceived as scarcity, when some goods are loved to the 
exclusion of others. Augustine names the hegemonic claims of voracious love as 
'concupiscence', and shows how disordered love generates both pride and despair. 
Humanity's helpless bondage is revealed in Christ's death for sin, but right responses to 
God and to the abundant moral field are secured by the pneumatological reorientation of 
love. Throughout, I introduce Manichean and Pelagian opponents, against whose opposing 
accounts of evil (as, respectively, primordium and dysfunction) Augustine forges his 
account of evil as the privation of good. 
a) A melancholy plenty: Confessiones 
People respond in love to myriad created goods, with varying degrees of intensity. Such 
love is disordered when some goods are loved to the exclusion of others-most notably 
God, who is the greatest good. Absences and lacks such as this will form Augustine's 
account of evil. 
The narrative structure of the Confessiones states the problem poignantly. The background 
6canvas' is alive with earthy blessings: fertile ground, good food, sexual enjoyment. 
Layered onto this are a network of social goods: a loving family, good schooling, 
fine 
2" Augustine, De civ. Dei (Dods), 268 (XIV-8). 
"' This phrase is from the quotation above, 80. 
... This is illustrated further in the parallel translation above, 80, where adfectiones are 'turbulent and 
depraved'. By 
definition, the demons that have these do evil very heartily, so more than motus (or 'emotion') 
is automatically 
required for them. 
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rhetoric, the bustle of a city, friends, and spouses. The impression is not that these revolve 
around Augustine in a life of ostentatious privilege. Rather, all the little human figures in 
the story move about on a massive, richly woven tapestry of riches, benefits, excellences 
and goods. 
Yet a deep melancholy prevails, since no character can properly appropriate these goods. 
Certainly they try. Augustine and his acquaintances seize so voraciously upon various of 
these goods, and so much to the exclusion of other excellences, that life is experienced by 
each character as a problem of scarcity. 
An infant is "pale with envy" at his sibling on the breast. He , object[s] to a rival" finding 
life in this nourishment, "when the milk flows in such abundance from its source". 276 To 
dismiss this behaviour as a natural drive seriously misses the point. Like us, Augustine 
tolerates such behaviours, knowing that children will grow out of them. He also knows that 
he writes of this infant, and of his own infancy and childhood, from the perspective of adult 
voracity. Indeed this is the point: he can detect no turning point, no dividing line, when 
people cross into voracity. It colours every human and all relationships. 
He also sees clearly where his infant self was wronged by others in this. The 
straightforward benefits of learning were eclipsed by grammar school teachers who laughed 
while beating him. When the good of learning is used by these same teachers to deride play 
as an evil, they exhibit selective sight: not only is one good (education) used to denigrate 
another (play)-these grown men forget their own versions of play (called 'business'! ). 
This selective sight is hypocritical. "Was the master who beat me himself very different 
from me? If he were worsted by a colleague in some petty argument, he would be convulsed 
with anger and envy, much more so than I was when a playmate beat me at a game of 
ball. ""' Even the educational process is marred by selective sight. The gods' ethical 
corruption is side-stepped in Greek literature studies. "A man who has learnt the traditional 
rules of pronunciation, or teaches them to others, gives greater scandal if he breaks them by 
dropping the aitch from 'human being' than if he ... 
hates another human". "' 
The boy Augustine cheats to win, yet hates to be cheated and is angered when found out. "' 
In this succinct collocation, externally viewed irrationality seems internally rational under 
276 Augustine, Confessions (401), tr. R. S. Pine-Coffin, Penguin Classics edition, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1961), 28 
(1.7). 
277 Ibid., 31 (1.9). 
278 Ibid., 38,39 (1.18). 
279 Ibid., 40 (1.19). 
Page 86 
voracity and selective sight. This forms the subject of his extended reflection on the theft of 
pears. "[O]f what I stole I already had plenty, and much better at that, and I had no wish to 
enjoy [them. ] ... We took away an enormous quantity of pears, not to eat them ourselves, 
but simply to throw them to the pigs. "110 The scarcity of plenty, instantiated by enjoyment of 
theft and in grasping the forbidden, admits of another (selectively seen) love: 
This was friendship of a most unfriendly sort, bewitching my mind in an 
inexplicable way. For the sake of a laugh, a little sport, I was glad to do harm 
and anxious to damage another; and that without thought of profit for myself 
or retaliation for injuries received! And all because we are ashamed to hold 
back when others say "Come on! Let's do it! ""' 
Yet friendship itself is not impugned by this; rather, the tragedy of this selective seeing is 
that friendship could have been had-was already had-without this theft. Indeed it cannot 
be overstated how emphatically Augustine defends the goods themselves. They are not 
made suspect by this voracity and selective sight. The pears "had beauty, because they were 
created by you, the good God". "' Even within and among this life, Augustine himself had 
being, sensation, pleasure, memory, verbal skill, friends, and the innate ability for effective 
self-preservation. "Should I not be grateful that so small a creature possessed such 
wonderful qualities? But they were all gifts from God ... His gifts are good and the sum of 
them all is my own self. ""' Augustine continues in thanks to God and in penitence for his 
ignorance of God at that time. 
Thus opens Book V: "Accept my confessions, 0 Lord. "284 The more obtuse reader realises 
with a jolt that almost every section of every book has followed the same pattern. Augustine 
has continually erred, within this rich tapestry of plenty, by failing to see its plenitude and 
by responding with voracity to its perceived scarcity. The confession that closes almost 
every section thanks God for his bounteous modes of action at each time, offering 
repentance for never having seen it. These actual Confessiones form the grand substance of 
the work. 
Renewal of perception after his conversion enables Augustine to see these isolated patches 
of so-called scarcity as the constituent elements of an entire moral field. The central 
paragraph of 11.611, puts the point forcefully. A plethora of goods each have their rightful 
211 Ibid., 47 (11.4). 
211 Ibid., 52 (11.9). 
212 Ibid., 49 (11.6). 
283 Ibid., 20 (1.20). 
284 Ibid., 91 (VA). 
285 Ibid., 49-50. 
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appeal: beauty, power, sexual love, scientific enquiry, simplicity, justice, inactivity, 
generosity, acquisitiveness, safety, and even grief When held aloft to God each finds in him 
their greater fulfilment and fuller exemplar. (Thus to turn away from God as Augustine 
always did is an "unchaste love" and a recourse to perverse, if unwitting, imitation of God. ) 
Rather than some Platonic marginalising of these goods against the invisible excellence of 
God, the reverse occurs: by deeply knowing the good Creator of these goods, the entire 
moral field can be accessed with a powerful sense of its completeness and abundance. 
Voracity is no longer always required. The way is open to a new kind of love, perhaps 
called 'contentment'. The logic parallels that of Christ, where to seek first God's kingdom 
makes "all these things [to] be given to you as well" (Mt. 6: 33, Lk. 12: 3 1). 
On this conception of the moral field, evil is "the removal of good until finally no good 
remains. "286 This deceptively simple conception is the outcome of Augustine's agonising 
personal struggle with Manichean dualism, whose easy account of evil held certain 
substances in the world to be intrinsically foul. 
(It is worth a short excursus to note what is meant by 'Manicheism', both in Augustine's 
initial discussion of it, and subsequently. Manicheism was an ancient gnostic sect 
originating with the third-century Persian Mani [or Manes], who taught that everything 
originated from one of two chief principles: light and darkness, or good and evil. 
Augustine's offhand comments in the Confessiones remain a serviceable guide to its main 
claims. Evil, on the Manichean account, is a "kind of substance, a shapeless, hideous mass, 
which might be solid ... the Manichees called 
it earth, or fine and rarefied like air. This they 
imagine as a kind of evil mind filtering through the substance they call earth. ""' Material 
existence comprises "two masses of good and evil"'" that are antagonistic and infinite, "the 
evil in a lesser and the good in a greater degree. ""' These materials also raged in conflict 
within each person, to the point that souls could themselves become materially and 
substantially corrupted. 190 One antidote included a strict dietary regimen, since "particles of 
the true and supreme God were supposed to be imprisoned in ... fruit and could only 
be 
286 Ibid., 63 (111.7). 
287 Ibid., 104 (V. 10). 
211 Ibid., 106 (V. I I). 
289 Ibid., 104 (V. 10). 
290 Ibid., 135 (VII. 2). 
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released by means of the stomach and teeth of one of the elect", who "retch[ed] them up as 
he groaned in prayer. 
95291 ) 
(In Augustine's subsequent writing, as in later theological usage, the term stands more 
generically for any radical dualism of good and evil, and for allied intellectual tendencies to 
decry aspects of material existence as inherently wrong or bad, usually in an 
anthropological connection. Elsewhere, Augustine describes a Manichean anthropology: 
that "man was formed by the prince of eternal darkness of a mixture of two natures which 
had ever existed-one good and the other evil. "191 Thus in anthropological discussions, 
descriptions of any bodily process as irremediably evil, and not open to any 'redemption' 
other than by eradication of the body, would be regarded as 'Manichean'. This broader 
derivative meaning will generally govern subsequent usage in this thesis. ) 
Thus in VIL 12, an important statement on evil represents a breakthrough for Augustine. In 
his post-Manichean understanding, for something to be corrupt its goodness has simply 
drained away, to the point where the object under scrutiny is finally deprived of existence 
itseýf (rather than leaving a residuum of evil substance). Genesis 1: 31 ("indeed, it was very 
good") now makes deep sense for him: existence itself is always good, and this goodness is 
greater by the degree to which divine order is retained. 
However, this kind of philosophical statement is no longer Augustine's method of choice, 
and he is bemused at the younger Augustine's Beauty and Proportion, a lost work that 
celebrated beauty in relation to an overall order. The Confessiones has moved far beyond 
this Platonic "fundamental kinship of all fine things" (borrowing Nussbaum's phrase), 191 to 
the melancholy of disorder. The disorder is not intrinsic to the good creation, but is a failure 
of misdirected human love. As Taylor puts it, 
This perversity can be described as a drive to make ourselves the centre of 
our world, to relate everything to ourselves, to dominate and possess the 
things which surround us. This is both cause and consequence of a kind of 
slavery, a condition in which we are in turn dominated, captured by our own 
obsessions and fascination with the sensible. "' 
Such was the theft of the pears: "a greedy love ... my own 
love of mischief ... The evil 
in 
me was foul, but I loved it. I loved my own perdition and my own faults, not the things for 
"' Ibid., 67 (111.10). 
292 Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence (421), ed. Philip Schaff, tr. Peter Holmes and Robert E. 
Wallis, 
NPNF 1, vol. V (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987; originally published New York, 1887), 286 
(11.9). 
Nussbaum, "Augustine and Dante, " 64. 
294 Taylor, 138-39. 
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which I committed the wrong". 191 In this Augustinian "zone in which we live, of half- 
understanding and contrary desires, the will is as much the independent variable, 
determining what we can know, as it is the dependent one, shaped by what we see. The 
causality is circular and not linear. ' 1296 
b) A lost peace: De civitate Dei 
The tragedy of disorder, written in Confessiones from within one life, is writ large for 
human society in De civitate Dei. Again evil is voracity, selective sight, and a turn toward 
nothingness; "' and again, societal consequences are melancholic (XIX. 5-8). Friendships are 
uncertain and prone to treachery. Families experience conflict. The judiciary is a zone of 
torture. Communication with a pet is easier than crossing cultures: "a man would more 
readily hold a conversation with his dog than with another man who is a foreigner. "191 The 
best peace is a pretence, and warfare a necessity. So severe is this disorder that the ontology 
of a good universe peopled with those who love all its varied goods almost seems 
submerged. Instead, a series of vices and woes seem to rule as the final statement of reality. 
"[I]n the midst of the error and calamity with which human society is so full", even the 
consolations of friendship become "perfidy, malice and wickedness"; and the death of a 
friend is "bitterness", a "wound or ulcer". In Augustine's pithy summary, "[t]he earth is full 
of this great mass of evil S. "299 
He amplifies the tragedy by juxtaposing a 'thick' form of 'peace' with the 'thin' form that 
Roman society settles for and even celebrates. Instead of the calamity of "this great mass of 
evils", there could have been peace in its 'thick' form-"that state of security where peace 
is most full and most certain. "100 But amongst the calamity, there only remains a 'thin' rump 
of this 'could have been', the emaciated residuum of that ordered tapestry of goods which 
was such a breakthrough for the young Augustine. "Here, in this world, we are said to be 
happy when we have such little peace as a good life can accord. " 
... Augustine, Conf, 47 (11.4). Cf. ibid. 48 (11.5): "The life we live on earth has its own attractions ... 
because it has a 
certain beauty of its own in harmony with all the rest of this world's beauty. Friendship ... is a 
delightful bond, 
uniting many souls in one. All these things and their like can be occasions of sin because, good though they are, they 
are of the lowest order of good, and if we are too much tempted by them we abandon those higher and 
better things, 
your truth, your law, and you yourself, 0 Lord our God. " 
296 Taylor, 138. 
297 Augustine, De civ. Dei, 498-540 (XII) passim, especially 509 (XII. 8); cf also 461 (XI. 9), 471 
(XI. 17), 477 
(XI. 22). 
291 Ibid., 928 (XIX. 7). 
299 Ibid., 929-30 (XIX. 8). 
310 Ibid., 932 (XIX. 10), and for quotations following. 
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Such 'thin' peace is eclipsed by the City of God's "final peace" (XIX. 13), where balance 
and rightly-ordered love bring concord and harmony between people. "[S]uch peace as 
there can be in mortal affairs" is had when virtue "makes right use of the blessings of 
peace. " That is, virtue is only virtuous when it is informed by, thus directed toward, that 
final *thick' peace. 
(This overturns another ancient debate, XIX. 4. Virtue does not cause some inner 'peace' of 
the 'rational soul' to flourish, and ancient eudaimonism is a sham, since earthly life is so 
filled with woe. The very existence of the four classical virtues points to the ambiguity, vice 
and decrepitude of life in the flesh. Classical eudaimonism "begins to creak and crack 
before our eyes"101 when Augustine argues that in the face of such woe, disturbance is 
entirely appropriate. ) 
Therefore the hard task for travellers to the City of God is to live among the calamity while 
allowing that final peace to inform, shape and guide their virtues. Such travellers recognise 
that peace as the soul's proper 'gravity', re-shaping the soul's loves. Thus they "maintain 
their identity not by withdrawal, but by something far more difficult: by maintaining a firm 
and balanced perspective on the whole range of loves of which men are capable in their 
present state". 101 This balance is not like the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, but instead 
conceives of real enjoyment coming from an appreciation of the source of all loves. (Hence 
Augustine's ambivalence to pleasant sensory experiences: "He made them all very good, 
but it is He who is my Good, not they. "101) Moreover, the balance understands the moral 
ordering of the present to be unveiled in part by a theological understanding of "final 
peace". 
c) A concupiscible helplessness: De spiritu et littera 
But even balance seems supremely difficult in the anti-Pelagian literature, where extreme 
human helplessness is brought to the fore. Without affective renaissance, free and 
unfettered commission of sin is a foregone conclusion: 
"' Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Suffering Love, " in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, ed. Thomas V. Morris, (Notre 
Dame, 1988), 205; cf. 232 n. 9. 
This represents a shift from Augustine's earliest philosophical arguments. De moribus ecclesiae catholicae offered a 
'Christianised' account of the four classical virtues, with each subsumed under the 'greatest commandment' to 
love 
God, as a facet of it. This established a 'bridgehead' onto eudaemonist grounds of classical philosophy, and prim 
object-lessons could follow. Prudence was "love distinguishing with sagacity between what hinders 
it and what helps 
it", and fortitude was "love readily bearing all things". But by De civitate Dei XIX. 4, prudence and 
fortitude are like 
canny, streetwise veterans which audit and enforce respectively, to prevent headlong rushes 
into evil. 
'0' Brown, Augustine, 325 (325). 
'0' Augustine, Conf, 239 (X. 34); cf X. 31-33. An aside in De civ. Dei X1.25 also seeks to clarify this right enjoyment. 
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A man's free-will, indeed, avails for nothing except to sin, if he knows not 
the way of truth; and even after his duty and his proper aim shall begin to 
become known to him, unless he also take delight in and feel a love for it, he 
neither does his duty, nor sets about it, nor lives rightly. Now, in order that 
such a course may engage our affections, God's "love is shed abroad in our hearts, " not through the free-will which arises from ourselves, but "through 
the Holy Ghost, which is given to us. ""' 
'Will' is for Augustine "the whole agent's total active relation to God and the world", 305 44 the 
integrating orientation of the very self ... not distinguishable from reason and emotion 
because it is, as it were, the 'subsistent relation' between every part of the integrated self, 
including reason and emotion. "101 A bad will is like a ship's company stricken with plague 
(rather than the ship's captain going mad). Glib constructions of the will, and 
underestimates of disordered love, compel Augustine in the Pelagian controversy. Only the 
love of God as mediated by the Holy Spirit can overcome this affective deficiency. 
Augustine understands this human need for 'psychological healing' to explain St Paul's 
ambivalence toward 'the law'. For Paul, the law is supremely good; but it remains a 
subjective disaster for people who have not undergone this pneurnatological reorientation of 
the affections. This accounts for Pauline aphorisms such as 2 Corinthians 3: 6b, "the letter 
kills, but the Spirit gives life" (and Rom. 7: 7-11, which Augustine takes to be a fuller 
expression of the same thought). Augustine appreciates Paul's use of the tenth 
commandment (against coveting) to highlight that affective disorder which the Holy Spirit 
must reorder: 
The apostle, indeed, purposely selected this general precept, in which he 
embraced everything, as if this were the voice of the law, prohibiting us from 
all sin, when he says, "Thou shalt not covet; " for there is no sin committed 
except by evil concupiscence; so that the law which prohibits this is a good 
and praiseworthy law. But, when the Holy Ghost withholds His help, which 
inspires us with a good desire instead of this evil desire (in other words, 
diffuses love in our hearts), that law, however good in itself, only augments 
the evil desire by forbidding it. 101 
The conundrum of the pears remains. C. S. Lewis was correct to notice how the law of God 
must indeed cut across humanity like a dentist's forceps or a stint on the front line. If 'evil 
concupiscence'-love at its most disordered-propels each human toward sin, there can be 
no 'ravishment' of 'moral beauty' here. 
3" Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter (412), ed. Philip Schaff, tr. Peter Holmes and Robert E. Wallis, NPNF 
1, 
vol. V (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987; originally published New York, 1887), 84-5 (§5). See page 113 on this use of 
Romans 5: 5. 
305 Charles T. Mathewes, "Augustinian Anthropology, " Journal of Religious Ethics 27 no. 2 (1999): 207. 
306 Gerald W. Schlabach, "Augustine's Hermeneutic of Humility: An Alternative to Moral Imperialism and Moral 
Relativism, " Journal of Religious Ethics 22 (1994): 305. 
307 Augustine, De spir. et lit., 85 Q6). 
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Concupiscentia appears in Augustine's writing to drive home the extremity of disordered 
love and the subject's helplessness to change. The term concupiscentia was little used 
classically, but became a Christian technical term often denoting biblical EiTfflupict- 
Augustine used it broadly and interchangeably with libido (which is used classically). 
Although strong sexual passion is a typical symptom, concupiscence is not identical with 
sexual feeling, as when it is used of the soul's deep desire for wisdom. Concupiscence for 
wisdom is unambiguously good, but concupiscence is generally a sickness and a wound. It 
is not sin itself, since it results from but is not identical with original sin. 101 
The sexual associations of concupiscence confront us with the most trenchant objections of 
Nietzsche, Solomon and Nussbaum, all of whom agree that Augustine speaks for a 
Christian tradition that 'hates' the body, including sexual intercourse and sexual passion. 
Can Augustine therefore guide moderns in 'affairs of the heart'? I will return to this in 
Section Three. Before addressing this, though, it is important to explore the gravitas of 
Augustine's concupiscentia, for his conception of it is more than merely a misguided 
melancholy based in his own unfortunate experience. 
d) A Christological 'hard point': De natura et gratia 
De natura et gratia lifts Augustine's claim of human disorder beyond experience and 
phenomenology to the theological. The treatise has the interesting structure of a three- 
cornered fight. The stern moralist Pelagius attacks justifications of moral irresponsibility 
that appeal to 'human nature'. Since God has created human nature as good, an evil nature 
cannot arise from it; therefore that which ought to be done can be done. 
Unlike in his earlier more philosophical works, Augustine's terms of reference in De natura 
et gratia are conspicuously christological. Augustine agrees that moral irresponsibility 
cannot be excused by 'human nature'. Even so, Pelagius' solution is christologically 
defective. 
In the first of two pivotal rebuttals, Augustine finds Pelagius' solution to ignore "the 
righteousness that comes from God ... .. to establish their own", as 
in Romans 10: 2-3. 
Augustine takes the following verse (v4, that "Christ is the end [TEXoq] of the law") to 
mean that lawful obedience proceeds only from the grace of Christ. The second pivotal 
point against Pelagius concerns Christ's death. The absurdity of "Christ's death in vain" 
(Gal. 2: 2 1) drives the rebuttal forward. Christ died to become sinful humanity's 'physician', 
'0' Margaret R. Miles, Augustine on the Body vol. 31 (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1979), 67; Gerald 1. Bonner, 
"Libido 
and Concupiscentia in St Augustine, " in Studia Patristica: papers presented to the Third 
International Conference on 
Patristic Studies (oxford 1959), ed. Frank Leslie Cross, vol. VI (Berlin: Akadernie-Verlag, 1962), 
305,308 & 
passim. They cite: En. in Ps. 102.6; 118.20; De nupt. et conc. 11.30. 
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thus "human nature cannot by any means be justified and redeemed from God's most 
righteous wrath-in a word, from punishment-except by faith and the sacrament of the 
blood of Christ. "109 Clearly, the atonement is an epistemological 'hard point' to which any 
version of human nature and free will must interlock. "Our whole discussion with 
[Pelagians] turns upon this, that we frustrate not the grace of God which is in Jesus Christ 
our Lord by a perverted assertion of nature. ""' 
De natura et gratia must perforce investigate not only 'human nature', but also the manner 
of engagement between agencies divine and human, and in this treatise, superbia (rather 
than concupiscentia) emerges as humanity's key problem. "' The conundrum of one 
Psalmist becomes central: 
I said in my prosperity, 'I shall never be moved. ' 
By your favor, 0 LORD, you had established me as a strong mountain; 
you hid your face; I was dismayed. (Ps. 30: 6-7) 
The whole Psalm is surprising, and pivots on the final line. It seems shockingly non- 
sequential, until we understand that the Psalmist's overconfidence, and the Lord's 
disapproval, began when the Psalmist forgot the source of his prosperity. For Augustine, 
this failure sums up the Pelagian account of divine agency in humanity. After God heals 
'sick' humans,, "pride only has to be guarded against in things that are rightly done" and 
people must not "attribute to their own power the gifts of God". "' So on Philippians 2: 12-13 
("work out your salvation with fear and trembling [for] God ... is at work in you ... to will 
and to work for his good pleasure"): 
Why, then, must it be with fear and trembling, and not rather with security, 
since God is working; except it be because there so quickly steals over our 
human soul, by reason of our will (without which we can do nothing well), 
the inclination to esteem simply as our own accomplishment whatever good 
we do; and so each one says in his prosperity: "I shall never be moved? " 
(Ps. 30: 6). Therefore, He who in His good pleasure had added strength to our 
beauty, turns away his face ... 
" 
... Augustine, On Nature and Grace (415), ed. Philip Schaff, tr. Peter Holmes and Robert E. Wallis, NPNF 1, vol. V 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987; originally published New York, 1887), 122 (§2). Augustine offers no specific theory 
of the atonement here, but a comment elsewhere is clearly substitutionary, perhaps propitiatory: "You had not yet 
forgiven me any of these sins in Christ nor, on his cross, had he dissolved the enmity which my sins had earned me in 
your sight. " (Augustine, Conf, 102, V. 9. ) Cf. "he was able to redeem us from sin by His own death, because He died, 
but He died for no sin of His own" (Augustine, De civ. Dei, 426, X. 24). 
"' Augustine, De nat. et grat., 150 (§ 8 1). 
... For Augustine on superbia also see Miles, 69, where she argues for a development in Augustine's understanding. 
Earlier literature accounted concupiscentia as the root of human sin, but in Augustine's mature account superbia 
displaces concupiscentia as sin's root cause. Also see Augustine, De civ. Dei, 608-11 (XIV. 
13-14); and Augustine, 
De nat. et grat., 131-35 (§§31-36). 
"' Augustine, De nat. et grat., 131 (§ 3 1). 
113 Ibid., 132 (§3 1). 
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The affirmation of 'will' embedded in this warning makes clear that 'will' simply describes 
human power to act. "' Its operation is not the offence of superbia. The failure is more 
subtle: it is the failure to understand how even human willing is actually aform of response 
Conversely (and perhaps paradoxically), when people 'fall into sin' they "Perish rather from 
the recklessness of despair, and not only neglect the remedy of repentance, but become the 
slaves Of JUS&9.315 In this case, they misunderstand 'will' in an equal and opposite direction, 
failing to grasp that there is a power of response, a 'will'. This illusion brings a 
"recklessness of despair", where the power of will is not lost, but somehow becomes 
hidden. Disordered love again 'rules' through the will, but to self-destruction. (Here is an 
undeniable common ground with Nietzsche, deep in the heart of this anti-Pelagian treatise. 
He also saw the will surging namelessly beneath the oppressed ressentiment of the 'slaves'. ) 
Therefore in addition to the problem of concupiscentia, both superbia and despair are 
equally sad disorders of human love. In the rising heat of anti-Pelagian battle, Augustine 
again hopes for a right love, and ordered affections. But that Christ must die for sin 
confirms the extremity of the problem; this epistemological 'hard point' confirms that 
Augustine's account of 'human nature' is no mere projection of his unhappy past. 
Likewise however, the incarnation and resurrection of Christ offers irresistible hope for the 
sufficiency of the solution that is mediated by the Spirit of God: 
Now all things are easy for love to effect, to which (and which alone) 
"Christ's burden is light" [Mt. 11: 30]-or rather, it is itself alone the burden 
which is light. "And his commandments are not grievous" [I Jn 5: 3]; so that 
whoever finds them grievous must regard the inspired statement about their 
4not being grievous' as having been capable only of this meaning, that there 
may be a state of heart to which they are not burdensome, and he must pray 
for that disposition which he at present wants, so as to be able to fulfil all that 
is commanded him. 316 
317 This of course is what the theologian should have said to C. S. Lewis. The 'ravishment' of 
'moral beauty' 
314 cWillq is equally straightforward in Confessiones: I knew I had a will, as surely as I knew that there was 
life 
within me. When I chose to do something, or not to do it, I was quite certain that it was my own self, and not some 
other person, who made this act of will" (Augustine, Conf, 136, VII. 3). Of course Augustine knows well enough of 
the ambiguities, such as akrasia; indeed, trying to unravel this is a large measure of his entire project. 
But that should 
not confuse, nor does he confuse, this straightforward starting point: will simply describes that people choose, and 
act. 
315 Augustine, De nat. et grat., 135 (§40). 
316 Ibid., 151 (§83). 
317 See above, 68. 
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is not "shed abroad in our hearts" by our own nature or volition, but "by the 
Holy Ghost which is given to us" [Rom. 5: 5] and which both helps our infirmity and co-operates with our strength. ' 18 
Christ's death for sin, and the pneumatological reorientation Of love, secure a rightful 
operation of the will in response to God and his good universe. Augustine makes room for 
the rightful actions that PelagiLIS seeks to defend, but without room for superbia and with no 
cause for "the recklessness of despair". 
3. Augustine and the body 
We have seen that Augustine opposes the hegemonic claims of voracious love, naming it 
cconcupiscence'. But perhaps in sympathy with the Nietzschean charge against Augustine, 
it is easy to hear this 'concupiscence' as a charge against the body itself. It is important for 
us to pause and address this before proceeding to Augustine's account of reordered love 
(Sections Four and Five). 
Therefore in this section I will detail Augustine's high view of the body, and I will clarify 
Augustine's treatment of marital 'concupiscence'. I show that Nussbaum is mistaken about 
Augustine's 'hatred' of the body; rather, Augustine's condemnation of hegemonic hungry 
love threatens her own system and highlights Nietzschean incomprehension of contented 
love. She observes Augustine's lack of confidence in human choice, but fails to engage his 
melancholy reasons: that under voracity and selective sight, choice-making brings cruelty 
and chaos. Ironically, Augustine seems much more interested in using concupiscentia to 
describe the will to power. 
a) Body and soul 
The Nietzschean charge (that Augustine speaks for a Christian tradition that 'hates' the 
body) is obviously facile, if only because of Augustine's lifelong hostility to Manicheism. 
What, then, is the body's standing in relation to the soul for Augustine? 
The entire corpus states and restates the general principle that "corruption of the body ... 
was not the cause of the first sin, but its punishment; nor was it corruptible flesh that made 
the soul sinful, but the sinful soul that made the flesh corruptible. "' 19 That vices can range 
from the overtly bodily (like drunkenness) to those that seem less physical (like envy or 
hatred), implicates the soul rather than merely the body. (This anti-Manichean stance does 
become tricky in the later Pelagian dispute, when Augustine describes a fundamental 
6 change' in human nature. ) 
"'Augustine, De nat. et grat., 151 (§84). 
3" Augustine, De civ. Dei, 585 (XIV. 3). 
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Even this much is counter to prevailing attitudes about bodily life. For Margaret Miles, the 
body was a 'stone rejected' by classical antiquity. It is not so much that the body is 
"unambiguously scorned and disparaged" by thoughtful persons, whether Christian or 
pagan (although she does however find some extreme statements: "I am killing it because it 
is killing me"). 110 It is rather that these thinkers gravitated toward cosmological explanations 
for experiences of existential dualism. Against this backdrop, Augustine "describefs] the 
meaning and value of the human body". "' 
A bipartite conception of body and soul is obvious throughout his thought-but merely to 
speak of 'body' and 'soul' does not in itself constitute Greek (or Cartesian) dualism, and 
Augustine's view of the body-soul relation is never hard and fast. After a lightning tour of 
philosophical disputes in metaphysical anthropology, Augustine refuses to arbitrate and 
seems tired of such enquiry. "This dispute is not easy to settle; or, if the proof is plain, the 
statement requires time. This is an expenditure of time and strength which we need not 
incur. ""' Despite this 'shrug', he secures a high place for the body, and informs language of 
Greek dualism with the biblical account of a creature well-made as imago dei. The 
significant result here is that "the chief good of man is not the chief good of the body; but 
what is the chief good either of both soul and body, or of the soul only, that is man's chief 
good. ""' This is not prevarication. Augustine is asserting equivalence between 'the chief 
good' of soul and of body. In Augustine, soul is never far from body. Without the soul, the 
body would be as if anaesthetised. Soul is "an entity whose activities underlie the being and 
behavior of the body in such a way as to make the difference between merely physical 
activity, and the conscious, animated, purposive behaviour characteristic of living human 
beings. "324 
This clear endorsement of bodily existence becomes more pronounced in De civitate Dei 
There is no need, then, in the matter of our sins and vices, to do injustice to 
our Creator by accusing the nature of flesh, which, of its own kind and in its 
due place, is good. But it is not good for anyone to forsake the good Creator 
and to live according to a created good: whether according to the flesh, or the 
soul, or the whole man who, because he consists of both soul and flesh, can 
be signified by either 'soul' alone or 'flesh' alone. "' 
320 Miles, 128, citing an unnamed desert father. 
"' Ibid., 1. 
322 Augustine, On the Morals of the Catholic Church (388), ed. Philip Schaff, tr. Richard Stothert, NPNF 
1, vol. IV 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989; originally published New York, 1887), 43 (§4). This is all the more striking only 
one year after De immortalitate animae. 
121 Ibid. (§4). 
324 Gareth Matthews; cited in Miles, 14-15. 
325 Augustine, De civ. Dei, 588-89 (XIV. 5). 
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The difficulty in being precise about the interconnection of body and soul is still evident (as 
can also be seen for example, in XIX. 3); but more important is Augustine's decision not to 
ontologise Galatians 5: 17 ("what the flesh desires [ETOuptlt] is opposed to the Spirit"). 
When evil is understood as the privation of good, Paul need not be understood as a radical 
dualist who suggests that 'flesh' is evil because it is material. Rather, for both Augustine 
and Paul, a christology of the incarnation and atonement guarantees bodily goodness. In 
Christ, humanity has received "a most merciful cleansing of mind, body and spirit alike. 5ý326 
(T]he good and true Mediator showed that it is sin which is evil, and not the 
substance or nature of the flesh. He showed that a body of flesh and a human 
soul could be assumed and retained without sin, and laid aside at death, and 
changed into something better by resurrection. "' 
The idea that body and soul can be 'mixed' "was deeply troubling both to classical (Stoic 
and Neoplatonic) and to dualist (Gnostic-Manichean) thought", describing "an experience 
11121 
of contamination of the higher by the lower elements. Yet by De civitate Dei XV. 7, 
Augustine can describe the body as 'spouse' of the soul. For Miles, Augustine has seen to 
the heart of Pauline uses of a6pa (body) and acck (flesh) . 329 Likewise, "the Pauline 
description of the radical disjunction between cidp4 and iTvEOýt(x ... formulated 
for 
[Augustine] the central problem of human being, a 'moral conflict within the human soul, 
not an encounter between opposing substances. `110 
That is, Augustine understands with St Paul that the offence of 'flesh' is emphatically not 
that it is bodily. Flesh is body understood without reference to Spirit-which is to say, 
without reference to God. It is the body of disordered love. 
b) Sex and marriage 
But even though such a strong case can be put for Augustine's high view of the body, is the 
view undermined when Augustine associates concupiscence with marital sex? Any 
discussion about the matter should notice at the outset how sexual concupiscence is simply 
not a major preoccupation for Augustine. Indeed the first reference to sexual lust in De civ. 
Dei only occurs in XIV. 15 as one among many lusts typical of disordered affection. When 
Augustine thinks of sex, he immediately thinks of these other lusts. "' This is the same 
... Ibid., 432 (X. 27). 
327 Ibid., 426 (X. 24). 
321 Miles, 2. 
329 Ibid., 132 n. II (following J-A-T. Robinson). 
"' Ibid., 24-25 (quoting W. A. Schumacher). 
311 Cf. Augustine, De nupt. et conc., 272 (1.20), where sexual lust is just a species of the more generic 
'lusts' of I John 
2: 15-17. 
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territory as Confessiones: the common denominator is, again, voracity. Beings who only 
perceive the scarcity of a fragmented moral field, can be expected to react in this extreme 
manner. The desperation that people display from infancy for every other good, is seamless 
with their desperation for sex. This seamlessness strikes him; and human conception after 
an orgasmic moment of intense desperation inaugurates a continuum of voracity that 
appears in all people even from infancy. 
Even so, the soul is the spouse of the body; and "what pertains more closely to a body than 
its sex? 
"332 Not only is sexual concupiscence no major preoccupation for Augustine; we 
rather find that his high view of the body extends to a high view of sexual intercourse. The 
vision of sexual intercourse in paradise (XIV. 26) instantiates the peace of XIV. 10, 
describing a thankful, joyful and honest love that the pair always experience-and with no 
hint that it is not deeply, and bodily, pleasurable. This kind of sex is highly regarded by 
133 Augustine, and pleasure itself, either sexual or otherwise, is not the offence. 
Clearly then, the problem of concupiscence is not that it anticipates whatever is pleasurable. 
Rather, concupiscence offends Augustine by its overthrow of reason. He takes the 
involuntary nature of sexual arousal to reflect this overthrow, along with the general 
impulse to privacy during sexual intercourse, which he takes to evidence shame about 
overthrown reason. Augustine concludes that sexual concupiscence is a just punishment for 
humanity, a loss of rational control for a race who had so brazenly sought to seize control. ", 
Ergo, on this account, 'original sin': Adam's punishment was concupiscence; we are 
conceived in a concupiscible moment; thus just as in the Scriptures, humanity is in 
solidarity with Adam. The white-hot core of debate is that when Pelagians deny all this in 
service of optimistic claims for free-will, the death of Christ is again rendered unnecessary, 
including its efficacy for children. ', ' The questions about sex which we put to this debate are 
actually only put to its supporting structures. 
In the course of the debate Augustine states that concuPiscible desperation occurs even in 
marriage, and always at the moment of orgasm. Yet neither sex nor marriage are impugned 
by this concupiscence. The situation differs outside of marriage, where the concupiscible 
... Augustine, De civ. Dei, 195 (V-7). 
... This is reiterated elsewhere, e. g, Augustine, On the Good of Marriage (401), ed. Philip Schaff, tr. 
C. L. Cornish, 
NPNF 1, vol. III (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988; originally published New York, 1887), 407 (§ 
18), where "carnal 
delight" "cannot be lust" when 'used' rightly; and Augustine, De nupt. et conc., 291 (11.22), where "pleasure can 
be 
... honourable". 
... Augustine, De civ. Dei (Dods), 614-18 (XIV. 16-18); Augustine, De nupt. et conc., 266 
(1.7). 
... Augustine, De nupt. et conc., 272 (1.2 1) & passim. 
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element in sexual activity "has a certain prurient activity which plays the king in the foul 
indulgences of adultery, and fornication, and lasciviousness, and uncleanness" . 311 These 
vices represent a wider social disordering that is difficult to condone. If we recall 
Nussbaum's argument that to name these as vices generates revenge, localism, and hatred, 337 
Augustine might reply in terms of the sadness and ambiguity which he himself wrought by 
taking a concubine. 
The story is unbearably poignant. "I lived with a woman ... a mistress whom I had chosen 
for no special reason but that my restless passions had alighted on her. But she was the only 
one and I was faithful to her. " This was "a bargain struck for lust, in which the birth of 
children is begrudged" "though, if they come, " as a son did,, "we cannot help but love 
them. ""' It also seems that the natural good of companionship emerged; she "was torn from 
my side as an obstacle to my marriage", "which crushed my heart to bleeding, because I 
loved her dearly. " As a consolation, and impatient to marry, he takes another mistress, 
"more [as] a slave of lust than a true lover of marriage". The marriage itself is thus marred, 
including that "the wound that I had received when my first mistress was wrenched away 
showed no signs of healing. "119 The goods of creation appear and reappear; but 
concupiscence has "played the king" so as to make them, finally, melancholy. 
The point of marriage, by contrast, is to bring a peaceful order where those goods can be 
enjoyed. Marriage is one shelter (and celibacy the other) where peace begins to be found. In 
"the restraint of the marriage alliance, contracted for the purpose of having children" , 340 
children can be a welcome fruit. Disordered desire is stilled, ceasing to range over all 
humankind, so that one person becomes the grateful and constant locus of desire, rather 
than the pitiful 'love triangles' so vividly portrayed in Augustine's own past. 
Although a residuum of concupiscence remains within marital intercourse, "[c]arnal 
concupiscence ... must not 
be ascribed to marriage: it is only to be tolerated in marriage. It 
is not a good which comes out of the essence of marriage, but an evil which is the accident 
of original sin. "34 1 For the 'regenerate' married person, "concupiscence is not itself sin any 
... Ibid., 269 (1.13). 
337 See above, 44. 
33' Augustine, Conf, 72 (IV. 2). 
339 Ibid., 131 (VI-15). 
340 Ibid., 72 (IV. 2). 
341 Augustine, De nupt. et conc., 271 (1.19). 
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longer, whenever they do not consent to it for illicit work S342 ... As arising from sin, it is, I 
say, called sin, although in the regenerate it is not actually sin". 
343 
Although Augustine might seem unsatisfactorily to twist and turn, his contention makes 
sense on his view that regeneration entails a prieurnatological and psychological 
overwhelming of concupiscence with new affections. So even something as 'suspect' as 
marital concupiscence is validated ("is not ... sin") when it finds a place with the created 
goods of marriage, which delight the affections of this regenerate person. We might even 
better speak of a 'reframing' or 'reorientation' of marital 'concupiscence', rather than its 
overwhelming. "[fln the indispensable duties of the marriage state, " sexual concupiscence 
44exhibits the docility of the slave. "344 
Augustine's case needs revision, if only because it was a mistake not to see that 
concupiscence is hardly concupiscent when rendered 'docile'. Even if it is not always 
'docile', Aquinas will revise the 'eclipse of rationality' by pointing out that the hindrance of 
an act of reason should not be equated to the overthrow of the order of reason; and marital 
sex only does the first, not the second . 345 'Concupiscence' is not an appropriate term for 
libidinous sexual delight in marriage, and Augustine's critique is overly rigorous in its 
application per-act. 346 
But neither should our dismissals be too quick. A knowing comment about concupiscence 
decreasing for the elderly and the sexually continent, but increasing in even the old when 
they abandon themselves to it, shows this deliberation is done with an eye to the 'real 
world'. 347 Sexual desire and its expression is not always untrammelled delight, and the 
darkly terrible secrets that stalk our modern state of sexual 'enlightenment'-ranging from 
the disorders of desire that regularly mar even marriage, through to sexual obsessions that 
require imprisonment-would come as no surprise to Augustine. 
342 'Illicit works' means sexual activities that cannot result in conception. While discussion of this morality should be 
pursued elsewhere, it is pertinent to observe that Roman Catholic moral thought has tended to make this judgment, 
with Augustine, on a 'per-act' basis. However, Protestant ethics concludes that the goods of marriage are biblical 
norms that are better appropriated 'per-marriage'. This accounts for Protestant tolerance of contraception, and many 
forms of marital sexual play, in the context of a marriage that is gratefully open, fertility permitting, to the bearing 
and sustenance of children. 
... Augustine, De nupt. et conc., 274 (1-25). 
'44 Ibid., 269 (1.13). 
3" Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (London: Benzinger 
Brothers, 1937), vol. 19,83-84 (3a. supp. 41.3. ad. 6). For referencing style used for Thomas see below, 
124 n. 455. 
'46Cf 99 n. 342 for the same point in reference to contraception. 
34' Augustine, De nupt. et conc., 275 (1.28). 
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Thus the generic categorisation of sexual concupiscence alongside more general 'lusts' is 
hardly fanciful, and the travails it can bring are no less severe than those brought by any 
other lust. This is the backdrop against which Augustine longs with Paul for 'redemption of 
the body' (Rom. 7: 24) in the kingdom of heaven, "where there shall be not only no guilt for 
sin, but no concupiscence to excite it". 348 
"The nature of the original fault had, for Augustine, nothing essentially to do with the 
creation of the body""' because "Augustine had come to a firmly-rooted idea of the 
essential goodness of created things". 110 In the arena of sexuality, Paul Ramsey's study 
shows this conviction actually to be the distinguishing feature of Augustine. ", Reflecting on 
Augustine after his Body and Society, Brown unequivocally defends him. Despite 
Augustine's idiosyncrasies, "the pace of his thought on sexuality was set by firm if 
courteous disagreement with other Christians and upholders of radical ascetic ideals, most 
notably with Jerome. " Against such contemporaries, Augustine's is "a call to 
moderation" . 352 Brown's powerful comments on the anti-Pelagian works describe a 
realisation that this 'harsh' literature was actually triggered by Augustine's earlier venture 
into uncharted territory: 
He had come to envision, in a manner far more consequential than many of 
his Christian contemporaries, Adam and Eve as fully sexual beings, capable 
of ... a glorious intercourse, unriven 
by conflicting desires, without the 
shadow of sin upon it. ... two fully physical 
bodies follow[ing] the stirrings 
of their souls, "all in a wondrous pitch of perfect peace". 353 
For married people now, any regrets are to be had against this vision. Indeed, Brown is 
hotly polemical toward the "egregious cultural narcissism" that blames Augustine for all the 
Western sexual discontents, 
354 
even branding one recent treatment 4ca traveStyll. 
315 
Augustine's main concerns actually lay elsewhere than sex. This is better seen once 
Augustine's project is held against the Nietzschean complaint. 
348 Ibid., 279 (1.38). 
349 Miles, 67. 
3" Brown, Augustine, 325. 
"' Cf Augustine, De civ. Dei, 628-30 (XIV. 26) for his account of sexual intercourse in paradise; and cf. 
Paul 
Ramsey, "Human Sexuality in the History of Redemption, " Journal of Religious Ethics 16 no. I (1988): 62 & passim. 
312 Brown, Augustine (new edn. ), 500. 
'5' Ibid., 501, citing one of the recently discovered letters (Divjak 6*). 
354 Ibid., 502. 
355 Ibid., 518 n. 69. 
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c) The Nietzschean complaint 
gr phy. 5 His Martha Nussbaum has "much admiration" for Brown's first edition of the Bio a36 
recent comments about Augustine's description of "glorious" sexual intercourse should, 
therefore, assist Nussbaum radically to revise her assessment of Augustine on the body. In 
her view, "emotional error is understood [by Augustine] to be rooted in the body itself and 
its sexuality". 31, Augustine is guilty by association with traditional Christianity's alleged 
"hatred of this world and of the body. ""' Elsewhere, "the disfiguring self-hatred caused by a 
notion of original sin" (here we presume Augustine) is trumped by Nietzsche's Dionysian 
44affirmation of life" . 359A 
language of disjunction, which downgrades bodily existence, is 
presented as Augustine's. He "strips away ... the merely 
human" in love. He "weans 
himself [toward] independence" of the temporal. Christians "sever their connections to 
earthly desires and pleasures". People's "bodies [are] incidental accretions 
from the world 
of sin". Augustine makes "explicit denunciations of earthly ties". 
360 
These plainly false statements are not incidental, and the progress of each argument pivots 
on them. Nussbaum does appreciate that in Augustine "the emotions are restored 
to a place 
of value in the good human life" where there is a "deep vulnerability to external 
influence", 
"a pervasive sense of longing" toward God, and an "erotic 
longing". "' However, this 
appreciation is thin, and becomes hostility again when 
Augustine offers "no continued 
erotic vulnerability of any sort" . 36, 
His work is "ultimately, in the service of advancing the 
contrite soul toward a nonerotic life 9'J363 where "once grace 
is assured, there is no need, 
really, of other human individuals". 
364 
In a will-to-power reading, love is only intelligible 
if hungry. But Augustine's project is to 
question the 'globalisation' of lust. What if some 
love is not hungry, just content? What if 
not all love is from need? What if some love simply recognises what 
is precious, not 
understanding itself to be the creator of 'preciousness'? 
To a Nietzschean, these questions 
are at best unanticipated, and at worst incomprehensible. 
... Nussbaum, "Augustine and Dante, " 85 n. 4. 
35' Nussbaum, "Morality and Emotions, " 561. 
35' Nussbaum, "Augustine and Dante, " 86 n. 13. 
359Nussbaum, "Transfigurations: Nietzsche, " 108. 
... Nussbaum, "Augustine and Dante, " 61,65,66,81 and 84 respectively. 
361 Ibid., 62,71 and 72 respectively. 
362 Ibid., 84. 
363 Ibid., 85. 
364 Ibid., 84. 
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To demonstrate her historical 'ascent' of love, Nussbaum assimilates Augustine into the 
classic tradition, as if he only sought to develop it. Thus she has no interest in the different 
scriptural ground from which the mature Augustine regularly subverts the classical 
tradition. She misunderstands his view of the moral field, tending meagrely to summarise 
his view of the moral field as a "fundamental kinship of all fine things". 365 (She does 
accurately describe Augustine's "different forms of false love", 366 as appropriated by Dante, 
where "excessive" interests-such as pride, envy, anger, sloth and lust-produce "defective 
interest" toward other people, "who are worthy objects of love". Her appreciation of the 
Augustinian conception of false love emerges when she refers to its "insights", but she 
makes little use of whatever makes it insightful. ) 
For Augustine, love recognises a preciousness intrinsically there (thanks to God), rather 
than 'creating' this preciousness through voracity. He cannot predict why some see this, and 
others do not. When Nussbaum says that "Augustinian love does not retain sufficient 
respect for the lover's freedom and choice", "' she has correctly noticed Augustine's 
dependence upon God, and his lack of confidence in human choices that are marred by 
voracity and selective sight. But the offence she takes (that Augustine lacks "sufficient 
respect") relies upon a Nietzschean interpretative decision. 
Likewise her construal of Augustine as inhabiting a "world of chance encounters" and 
"sudden reversals" shows no sympathy to Augustine's own disastrous choices as a lover, 
and although Nussbaum pays some attention to Confessiones, she simply does not engage 
with Augustine's testimony that the life of bodily passion was tried and found wanting. "' 
He is simply taken to hate the body; presumably he just needed to say "yes-to the 
inconstancy and imperfection ... of real-life 
love "369 and to favour with Nietzsche "a view 
that urges us to take joy in life, in the body, in becoming---even, and especially, in face of 
the recognition that the world is chaotic and cruel. "370 
But Augustine would retort that Nietzsche's voracity and selective sight make the world 
chaotic and cruel, and would refer us in this to his concubine (and to his "insights" that 
"' Ibid., 64. In fairness, this comment was made in reference to the early 'Platonic' Augustine and in contrast to 
Confessiones. 
366 Ibid., 82, as for quotations following. 
367 Ibid., 80. 
368 Ibid., 66-67,69. 
16'Nussbaum, "Transfiguration Everyday, " 259. 
37'Nussbaum, "Transfigurations: Nietzsche, " 98. 
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Nussbaum saw). Nietzsche can brush this aside, since his order is of rank. Presumably this 
is not available to Nussbaum, and we await from her an alternative account of order and 
disorder, of peace and of cruelty. Conversely, Augustine's account offers a basis for justice 
and a common life. 
371 
d) A socialjudgment on the will to power 
Augustine makes his own judgment against the will to power. Of course, it is clear enough 
to him that people have will, and various powers . 
371 The problem arises when love and will 
are conflated to become hegemonic and hungry. Manifold voracious obsessions are our 
373 tragic plight. But the epic melancholic refrain in De civitate Dei is of a humanity 
persistently missing what could be, because of relentless and hegemonic strivings of power. 
The two 'cities' correlate respectively with humility and pride, and the earthly city "when it 
seeks mastery, is itself mastered by the lust for mastery even though all the nations serve 
it. 99374 "This 'lust for mastery' disturbs and consumes the human race with great illS". 
371 The 
minor-key melodies that follow are too numerous to list; but special attention might be paid 
to Books III and IV,, where Augustine repeatedly observes all the goods that were destroyed 
in the bloody, lordly establishment of Pax Romana. 
376 Likewise, the melancholic first half of 
Book XIX treats the quest for 'peace' by various forms of mastery; but these are regarded 
as a pale shadow of true peace. 
When Bonner enumerates Augustine's many references to various lusts, he finds the 
predominant concupiscence to be the domination of others by the exercise of power. This 
seems an ironic rejoinder to the Nietzschean complaints against Augustine. Sex was always 
a secondary topic of discussion-as we have already seen, the first clear reference to sex is 
only at XIV. 15 (and in the later Pelagian disputes, only because forced upon him). Bonner 
suggests that the later Christian emphasis on sexual concupiscence, though having a clear 
basis in Augustine, developed once the apologetic intention of De civitate Dei was eclipsed 
"' Augustine, De civ. Dei, XIX. 21. 
372 See above, 93 n. 314; and love 'strives' in the description of it quoted above, 81 (De civ. 
Dei XIV. 7). 
373 Cf Augustine, De civ. Dei, 613-14 (XIV. 15, final paragraph). 
374 Ibid., 3 (1, preface). 
375 Ibid., II1 (111.14). 
... See especially 1.31,33; Ill. 10,13-14; and a summary statement at IV. 3. 
Similar reflections are found at V. 17,19, 
22, but this time to consider the supervention of God's sovereignty. 
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in the post-Constantinian empire. It was in the interests of this empire to supplant, as it 
were, Augustine's attack on the lust for power by use of his writings on sexual morality. 377 
4- Enjoying each other 
Thus far I have shown how for Augustine, a logic of love grounds our responses to the 
moral order. This love is disordered, though not in such a way as to impugn bodily 
existence. It remains to be seen, though, how Augustine understands love to become 
reordered, and this will be the subject mainly of Section Five. I will now show Augustine's 
deep respect for other human persons, and his commitment to the necessity of loving them 
(a necessary preparation to the discussion of love's reordering in Section Five). I will 
proceed by addressing the charge that Augustinian theology does not need human others. 
Nussbaum puts the charge in the following way. "[O]nce grace is assured" for Augustine, 
"there is no need, really, of other human individuals". "' His position opposes that of Dante, 
who "restore[s] dignity to this-worldly will and den[ies] that earthly relations and acts are 
merely provisional", 119 But Augustine is among those who "denigrate their own movement 
and striving", 110 against whom questions remain outstanding "about the significance of this- 
worldly striving within a universe that points towards eternity. ""' 
Indeed we can give the charge a finer grain. Grounds for it might reside in the impassibility 
of God (if humans are imago dei); or in Augustine's unfortunate early formulation that 
people may be used (uti) for the enjoyment (frui) of God; or in the eudaemonist substructure 
of his thought. But in each case, I will offer a 'thick' theological defence to show that for 
Augustine, humanity is to be 'enjoyed in God'. Augustine's strenuous campaigns against 
social evils are evidence of his living in accordance with such a view. 
a) Impassibility? 
God's existence remains alien to our own. He is free from the 'discomfort' we associate 
with even 'good' affections, such as compassion-a discomfort endemic "to the infirmity of 
this present life. ""' In Augustine's intellectual milieu, the very postures that generate the 
undisturbed 'wise man' also make an impassible God and heaven irresistibly attractive. 
377 Bonner, 312-14. 
17'Nussbaum, "Augustine and Dante, " 84. 
37' Nussbaum, " Wuthering Heights, " 377. 
... Ibid., 375. 
381 Ibid., 377. 
312 Augustine, De civ. Dei, 366 (IX. 5). 
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Augustine's formal and willing adherence to divine impassibility is unquestioned, for 
neither God nor angels have 'passion' in the sense of 'disturbance'. No 'war' of passion 
rages 'against their soul', to borrow the biblical phrase (I Pt. 2: 11). On this view, scriptural 
language is conventionally analogical. 
In an arena of acute interest for a post-Holocaust world, hard questions might be put to 
Augustine about such divine beings. It might also seem that other decisions are required 
about the nature of the imago dei. These controverted paths might then combine to suggest 
that an orthodox position on God's impassibility renders human compassion unnecessary. 
Of course, Stoicism made similar connections, which we know Augustine trenchantly to 
have opposed. Even cursory scrutiny shows that Augustine had ample reasons for seeing 
things differently. These reasons fall into three broad categories. Firstly, the absence of 
divine disturbance need not connote the absence of divine affection. Secondly, the eschaton 
is full of 'love and gladness'. Thirdly, in the incarnate Christ God instantiates rightly 
ordered emotion rather than repudiating emotion as such. 
A being's "blessedness consists in the possession of that whose loss makes them miserable. 
Only He, then, Who is blessed not in another, but only in his own good self, cannot be 
miserable, because only He cannot lose himself. ", " This account of divine aseity shares 
something of ancient teleology-God here is an 'unmoved mover' of sorts-but the 
ýmovement' on view is the attention of love. All angelic and divine action issues from the 
settled, co-ordinating force of love. Augustine therefore courts the univocal possibilities of 
a language of divine 'affection' that is untainted by disturbance or 'passion'. This divine 
'affection' does not primarily connote the attention of divine love toward a creature, yet 
such love-to-creature is enveloped in God's activity for (what in Scripture is termed) 'the 
sake of his Name' or 'his own glory and goodness'. Such a foundation would explain why 
God does not experience the 'disturbances' of passion. 
This discussion is further informed by Augustine's attention to impassibility and Stoic 
apatheia: 
If ... we are to understand ... 
'impassibility' to mean a life without those 
emotions [adfectiones] which arise contrary to reason and which disturb the 
mind, it is clearly a good and desirable condition. It does not, however, 
belong to this present life. ... This condition of apatheia ... will come 
to pass 
only when there is no sin in man. ... 
Moreover, if apatheia is to be defined as a condition such that the mind 
cannot be touched by any emotion [adfectus) whatsoever, who would not 
judge such insensitivity to be the worst of all vices? It can, therefore, be said 
without absurdity that our perfect blessedness which is to come will 
be free 
383 Ibid., 499 (XII. I). 
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from the pangs of fear and from any kind of grief, but who save one wholly 
estranged from the truth would say that there will be no love and no gladness 
there? "' 
By now we are deeply into the territory of adfectus as 4converted' from motus, with 
Augustine exploring rightly ordered affections. This terrain is by now familiar to us. With 
the philosophers, passions do make war against the soul; somewhat with the philosophers, 
affections can be wrongly directed, blurring their distinction to passions; but emphatically 
against the philosophers, rightly ordered affection lies at the core of what it is to be truly 
human. The eschaton is free of disturbance but full of love and gladness. (This seems 
strikingly to vindicate Augustine over Nietzschean charges against his eschatology-unless 
Nussbaum's point is that this non-erotic 'love' and 'gladness' do not count to make people 
'needed'. I will return to this. ) 
Just as importantly, the incarnate Christ is seen to have experienced rightly ordered 
affection, and the 'disturbances' he felt were his appropriate human responses "to the 
infirmity of this present life. ""' "For human emotion was not feigned in him Who truly had 
the body of a man and the mind of a man. ... Truly, He accepted these emotions into His 
human mind for the sake of His own assured purpose, and when he so willed". '" Again, 
Augustine's point is not based rigidly in semantics (although the subservient role of motus 
can again be detected in this discussion). The point is rather that God in Christ instantiates 
rightly ordered emotion. 
Therefore even within what we might call Augustine's system of 'hard-impassibility', there 
is a life of affectionate love, within the Godhead, at the eschaton, and within the incarnate 
Christ. Augustine can place love at the centre of human being as reflecting the imago dei 
and in a manner quite unthreatened by even a most orthodox conception of impassibility. 
For impassibility, strictly understood, is about the absence of disturbance associated with 
human emotion; but in Augustine it is emphatically not about the absence of a holy divine 
affection. 
b) 'Use'andde i t. 9? 
Although divine impassibility does not put divine and human love at risk, Augustine's 
promulgation of the 'use' of other human persons might seem to 
downgrade their 
importance. 
"' Ibid., 600 (XIV-9). 
Ibid., 366 (IX. 5). 
386 Ibid., 599 (XIV-9). 
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While struggling to articulate a correct and non-voracious approach to the world's goods, 
uti ('use') becomes Augustine's favourite term-a way of "ordering that which one does 
not love toward the goal of achieving that which one does. 15387 The influential distinction is 
between uti and 'delight' or 'enjoyment' Orui). It is elementary to De doctrina Christiana, 311 
where only God should be enjoyed, and earthly things only used (since to delight in an 
earthly thing may give rise to a disordered love). In De doctrina Christiana 1.22, Augustine 
infamously concludes that use-relationships between humans are appropriate. 
But O'Donovan observes a clear development by De civitate Dei XIX, when humanity's 
peaceful goal is the thrice-mentioned crescendo-a "perfectly ordered and harmonious 
enjoyment of God and of one another in God". 389 A significant shift has occurred in 
Augustine's view of the relationships between human persons. 'In God', the resounding 
value of other people is observed and solidarity with them enjoined. Others are honoured on 
the basis of their creaturehood and without reference to their merits. 
Thus Augustine can envision 'use' in the service of human community. "In the earthly city 
... the whole use of temporal things is directed towards the enjoyment of earthly peace. In 
the heavenly City, however, such use is directed towards the enjoyment of eternal peace. "110 
Augustine's 'use' is not ordered by a monistically conceived good, but by that cluster of 
goods which constitute a 'City' of peaceful relationships. The pilgrimage to the heavenly 
City brings together "citizens of all nations and every tongue", who are yet happy to work 
alongside the earthly city in its efforts to maintain earthly peace. These pilgrims understand 
their righteous acts to be "for God" and "for neighbour", "since the city's life is inevitably a 
social one". ", So in fact Augustine's conception and revision of uti causes him to "burst 
outside" the classical ideal, and beyond pagan ethics. 392 His mature formulation marries 
material aspects of creaturehood to eschatological. and social longings for the City of God. 
311 Oliver M. T. O'Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1980), 25. 
Augustine, On Christian Doctrine (397), ed. Philip Schaff, tr. J. F. Shaw, NPNF 1, including The City of God, vol. 
11 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988; originally published New York, 1886), 523-24 (1: 3-5). 
... Or near equivalent-twice in De civ. Dei XIX. 13 and once in XIX. 17. Cf Oliver M. T. O'Donovan, 
"Augustinian 
Ethics, " in A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics, eds James F. Childress and John Macquarrie, 
(London: SCM, 
1986); and O'Donovan, Self-Love, 25. 
Augustine, De civ. Dei, 940 (XIX. 14). 
"' Ibid., 946-47 (XIX. 17). 
"' Wolterstorff, 206. However the main point of Wolterstorff s argument is that while classical eudaimonism was 
radically transformed in this way, Augustine failed to 'carry it through' in 
his doctrine of God, meaning that he 
should have adjusted his doctrine of impassability. (Ibid., 2 10-11. ) 
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This revised conception of 'use' in the service of human community overturns important 
Nietzschean charges against Augustine. It is plainly baseless for Nussbaum to imply that 
Augustinian Christianity deals in "anger and intolerance" and somehow excludes the alien 
and the stranger. 191 Also false is her charge that Augustine annuls earthly activity and 
renders other people unnecessary. For Augustine, earthly human activity is less about 
4striving for' than about 'responding to' the divine peace initiative; and rather than people 
being erotically 'needed', they are 'enjoyed' (which is a valid form of 'interest'). But a 
voracious Nietzschean commitment to 'need' and 'striving', where true humanity always 
features a hungry eros, will always tend to denigrate such enjoyment and response. 
c) Eudaimonism? 
But perhaps the greatest threat to the importance of other human persons might be seen to 
reside in another substructure of Augustine's thought. For O'Donovan, Augustine stands 
within the classical tradition of eudaimoni SM, 
394 
and eudaimonism tends to presume egoism. 
Unlike the development seen in his uti-frui distinction, his eudaimonism does not seem to 
be revised appreciably. Augustine's argument in the early De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae 
is eudaimonistically premised: "How then, according to reason, ought man to live? We all 
certainly desire to live happily; and there is no human being but assents to this statement 
almost before it is made. "191 Nearly thirty years later, little seems to have changed: : 
It is the settled opinion of anyone who is in any way capable of using reason 
that all men wish to be blessed. But whenever men in their weakness ask who 
is blessed or what makes them so, they raise a great host of controversies 
upon which the philosophers have exhausted their efforts and spent their 
leisure. "' 
This desire to be blessed begins an epic argument, which culminates in the peace of the 
heavenly city that we have seen. O'Donovan considers that for Augustine, the commands of 
God, though prior, can be viewed within this wider framework. "Augustinian eudaimonism 
... is not a teleological ethic 
in the modern sense, but a teleological metaphysical 
framework that serves to give intelligibility to ethics that are in substance command- 
based. "19, 
... Nussbaum, " Wuthering Heights, " 377. 
311 O'Donovan, Seý&Love, 16; he amply supports the case for indebtedness to the tradition throughout 
Augustine's 
works (168, n. 20). 
395 Augustine, De mor. ecc. cath., 42 (§3). 
116 Augustine, De civ. Dei, 390 (X. 1). 
397 O'Donovan, "Augustinian Ethics, " 46. 
Page 110 
But while O'Donovan's eudaimonistic diagnosis remains formally true, it risks 
misrepresenting the later Augustine, for whom the infinite worth of God's person, and the 
contingent value of other human persons, stood rather more dramatically in the foreground 
(as seen in his change of mind over uti). The eudaimonistic quest for peace is transformed, 
beyond all expectation, into a most unexpected centring upon God and others. O'Donovan 
of course acknowledges fundamental differences in Augustine's eudaimonism, insofar as 
"happiness cannot be reached by solitary individuals or under the conditions of earthly 
existence"; only God can make the human person happy. 191 However, perhaps by the end of 
his life (like the course of De civitate Dei X-XIX), Augustine's eudaimonistic scheme has 
become so heavily modified that the word is less suited to describe it. Formally, the 
eudaimonistic premise remains; but materially, it is so radically changed in content as to 
contradict the early Augustine's eudaimonism. 
This 'less suited' is due to the movements we are investigating and have seen: the egoistic 
connotation is lost; and although rightly ordered love may bring happiness, the presence or 
absence of that happiness is so completely outside the point of attention as to be entirely 
subsidiary. The '-monism' in 'eudaimonism' is stretched to breaking point, and 
"begin[ning] to creak and crack before our eyes". 199 To say less risks a return to the voracity 
that is quelled by 'love shed abroad in the heart'. 
Augustine's 'development projects'9 
Augustine's respect for the love and active service of human others has an ample theoretical 
basis, and there are consonant practices in his life. 
Brown has radically revised his previous picture of a harsh, burnt-out older Augustine. In 
this revision we see Augustine living by his commitments about the place and preciousness 
of others. "Few documents have illustrated so vividly, as have [the Divjak letters], the 
extent and the urgency of the involvement of Augustine and his colleagues in the social ills 
of their own time . 
ý'400 Augustine's attempt to curb the voracity of one Antoninus, the young 
bishop of Fussala (on the rural outskirts of Hippo) was already known from his 422 
letter to 
Pope Celestine. But this is vividly complemented by the Diyjak letter to Fabiola, 
Antoninus' senatorial protector. Brown summarises it: 
The upshot of repeated attempts to investigate and discipline Antoninus was 
that, in the hot late summer of 422, Augustine found himself stranded 
for 
weeks on end in the middle of a countryside where everyone spoke only 
"' Ibid. 
399 Wolterstorff, 205; cf 232 n. 9. 
'0' Brown, Augustine (new edn. ), 468. 
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Punic. He visited the village of Fussala, where the inhabitants pointed out to him the holes in the houses from which Antoninus had pillaged the stones in 
order to build a splendid new episcopal palace. He was finally left, sitting 
alone one morning in a village church after the entire congregation had 
walked out in disgust-even, he told Fabiola, the nuns-leaving him and his 
colleagues to wonder how, by what series of misjudgements exploited by an 
able rogue, they had brought "so much sadness upon the country people". "' 
Brown goes on to describe Augustine's efforts against a slave trade within the empire, also 
revealed in these letters. He seeks to stop the slavers, but is reluctant for them to suffer the 
appalling flogging by leaden-whip required under Roman law; therefore he and others 
arduously search for different Roman laws under which to prosecute them. The same 
campaign ranges from time spent interviewing a young woman terrorised by the slavers, 
through to the "great rhetor" dictating letters calculated "to move a distant court" . 401 These 
interventions parallel Nussbaum's own third-world "development" projects '401 although 
Augustine would deny that these 'develop' anything. Rather, these are responses of love 
that are concomitant to peace, and that seek peace from the blighted chaos of human 
voracity; "for our God made his whole creation very good. 
99404 
5. The logic of love reordered 
Having seen that Augustine uses a logic of love to ground our responses to the moral order, 
we have also seen that respect for bodily existence, and love toward precious human others, 
are integral to Augustine's account of reordered love. 'Love' connotes worship of God, 
enjoyment of neighbour, and the exclusion of certain behaviours toward those loved. But it 
remains to be seen how Augustine understands love to become reordered, which will be the 
subject of this section. 
I will show that although affections cannot be commanded, a logic of 'love poured in' has 
the Spirit to pour a love for God into the human heart, with God's 'embrace' also reordering 
human loves. This 'pouring in' is not ours to control; yet participation is accessible in a 
logic of 'love commended', where love for God stretches our horizons, and requires the 
curtailment of voracious selective sight. I will go on to recount some 'aspects' of the 
agent's loving participation in moral field, and suggest that the Psalmist's love of 'the 
Law' 
is a delight in instruction about the aspects of love. I finally suggest that Augustine's project 
reflects Christ's 'treasures of the heart'. 
"' Ibid., 469, citing Augustine's letter. 
402 Ibid., 466,470-71. 
"' Martha C. Nussbaum, "Martha C. Nussbaum and Her Critics: An Exchange, " New Republic 
220 no. 16 (1999)1 cf. 
Nussbaum, "Comparing". 
414 Augustine, Conf., 148 (VII. 12). 
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a) Twin 'logics', or grammars, of love's divine reordering 
For Augustine, "otherness" (in Charles Mathewes' phrase) "is already at the base of the 
self' ; 
401 
more specifically, "at the core of the self is an other, God. 
"406 The enjoyment of 
others requires the prior enjoyment of God. By God's "incorporeal embrace alone", the soul 
is "filled up and impregnated with true virtues. "101 Yet in agreement with Christ, each 
person is invited (by command) actively to participate in the reorientation of love, by 
obedience to the two great commandments (Mt. 22: 37). 101 The connection between ethics 
and worship is constituted in love. It connotes both worship of God and enjoyment of 
neighbour, while ruling out a set of postures and behaviours toward these other persons. 
This participation in love is like the logic of (say) Matthew 7: 7 ("Ask ... seek ... 
knock But Augustine knows the obvious objection: love cannot just be commanded, 
and God's "incorporeal embrace" is required. Thus Augustine also argues the 
complementary logic of (say) John 3: 7-8, where Christ's strange words unnerve and 
perhaps anger Nicodemus, precisely because 'rebirth' is beyond the locus of human control, 
and because its 'midwife', the Spirit, is as untamed as wind. Here is the 'chancy' aspect of 
Augustine's thought that leaves Nussbaum uneasy: a response of delight and love for God 
"is summoned up in us by an external call and is not perfectly ours to control. 53409 
Yet Augustine does not find either logic incompatible with the other, and he often brings 
them together in dialectical relationship. The "great work" of a repentant life "no doubt" 
"belongs to human agency to accomplish, yet it is also a divine gift". 410 The nature of this 
assistance is not mere instruction "in the knowledge of what he ought to avoid and to desire 
in his actions". On such a Pelagian account, free will is simply tutored to give a "just and 
pious course of life" that "deserves to attain to the blessedness of eternal life. 9941 1 Augustine 
certainly respects the tutoring power of divine teaching, but he also insists that the Spirit 
works within us, beyond our 'reach'. The next two subsections examine each facet of this 
twin logic. 
115 Mathewes, 214. 
406 Ibid., 216. 
407 Augustine, De civ. Dei, 395 (X-3). Similar declarations are found passim, e. g. 399 
(X-6); 419 (X. 17). 
408 Ibid. (X. 3). Similar declarations are found passim, e. g. 399 (X. 6); 419 (X. 17). 
'09 Nussbaum, "Augustine and Dante, " 67. This 'chanciness' was touched on above, 104. 
4 '0 Augustine, De spir. et lit., 84 (§2). This derives from Philippians 2: 13 ("it 
is God who is at work in you, enabling 
you both to will and to work for his good pleasure"). 
411 Ibid. (§4). 
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b) The logic of love poured in 
[W]e are assisted by divine aid towards the achievement of righteousness, - not merely because God has given us a law full of good and holy precepts, but because our very will, without which we cannot do any good thing, is 
assisted and elevated by the importation of the Spirit of grace ... "I 
Although freedom of will and divine teaching are goods, Pelagians have not grasped that 
affections truly cannot be commanded. The work of the Spirit is radically to do with 
affective reorientation: 
[By the Spirit] there is formed in [a person's] mind a delight in, and a love of, 
that supreme and unchangeable good which is God, even now while he is still 
'walking by faith' and not yet 'by sight; ' in order that ... 
he may conceive an 
ardent desire to cleave to his Maker, and may burn to enter upon the 
participation in that true light, that it may go well with him from Him to 
whom he owes his existence. 413 
By alluding to 2 Corinthians 5: 7 ("faith ... sight"), Augustine acknowledges that 'delight' 
and 'desire' will not at first be without ambiguity and trial, sure though its object may be. 414 
He resolves the matter Lewis raised (how can the law be like dental forceps, and also like 
honey? ), by reference to Romans 5: 5, where "the love of God" is "poured into our hearts" 
by the Spirit. This is the key element in divine reordering of human beings: the Spirit pours 
a lovefor God into the human heart. 
However, a concern might be raised over this use of Romans 5: 5. By taking the genitive in 
q dyd1TT1 ToO OF-oO ("the love of God") as grammatically 'objective', human love toward 
God is made the referent. But as Cranfield notes, despiteElKKEXOTat this is hard to defend in 
context, since the point is to give assurance of hope despite tribulation. Therefore the 
majority reading is of a 'subjective' genitive, with God's own love toward people on 
view. "' But the verse is completely fundamental to Augustine's account of the key 
pneumatological change that God brings to the will, and appears in this usage repeatedly 
416 throughout his writings. Does the exegetical point constitute a fatal blow? 
A meditation on Psalm 36 in De spiritu et littera is one of many texts that avert the 
problem. Augustine celebrates God as the prevenient, proactive lover and preserver of 
humanity, and in conceptual concord with the modern understanding of Romans 5: 5, this 
love is the locus and glory of God's grace. A string of metaphors, including feasting at 
"' Ibid., 91 (§20). 
413 Ibid., 84 (§5). 
414 Cf. ibid., 112 (§64). 
"' C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans 
(I-VIII) 2 vols, vol. I 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975), 262 & n. 2. 
416 E. g. En. in Ps. 87.1; De nat. etgrat. §67, §84; IEp. Ioh. tract. VI. 
8-10; VII. 6; VIII-12. 
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God's banquet and drinking at his fountain, picture people in response. Although the Spirit 
is not here mentioned, this is the conceptual substrate for Augustine's subjective genitive in 
Romans 5: 5. The verse functions as a slogan for what can be easily derived from elsewhere 
in the Bible, "' where the Spirit originates human love toward both God and humans. Indeed 
on Romans 15: 30 Cranfield can argue agai . nst a subjective genitive (the Spirit's love toward 
humanity), and for a genitive of origin. "' Augustine's theological 'eisegesis' is, in this case, 
easily left unchallenged. 
419 
c) The logic of love commended 
Augustine's hope that the Spirit will reorder turbulent affections to the love of God, 
releasing people from voracity and selective sight, opens up a tricky pastoral gap for those 
who have not yet experienced this reordering. It seems 'chancy'. 
Augustine begins to close this gap by speaking of a 'flight' to God: a movement of 
dependence and humility, spoken in prayer. 110 Augustine does not wish this 'flight' to be 
misunderstood in particularly difficult or inaccessible categories. The Confessiones show it 
worked out in one man's life, and although there is mystery there (the unconverted 
Augustine's unawareness that God was at work), whoever takes and reads the Confessiones 
can easily do as Augustine did, praying as he prays. Likewise, Brown refers to a Dolbeau 
sermon delivered in Carthage near the time of Augustine's arrival. Vividly drawing upon 
the experience of the stadium, he reminds the (apparently young male) listeners of what 
comes over them there. Simply by watching their friends, and attending to the action, a deep 
love for the sportsmen and the sport grows. Though mysterious, this is quite accessible. ',, 
Hence despite 'the logic of love poured in', there is no embarrassment to commend love; 
and love can be commended in this way on the understanding that the mysterious changes 
are themselves divinely gifted. By enjoining his hearers to engage in love for God and for 
"' E. g. Rom. 15: 30, Gal. 5: 22, Col. 1: 8, or 2 Tim. 1: 7. 
418 C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (IX-XVI) 2 vols, vol. 
2 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1979), 776 & n-2. 
"' The appearance of Romans 5: 5 at Augustine, De nat. et grat., 144-45 (§67) is a possible exception to this easy 
acceptance. There, the Spirit's absence or presence is deduced by one's affection toward, or fear of, the 
law. This 
might void the Pauline intention to give assurance, collapsing the tension of 2 Corinthians 
5: 7 (between 'faith' and 
9 sight'). But the problem is not too severe, since the duty "to pray for such further healing as shall enable us 
to enjoy 
full liberty" (Augustine, De nat. et grat., 145, §68) is squarely based upon human nature's "capacity 
for progress" but 
only "by God's grace, however, through our Lord Jesus Christ. " Nonetheless Augustine's tone offers a 
valid, if 
tenuous, ground to his exegetical critic. (The same problem is evident at I Ep. 
Ioh. tract. VIII. 12, with VIII. 13 
offering similar amelioration. ) 
Augustine, De spir. et lit., 105-06 (§ 5 1). 
"' Brown, Augustine (new edn. ), 448-49. 
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others, Augustine understands people simply to be finding the correct response to the reality 
already before them. 
The homilies on John's first epistle work and rework this principle in a variety of ways, 
since the epistle commends love so 'ardently' . 422 "It is by charity that other things come to 
be rightly loved; then how must itself be loved! 
59423 If our life in the world is like a desert 
wandering, then love "is the fountain which God has been pleased to place here" to sustain 
our sojourn. "' 
O'Donovan finds I John 4: 8 ("Whoever does not love does not know God, for God is 
love") prolifically quoted throughout Augustine's corpUS, 425 and the homily majors upon it. 
"God is love"; therefore, love "is God". The linguistics are flawed '42' but Augustine knows 
the difference between an abstract noun and a personal Trinitarian God . 421 Rather, the 
equivalence graphically expresses God's most striking affection. Thus "to act against love is 
to act against God"421-and by extension, against the proper ordering of his world. 
The outcomes that follow are too numerous to list or examine here. Polemic against loveless 
religious counterfeit gives way to a conception of rightful, loving worship. The biblical 
witness of Christ's crucifixion (and incarnation) confirms God's loving nature; thus to be 
cavalier about love is to scorn not only God's essence, but its foremost historical 
expression. Pride extinguishes love, humility strengthens it, and certain communal 
behaviours emerge. Voracious false loves are to be resisted, but the intrinsic goodness of 
creation is reaffirmed. 
An intriguing metaphor, picturing the neck of a skin sack being stretched, ", equates to what 
we would call the stretching of our 'horizons'. When people apply themselves to John's 
exhortations, the ordered moral field-the integrity of which is grounded in the God who is 
422 Augustine, Homilies on the First Epistle of John (416), ed. Philip Schaff, tr. H. Browne, NPNF 
1, vol. VII (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986; originally published New York, 1888), 513 (VIII. 14). 
423 Ibid., 501 (VILI). 
424 Ibid. (VIL 1). 
425 O'Donovan, Seýf-Love, 11. 
... Grammatically, Augustine seems unaware of the applicability of 'Colwell's canon', governing articular 
subjects 
and anarthrous predicates in the nominative case. 
41'Augustine, IEp. Ioh. tract., 503 (VII. 6) 
428 Ibid. (VII. 5). 
429 Ibid., 485 (IV. 6). 
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love-begins to open before them. Old loves change, and new loves grow. An analysis by 
O'Donovan further teases out the responses of love to the 'horizons' of the moral field. 430 
d) Aspects'of love 
I have shown twin facets of Augustine's grammar, or logic, of the divine reordering of love. 
However I have not yet developed the other sense of 'the logic of love', where love has an 
ordinant logic and deliberative logic has its love(s). 111 To do so, I will use O'Donovan's 
analytic presentation of Augustinian love as a series of 'aspects'. These 'aspects' constitute 
the love towards which God reorders people. When love is divinely reordered, the lover will 
love according to each of these aspects. 
Augustine uses three important words (dilectio, caritas, amor) sometimes synonymously, 
and sometimes not. Thus simplistic lexicographical approaches that "label certain motifs by 
the Latin or Greek words which [modem thinkers] think encapsulate them" are of no 
assistance for understanding Augustine's love . 431 Dilectio and amor are used indifferently, 
often for stylistic variation; Augustine notices good and bad senses for them in Scripture. 433 
Caritas translates the dcydTTrI of I John 4: 8, and never denotes the inordinate desire for 
worldly things, while cupiditas generally always does. 434 Rather, to notice Augustine's 
'aspects' of love is to discriminate among love's various responses to the complex order of 
moral field, since "the loving subject stands in a complex and variable relation to the reality 
which his love confronts. ýý435 
Two such aspects follow the classical tradition. In cosmic love, the subject is drawn by her 
telos to the love of God. In positive love, the subject self-directs toward some end she has 
chosen for her happiness. The later Augustine considers his earlier sole reliance upon these 
aspects of love as a misstep, not least because it generated the ill-advised uti-ftui 
distinction, in which persons can all too easily be merely 'used'. 436 
So two further aspects represent "inten-nediate possibilities which became increasingly 
important to Augustine as he continued his search for an 'ordered' love where the subject 
... O'Donovan, Seý(-Love, 18-35. 
131 See above, 70. 
432 O'Donovan, Sel(-Love, 10. 
433 O'Donovan cites De civ. Dei XIV. 7 and I Ep. Ioh. tract. VIII. 5. 
434 O'Donovan, Self-Love, 10- 11 - 
435 Ibid., 12-13. 
436 See above, 108. 
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was neither victim nor master. ""' In rational love the subject recognises, in appreciation and 
approval, a teleology and order which she has not herself imposed . 431 Love of lesser goods 
becomes appropriate, as long they do not displace God. The language of 'use' takes on a 
new connotation. Loving someone 'for' God now includes seeking their welfare for their 
sake; loving 'for' God is a way of correctly valuing them without seeking to dethrone God 
Alongside this is benevolent love where "the subject, having recognized the objective order 
of things, may freely affirm it, thus giving the weight of his agency to support an order 
which he did not devise. "439 It is possible only between creature and creature; it is concerned 
with an order independent of the subject; and the lover and the beloved are separate. This 
love is for people's 'own sake'-not as a counterpoint to 'for God's sake', but in denial of 
any personal advantage to the lover. In benevolent love, we acknowledge that others have a 
destiny given by God, whether or not our own agency is called upon to assist fulfilment of 
that destiny. 440 
The mature Augustine constantly moves between these four aspects of love: 
The choice of means to ends, the admiration of the neighbor's goodness, the 
pursuit of the neighbour's true welfare, all these are the subjective aspects of 
a single movement of the soul which reflects the one dominant cosmic 
movement, the return of the created being to its source and supreme good. "' 
This does justice to Christ's two-fold love-command; and "virtue is the conformity of love 
to the structure of reality. "141 Regard for the other, whether divine or human, certainly 
accrues benefit to the self-but simply and only in virtue of the self s proper engagement 
with a good reality. 
Augustine upholds 'the logic of love', then, in a highly nuanced form. That love has an 
ordinant logic and deliberative logic has its love(s) can be further understood in terms of 
these 'aspects' that O'Donovan has described. His analysis will prove invaluable in my 
final chapter, and I will return to it occasionally before then. In what follows, 'rational', 
6cosmic', 'positive' and 'benevolent' love will retain the senses given in this discussion, 
without tedious reminders. "' 
437 O'Donovan, Setf-Love, 18. 
438 Ibid., 18,3 1. 
439 Ibid., 18. 
440 Ibid., 34 
441 Ibid., 35-36 
442 O'Donovan, "Augustinian Ethics, " 47. 
443 1 will also dispense with the continued use of quotation marks. 
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e) Law, love, and 'treasures'of the heart 
I will now pause to note two implications of Augustine's account of reordered love. Firstly, 
it sheds light upon the conundrum Lewis found, where the Psalmist's delight in the law 
seemed to run counter to the unpleasantness of obeying it (and the pause to note this here is 
preparatory to a fuller discussion later in the thesis). "' Secondly, it gives conceptual content 
to an Augustinian utterance which is regularly abused for the lack of such content. 
On Augustine's account, the Psalmist's love for the LaW445 is no encounter with mere ethical 
demand. The Psalmist was not "ravished by a moral beauty" '446 unless we understand 
ýravishment' to be a kind of synergy, between love and the instructional component of the 
law. For this component can elicit a delighted response to a moral field centred upon God. 
[N]o fruit is good which does not grow from the root of love. If, however, 
that faith be present which worketh by love, then one begins to delight in the 
law of God after the inward man, and this delight is the gift of the spirit, not 
the letter 
The 'law' can be both a dentist's forceps and sweet honey while love is being reordered; yet 
in the law, the Psalmist is instructed in the aspects of love. He can love the law, since it 
frees him rightly to engage with the real ity-including God-that surrounds him. 
Augustine said, "the soul is carried by its loves" . 
441 Looking to the source of Augustine's 
whole project, we recall Christ's "where your treasure [OqGcxup0q] is, there your heart 
[i<ap8ta] will be also. " (Mt. 6: 21 & Lk. 13: 34). 449The language is different, but Augustine's 
thought plausibly interprets it if OTlcycxupO'q is any object of the affections, and Kap8la the 
seat of the will. ("[I]n man's heart are his spiritual hands" . 
450) 
" See above, 67-70; and see below, 238-240. 
445 We must unfortunately side-step the interesting matter of Christian theology's approach to OT law. Briefly: 
NT 
authors understand OT law to stand in its entirety-yet since Christ is the telos of that law (Rom. 10: 4), continued 
observance of some forward-looking aspects of it amounts to rejection of Christ. Therefore normatives can only 
follow from the application of a proper NT and biblical theology. The Reformers' 'civil', 'moral' and 'cultic' 
distinction, though intuitively appealing, was not rigorous enough to show how this process proceeds. Christian 
wisdom might find that the three categories remain, albeit after a more carefully christological and trinitarian 
explication of how this is so. (That is, Christian readers might find themselves pondering what facets of moral order 
were highlighted by OT law, and their reading of it might be more akin to the way OT wisdom is read. 
) Interestingly, 
that "[I]ove does no wrong to a neighbor; therefore, love is the fulfilling of the law" (Rom. 13: 
10) resonates strongly 
with the conclusions of this chapter. See also below, 239 n. 733, on the divine command. 
44' See above, 68. 
44' Augustine, De spir. et lit., 94 (§26). 
448 Augustine, De civ. Dei, 487 (XI. 28). 
449 Cf also Mt. 13: 44-46 & 19: 21, where a change in Oylcjaupoq drives people to radical new action. 
Augustine, De nat. et grat., 151 (§83). 
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This assists us to comprehend Augustine's most popular aphorism, "Love and do what you 
will",, ý, which has become a well-worn 'summary' of his ethic and is often used to sanction 
modern causes in contextual ism. "' Augustine intended the aphorism to describe how action 
between people must be ordered by love, understood in its 'aspects'. But the aphorism is 
seriously misused if used apart from Augustine's logic of love, a logic where the command 
of God plays a key role in the reordering of love, since the love of various goods is 
commended to us by God's command. 
In this chapter, I have outlined Augustine's approach to ethics and emotion by way of a 
'logic of love'. Love is fundamental to our knowledge and behaviour, but love is disordered 
by voracity and 'selective sight'. However this conception of disorder does not constitute a 
hatred of the body or of bodily life-indeed, love for human others is integral to 
Augustine's account of love for God. Reordered love is a divine gift, formed in part by our 
willing participation in the divinely ordered moral field. I have used O'Donovan to show 
how such reordered love diffracts into a series of aspects. 
Aquinas attempted to complete Augustine's grand vision in the finest possible detail, and 
Augustine's analysis became amplified into Aquinas' well developed psychology. In 
chapter following I will examine Aquinas' attempt to refine Augustine in the light of 
Aristotelian psychology. 
"' Augustine, I Ep. Ioh. tract. (VII. 8, on I Jn 4: 4-12). 
O'Donovan, "Augustinian Ethics, " 47. 
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Chapter V: Aquinas' Grand Vision: a 'Christian 
Moral Organism' 
In [Aquinas' account of virtue], inadequacies are remedied by using the Bible 
and Augustine to transcend the limitations not only of Aristotle but also of Plato ... and by using Aristotle as well as Augustine to articulate some of the detail of the moral life in a way that goes beyond anything furnished by 
Augustine. "' 
In the previous chapter, we saw Augustine's 'logic of love'. The purpose of this chapter is 
to describe Thomas Aquinas' deep interest in this logic, and his utilisation of it to 
understand the interplay between emotion and ethics. In the seven subsections of the 
chapter, I will use the Summa Theologica to show how Thomas expands Augustine's 'logic 
of love' by drawing upon and adding to the main lines of Augustine's treatment. 
Aquinas shows that with love, certain structures can be discerned. Love refracts into a series 
of emotional responses, and these responses reflect a complex array of goods within moral 
order. There is a complex recursive relationship between these responses and moral 
reasoning. Augustine had already said as much; but Aquinas tells more of the array of 
goods, the responses to them, and the relationship between these responses and moral 
reasoning. 
Before beginning the investigation proper, I will briefly survey the structure and function of 
the Summa (Section One). Although this thesis focuses on the Summa's philosophical 
anthropology, Thomas only develops his anthropological position to serve his broader 
ethical intention . My description of how Thomas expands Augustine's 
'logic of love' will 
then proceed as follows. 
Humans are each an array of parts and powers, and their 'will' operates as an amalgam of 
'intellect' and 'appetite' (Section Two). Human will reaches for humanity's proper end. 
This will involves intellectual assessments about that end, and is affected by emotional 
responses to more immediate circumstances (Section Three). These emotional responses 
reflect the complexity of the moral field, and can be ordinate or inordinate, depending upon 
their fittingness to humanity's true end (Section Four). Therefore virtue necessarily 
becomes a central element in moral life, since each virtue is a special amalgam of thought, 
habit and ordered passion, with all virtues helping people toward their true end 
(Section 
Five). But virtue itself requires the power of the Spirit, working through Christ's teaching, 
to produce 'Christian moral organisms', who are the only kinds of human 
being to be 
properly ordered to humanity's true end (Section Six). Equipped with this conception we 
45' Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry (London: Duckworth, 1990), 
140-4 1. 
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are better equipped to examine the recursive relationship of emotion to moral reasoning. 
This reasoning can be misled in various ways by ernotion-or it can itself maliciously 
mislead emotion (Section Seven). I will now pause to outline these sections in slightly more 
detail. 
In Section Two I will examine some categories by which Thomas approaches the problem, 
and will show Aquinas' account of human parts and powers in their relations. He 
seamlessly orchestrates various aspects of being human into what I call a syntagma of 
human being, so that human willing is located at the intersection (roughly) of 'intellect' and 
ýappetite'. Section Three concerns his account of human ends, both with and against 
Aristotle. Human action is unintelligible without this telos. But actions become intelligible 
when the 'syntagma' operates towards its telos. 
These sections form the conceptual basis of Thomas's account, and will seem unrelated to 
emotion until we realise how appetition steers people towards ends. Furthermore, Aquinas' 
use of rationality will seem to preclude emotion, until we understand his distinctive form of 
ýrationality' and his distinction between passion and affection. For example, 'happiness' is 
humanity's rational end; but this affection is not really a passion, leading some to think it is 
not an emotion either. Nor does he generically label various other 'emotions' as 'emotion' 
(e. g. love, enjoyment, and delight). 
Section Four shows how passions involve bodily 'disturbances', as appetition 'moves' a 
person toward some end. Passions reflect the complexity of the moral field, which has many 
goods. Ordinate passions move the soul to its proper end, and all passions can be morally 
evaluated by the moral visions they serve. Emotional reactions express opinions about good 
and evil, offering avenues for reflection about one's ethic that may not easily be accessible 
by other means. 
In Section Five, I examine Thomas's account of the relation of virtue to passion. Logically 
prior to virtue are acts, which are evaluated both by their ends and their nature. Virtue 
governs appetition (the locus of passion) so that right ends may be chosen, thus producing 
ordinate passion'. The formation of virtue, toward lives populated by a variety of 
interesting virtues, begins naturally and continues with elements both of 'love commended' 
and 'love poured in'. 
In Section Six, we ascend a kind of 'summit' in the Summa, to find the 
logic of the heart's 
turn to reordered love. I show how passion is directed by the work of the 
Spirit (an example 
t: ý I 
of love 'poured in'), and how new loves are 'commended' in Christ's evangelical 
teaching 
Hence a 'Christian moral organism' is formed who responds rightly 
to Godýs good order, 
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and for whom virtues are existentially primary. By the end of this section, the logic 
MacIntyre's comment (above, page 121) will be clear: Thomas's categories of thought, 
though Aristotelian, are more primarily grounded in Christian theology 
I will end the chapter in Section Seven by summarising some satisfying discoveries in the 
Summa, particularly Thomas's emphasis upon the immediacy to us of sensory particulars. 
By way of a personal example I will show that Thomas can move from this immediacy to a 
lively understanding of the interconnections between emotion and moral reasoning. But 
central to his account of these interconnections is his main concern-to set out an agenda 
for personal ethics within the teleological givens of the Christian gospel. Although 
presenting the human good as grounded in a general theory of goodness that rests upon a 
particular theory of nature, people within nature cannot respond rightly without reason's 
recognition of its teleological ordination-namely, to love God. But without this 
qualification, it will seem as if Thomas presents reason as autonomously capable of ethics. I 
will suggest that Thomas guards against this misconception by describing a class of people 
for whom moral reasoning takes the form of certa malitia, 'resolute malice', which is an 
intellectual refusal to esteem divine goods over proximal goods. But Thomas's ability to 
help us ethically is severely curtailed when the Summa is read without the qualification and 
under the misconception. Hence John Calvin finds it necessary to respond to the 
misconception, whether real or imagined in Thomas, as will be seen in the next chapter. 
1. Anthropology and the Summa's ethical intent 
Before beginning the investigation proper, I will briefly survey the structure and function of 
the Summa. Although this thesis focuses on the Summa's philosophical anthropology, 
Thomas only develops his anthropological position to serve his broader ethical intentions. 
According to MacIntyre, the Aristotelian renaissance of thirteenth century Paris produced 
an extensive and 'fine-grained' Aristotelian account of order that seemed to render obsolete 
the bowdlerised Augustinian theology of the day. Thomas was therefore motivated to 
develop a more consistently theological account of order. To this end, the highly developed 
theological and philosophical psychology of the Summa describes the 'shape' of the soul, 
its 
rightful end, and the way action operates as the means to this end. The Summa 'decodes' 
human ethical existence at first globally, and then increasingly in 'fine-grained' 
detail. 
Although many of its central conceptions are conventionally Aristotelian, 
Thomas regularly 
surprises his Aristotelian readership by transforming those conceptions 
into something 
uniquely Christian-"' 
"' This observation is indebted to MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, 127-48. 
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The First Part is effectively a prologue, outlining the theistic universe in which humanity is 
located. The main substance of the Summa is the massively central Second Part that answers 
general and then specific questions about humanity. The Third Part is a theological 
meditation upon the place and work of Christ for humanity. The pivotal prologue to the 
Second Part clearly signals Aquinas' shift to the question of who, and what, is humanity: 
Since 
... man is said to be made in God's image, in so far as the image implies "an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement": 
now that we have treated of the exemplar, i. e. God, and of those things which 
came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for 
us to treat of His image, i. e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his 
actions, as having free-will and control of his actions. (I a2w. I. prol. )III 
Hence the Second Part can be construed as outlining the correct human responses to divine 
order. In this outline, passion (particularly understood) furnishes the soul with impetus for 
its movement forward in action. Given the complexity of the soul and of external reality, 
4passion' is many-faceted and virtue is necessary to 'shape' it. But in turn, virtue must itself 
be 'shaped' by the love that is both poured in and commended. 
Mark D. Jordan describes the Prima Secundae as "something like a fundamental 
philosophical anthropology designed to undergird a moral treatment of human life in 
particular. 99456 These 'particulars', which appear in the Summa's second half, are arguably 
Thomas's main point. But his philosophical anthropology is the main concern of this thesis, 
since it will enable us to consider the operation of passions and affections in ethics, and to 
begin to see their relationship to virtue and to moral reasoning. 
This primarily ethical intention of the Summa has been widely noticed. Jean Porter finds 
"that an account of action is the common thread" running through the various treatises of its 
Second Part . 45, This account of action 
is not just any kind of account, as Alasdair MacIntyre 
notices in seeing the Summa "forc[ing] us back upon the question of what kind of persons 
we will have to be or become ... 
in order to read it aright. 99458 Indeed the Summa only offers 
to account for human action in response to that order entailed by Christian theism. Hence 
... References following will abbreviate the pars as I a, I a2w, 2a2Ee and 3a (with 'supp. ' for the supplement to 
Tertia 
Pars), followed by a number for the relevant question, then 'a' for each article. Article subdivisions will be 'Obj' 
for 
objections, 'sc' for the sed contra, V for the corpus, and 'ad' for each answer (and 'prol. ' 
for the occasional 
prologue near the start of each pars): e. g. la2x. 109. a7. obJ3. Where smaller divisions are not noted the reference 
should be regarded as passirn to the article or question. The older Benzinger Brothers edition, 
by the Fathers of the 
Dominican Province (first referenced above, 101 n. 345) will be used throughout. (On the decision to use 
this 
translation, see below, 159. ) For readability references to Augustine occurred both in footnotes and 
in main text; but 
references to the Summa will be retained only in the main text, also for readability. No attempt will 
be made to give 
pagination (in accordance with general practise for Aquinas). 
156 Mark D Jordan, "Aquinas's construction of a moral account of the passions, " Freiburger 
Zeitschrift fiir 
Philosophie und Theologie 33 no. 1-2 (1986), 86. 
457 Jean Porter, The Recovery of Virtue (London: SPCK, 1990), 70. 
"' MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, 133; cf. 129-30. 
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Servais Pinckaers describes its main concern to be the formation of a "Christian moral 
organism". 119 Similarly, after a close reading of Thomas's construction of a moral account of 
the passions, Jordan concludes that "Thomas assumes that his readers, being students of 
theology, have already been passionately converted to the Gospel. " Thomas's moral 
account of the passions is a "pellucid ostension" of the rational control of passion for such a 
person. I'll 
Despite a first impression of overwhelming complexity, the argument actually builds upon 
itself quite clearly and the Summa lends itself to the sequential approach I will employ in 
this chapter. The emotions are constantly under scrutiny, being central to humanity's 
response to the divine order in which people are situated. Thus emotions are woven 
throughout the Summa, since for Aquinas, they are woven through the deepest structures of 
being human. 
2. A syntagma of being human 
In this section I will outline Aquinas' account of human parts and powers in their relations. 
He seamlessly orchestrates various aspects of being human into what I call a syntagma of 
human being. Human willing is located at the intersection (roughly) of 'intellect' and 
ý appetite'. 
The Aristotelian/Thomist taxonomy of the soul into its various 'parts' and 'powers' is 
usually described by the term 'faculty psychology'. Thomas may or may not be 
representative of that term's less tenable connotations, such as that a person is merely a 
collected set of 'departments'. Therefore to enable a fresh approach, I will employ the term 
'syntagma' (which denotes any systematic body, system or group) to describe the totality of 
the various 'parts' and 'powers' of the soul and their complex interrelationship. It is this 
interrelationship, or 'syntax', of parts and powers that largely constitutes the human person 
who operates in the world. To describe the being so constituted as a 'syntagma' is to 
highlight the 'syntax' without prejudice as to whether Thomas is guilty of 
'departmental isation'. (But he is probably not, since "all the soul's powers are rooted in the 
one essence of the soul", la2x. 77. al. c. ) 
a) Humans as desirous 'knowers' 
Aquinas firstly considers humanity to be by nature a 'knower' of the divinely ordered 
universe: 
... Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics tr. Mary Thomas Noble, (Edinburgh: 
T. & T. Clark, 1995), 
178. 
460 Jordan, 97. 
;, flýý 
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Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act 
without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable. 
... For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any 
effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of 
the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the 
natural desire would remain void. (Ia. 12. a 1) 
"[T]he ultimate beatitude of man", then, "consists in the use of his highest function, which 
is the operation of his intellect". This does not mean that human beatitude is merely the use 
of the intellect; rather, the final point is to know God. An outline of this knowledge follows, 
including how God makes it possible. The bedrock of the syntagma, though, is that human 
'knowers' are drawn relentlessly to the 'supremely knowable', the certainty of which 
parallels a modern astronomer's respect for the gravitational force of a black hole. 
We are reminded of Augustine's 'being, knowledge and love ý 461 (even if Aquinas has yet to 
account for 'love'). As for Augustine, it follows that in our awareness, the good is 
contingent upon the true. This is obvious to Aquinas for an ontological and an 
epistemological reason: 
First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the 
true re ards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good 9 : 0141 follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is 
desirable. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally 
precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good 
regards the appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good. (Ia. 16. a4) 
That "the true regards being itself simply and immediately" is, of course, a little contentious 
for moderns. It is beyond our scope to defend the claim other perhaps than to suggest that it 
is easier to defend in a good divine order than elsewhere. The main point of interest is that 
"thus it is desirable". This would seem to be Aquinas' way of saying, with Augustine, that 
we love what we see. "As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the 
true denotes that towards which the intellect tends" (la. 16. al. c). We are first knowers of, 
and then responders to, the order of reality; and hence there follows ethics. 
And thus we incidentally discover a major distinction in Aquinas' syntagma, between 
intellect and appetite. In fact, intellect is a "cognitive power in the soul" (la. 12. a4. c); 
cognition is the genus of which intellect is a species. The soul, broadly, is both cognitive 
and appetitive. 
Aquinas also follows Aristotle's hierarchical view of functionality. Natural, 
ývegetative' 
traits (e. g. nutrition and growth) are shared with all living things. With animals, 
humanity 
shares a 'cognitive power' called sensation, and an 'appetitive power' called sensuality 
or 
"' See above, 78. 
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'sensitive appetite'. Specific to humanity are the 4rational powers': a cognitive power called 
intellect, and an appetitive power called will. 
b) A diagram of the 'syntagma -9 
At this point it might be useful to pause and offer a diagram, to assist us better to grasp the 
developing syntagma. For completeness, additional material on the vegetative power is 
included, but that is of less interest to us than the powers of sense and intellect: 
COGNITIVE APPETITIVE 
concerned with the true concerned with the good 
INTELLECT I REASON WILL 
ca 
0E 40 directed to UNIVERSALS 




SENSATION SENSITIVE APPETITE 
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-j a 0 C= M 
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U) .C 
&- - C) -ý -: Eý --ý the power whereby the body 'continues'its existence C" ?ý 
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> ; the power whereby the body acquires its due quantity 
IU C, ) 
NUTRITIVE - M W= 
> 
L- ;3 
LZ ý2 the power whereby the body is preserved in its existence and in its due quantity . 
I 
The diagram is not exhaustive. (For example, an 'apprehensive' power might be imagined 
three-dimensional ly, as if lying across all the boxes of the grid; it will not help us to attempt 
to show it, and in any case it does not concern us. ) Moving from bottom to top of the 
diagram shows how in Aquinas' understanding, the soul's attention moves further and 
further beyond the self. (The 'locomotive' power should somehow straddle the topmost part 
of the powers of sense, since higher animals go to get objects of sense). Moving 
from left to 
right shows how this attention moves from contemplation to action (except 
for the left-right 
layout of irascible and concupiscible, which are in recursive relation . 462) 
In the next 
See below, 128f 
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paragraphs, to the end of this section, I will explain some of the elements of Aquinas! 
syntagma. The explanation will be clearer if frequent reference is made to the diagram. 
Human action is that which stems from the specifically human powers. The will chooses 
freely from goals proposed by the intellect, after the intellect considers ends and means. 
Aquinas will sometimes refer to the 'intellect', and sometimes to 'reason'; but these are not 
to be distinguished, except insofar as reason is the process by which people "advance from 
one thing understood to another" (I a. 79.8), so as to bring understanding. 
Modern philosophy argues about whether 'desire', 'passion', 'feeling', and certain forms of 
motive and intention, should be included under 'emotion'. Aquinas covers all such concepts 
4 
463 as appetition'-an Aristotelian principle of 'tendency' as applied to the human person. 
When in la-80 (esp. a2) Aquinas classifies 4appetitive powers' by a distinction between 
'higher', 'intellectual' appetite (the will), and 'lower', 'sensitive' appetite (sensuality), we 
find he can account for the 'tug' of the external world in all its pluriformity. Both powers 
tend outside of the self-but the 'intellectual' appetite tends toward universals (e. g. that 
which is 'good'), and the 'sensitive' appetite tends toward particulars (specifically, the 
objects of sense). In this, "the higher appetite moves the lower", and so at the outset 
Aquinas contends that appetite can actually be shaped and governed by the intellect. And 
yet a little more cryptically when considering how this may relate to 'motive' powers, 
Aquinas can also say that "the higher appetite moves by means of the lower" because "a 
universal opinion does not move except by means of a particular opinion". So the 
relationship between these two, though hierarchical, is also dialectical, or (perhaps better), 
recursive: desires of sense are somehow shaped by prior 'intellectual' decisions, and yet 
these decisions can also be shaped by that to which the senses are exposed. 
Sensuality is further subdivided into the 'irascible' and 'concupiscible' (la. 81-2). 
Respectively, one repels the undesirable, and the other pursues the desirable. Anthony 
Kenny rejects this further 'anatomising' as largely a "forced assimilation" of conceptions by 
464 
previous thinkers. But we should rather commend Thomas for his astuteness in retaining 
46' Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind (London: Routledge, 1993), 59-6 1. 
464 Ibid., 63. The source has been identified as William of Moerbeke's Latin translation of Aristotle's 
De Anima, with 
irascibilis rendering Oup(ml and concupiscibilis for ETrIOUVIKTI [in Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica: The 
Emotions (Vol. 19, la2ce. 22-30) ed. Thomas 0. Gilby, tr. Eric D'Arcy, (London: Blackfriars; Eyre 
& Spottiswoode, 
1967), xxv]. It is interesting that the respective cognate NT words are used both restrictively and generally: 
Oup6q 
generally only for 'wrath', but imOupfa for various strong desires right across the moral spectrum 
(c. f Jesus' A 
have eagerly desired F-1-mOupig tTrf: OUpqcYa, [Lk. 22: 15], or Paul's "great eagerness", Ev -rroAAý EmOup(q- 
P 
Th. 2: 17], with the thrice-repeated EiTtOuplct of I Jn 2: 16-17, or the adjectivally qualified usages in 
Col. 3: 5 or 
2 Pt. 1: 4,2: 10). The NT's moral interest is in the object of the desire, not the strength of 
it. Aquinas' primaril) 
technical and philosophical usage pertains to desire-related 'movements of the soul' prior 
to any moral evaluation of 
those movements. Aquinas does engage with the narrower moral usage when 
he discusses the noun (e. g. in la2w. 30). 
but even then, the discussion stays much wider than its narrowest meaning 
('Iust'). Moreover, various nuances are 
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the distinction, noticing as he does that both 'violent' and 'hungry' feelings strongly impact 
human decision and action. Indeed, Aquinas has introduced this as groundwork for a far 
more defensible claim-of significant interest here-that people emote and act in order to 
protect or accrue or displace whatever they construe to be goods or evils. 
Interestingly, the will does not itself contain this irascible-concupiscible distinction. This is 
because it governs general conceptions of the good, whereas the sensitive appetite can only 
construe the good in its different aspects. With the single-mindedness of a referee, the will 
decides for or against sense: 
Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good, 
because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And therefore the 
parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different notions of 
particular good: for the concupiscible regards as proper to it the notion of 
good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature: whereas the 
irascible regards the notion of good as something that wards off and repels 
what is hurtful. But the will regards good according to the common notion of 
good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there is no 
differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in the intellectual 
appetite an irascible power distinct from a concupiscible power ... (la. 82.5-c) 
That there is no significance in the left-right placement of irascible and concupiscible 
(above) is because Aquinas sees them to be equal and interconnected-or at least, that the 
grounding of irascence in concupiscence is insignificant. (As Mark Jordan puts it, "[t]he 
irascible is 
... teleologically subordinate to the concupiscible, 
from which it begins and in 
which it ends. "465) 
[T]he irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscible 
when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable things 
which the concupiscible desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which 
the concupiscible flies. And for this reason all the passions of the irascible 
appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in 
them; for instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, 
terminates in joy. (la. 81.2. c) 
Aquinas contends that 'irascible' and 'concupiscible' 'obey' reason (la. 81.0). Given the 
principle that "the higher appetite moves the lower appetite", this 'obedience' is understood 
to mean that the intellect has a 'kingly' rather than a 'despotic' rule over these appetites. We 
might say it has a 'right' to rule, even though that rule is resisted (with Aquinas pointing 
here to the "other law at work" in Rom. 7: 23. ) Universal principles held in the intellect are 
(we might say) 'processed' by reason. These principles are applied (via the will) to 
particular circumstances, hence the appetites receive direction. The account explains why 
the appetites of animals are immediately responsive to the inputs of sense, while 
this is not 
so in humans. As yet, intellect and reason are not called into question; 
Aquinas will later 
found in the occasion, and therefore the morality, of concupiscence. 
Jordan, 89. 
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discuss their 'malfunctioning'. But already we can see that this 'malfunctioning' would not 
seem to involve an 'infection' of reason by sense; it will be more in the nature of a 
'misleading' perhaps. 
Aquinas thus imagines the human person as a single 'unicity of substantial form', to which 
he can refer in entirety by its distinctively human aspect of rationality. 411 Rather than the 
various powers being nested together, there is a subtle interplay between them (which the 
diagram risks erasing); and "the elements of order, perceived at first in the roughest outline, 
come to be understood with increasing subtlety and discernment. 15467 O'Donovan's 
description of moral discernment, though belonging to another context, well describes 
Aquinas' analysis of the human syntagma. 
3. The human telos and its means 
In the previous section, I have shown Aquinas' conception of human being as a complex 
interplay of thought and appetite directed towards various ends. Human action is constituted 
in appetition towards ends. The left-right orientation of the diagram (on page 127) signalled 
the soul's movement from contemplation to action. 
All 
Herein lies the conceptual basis of Thomas's account of the relationship between emotion 
and ethics, but before moving ahead further to consider his account, it is necessary to pause 
and consider the ends to which the soul might move, and how the process of this 
ýmovement' is what we normally call 'action'. Human action is unintelligible without a 
telos, but actions become intelligible when the 'syntagma' operates towards a telos. 
Normative action is intelligible once we discern what the syntagma isfor, and towards what 
ends it might rightly be directed. 
The function of the irascible and the concupiscible within the syntagma flag the significance 
of emotion for human functioning; but an account of telos is required before Aquinas can 
expand upon the place of emotion. That is, Aquinas' account of that to which humans are 
directed is necessary to and will govern his account of the relationship between emotion and 
ethics. 
a) Why Aristotelian cosmology does not discredit 'appetition' 
As Thomas's account of a human telos unfolds, a problem may present itself to modern 
readers. He often buttresses his account with simple Aristotelian examples of natural 
... Norman Kretzmarm and Eleanor Stump, "Aquinas, " in Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig, 
10 vols., vol. I (London: Routledge, 1998), 335. 
461 O'Donovan, Resurrection, 81. 
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teleology, since the will is teleological; but these examples will seem outmoded to modern 
minds and may therefore seem to discredit his wider account of a human telos. 
Kretzmann and Stump succinctly describe how for Thomas the will parallels natural 
teleology: 
[The will is] the most subtle terrestrial instantiation of an utterly universal 
aspect of creation. Not only every sort of soul but absolutely every form, 
Aquinas maintains, has some sort of inclination essentially associated with it 
... Inclination is the genus of appetite, and appetite is the genus of will. "' 
So fire, "by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like" (I a. 8l. l. c). The irascible 
and concupiscible aspects of the appetitive power are also to be seen in fire, which "has a 
natural inclination, not only to rise from a lower position, which is unsuitable to it, towards 
a higher position which is suitable, but also to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action" 
(la. 81.2. c). 
When moderns imagine a dismissal of Aquinas' anthropology can follow-as if over- 
imagination about the physics of fire makes teleology implausible for a human syntagma- 
the point is seriously missed. Aristotle and Aquinas were guilty of a much less serious error, 
by seeing in fire a teleological behaviour more applicable to living things. Aquinas' 
syntagma seeks to codify the obvious observation-phenomenological, but surely 
indubitable-that humans are teleological beings. Whether or not fire should be seen in this 
way is moot. Human will is "the most subtle terrestrial instantiation" of something 
teleological. Thus, neither does it follow from the rejection of Aristotelian teleology by 
modern science that human thought and behaviour is not profoundly appetitive and oriented 
toward ends. If the point seems obvious, we need only remember how Lyons' assessment of 
emotion was made distinctive (among other scientifically oriented accounts) by his 
willingness to canvas a teleological dimension. 469 
b) Humanity's true end 
In MacIntyre's description of Aristotelian and Thomist moral logic, "[flo progress in both 
moral enquiry and the moral life is ... to progress 
in understanding all the various aspects of 
that life, rules, precepts, virtues, passions, actions as parts of a single whole. "470 
Aquinas uses humanity's true 'end' as the organising principle for this 'single whole'. 
At 
first, his treatment of humanity's end closely parallels Aristotle. But as 
he proceeds it 
Kretzmann and Stump, 338. 
See above, 3 If 
470 Macintyre, Three Rival Versions, 139. 
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becomes apparent that for Aquinas, the best account of morality's 'single wholeý is 
Christian, not Aristotelian. Aquinas' account of humanity's end therefore illustrates how he 
makes Aristotelian conceptions become Christian, for the sake of a contemporary 
Aristotelian readership.,,, 
"The end, " for Aquinas, "is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end" (I a2w. l. prol. ). 
That in which a man rests as in his last end, is master of his affections, since 
he takes therefrom his entire rule of life. Hence of gluttons it is written 
(Phil. 3: 19): "Whose god is their belly": viz. because they place their last end 
in the pleasures of the belly. Now according to Mt. 6: 24, "No man can serve 
two masters, " such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore it 
is impossible for one man to have several last ends not ordained to one 
another. (Ia2ae. I. a5. sc) 
Of course the belly is an improper end by which to discern order, and the Summa's Second 
Part seeks to ascertain humanity's true telos. Thomas's long build-up to the discovery of 
humanity's true telos almost reads like a detective novel. 
He begins the search with a eudaimonistic premise. To find whatever brings true and lasting 
happiness will be to discover humanity's true end. But happiness (la2x. 1-5) does not 
consist in bodily goods, of which a variety is considered (la2w. 2). Neither is delight the 
essence of happiness, and pleasure certainly is not. Happiness is not primarily found in any 
operation of the senses, and neither is it shared with animals (la2w. 3. a3). This process of 
elimination is familiar terrain to readers of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, and for 
thirteenth-century Parisian Aristotelians, the treatment of happiness so far is 
uncontroversial. 
Having eliminated the 'usual suspects' (bodily goods, delight and pleasure), Aquinas turns 
to consider how might come about that 'final happiness' which lulls and quenches bodily 
appetites and desires. Such complete happiness can only be mediated by the soul rather than 
by the body. Therefore, it must occur in response to something found by the soul, among 
universals, rather than among sensual particulars (I a2w. 2. a8). 
At this point Thomas is reminded of Scriptures such as Jeremiah 9: 23-24 ("let those who 
boast, boast ... that they understand and 
know me, that I am the LORD` I a2x. 3. a6-a7), 
Psalm 103: 5 ("Bless the LORD, 0 my soul ... who satisfies you with good as 
long as you 
live"-la2x. 2. a8), Psalm 73: 25 ("Whom have I in heaven but you? And there 
is nothing on 
earth that I desire other than you"-la2x. 4. a7), and the other references to personal telos 
"' See above, 123. 
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that abound in Scripture. "' These Scriptures solve the problem by discerning among 
universals a source of happiness that eclipses bodily desires and satisfies the soul. 
The logic of Aristotle has been extrapolated to show that God alone is humanity's true end, 
and that final happiness is found in him. The familiar premises of the Nichomachean Ethics 
have given way to a theological conclusion, and "Aristotle was invoked against Aristotle in 
the interests of Scripture and Augustine, not because Aquinas was rejecting Aristotelianism, 
but because he was trying to be a better Aristotelian than Aristotle. ""' To so speak of God 
as the answer to the riddle of human happiness "retrospectively vindicates", in a Pauline 
and Augustinian mode, "that in Aristotle which had provided a first understanding of the 
moral life. 19474 T. O. Gilby catches Thomas's mood in this loyal observation: 
[Tjhe treatise is written in his customary rather dead-pan manner; some may 
have the impression, from a hasty scanning of these pages, that it purveys 
somewhat sober stuff, doubtless improving, yet civic and Aristotelean and 
not very generous. Where the leap, the abandon, the fire in face of divinity? 
They will have missed the climax of each Question, which breaks out of the 
gates of the City of Reason, not in a desperate sortie, but at full strength and 
equipment, a theology with all of its philosophy intact. "' 
It is "by His infinite goodness" that God "can perfectly satisfy man's will. " God is happy in 
his essence, but humanity's happiness consists in participation with God (la2ac. 3. al, esp. 
adl). It is in this way that happiness can be considered both as uncreated and created, as 
both belonging to the soul and outside the soul (la2w. 2. a7). This participation is mediated 
by "the vision of the Divine Essence" that is also described as a "union" (1a2W. 3. a8). 
Happiness fulfils hope when the intellect completes knowledge by vision and 
comprehension, and when the will delightfully reposes in its beloved object (la2x. 4. a3). 
Ethics and virtue are therefore teleologically contingent: biblical 'cleanness' and 'holiness' 
are for Aquinas the 'rectitude of the will' when duly ordered to the last end (cf. 
I a2w. 69. a3. c, end). In addition, 
the will of him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he 
loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him who sees not God's 
Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common notion of 
good which he knows. (I a2w. 4. a4) 
While bodily perfection is not integral to final happiness (Ia2x. 4-a5), bodily disposition to 
virtue certainly is (Ia2x. 4. a6, with Jn 13: 17 used in support, where Christ promises a 
"' E. g. Ps. 17: 15; Is. 66: 14; Mt. 5: 8; Jn 17: 3; 1 Cor. 9: 24; Heb. 12: 14; 2 Tim. 4: 7-8; 
1 Jn 3: 2; & Rev. 14: 13. 
473 MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, 137. 
474 Ibid., 140-41. 
"5 In Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica: Purpose and Happiness (Vol. 16, la2a,. 1-5) ed. 
Thomas 0. Gilbý'. 
(London: Blackfriars; Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1969), xiv. 
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blessing to disciples if they do his teaching). With Augustine, Aquinas is adamant that the 
soul's perfection is necessarily connected to the body. Aquinas limits one corollary, that 
happiness can be found in this life (la2w. 5. a3), but allows another, that "one man can be 
happier than another", since "the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is ", which 
"happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him" 
(la2w. 5. a2. c). 
The chain of subjects that follows in the Summa-acts, decisions, 'passions', habits, virtues 
and vices, law, gospel-are all "those things by means of which man may advance towards 
[the] end, or stray from the path" (I a2w. I. prol. ). 
Action as movement to the end 
Why, then, are not all humans well-ordered to their true end, and to final happiness? 
Aquinas knows that "God could make a will having a right tendency to the end, and at the 
same time attaining the end"; but "the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should not 
be thus" for humans. With Romans 4: 6 (that "those to whom God reckons righteousness 
apart from works" are blessed) squaring off against John 13: 17 ("you are blessed if you do" 
what Christ has taught), Aquinas uses Aristotle as referee to conclude that since happiness 
is so far beyond humans, movement to it is necessary. (We might wonder if Aquinas has 
missed a double meaning in biblical 'blessing' here. ) This necessity for movement will 
translate into ethical activity. 
ý:, Il 
w 41ý 
The "many movements" so predicated are called merits, and happiness is the reward 
(la2w. 5. a7). But what are these "many movements"9 Precisely those acts, decisions, 
emotions, habits, virtues, precepts, and responses to the gospel that bring forth rectitude of 
will. Aquinas will proceed to examine these later in the Summa. 
The point is unambiguous: "Happiness is obtained through works" (la2x. 5. a7. sc). For 
Aquinas, this is not Pelagian, but is rather a simple facet of reality. Humans find happiness 
when their manner of life corresponds to reality as theologically understood. 
But before these 'works' can be considered, it is hardly surprising that, true to 
thoroughgoing form, Aquinas must pause to give an account of work itself, that is, of 
human action. 
There are acts "proper to man as man", the actus humani, by which 
human persons are 
masters of their actions, through reason and will, and by which they are said to 
have free- 
will. These correspond to the specifically human powers that humanity 
is said to possess. 
The actus humani, and the will that produces them, are the subject of 
I a2w. 6-21. 
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Since humans share sensory abilities with animals, it follows that there are activities done 
by humans that do not involve this interaction of intellect and will. These are called actus 
hominis by Aquinas, and are "not proper to man as man" (Ia2x. I. aI. c, even though some 
such acts might be unique to humans). "' The passions occur within the locus of actus 
hominis, and are the subject of I a2w. 22-48. 
It might seem problematic to moderns that passion does not inform the actus humani, 
whereas the will does. The problem would reside in the idea of a passionless will, if 
emotions are at all valuable. But this charge presupposes an equivalence between passion 
and emotion, and such an equivalence is not held by Thomas Aquinas. We can say this on 
the basis of his understanding of happiness, which will be described next, and given his 
important nuancing of 'passion', which will be described below (page 136). 
d) Passions and 'emotions'as different kinds of mover 
The current investigation requires that we close in upon Thomas's discussion of the 
passions. But interestingly, and very surprisingly for moderns, the reason for closing in 
upon this discussion is emphatically not because his discussion of the passions is a 
discussion 'about the emotions'. Rather, we shall find that for Aquinas, passion is a species 
of our broader genus, emotion. Also, we shall find that Aquinas does not characterise this 
broader genus. 
We have already seen an important example of this. Most people would call happiness an 
emotion. In Aquinas, it is humanity's true end. Yet it would never occur to him to call it a 
passion. There is no more 'movement' to be had when someone is finally happy, since the 
subject has 'arrived'; and 'passion' for Aquinas always connotes change or movement. 
Aquinas will reiterate this by defending 'enjoyment' as a function of the appetitive power, 
but which represents a kind of final fruition that "should calm the appetite with a certain 
sweetness and delight" (I a2x. ll. a3. c; cf. a3 passim). "To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to 
something for its own sake. " This aphorism from Augustine is twice-quoted, first (al) to 
impress upon us how human appetition can find a final home in the good order of reality; 
and then surprisingly (a4. sc), to show that this end can be 'enjoyed' even when not yet 
possessed, but in anticipation and prospect, as it were. (Cf. "one is said to possess the end 
already, when one hopes to possess it", la2w. 69. al. c. ) So we see, with Augustine, a 
collocation of happiness, love, joy, enjoyment and delight as affections that are all 
fundamental to this most prosaic treatise about the logic and axiology of human action. 
As 
476 Cf Norman Kretzmann, "Warring Against the Law of My Mind: Aquinas on Romans 7, " 
in Philosophy and the 
Christian Faith, ed. Thomas V. Morris, (Notre Dame: University Press, 1988), 
174. 
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with Augustine, terms of reference demanding all true 'love' to be hungry are implicitly 
rejected as a reductive error. 
It may be the case that there is no place for passion in Aquinas' will. But his wholehearted 
advocacy of what we would (and he would not) call emotion, is indisputable. That passion 
and emotion are distinct in this way, and that some of what we call emotion (viz. love, 
enjoyment, delight etc. ) is simply not labelled as generically so by Aquinas, will explain 
deep confusions among those who comment on him in this matter. In this so-called 
'Treatise on the Passions', D'Arcy opts to translate passiones animae as 'emotions', but in 
the full knowledge that the 'best' English word would lie somewhere between 'passions' 
and 'emotions'. 477 
'Passion' is a different kind of 'mover' for the soul than is happiness, delight and 
enjoyment-experiences that we (but not Thomas) would call 'emotional'. But in order to 
sustain this point I will need to elucidate his analysis of passion, which at some points 
seems to make passion coextensive with emotion or with affection. 
4. Passion: mover of the soul 
In this section I will show how Aquinas' passions involve bodily 'disturbances', as 
appetition 'moves' a person toward some end. Passions reflect the complexity of the moral 
field, which has many goods. Ordinate passions move soul to its proper end, and passions 
can be morally evaluated by the moral visions they serve. These reactions express opinions 
about good and evil, offering avenues for reflection about one's ethic that may not easily be 
accessible by other means. 
Thomas has clearly signalled the passions as integral to human functioning. In his reading 
of human experience, the 'freedom' of the will is sometimes augmented, sometimes 
compromised, by them. His account of them prepares for his examination of virtue. 
His understanding of emotional life represents experiences of contentment with goods, and 
other experiences of a conflict between goods both present and absent. This is, of course, an 
Augustinian substrate. But his labels here will prove a little different to our own (and 
Augustine's). 
477 Aquinas, Summa (Blackfriars 19)9 xix-xx. Indeed this is an interesting discussion of the problem 
in general. 
'Affection' is rejected as obviously inappropriate for negatives such as despair or 
fear; 'feelings' are seen to be too 
wide; and the point is made that for Thomas, the passions are object-oriented. 
D'Arcy also notices the clear 
connection between passion and passivity, which shall be considered below, 137. 
But for my decision to retain the 
older Benzinger Brothers edition by the Dominican Fathers, see below, 159. 
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Aquinas understands 'passion' (and 'passivity') in connection with the soul's power of 
appetition. In I a2ae. 22. a2, Augustine's discussion of passion (De civitate Dei IX) is used to 
bolster the case for passion as a function of the appetitive part of the soul (rather than its 
apprehensive part). This appetitive power orders things for the soul "as they are in 
themselves" (la2x. 22. a2. c), determining for it whether they are good or evil, and so 
becoming "the principle of the exterior action" by which "we come into contact with 
things" (ad2). 
Therefore in Thomas's description, passion is located very near to the will, but is not to be 
confused with voluntas as such. This 'very near' is precisely because passion is located in 
the sensitive appetite, whereas voluntas is the rational appetitive power, and as Aquinas 
says, "the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will", 
la2w. 24. al. c. (A slight oversimplification is necessary to sustain these assertions, since at 
one point passion is associated with 'knowing', which suggests that it inheres in the 
sensitive and in the rational appetite. But I will show how Aquinas himself justifies my 
oversimplification. ) 
Contrary to modern thought, we find that 'passivity' describes the active intentionality of 
passion: to want, to desire, to long for something, is an aspect of the soul at work. But on 
the basis of the distinction between passion and will, Aquinas denies that the 'passive' 
aspect of passion somehow implies the surrender of choice. Yet the closeness of the 
relationship between passion and will also means that passion is to find its ordering within 
the bounds of reason, and once ordered, passion may rightly reinforce reason to assist the 
will toward good ends. 
a) Nuancing ýpassion' 
We need pause and note Thomas's understanding of a 'weak' and a 'strong' sense to the 
word 'passion', and his preference for it to be understood in the 'strong' sense. 
A discussion in la2w. 22. al. c is driven by Romans 7: 5. What account can be given for 
Paul's understanding of passion as being 'in' the soul (since Paul describes "the passions of 
sin 
"478)? Thomas describes two broad uses for the word 'passion' (although he calls them 
three uses, subdividing the second). 
The first "general" use refers to the kind of change or 'movement' that occurs when 
something is filled up, completed, or perfected. Since this is a change or movement, 
then 
478 That is, since passions are 'of sin, sin must be 'in' the soul. The logic 
follows from Thomas's anti-Manichean 







technically, it is a passion. But it is 'passion' in a non-moral mode, and is related to 
cognition, as when the soul 'receives' new knowledge; and Thomas can even refer to 
'feeling' in this connection. This kind of passion is less intense because less potentiality is 
involved. Aristotle is Thomas's source for this understanding of passion. 
But there is a second use of the word that Aquinas takes to be "its proper sense". In this 
44proper" use a subtraction occurs, even if something else is being received. The strongest 
and "most proper acceptation" of this sense represents a response to situations where "from 
a more excellent thing, a less excellent is generated", which is to say, where some essential 
good is subtracted. Hence there is a moral aspect to this use. Moreover unlike the first 
sense, this is the respect in which passion involves "bodily transmutation". In these 
responses of the sensual appetite to good and evil, passion is more intense because great 
potentialities are involved. Augustine is Thomas's source for this sense, a sense that very 
much seems to be Thomas's preferred usage. 
Commenting upon Augustine's treatment, Aquinas says that "the passions of the soul are 
the same as affections" (passiones animae sunt idem quod affectiones, I a2w. 22. a2. sc). But 
in fact Aquinas is capitalising upon the very point that Augustine was making: that 
passiones animae has a broad range of meaning. However whereas Augustine uses this 
observation to secure claims about a real consensus between argumentative Hellenistic 
philosophers, Aquinas has moved from Augustine's observation to a closer understanding 
of the uses ofpassio. 
Therefore in Ia2x. 22. a3. adl, people can be "well affected towards" and "united ... by 
love" to 'divine things' (affectio ad divina, et conjunctio ad ipsa per amorem), "without any 
alteration in the body. " The context leaves open whether this 'affection' and 'love' is an 
operation of the sensitive, or of the intellectual, appetite. But beyond doubt, said affection 
and union by love is not an example of passion in its strong sense, since there is no 
alteration in the body. 
Mark Jordan has noticed something related. Firstly, Jordan shows that while Aquinas seeks 
to co-ordinate sources in Aristotle and Augustine, Augustine remains the controlling 
authority in this section. 479 Secondly, Jordan sees that although a single power 
(the 
appetitive) is on view, Thomas distinguishes two movements within it, where 
"one is like 
479 Jordan, 75-76,79-80. 
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rest, the other like motion" Oust as we have seen in the two senses of passion); and the 
prevailing tendency of passion is toward the inclinations of the sensitive appetite. 480 
Although this nuancing of passion might seem pedantic, it is very relevant to what follows 
since we shall see Thomas describe joy (for example) as both a passion and as non- 
passionate. There is no contradiction here: joy can be a passion in the 'general or weak or 
technical sense, but not in the 'proper' sense. (Again, we need to remember that this in no 
way diminishes the 'joyfulness' of joy, given the differences we are seeing between 
passion, emotion and affection. ) Furthermore it is the 'proper' sense that is under discussion 
when Thomas develops his moral account of the passions. Passions as 'properly' 
understood are all the more interesting in that they are not 'simple'. 
b) Simplicity and passivity 
Thomas resolves that 'passion' (strong sense) is in the soul, but accidental to it. That it is in 
the soul seems clear enough, because it has to do with appetition. But that it is accidental to 
the soul is confusing to us: we find it hard to see how something seemingly as integral as 
4passion' can yet be an accident rather than an essence. This might represent a major 
dispute with Augustine, who thought of being, knowing and loving as essential to the soul. 
However Aquinas does understand love and joy (like happiness and enjoyment) not to be 
accidental, but rather essential, to the soul. Love and joy are uncomplicated responses to the 
soul's true end, and so are "simple acts of the will ... without passion" (I a2x. 22. a3. ad3). ` 
They are certainly "without passion" in the 'proper' sense, but also because in some 
circumstances, each is free from what Augustine's debate termed 'disturbance'. Instead of 
'disturbance' Aquinas speaks of Aristotelian 'simplicity' and 'passivity'. 
Passion is passion insofar as it is not 'simple'. By this is meant that there exists a potential 
for action. "Passion is a kind of movement" (Ia2w. 23. a1c), and "sorrow is more properly a 
passion than joy" (la2w. 22. al. c) since in sorrow, the potential movement to regain what 
was lost is greater than the potential for movement in joy, where what is desired is already 
received, or nearly so. Indeed, love and joy are contrasted to passion since they are states 
that obtain when no action is called forth. What was desired is now received. Moreover, it 
follows that in such states there is no conflict of goods. Conversely situations are not simple 
when more than one good is sought after; hence in response, passion is heightened. 
Ibid., 88. 
"' For one reader of D'Arcy's translation, a major distortion follows from D'ArCY's trivial 
"simply ... acts of the 
will". Aquinas' 'simple' is not English's 'simply'. See below, 159. 
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An elegant statement uses 'passibility' and 'passivity' to explain this 'non-simplicity' (and 
hints at the direction he will take to account for the seeming strength of some passions, even 
when their objects are relatively unimportant in comparison to the beatific vision) : 482 
Intensity of passion depends not only on the power of the agent, but also on 
the passibility of the patient: because things that are disposed to passion, 
suffer much even from petty agents. Therefore although the object of the 
intellectual appetite has greater activity than the object of the sensitive 
appetite, yet the sensitive appetite is more passive. (Ia2x. 22. a3. ad2) 
In the same way that a magnet is an 'agent' that draws iron filings to itself, so also the 
object of a passion is an 'agent' that draws its 'patient' to itself-even though the 'patient' 
is simultaneously an active human chooser. 
We can add some illustrations. A person gazing at a splendid work of art feels a deep 
satisfaction that reflects, Aquinas might say, the activity of the soul's appetition. Yet he 
would not regard the experience as 'passionate' -at least, not in the strong sense of 
4passion'-and any strong passions that were felt would reflect whatever potentialities the 
artwork suggested to the person-for example, the possibility of ownership, whether 
through purchase or theft. (Passion 'properly' understood may or may not become manifest 
toward the subject matter. If the artwork was a painting of a beautiful scene, the longing or 
craving to hike there might be passionate, while an awed wonderment at the beauty of the A: 
place would not, since there can be enjoyment without possession. 483 ) But consider an 
erotically passionate gaze toward a beautiful person: it is passionate, precisely because the 11 
,; I 
other seems replete with various potentials. For Aquinas, this too is the appetitive power of 
the soul at work, but accompanied by intense passion. 
These illustrations show the appeal of Aquinas' syntagma, where appetition is 'essential' to 
the soul, but passion only an 'accident'. 
Now passion pertains to defect, because it belongs to a thing according as it 
is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things that approach to the Supreme 
Perfection, i. e. to God, there is but little potentiality and passion: while in 
other things, consequently, there is more. (la2w. 22.2. adl) 
The 'defect' here may also invite our misunderstanding. Aquinas does not simply equate 
passion with pursuit of evil. The proposal is quite different, and the 'defect' concerns the 
degree to which a thing has potentiality: passion is strong in reference to such things. 
But 
for more perfect things-that is, things that display less 'potential ity'-the 
less intensely 
passionate' is the soul's appetition of it. 
... This is quite evident, for example, in the answer to "fwjhether bodily and sensible pleasures 
are greater than 
spiritual and intellectual pleasures" (I a2w. 3 La5; & cf, a6 on the 'greater' pleasures of touch). 
"' Cf above, 135. 
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Thus non-simplicity concerns the degree to which the soul is in movement toward some 
good, and the number of goods, though possibly conflicting, toward which it attends. The 
less simple the emotion, the more passionate it is; and so the degree of simplicity represents 
a non-moral axis for analysing passion. (There is a moral axis to this analysis: the less in 
accord with the soul's true end a passion is, the more inordinate, and so evil, it is. I will 
discuss this axis below, on page 144. ) 
Aquinas invites three modern misreadings here. 
Firstly: if modem readers were to smirk at Aristotelian simplicity being used in this way, 
they should first pause to reflect upon references in modern psychology to distressed 
clients, where metaphors rely upon non-simplicity. Such people are 'conflicted', 'divided, 
or 4not integrated'. What is meant by this is precisely what Aquinas means: sometimes, that 
a desired good is absent while at other times, mutually exclusive goods are desired. Yet 
experiences of well-being, such as love and joy, do not readily attract such metaphors of 
division. (We shall see in a moment, in extension of this point, how Thomas makes especial 
sense of anger. ) 
Secondly: modern readers will be unnerved that 'passion' is understood as a function of the 
soul's 'passivity'. But we misunderstand the significance of this 'passivity' if we construe it 
in modem terms--either literally, as if Aquinas saw passivity as a puny quietism; or 
conversely as if he meant us merely to be 'passive' hostages of strong, raging and 
uncontrollable passions. The subject-object relations of Aristotelian logic can seem to us 
quite reversed. When a final cause is operative, 'passivity' is basically opposite to modern 
usage; in Aquinas, it is similar to the soul's 'weight', or momentum, as in Augustine. "' This 
is only offensive when this 'weight' is considered entirely to be self-generated: that would 
be grounds for a substantive disagreement. 
Thirdly: if the subtle interplay between passivity and simplicity is not taken into account, 
there can be no understanding of how it is that Aquinas does not understand love and joy to 
be 'Passion'. This is Solomon's misunderstanding, when he refers to 
the curious observation that the highest virtues, such as love, hope, and faith, 
were not classified as emotions as such, but were rather elevated to a higher 
status and often (e. g., by Thomas Aquinas) equated with reason. The old 
master-slave metaphor [of reason over passion] remained alive and well, and 
as some emotions were seen as sins, the highest virtues could 
hardly be 
counted among the mere emotions. "' 
See above, 79. 
Solomon, "Philosophy of Emotions, " 6. 
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Thus Thomas Aquinas is made similar to Immanuel Kant. But the criticism in the final 
sentence only works if Aquinas is required to think of emotion' as we do. Rather than 
depositing all experiences within the same bucket, he is interested to understand them as 
inordinate passion, as ordinate passion, and as something unmixed and ' simple' (therefore 
only 'passionate' in a weak sense). Thus his project is fundamentally ethical. Solomon 
knows this, having introduced his comment to illustrate a "tight [medieval] linkage between 
the study of emotion and eth 
iCS". 486 Indeed Solomon is not unsubtle concerning differences 
between 'passion' and 'emotion', nor is he slow to notice that moderns understand words 
differently to ancients and medievals. But he is in good company (as we shall see 487) when 
he thinks Aquinas excludes love and joy from emotion. Aquinas does not; he excludes them 
from passion. Dixon's objection to Solomon remains solid here: although Aquinas does not 
overtly describe love, joy and happiness as 'affection', they certainly remain highly 
4affectionate'. 
c) Principal passions, and anger 
Disconcertingly however, love can also be discussed as a passion (la2w. 23), and is 
explicitly defended later as a passion (la2w. 26. a2). But this is because love can also cause 
movement toward a good end, making it a 'passion' in the 'weak' sense. The "four principal 
passions" will include joy and love (la2w. 25. a4). These remain 'passions' (weak sense) 
insofar as they imply some sort of change or movement. Insofar as they harmonise with the 
soul's true end, each is a 'simpler' kind of passion than more 'negative' passions (I a2w. 22). 
Therefore love (for example) can be construed in some circumstances as a non-passionate 
affection; whereas in other circumstances it is a passion of sorts. A judgment between these 
alternatives (were one necessary) would require an overall circumstantial assessment 
including the degree of simplicity, the potentialities remaining to be realised, and the degree 
of bodily transmutation elicited. 
In la2w. 23. al Aquinas returns to the 'irascible'-'concupiscible' distinction, which has 
previously been flagged as integral to human functioning, but whose function can now be 
delineated with clarity. A reliable kernel to Kenny's objection 488 might be that the 
distinction hypostasises aspects of human behaviour. But that is less important than the use 
Aquinas makes of the distinction, for he uses it to find the differing 'flavours' of certain 
passions. He names joy, sorrow, love and hatred as passions that 
have a certain 
straightforwardness-they evaluate an object. On the other hand, 
daring, fear and hope 
486 Ibid. 
487 See 'The immediacy of particulars' below, 159f. 





concern the path toward (or away from) an object. That is, some passions are more 
concerned with problems of action. 119 Aquinas concludes with an abrupt summary: 
[TIhere are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the 
concupiscible faculty [love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness], 
and five in the irascible [hope and despair, fear and daring, anger which has 
no contrary]; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained. 
This conclusion is further reworked in la2w. 25; and although the mechanics of the 
reworking might seem forced to us, the resulting "four principal passions"-joy, sadness, 
hope and fear-retain a certain elegant force. The appeal for Aquinas is in their symmetry 
and finality-that all other passions finally resolve into one of these, with the first pair 
pertaining to objects-as-ends, and the second pair to path s-toward-obj ects. We should also 
pause to note the sensitive portrayal of anger within this schema. 
The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot have a contrary ... For anger is caused by a difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is 
present, the appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond 
the limits of 'sadness, ' which is a concupiscible passion; or else it has a 
movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement is that of 'anger. ' 
But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to 
be already present or past. (la2w. 23. a3. c) 
Again, here is an interesting anticipation of the modern therapeutically-oriented typologies 
that understand anger sometimes to be a 'masking emotion'. On this view, therapist and 
client are tasked to 'uncover' 'underlying' sadness, or hopelessness, etc. If no such sadness 
is discerned, client and counsellor might switch to another view of the anger-that it is a 
basic and irreducible defence by the client, in view of his or her own (God-given) 
preciousness. 
490 
By any estimate, Aquinas' insight into the nature of anger is striking, and at this point the 
view that the soul has its irascible and concupiscible projects is actually quite illuminating. 
Quite simply, anger is presented as an accompaniment to the soul's attempt to dispose of a 
sad object. Anger would seem to melt away into sadness when all avenues for such attempts 
are proven blocked. His later refinement will argue that anger is "a concurrence of several 
passions, because the movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain 
inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge" (la2x. 46. al. c). Also, reason Is 
integral to anger (I a2w. 46. a4). Again, the subtlety here might surprise, if it is not yet clear 
"9 Whether or not to consign joy etc. to the soul's concupiscible appetition, and 
daring etc. to the soul's irascible 
appetition, is a moot point. What is of interest is the estimate that emotions are complicated 
by the degree to which 
action is in view. 
... Moreover, Aquinas' reference to 'evil' in the passage quoted flags a debate to be had with any 
therapy that claims 
intelligibility for anger, but without reference to some conception of evil. That 
is, his analysis of anger implies a 
dispute with any therapy which claims to proceed in disavowal of moral knowledge. 
Given such a disavowal, the 
therapy must either declare anger to be trivial; or if it respects anger, its account of anger will 
be incoherent, deceitful, 
or both. 
Page 143 
what a highly astute commentator Aquinas is on the interactions between human interiority, 
the value of the external world, and the human will to act in it. 
Even if this is not an exhaustive account of anger, most people could remember enough 
corroborative examples to make it comprehensive. There is a significance for ethics: angry 
action can be evaluated by further consideration of the 'sad object' it seeks to avoid; and 
more specifically, the 'justice' it seeks to achieve (cf. Ia2x. 46. a2. sc). That is, what is 'sad' 
about the anger's object? What wider moral commitments render the existing situation 
4unjust'9 (Better here perhaps might be the term 'unfair', which can include those claims to 
missing goods as perceived by a single subject, to the exclusion of some other valid claim. ) 
d) Moral evaluation of emotion 
Of course a moral account of the emotions must fundamentally decide whether emotions are 
themselves 'good', 'bad' or non-moral. Aquinas wrestles with this matter in reference to the 
passions in la2w. 24. al, where the objections point to the non-rational, animal nature of the 
passions to argue that they should attract neither blame nor praise. In reply Aquinas cites 
Augustine, where passions "are evil if our love is evil, good if our love is good" (De civitate 
Dei XIV. 7). Aquinas adds that while a 'raw' emotion would be morally neutral, there is 
never any such thing in the human person, who has a rational will either to command the 
passions or to check them. Therefore passions are said to be voluntary, and Aquinas offers 
an interesting clarification of his syntagma: 
[T]he sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and 
will; and yet movements and actions of the outward members are morally 
good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. 
The sensitive appetite, then, is seen to lie 'between' reason and action. Abstracted away 
from this relation, the passions may 'in themselves' be morally neutral. But they are not so 
abstracted: the will and reason are under our control, our actions are under our control, and 
being 'locked' within this 'matrix' the passions are part of a total 'package' open to moral 
evaluation (hence the citation from Augustine). 
"Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational, in so far as 'they partake of reason 
in 
some sort"' (la2x. 24. al. ad2). The claim is a little startling, suggesting that every 
desire is 
open to moral evaluation. Yet even so, Aquinas steadfastly refuses to drift into 
Manicheism. 
In I a2w. 24. a2 Aquinas again follows Augustine to reject the view that passions are evil of 
themselves. Rather, this Augustinian line of argument holds that passions serve broader 
moral visions and are to be evaluated accordingly. Aquinas' brief quote salutes 
the highly 
important De civitate Dei XIV. 9, where Augustine evaluates the operation of passions 
for 
"the citizens of the holy city of God, who live according to 
God in the pilgrimage of this 
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life". The analysis, rich in scriptural attestation, depicts passions that are shaped by the 
destinies and values of that city. 
In I a2x. 24. a4, this kind of view is repeated in a different kind of way. There, 'pity' and 
4envy' are offered as examples of good and evil passions respectively, precisely because the 
words themselves signify this wider moral field: pity is an emotion that concerns the good 
of another, whereas envy despises it. Aquinas remains consistent here, having explained 
that 'on their own' such passions are morally neutral, but take on moral shades once their 
object is in view. In their 'non-simplicity' then, passions can also be 'inordinate', corrupting 
the soul by the degree to which they represent the soul favouring some good over another, 
greater good. (This is something like what in Augustine I called 'selective sight'. ) By 
contrast, ordinate passions help the soul to be moved toward its proper end. 
The objections of I a2w. 24. a3 claim that the goodness of an act decreases in proportion to 
the passion that accompanies it. Aquinas deftly reverses this proto-Kantianism by arguing 
for what we might call a 'holistic' view-that where reason, passion and action are in 
concert, the rightness of the act is enhanced-which prefigures his view of what constitutes 
virtue. Psalm 84: 2b ("my heart and my flesh cry out for the living God") bears interesting 
witness to the view. In the later discussion of pleasure, the disavowal of Manicheism 
remains evident-so much so that we are almost startled by Aquinas' directness: "since the 
desires of good actions are good, and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of 
good actions good, and those of evil actions evil" (la2w. 34-al. c). 
e) Impassibility? 
Within this argument, la2x. 24. a3. obj2 and its answer become very significant in light of 
the modern 'passibility of God' debate. As we observed with Augustine '49, a simplistic 
argument might be made from the impassibility of God to a conclusion that human passion 
is an evil, perhaps on the basis of the imago dei; or, as in obj. 2, on the basis of the imitatio 
dei of Ephesians 5: 2. Modern theological anthropology may assume that positive estimates 
of human emotion can only be secured when Greek conceptions of divine impassibility 
have been overturned in favour of a 'suffering God'. 
The theological side of this investigation is surely significant. However, 
it is equally 
significant that Aquinas, whose view of God's nature in this respect is 
hardly ambiguous, 
can say: 
"' See above, 106f 
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In God ... there is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in [him] good does not depend on the right ordering of passions or of bodily 
actions, as it does in us. (I a2w. 24. a3. ad2) 
In this arena, the simple disjunction between human and divine constitution answers all 
comers. "' Admittedly, this is partly because for Aquinas the imago dei has been settled as a 
question of rationality, a view we might wish to argue. But the main element of this answer 
is that between human creatures and their Creator is "only pure teleological relation, 
unqualified by any generic equivalence ... an ordering-to in which there is no element of 
ordering-a tongs ide . "491 No analogia entis operates at this point. It is equally significant that 
Augustine (upon whose authority Aquinas is almost entirely dependent here) settles the 
question with equivalent ease, and without the same Aristotelian commitments as in 
Aquinas. 
fi Enjoying each other 
After deducing the four principal passionS, 494 Aquinas proceeds to refine the passions-first 
the concupiscible (la2w. 26-39: love and hatred; desire and aversion; pleasure and sadness), 
and then the irascible (la2w. 40-48: hope and despair; fear and daring; and anger). An 
increasingly 'fine-grain' is obvious in articles such as "whether [sorrow] is assuaged by 
sleep and baths? ", "whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards? " and "whether a 
person's defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him? " 
The significance of the passions for ethics is equally clear in articles such as "whether doing 
good to another is a cause of pleasure? ", "whether love conduces to action? " and "whether 
[fear] hinders action? " However, until we arrive at the treatment of 'virtue', the main work 
for ethics has already been done. But the section has some helpful clarifications and a few 
surprises. 
The usual Aristotelian categories are pressed into service in I a2w26. a4. c to give the helpful 
conclusion that persons are to be loved as 'ends in themselves' (so to speak). To paraphrase 
Aquinas, this is a primary friendship-type-love, as opposed to the secondary concupiscible- 
type-love that has non-personal goods as its object. We are reminded of Augustine's tussle 
over uti and ftui, and of the mature Augustine's formulation, that people are to 
be enjoyed 
"in God" . 495 "Accordingly, man 
has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes 
to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good. ... 
[T]hat which is 
... This is even clearer in the very blunt I a2w. 59. a5. ad3. 
'9' O'Donovan, Resurrection, 33. 
'9' See above, 143. 
495 See above, 108f 
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loved with the love of friendship is loved simply and for itself' . 411 To enjoy people in this 
way complements, rather than violates, the supervening divine moral order. 
g) Love: the weight of the soul 
If there remains any doubt by now over whether Aquinas shares with Augustine the 
primacy of love alongside being and knowledge, the doubt is laid to rest when sweeping 
statements are made concerning love. "All the other emotions of the soul are caused by 
love" (la2ae. 27. a4. sc), including even hatred (1a2x. 29. a2). Significantly for ethics, "every 
agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of some kind" (Ia2Oe. 28. a6. c). This is 
Augustinian bedrock, from De civitate Dei XIV, which is quoted repeatedly throughout 
la2ae. 26-48. But "love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved" 
(1a2x. 27. a2. c), meaning that knowledge is required before love can make its 'choices'. This 
reprises the position already recounted: that passions react, respond to and require prior 
moral commitments. 
"[W]hen we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being. " 
(la2x. 28. al. c); therefore "[e]vil is never loved except under the aspect of good" 
(I a2w. 27. a Lad 1). That is, love is always directed to a good, but the estimate of good can be 
'blinkered' from the wider field of view. Aquinas will later use this kind of approach to 
arbitrate between Stoics and Epicureans on the morality of pleasure (la2x. 34. a2); and hate 
is also assessed along these lines: 
[I]n the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, love is a certain 
harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as suitable; while 
hatred is dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as 
repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such, bears the 
aspect of good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. 
And therefore, just as good is the object of love, so evil is the object of 
hatred. (la2w. 29. al. c) 
This anticipates the kernel of truth in the 'boos and hoorays' of modern emotivist accounts 
of ethics. To react to something emotionally is (in part) to express an opinion about good 
and evil. Love, hate and the like offer a 'window' into one's moral commitments: some 
occurrences of emotion offer an avenue for reflection about one's ethic that is not as easily 
accessible by other means. Perhaps this would meet with the cautious approval of Aquinas 
(and even the enthusiastic approval of Augustine given De civitate Dei IX & XIX). 
... Aquinas offers further account of both friendship and disharmony in a later discussion on 
love's propensity toward 
'likeness' (la2w. 27. a3). But his commitment to people as ends in themselves, and implicitly to personal relationships, 
is never clearer than when the simple facts of human relationships subvert 
his best efforts to analyse them. In 
answering 'whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us' (la2w. 32. a5), 
Aquinas points to "the fact that 
we obtain some good through the action of another. " Why is this? Because 
"in this way, the actions of those who do 
some good to us, are pleasing to us"-for what reason? -"since it is pleasant to 
be benefited by another. " This can 
only raise an appreciative smile. 
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it is obvious on this view that the locus of a person's pleasure becomes a key test of their 
moral commitments. Since "the repose of the will and of every appetite in the good is 
pleasure", then "that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of virtue; 
and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works" (la2w. 34. a4. c). This is not the mere 
truism that, out of context, it may appear. Rather, pleasure is transcended for a kind of 
reflection that asks, 'why am I shaped this way? What makes my pleasures pleasantT The 
power of Aquinas at this point is precisely in the consistent refusal to decry pleasure, and 
other passions, as such; that 'they' are morally neutral, while 'T am not, means that 'they' 
can be used for insights into what 'F believe. Perhaps also we are put in mind of the same 
kind of transcendental questioning invited by the words of Christ in Matthew 6: 21 ("where 
your treasure is, there your heart will be also"), and 12: 33-35 (of good and bad "trees" and 
their "fruit"). 
There may be some other ethical implications hidden in I a2w. 26-48, but it has to be said 
that in the main, these questions concern the 'mechanics' of the passions in Aristotelian 
perspective. While there are many canny observations about various common experiences 
in the emotional life, most are not directly relevant to ethics. 
We do however see some hints of the next major movement in the Summa. That "no virtue 
is a passion" (la2x. 4l. al. objl; cf. la2w. 45. al. objl) intrigues us. Given that in Aquinas 
virtue is a lynchpin in the account of moral life, and given the preceding steadfast refusal to 
condemn passion, it remains to be seen what the one has to say to the other. 
5. Virtue: shaper ofpassion 
We are now in a position to see the centrality of virtue for Thomas in his explication of 
ethics. Given his method thus far, it would be odd for Thomas simply to analyse specific 
acts or laws, without considering how people might conduct themselves. Consideration of 
virtue is an obvious nexus through which his syntagma of human being moves toward a 
consideration of how law impacts upon human existence. Therefore I will now examine 
Thomas's account of the relation of virtue to passion. 
For the concept of virtue to carry the weight of Aquinas' subsequent ethical enquiry, 
it must 
be demonstrated that virtue's philosophical superset, a genus called 'habit', is a real entity. 
Thus the discussion of 'habits' or 'dispositions' in la2x. 49-54 is like a 
barrage of 
philosophical heavy artillery, preparing for virtue's 'invasion'. After this 
'barrage', 
la2x. 55-57 sees the 'beach-head' consolidated in terms of virtue proper. 
Virtues are a 
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series of both moral and non-moral 'operative habits' in the soul. They are 'operative' 
dispositions because they pertain to act, not to being (I a2w. 55. a2 C). 497 
Thomas's discussion of virtue proceeds by way of three points that might surprise a modern 
reader. Firstly, acts are logically prior to virtue, and acts are evaluated both by their ends 
and their nature. 'Intellectual' virtue assists this evaluation. But concupiscence threatens to 
derail the soul's appropriation of these acts; therefore secondly, C moral' virtue is needed to 
govern appetition (the locus of passion) so that right ends may be chosen. In fact, moral 
virtue and passion become triumphantly consonant-that is, moral virtue produces 
'ordinate passion', and rather than threatening to derail the virtuous life, passion can now 
actually assist in its formation! Thirdly, Aquinas explains the formation of intellectual and 
moral virtues toward lives populated by a variety of interesting virtues. The formation 
begins naturally, but can only continue theologically through 'love commended' and 'love 
poured in'. These three points form the three sub-sections of this section. 
Whereas the previous discussion of passion was somewhat value-neutral, toward the end 
la2w. 57 we finally see Aquinas start to circle back around on passion, armed this time with 
the 'weapons' of virtue. 
a) 'Prudence': a typical (intellectual) virtue 
The important response to I a2w. 57. a5, on prudence, is worth quoting in full: 
Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in 
good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not only what a man 
does, but also how he does it ... that 
he do it from right choice and not 
merely from impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things in 
reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, the due 
end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably 
directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive 
part, the object of which is the good and the end. And to that which is 
suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit 
in his reason, because counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to 
the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed 
in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards 
things ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently 
prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life. (la2x. 57. a5. c) 
Though specifically concerned with prudence (an 'intellectual' virtue), the response sets the 
tone for what follows, touching on a number of key concerns for ethics: 
Virtue finds its moral significance in the logically prior significance of acts; and we 
have already been told that as a 'habit', it is established within a 
history of action 
(I a2w. 5 I. a2-a3). (Clearly, Thomas cannot be blamed for the later 
losses in ethics, where 
497 In the spectrum of virtue theories, then, Thomas is among those for whom acts are epistemically 
prior to agents. 
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sometimes virtue has been submerged by acts, and sometimes acts have been 
submerged by virtue. ) 
The rightness of acts is, uncontroversially, governed both by their ends and their nature. 
(Thus Thomas would challenge hegemonic categorisations such as obligation, virtue, 
and consequence. These are over-reductive accounts of the moral field, and the 
bellicose disputes between their theorists would seem misguided to Thomas. ) 
Passion will not suffice for Aquinas in the right choice of acts (yet presumably, passion 
has not thereby suddenly become an evil). 
9 The 'appetitive part', which we recall is the locus of the passions, requires governance 
by virtue so that right ends may be chosen. (Aquinas will pursue this next, defining 
4moral virtue' specifically and exclusively to have this 'appetitive' governance- 
la2w. 58. al C. 
498) 
Having just given Aristotle's definition of prudence as "right reason of things to be done" 
(I a2w. 57. a4. c), Aquinas here elaborates: it is an intellectual disposition, enabling the reason 
to counsel that acts are ordered appropriately to their ends (cf. I a2w. 5 8. a4). But it turns out 
that prudence is not sufficient, and more must be said. 
To this end, Aquinas' disagrees with Socrates; and with unnamed others (la2W. 58. a2) who 
misapply Aristotle's dictum that "the soul rules the body like a despot". They all conclude 
that the soul is in complete command. On this view, only ignorance leads to sin (Socrates), 
which is to be remedied by giving the soul knowledge., 
Aquinas opposes such an account using a fusion of Aristotle and Augustine, effectively 
restating a view of concupiscence albeit without use of that word. Aristotle's 
counterstatement that reason commands appetite only by a 'politic power' actually works to 
oppose the Socratic point, for it means that a certain "opposition" obtains. The soul's 
requirement for such a 'politic' power highlights how "the habits or passions of the 
ap etitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. " In this I-P 
way Aquinas accounts for Augustine's famous reflection that 46sometimes we understand 
[what is right] while desire is slow, or follows not at all". Therefore it follows that 
for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well 
disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite 
be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue. 
... The syntagma becomes a little confusing when we discover that while all moral virtues 
pertain to the appetitive 
part of the soul, not all pertain to the passions (in the sensitive appetite), since 
there is also the intellectual appetite. 
Justice is the virtue that governs this arena (la2x. 59. a4. sc & c; cf 
la2w. 60. a2). 
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Prudence needs an appetitive 'ally'. 
b) Moral virtue 
Moral virtue is this ally, and the antidote to concupiscence: 
[T]o one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the 
object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. ... [H]e needs to be perfected by certain habits, 
whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue ... Consequently the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue. (I a2w. 58. a5. c) 
Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and 
command well. This is not possible unless the impediment of the passions, 
destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is 
done by moral virtue. (I a2w. 58. a5. ad3) 
Thus is the scene somewhat dramatically set for a 'confrontation' in la2w. 59, "of moral 
virtue in relation to the passions", surely inviting one of two breakdowns. A radical 
backslide into Manichean denigration of passion is very possible. (Any such 'Manichean' 
mood might be polite and subtle--e. g. a Stoic preference for virtue over passion. ) Likewise, 
a simplistic Pelagian argument for triumph-through-virtue might ensue, given that passions 
are 4voluntary' (Ia2x. 24. aI. c) and that habits are only ever sustained by a history of actions 
(I a2w. 5 La2-0). 
The first article sharpens the 'confrontation' in its clear delineation of passion from virtue. 
Yet Aquinas quickly reiterates his anti-Manichean premise, that "passions are not in 
themselves good or evil" (la2w. 59. al. c). And this opens the way for a most surprising 
second article, where passion and moral virtue are envisioned as triumphantly consonant, 
toward a good end (I a2w. 59. a2. sc). The mood is profoundly Augustinian, with the crucial 
De civitate Dei XIX and XIV evident again as Aquinas' key inspiration. In the corpus 
Aquinas also seeks to make a key distinction between 'passion', and "other affections of the 
human soul [also called] inordinate emotion[s]". It transpires that the latter are considered 
to be 'inordinate' because they are disordered, and "not as they should be to manner and 
time. " Or, to put it bluntly, "Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate 
passion. It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin" (Ia2x. 59. a5. adl, 2). This and 
the next article also see Aquinas following Augustine's deconstruction of certain aspects of 
the Stoic view. 
Throughout la2w. 60, Aquinas is gradually revealing the virtues that govern the various 
passions, by attainment of an Aristotelian mean between extremes. All of the concupiscible 
passions are governed by temperance; but the irascible passions have more troublesome 
Aristotelian categories and so are a little trickier. Fear and daring are ordered 
by fortitude; 
hope and despair require magnanimity; and anger, meekness. Altogether 
Aquinas defends 
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Aristotle's ten virtues that pertain to passion, and justice as an eleventh that governs the 
intellectual appetite (la2w. 60. a5. c); but of course, these are further distilled to agree with 
the four traditional 'cardinal virtues'-temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude . 419 B ut 
the preceding discussion has been lively, gesturing toward a certain creativity in imagining 
what kind of virtue might govern a given passion. Aquinas speaks for this flexible mood 
when he observes how "fm]any, both holy doctors, as also philosophers" speak of multiple 
virtues as "contained under" the four (Ia2w. 61.0 C). 500 A later view, that virtues should 
suppress moments of passion, distorts Aquinas' conception of virtues producing 'ordinate 
passions'. Thomas envisaged lives populated by various attractive, interesting and 
passionate virtues. 
c) Theological virtue 
The natural resolution of virtue into the classical virtues has proceeded conventionally 
enough. But to return to our other concern: has all this become merely Pelagian, as if virtue 
can simply trample down concupiscence on-call? A quotation from Augustine (De mor. ecc. 
cath. §6) becomes significant: 
"the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this 
something is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright. " Consequently the 
exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God ... (la2ac. 6l. a5. c) 
If this is akin to Augustine's logic of 'love commended', then the now dubious charge of 
Pelagianism is demolished by Aquinas' next famous development, a version of the logic of 
'love poured in': 
Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to 
happiness, as was explained above. Now man's happiness is twofold ... One 
is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain 
by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man's 
nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of 
participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Pt. 1: 4) that by 
Christ we are made "partakers of the Divine nature. " And because such 
happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles 
which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to 
direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive 
from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to 
supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his cormatural end, by means 
of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like 
principles are called 'theological virtues': first, because their object is God, 
inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused 
in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, 
save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ. (I a2ze. 62. al. c) 
499 la2w. 6l. al; respectively, these roughly concur with the concupiscible sensitive appetite, the 
intellectual appetite, 
the intellectual apprehension (? ), and the irascible sensitive appetite. Cf. I a2w. 6l. a2. c. 
"' Likewise, he argues against hard distinctions between virtues (I a2w. 6l. a4; I a2w. 65. al). 
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Finally, the very complicated I a2x. 63. a2-a3 engages directly with the problem, and 'Iocksý 
the development of virtue into a 'net' that relies on God's graceful agency in his divine law 
and the infusion of virtue. By this stage in the Summa, we are dealing with that same 
4global' turning of the heart to new loves that we saw in Augustine. Servais Pinckaers will 
be our guide to what, for him, is the summit of the Summa. 111 
6. Love 'poured Wand 'commended' 
What is the logic of the 'global' turning of the heart to new loves? This section treats a high 
point in the Summa, to find Thomas's account of the heart's turn to reordered love. 
I began this chapter by noting that Aquinas draws upon Augustine's main lines, and fills in 
Augustine's main lacunae. This has already been apparent, but in this section we will see 
the logic of love 'poured in', deeply threaded with the logic of love 'commended', all 
wrought in more detail than Augustine envisaged. I show how passion is directed by the 
work of the Spirit (an example of love 'poured in'), and new loves 'commended' in Christ's 
evangelical teaching. Hence a 'Christian moral organism' is formed, who responds rightly 
to God's good order and for whom virtues are existentially primary. 
a) The'summit'of the Surnma 
Pinckaers' reading of the Summa attends to its architectonics, and particularly to Thomas's 
understanding of the relationship between the theological virtues and the 'evangelical law' 
(I a2w. 106-108). If the Summa seems unchristological, this is only because Aquinas treats 
of Christ in the tertia pars, just as the Trinitarian dimension of the Summa was provided by 
the study of the divine Persons in the prima pars. 112 To ignore this is a form of myopia, 
according to Pinckaers, who also warns against a kind of 'double vision' when la2W is 
'dissected' so that 
there is hardly anything left but human acts, a smattering of passion, and a 
small sampling of virtue. The place in the sun is turned over to natural law 
and sin. We also note that the most explicitly Christian treatises have been 
removed from moral theory proper. "' 
This kind of use of Thomas by Thomism represents a 'decapitation', where the action of the 
Holy Spirit and the New Law-actually "the entire Gospel capstone of St. Thomas's moral 
teaching"-has "been suppressed"504 and neglected by the teaching schools. 101 
"' In fact, Pinckaers discerns another 'summit' later in the Summa; but I am content to limit our ascent 
to one 
summit. 
... Pinckaers, 170. 
... Ibid., 171. 
504 Ibid. 
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Significantly, Thomas's key authorities for this section are Jeremiah, Paul and Augustine; 
and the Philosopher is invoked only for some limited procedural and illustrative points. The 
evangelical Law (of which the Sermon on the Mount is paradigmatic) is conceived as 
internally active, and dependent upon the Spirit's action, following Augustine's logic in De 
spiritu et littera. For Pinckaers, this is a novel development in the Scholastic tradition. 101 
That the New Law is a 'grace' correlates it with the treatise that is to follow (on grace- 
I a2x. 109-114). 
b) Works of the Spirit 
Although the Holy Spirit was considered in la. 36-38, the Spirit now reappears immediately 
after the material on virtue (I a2w. 68-70). Clearly then, Aquinas seeks to detail Augustine's 
account of how love is 'poured in' by the Spirit. His discussion relates the Spirit to gift, 
Beatitude and fruit. That is, the lists of Isaiah 11: 2-3 (the 'gifts'), Matthew 5: 3-12 (the 
'beatitudes') and Galatians 5: 22-23 (the 'fruits') are all taken to come from God, by the 
Spirit. To Thomas, it follows straightforwardly that to understand the Spirit's work through 
these will illuminate the Spirit's other gift, the theological virtues. 
Thomas wishes to explain how the Holy Spirit co-ordinates these gifts together, to direct the 
natural virtues, and so to produce perfect works. The section is surprising in its ardent and 
urgent tone; Thomas seems quite delighted by what these spiritual donations represent. 101 On 
the Beatitudes, for example, a pattern of both virtue and gift operates in synergy upon both 
intellectual and sensitive appetite, working to turn a person wholeheartedly to the good. 
This turn to the good-"by a virtue, so that [passions] are kept within the bounds appointed 
by the ruling of reason"-operates in the same way as was sketched for prudence. 101 But 
now, Aquinas goes further: passions are directed not only by virtue, but now also "by a gift, 
in a more excellent manner" (I a2w. 69. a3. c). Thus moderation, for example, now joins with 
Ibid., 172-3. 
Ibid., 176-7. 
"' Pinckaers summarises how for Thomas the theological virtues (which I shall underline in this footnote) are 
brought about and assisted by the Isaianic gifts of the Spirit (which I shall place in italics). Roughly, the logic 
is as 
follows: faith follows from the gifts of understanding and knowledge; hope fromfear of the Lord; charily from 
wisdom; prudence from counsel; iustic from piety; courage from fortitude; temperance from fear of the 
Lord and 
hope. These gifts do not seem entirely to match the 'fruits' Galatians 5, but because of a quirk related to the 
history of 
the Latin Vulgate, they matched well enough for Thomas. (Ibid., 179-80. ) 
The exercise of correlating the various OT and NT donations of the Spirit is a stretch for modern readers, and serves 
to show (a) the medieval penchant for tidy categorisation; and more importantly (b) some of the ontologically realist 
substructures governing medieval ethics. Nevertheless, Thomas's exercise will be worth more than mere archaeology 
for any modern reader who is willing to experiment in synthesising thematically related 
biblical material across 
boundaries of authorship and testament. 
501 See above, 149. 
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a contempt for riches and honours; and with a sorrow at the irascible passions that beckon. 
Justice joins with "ardent desire" that is signified in the Beatitude's hunger and thirst; and 
with peace to the neighbour. Thus Aquinas sees the Spirit residing amongst the operations 
of the sensitive appetite, powerfully to 'fuel', amplify and vindicate virtue's intellectual 
task. Virtues are no longer just natural. They are supernatural, because the loves of the soul 
have supernaturally been changed This is a logic of love 'poured in'. 
If such 'fuelling' seems un-Thomistic (construing Thomism to include later, bowdlerised 
versions of Aquinas), then that is precisely Pinckaers' point. Thomas's account certainly 
has grace perfecting nature-but the supernatural work is vibrant, personal and intentional. 
This seems to have gone unnoticed in much commentary upon the Summa, possibly because 
la2x. 68-70 is of little interest to moderns (as compared, say, to the treatise on law). But 
Pinckaers rightly insists that for Thomas, everything has been leading to thi S. 
509 
The total effect is to describe a person in whom there are natural possibilities to move 
toward the happiness described in I a2x. 1-5. But for this to be realised, natural possibility 
can only be fulfilled or completed by the Spirit. The Spirit does this by theological virtues, 
by gifts, by beatitudes, and by fruits. These operate at all levels upon the human syntagma I 
have outlined. 
c) Evangelical Law 
In addition (and bypassing for the time being Aquinas' consideration of sin, I a2w. 71-89) 
comes the evangelical law, through which the Spirit works. Pinckaers' hermeneutic for the 
Summa is radical: "Clearly, not only ethics but the whole study of theology converges in the 
treatise on the evangelical Law, from the moment of its definition. "' 10 This conclusion is not 
impugned by the brevity of the treatise or the customary conciseness of Aquinas' 
expression. 
A problematic is outlined in la2x. 107. a4. c-a "difficulty [that] attaches to works of 
virtue", namely, that "that a virtuous deed be done with promptitude and pleasure. " But 
virtue is intended to help this difficult problem. To act with promptitude and pleasure "is 
difficult for a man without virtue: but through virtue it becomes easy for him. " But surely 
this bodes badly for the precepts of the New Law, which "prohibits certain interior 
movements of the soul" (such as an adulterous glance or murderous anger). Can the 
New 
Law help at all, then? 
5" Gilby pointed out, per-questiOn, how Thomas likes to build toward his most 
important points (see above, 133). 
Pinckaers shows that the same strategy seems to govern the Summa's entire architectonics. 
"' Pinckaers, 178. 
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Certainly, because in it, "maWs interior movements are ordered" (Ia2W-108. a3-c) by its 
address to human volition. Rather than merely proscribing external behaviours, evangelical 
law addresses hearers to refrain "from internal acts, and from the occasions of evil deeds". 
It also interrogates intention, so that "we should seek neither human praise, nor worldly 
riches, which is to lay up treasures on earth. " In the actual saying and hearing of it, Christ's 
teaching reorders a person toward the 'pleasures and promptitudes' of virtue. The same 
reordering occurs in reference to the neighbour, of whom it is forbidden "to judge him 
rashly, unjustly, or presumptuously" or "to entrust him too readily with sacred things if he 
be unworthy". As in Augustine, 'love poured in' merges into 'love commended', as hearers 
of the evangelical law are invited (by command) to participate in the divine reordering of 
love. 
He teaches us how to fulfil the teaching of the Gospel; viz. by imploring the 
help of God; by striving to enter by the narrow door of perfect virtue; and by 
being wary lest we be led astray by evil influences. Moreover, He declares 
that we must observe His commandments, and that it is not enough to make 
profession of faith, or to work miracles, or merely to hear His words. 
(la2x. l08. a3. c) 
Thomas has already made it clear that by the Spirit, God is at work to bring the theological 
virtues; and the hearing of the evangelical law is, apparently, instrumental to the Spirit's 
work. This hearing adds no new legal precepts. It reorders the heart, and seems also to be 
the means by which the gifts, beatitudes and fruits come amongst the elements of the human 
syntagma. Interestingly, it reorders by revealing truth that is consonant with the moral field 
(for rather than doing violence to natural virtues, it enhances them). Recalling that people 
are powerless to reorder themselves (given their bondage to voracity and selective sight), 
then presumably, 'evangelical law' 'unveils' whatever in the moral field was always present 
but lay hidden, veiled by voracity and selective sight. "' The supernatural work here remains 
mysterious, like wind; yet participation in the entire process is entirely accessible, 
beginning with the hearing of the evangelical law, and continuing in the doing of it. (This 
'doing' includes reflection upon and adjustment of "interior movements". ) 
"' This conception of the evangelical law's 'unveiling' task concurs with what, for Pinckaers, is the 'dynamic 
interconnection' between all the 'laws' in Aquinas. Space forces me to side-step the important treatise on law, 
la2w. 90-105, since it is not directly germane to the investigation. But Pinckaers' summary of Aquinas' 'laws' is 
sensitive, and worth recounting here to cast light upon my claim that evangelical law somehow 'unveils' the moral 
field: 
[Aquinas] distinguished five kinds of law: the eternal law, divine source of all 
legislation; natural law, which is the human heart's direct participation in this; then 
human law, which derives from natural law. Revelation further added the Old Law, 
centred in the Decalogue and relating to natural law, and the evangelical Law of the 
New Testament. These different laws were dynamically interconnected, beginning 
with the eternal law, descending through natural to civil law, and ascending again 
toward God to reach their summit in the evangelical Law, the most perfect possible 
participation in the eternal law that can be found on earth and the closest 
approximation to our final goal. (Ibid., 18 1. ) 
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d) A 'Christian moral organism' 
Thus for Pinckaers, Aquinas pictures a "Christian moral organism", where under the 
instruction of the evangelical law, evangelical (or supernatural) virtues proceed from the 
Holy Spirit. Acting through the reason and the will, and with the assistance of a spiritually 
reordered sensitive appetite, these virtues superintend the natural virtues of prudence, 
justice, fortitude and temperance, which in turn (especially in the case of the last) govern 
the sensitive appetites. "In this way, a new moral organism is formed, which is specifically 
Christian. ""' 
We might almost imagine Thomas telling a familiar theological story, but in reverse. Rather 
than beginning with the work of the Spirit in the preached Word, the entire first half of the 
Summa corrals the Aristotelian reader into an Augustinian corner. If the science of Aristotle 
is as true as it seems in thirteenth-century Paris, then to be a good Aristotelian entails a 
certain anthropology. A succession of implications follow from this anthropology: first for 
human action; then for virtue; then for theological virtue; and then for the work of the Spirit 
in the intellectual and sensitive appetites. Finally, the teachings of Christ are seen to fulfil 
this logic. The syntagma that is left is not, as Pinckaers rightly observes, an Aristotelian 
one: it is a "Christian moral organism", a kind of being that answers the deepest aspirations 
of Aristotle more completely than the best conclusions that thinker could ever give. 
"Christian morality ... lies principally 
in virtues and interior acts" and "the action of the 
Spirit through the virtues creates within us a spontaneous, personal movement toward good 
acts". "' Thus precepts are reduced, freedom increased, and the content of the precepts 
guarded by love. People can even be said to have developed new 'instincts'. "' Contrary to 
this, a charge is sometimes brought against the evangelical Law: that since it adds no 
precepts to the natural morality of the Decalogue, there is therefore no specifically Christian 
ethic. The charge assumes that an ethic fundamentally concerns precepts. But Thomas's 
ethic "consisted mainly in virtues and only secondarily in precepts", "' and for Pinckaers, 
there is a specifically Christian ethic-but constituted in the bringing to being of 
divinely 
reordered 'Christian moral organisms'. 
We can add to Pinckaers' conclusion. Distinctive to these 'Christian moral organisms' 
is 
their 'logic of love', by which they approach the moral field under divine tutelage, 
learning 
512 Ibid., 179. 
513 Ibid., 185. 
514 Ibid., 187. 
515 Ibid., 185. 
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to love those aspects of it previously veiled to them by their voracious selective sight, and 
participating in new praxis that will further generate reordered love. 
Summa Theologica will follow each discussion of virtue with discussions of the precepts 
connected to it (in 2a2w). The interior entity (virtue) is primary, while the exterior elements 
(precepts) are secondary. This might sound as if to deny the epistemological priority of act 
over virtue, but there is no such denial here. Rather, the existential side of the logic of love 
entails that in the best instances of right action, passion and virtue are in wholehearted 
consonance-not necessarily the case where right action proceeds by reference to precept. 
Virtue takes seriously that deliberative logic is imbued with love, and affirms that 
participation in 'love commended' is pursuant to 'love poured in'. 
7. How Thomas can, and cannot, help us 
I will end this chapter by summarising some satisfying discoveries in the Summa, 
particularly Thomas's emphasis upon the immediacy to us of sensory particulars. I want to 
show that whereas some commentators reproach what they take to be his separation of 
reason from emotion, actually the reverse is true. Thomas's distinctive understanding of 
passion usually leaves him misunderstood, and he has a quite lively understanding of the 
impact of emotion upon reason, as I will show by way of a personal example. 
In relation to the role of reason, I will revisit some observations (made at the beginning of 
the chapter) about Thomas's main concern, which is to set out an agenda for personal ethics 
within the teleological givens of the Christian gospel. Although Thomas certainly presents 
the human good as grounded in a general theory of goodness that rests upon a particular 
theory of nature, people within nature cannot respond rightly without reason's recognition 
of its teleological ordination-namely, to love God. Without this qualification, it will seem 
as if Thomas presents reason as autonomously capable of ethics. I will suggest that Thomas 
guards against this misconception. More importantly, Thomas's ability to help us ethically 
is severely curtailed when the Summa is read under this misconception. This is the reason 
John Calvin finds it necessary to respond to the misconception, whether real or imagined in 
Thomas, as we will see in the next chapter. 
a) A satisfying matrix 
We have seen a matrix-like quality at work in Aquinas' grand vision of transformed 
appetition and renewal of mind. r- 
Jean Porter neatly summarises the elementary natural basis of 'moral order' 
for Thomas. 
"[H]is theory of the human good is itself grounded in a general theory of goodness, which 
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rests upon a particular theory of nature. "' 16 On this basis certain structures can be discerned 
within love itself. Love diffracts into a series of emotional responses that reflect the 
complex array of goods within moral order. Hence a syntagma of human being places 
passion central to human doing-but not as central as to displace will and intellect. The 
penultimate telos of human action is a set of non-passionate (that is, non-voracious) 
ýemotions' such as happiness, contentment, joy and love, all terminating finally in the 
knowledge of God. 
Thomas's account effectively interprets some NT paranaeSiS, 5" and seeks to convert 
Aristotelians to Augustine's account of order: that the problem with passion is the 
disturbance of voracity and the conflict of goods; that emotions are not in themselves bad, 
but can be put to bad uses (thus making passions ordinate or inordinate); that the 
impassibility of God does not impugn the bodily nature of our passions; that we are 
contentedly to enjoy each other; and that the soul has its weight of love which cannot be 
ignored. Virtue was understood as the producer of ordinate passion; and the Spirit, working 
through the 'evangelical law', was understood as indispensable finally to turn the soul's 
love to its proper end. 
Within this satisfying matrix, we also notice a particular emphasis upon the immediacy to 
us of sensory particulars. To examine this I will observe what I take to be a misreading of 
Thomas, and by way of a personal example I will go on and consider Thomas's view of the 
interconnections between passion and moral reasoning. 
b) The immediacy ofparticulars 
i In translating Thomas, Eric D'Arcy has made the telling complaint that "the word emotion 
is only the best translation available; it is not perfect. What we call 'emotions' are engaged 
by far more things than sensory-good and sensory-evil; what St Thomas calls passiones are 
not. " "I My decision to use the older Dominican Fathers' translation is because of their 
decision consistently to retain 'passions' (also avoiding D'Arcy's idiosyncrasies, such as 
'orexis' for appetite). It is easier for modern readers to habituate to Thomas's nuanced use 
of 'passion', than to imagine the differences between his 'passion' and our 4emotion'. This 
516 Porter, 32. 
EL in Here are just four such exhortations: "[D]o not be conformed to the desires [tTrIOupfaig] that you 
formerly had i 
WEI ignorance [&yvoLq]" (I Pt. 1: 14); "[Llive ... no 
longer by human desires [&vOp6Trwv ýiTtOupfatq] but by the will of 
God [0EAqpaTt OEoO]" (I Pt. 4: 2); "so that ... you may escape 
from the corruption [ýOopdrfl that is in the world 
because of lust [E'v LrrtOupLa], and may become participants of the divine nature 
[0EIaq ... 
ýUcyEwJ' (2 Pt. 1: 4): 
"[Ble transformed by the renewing of your minds, so that you may discern what is the will of 
God [T6 OEAflpa TOO 
0EoOJ" (Rom. 12: 2). 
5" Eric D'Arcy, in Aquinas, Summa (Blackfriars 19), xxiii. 
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could not be clearer than in a treatment by the usually impressive Robert C. Roberts, who 
misreads the Summa here. 
Roberts wants to insist that emotions are rational, and that rationality is central to them. 
Thus he must take exception "to locat[ing] the emotions, as [Aquinas] does, in the 'sensory 
appetite"', even though "Aquinas' rational ity-account of the morality of emotions is the 
right kind of account". 119 The reading I have offered suggests that Aquinas would probably 
agree with the burden of Roberts' concerns; but Roberts' case is made more difficult by his 
prior agreement with D'Arcy (despite D'Arcy's caveats) over translation of passiones 
animae as 'emotion'. At a number of key points, Roberts' argument turns upon his claiming 
as emotion what Aquinas denies to be passion proper (that is, love, joy, happiness etc. ). 
The same criticism can be levelled at Lyons who, also reliant upon D'Arcy, considers 
Aquinas deficient because "emotions [are understood] in terms of impulses or desires, and 
the accompanying physiological changes and feelings, rather than in terms of cognitions 
and evaluations. ... Aquinas placed emotions first and foremost in the sensory orexis. "111 
But he did not-he placed passion there, and the distinction that Aquinas makes in this, 
which Roberts and Lyons do not, is that passion is not simple. 
The strength of both objections is that emotions are intricately attached to thoughts; but 
because of the confusion over 'emotion', they have missed that Aquinas agrees. ", 
Moreover, the strength of Aquinas' syntagma remains that emotions begin their focus in 
external particulars. No counsellor would disagree, and nor would Lyons or Roberts, since 
both recognise the counsellor's major tool, that emotions are highly responsive to context. 
That is much of Aquinas' point. 
I will now give a personal example that illustrates just how highly responsive emotions are 
to context. The example will also neatly illustrate their profound interconnections with 
moral reasoning. 
c) An example of emotion at work 
I was struck by a moment in my own experience that highlighted the immediacy of 
particulars for the emotions, the role of emotion in moral life, and the interconnections 
"' Robert C. Roberts, "Thomas Aquinas on the Morality of the Emotions, " History of Philosophy 
Quarterly 9 no. 3 
(1992): 288. 
... Lyons, 36. 
5" This disagreement is complicated to the extent that the modern discussion remains undecided 
about the degree to 
which an emotion is a bodily 'disturbance'. 
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between emotion and moral reasoning. It also illustrates the terrible complexities involved 
in accounting for even a small real-world event 
Over-simplified examples usually given by philosophers will not do here. Usually given for 
simplicity to establish some single point, they are almost always too thin to be more than a 
notional engagement with the world and its people. In contrast, to properly recount this 
incident risks awkwardness; yet it requires to be told it at length. The discomfort, if so 
caused, is intentional. Indeed the present tense will be used to help heighten the discomfort 
(since emotions respond to context). 
During the course of this doctoral study, my wife Mary-Anne and I had two (old) motor 
cars. A minor mishap for her left us with one, necessitating that as breadwinner she would 
now drive the other. Of itself this was of no major concern to me, after having satisfactorily 
resolved disposal of the first car, and deciding that in any case, a bicycle would be good for 
my fitness. 
A few days later and after a pleasant evening spent together, the conversation turns to our 
new situation, and Mary-Anne observes a good benefit arising from the accident. She says 
how good it is that in this way I should receive more exercise. The thought is exactly 
parallel to my own. 
But imagine her surprise when suddenly I hurl myself from my chair, aggressively reject 
this opinion as an insult, abusively shouting something to the effect of 'how dare she be so 
rude', and stalk from the room. The transaction takes less than five seconds. 
f as is almost The violence of my reaction seems explicable for a number of reasons (even 
certainly the case, there remain deeper reasons of which I am unaware). In a moment, 
several 'collisions' have occurred: resentment at the necessary rearrangement of my 
schedule; vanity at the thought I should need exercise; sadness that I should so obviously 
need it; hostility at the easiness of the comment, given the complexity for me in transacting 
with the insurer; and (petulant) 'grief at a moderate limitation upon my driving (which I 
usually enjoy). 
In this moment and during this cascade, these clusters of thought and emotion 
have the 
status of supreme and powerful self-evidence. They are gathered around a 
highly complex 
account of reality. They concern a number of seemingly lost goods. 
If she was bewildered by the wildness of this mood change, I was equally 
disconcerted by 
its rapidity-the sheer speed at which such thoughts formed and surged 
forth into decidedly 
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unethical action. The frailty of my hindsight was equally unnerving, for the difficulty in 
reconstructing what had actually happened was compounded by moods both of self- 
justification and shameful regret. 
Such moments illustrate the importance of the current investigation, representing as they do 
highly person-specific collisions of subjective reasons and the presence or absence of 
various goods, all within a shared reality. Action issues from collisions like these, 
sometimes explosively, and this action attracts moral predicates. (In my case, the predicates 
are vices: 'vain', 'irritable', 'pompous' etc. ) 
Many relationships are almost entirely constituted by an indistinguishable succession of 
such moments, and it is the living of relationship counsellors to go about this frail task of 
reconstruction after events-not to mention discoveries of deeper stories, such as that 
clearly it was not 'of no major concern to me' as I disposed of the damaged vehicle. I will 
further consider these kinds of difficulties in the next chapter. 
For now, the role of emotion in moral life, and the immediacy of particulars for the 
emotions, are clear enough in the example without further exposition. But the 
interconnections between emotion and moral reasoning require further exposition, and I will 
now assay (rather than survey) Thomas's account of this interconnection. 
Thomas on emotion and moral reasoning 
We recall that in Thomas's syntagma, the will is at the intersection of intellect and sensual 
appetite. 
The will "has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason" 
(la2w. 77. al. c) since it is the appetitive aspect of the intellect. The intellect presents good 
objects to the will, thereby moving it (I a2w. 9. al); which is to say the will chooses the good 
as proposed by reason, and as ordered by the eternal law (I a2w. 19). "[T]he goodness of the 
will depends on its being subject to reason" (I a2w. 19.0). 
Sensuality is "the appetite of things belonging to the body" (la. 8l. al. sc), and "the passion 
of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change 
in the judgment about the object of the will" (la2w. 77. al. adl). That is, passion can 
direct 
the will, even though the will's proper 'informant' is the intellect. 
How is it possible for reason to be directed other than by its proper 
informant? Some lines 
in Thomas's account can be surnmarised (inadequately) as follows: 
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A will to evil is mediated by the sensitive appetite seizing upon some particular good, to 
the exclusion of reason's other proposals about the good. (As in Augustine, evil is 
merely a privation of good. Simple evil is good in a certain respect but deficiently, 
la2w. 18. al-adl. ) This is how sensuality can be seen, like the serpent, as inciting sin 
(la. 8l. al. ad3). 
Firstly, the misleading of the will begins with afomes, "the inextinguishable spark of 
unreason in human nature. ""' This term encompasses the 'first movements' of 
concupiscence or sensuality. It is a natural bent of the sensory appetite (I a2w. 74. a3. ad2; 
la2w. 8l. a3. ad2; Ia2w. 89. a5. adI; la2w. 91. a6), and is used to describe ineradicable, 
culpable and personal participation in original sin. "Take thefomes as the beast within, 
the unpredictable source of impulses, loutish, lascivious, and perverse, a theologized 
id. ý9523 
e Secondly, the misleading of the will then proceeds "by a kind of distraction" 
(la2w. 77. al. c). The indivisibility of the soul, and a conception of limited energy 
available to it, means that "when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes 
remiss, or is even altogether impeded". So when the sensitive appetite is preoccupied by 
passion toward some particular, "the proper movement of the rational appetite or will 
must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded. " 
9 Thirdly, the misleading of the will also proceeds when sensuality speaks to the intellect 
by a kind of 'backdoor' route. This backdoor is, roughly, the imagination. "[T]hose who 
are in some kind of passion" (especially "those who are out of their mind") "do not 
easily turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion" (la2x. 77. al. c). 
e Elsewhere Thomas will picture reason "wholly bound", as in fury or insanity 
(I a2w. 10. a3. c), or simply marginalised due to the speed of passion (hence "unbridled") 
or due to a lack of conviction (hence "weak", 2a2w. 156. al. c). (Cf. also la2w. 33. a3. c. ) 
Space forbids a more extensive summary of this interesting and highly nuanced material, 
but we might fruitfully note a summary by Aquinas from elsewhere: 
[Wjhat is evil is concupiscently desired ... 
in accordance with the sensory 
appetite, pertaining to the flesh, stem[ming] not from the activity of the 
reason but from the bent of the fomes. But the man is said to 
do what his 
reason does, because a man is what he is in accord with his reason. 
And so 
[in the case ofl movements of concupiscence, which stem not 
from reason but 
52'Kretzmann, "Warring, " 185. 
121 Ibid., 186. 
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from thefomes (which is here named 'sin'), it is not the man but thefomes of sin that is operative. 
524 
Given this kind of summary, reason could easily be conceived as a noble citadel, albeit 
somewhat battered through external assault by the hostile forces of the sensitive appetite. 
The citadel can be beguiled-fed misinformation and misled by 'false intelligence reports', 
as it were, to make the wrong estimate of things. But although besieged, it is never finally 
overthrown, for all these misfortunes are accidental to its essence. Essentially, it exists to 
know the good and true. 
It is not hard to see how such a reading would make Thomas the exemplary optimist 
concerning the power of reason as autonomously capable of ethics. On this view, reason 
freely accesses the natural order, is unmolested by the distractions of any 'emotive' stimuli, 
and will serviceably pass estimates of good on to the will, thereby generally producing right 
action. 
But this reading misses the wider context within which the elements of the above summary 
are situated, just as it misses an important alternate account of malfunctioning reason. 
What is the wider context? In part, that Aquinas is trying to make sense of how people can 
decide against various impulses in the face of temptation-which presupposes a class of 
people who construe such impulses as 'temptation'. What then is the alternate account of 
malfunctioning reason? It is a mode of reasoning that pretends some lesser good than God 
to be humanity's last end, and construes impulses toward this counterfeit last end to be 
ordinate, rather than 'tempting' as such. Thomas calls this mode of reasoning certa 
malitia-that is, 'resolute' or 'certain' malice. It is a mode of reasoning that misleads the 
will and the passions, rather than being misled by the passions. 
A person "is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil 
knowingly", which is to say that he chooses the privation of good merely by estimating 
some temporal good to be more worthy than divine goods (la2x. 78. al. c). Again, this is 
something like what in Augustine I called 'selective sight'. Malice, then, represents a 
fundamental refusal to recognise humanity's true end: "he who sins through certain malice 
is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself' (la2x. 78. a4. c). Such reasoning straightforwardly 
passes a warped assessment of good to the will, thereby producing an 
"inordinate will" 
(la2w. 78. al. c). Therefore malice can equally be described as "a certain proneness of 
the 
will to evil" (la2x. 85. a3. ad2), which Thomas thinks he sees 
in Genesis 8: 21 (where "the 
inclination of the human heart is evil from youth"). 
Ibid., 188, citing Aquinas, Super epistolam ad Romanos lectura. 
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This is an account of evil as pertaining to a class of people for whom unaided reason 
cannot, in the nature of the case, deduce humanity's true end. The principle of spiritual life 
"is the order to the last end ... and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any 
intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone" (la2x. 88. al. c). Only a divine 
intervention can help. Thomas therefore has a sympathetic reading of Augustinian 
predestination, since "it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end" 
(la. 23. al. c); and as we have already seen, divine intervention takes place in the Holy 
Spirit's work through the evangelical law, to 'pour in, and commend love. 
Therefore the summary above (though initially seeming to endorse the autonomy of reason 
for ethics) only pertains to a specific class of people. Jordan has noticed this in his careful 
reading of Aquinas' logic of reason and passion. Thomas actually avoids a straightforward 
statement about the subordination of passion to reason, and prefers instead a certain set of 
metaphors and a specially structured argument. The net effect is to disclose that all souls 
have a specific teleological ordination, and that "emotions are subject to moral control 
precisely because they appear within the configuration of the soul's teleology. "', ' Hence 
there is no need for the Summa to persuade readers to choose the soul's true end. Rather 
Thomas simply clarifies it, then gives readers a clear knowledge of the ways that lead to a 
good already chosen. "There is no need for the Greek conversion of passions, because there 
has already been a conversion to Christ. This assumption transforms the order of moral 
teaching, especially in the crucial case of the passions. "526 This is the point that began this 
chapter, as stated also by Pinckaers and MacIntyre. 527 
Given this, we can make better sense of the distinction Kretzmann has found in Thomas, 
between two classes of people. "When the 'y' of [Rom. 7: 15] is understood simply as a EW 
person's reason, its carnality is (in the case of a person under sin) subjection of the reason to 
the flesh; or (in the case of someone under grace) the attack of the flesh upon the reason. 
11511 
These two correlate, respectively, with actual sin and original sin. 
Does Thomas's account of the interconnections between emotion and moral reasoning 
throw any light upon my sudden abuse toward my wife? Certainly. 
Thomas would call the 
rapidity of such action passion 'unbridled' by reason. He might ask 
if my frail hindsight, 
with its moods of self-justification and regret, reflected a lack of conviction as 
to my true 
"' Jordan, 96. 
526 Ibid., 97. 
521 See above, pp. 121 & 124. 
52'Kretzmann, "Warring, " 185. 
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end. He would notice irascible and concupiscible components in my anger, warding off 
sadness and grabbing for lost goods in my immediate vicinity, but perhaps also 
contaminated by false imaginings. The powerful self-evidence of my highly complex 
account of reality in that moment instantiated the kind of preoccupation that renders reason 
temporarily incapable of assessing the real order of things; perhaps for a moment, my 
reason was even 'bound'. What about my vices ('vain', 'irritable', 'pompous' etc. )? 
Although we have not examined Thomas's account of these, perhaps he would pause to 
determine whether they were a sudden and uncharacteristic burst in a generally ordered and 
virtuous Christian life, or if they reflected a malicious reasoning that is thoroughly 
committed to false ends. 
In sum, Thomas interrogates me over the degree to which I fall short of proper responses 
toward the divinely ordered natural situation within which I find myself. Is his interrogation 
of me the right kind of interrogation? It is Augustine who assists us to determine whether or 
not Aquinas' interrogation of me is of the right kind of interrogation. 
e) A theological caveat 
Augustine showed the privations of disorder within a good cosmos, where moral reasoning 
is complicated by our passionate responses to a complex world. But the prospect of 
reordered love beckons us to an optimistic overcoming of such complications. If theology's 
understanding of the good can join with the best available science, then perhaps we can 
discern the order that was lost and reorder love. Something like this was Aquinas' project. 
Indeed, to hope for less is to fear the worst: that our passions might be evil, that their 
'irrationality' makes them monstrous, that life in a body is fractured at best, and that the 
Manichees were right. But thankfully, Aquinas' grand vision triumphantly vindicates 
Augustine against the Manichees. For Aquinas, there are many reasons joyfully to expect 
the gospel's promise of reordered love. 
Nonetheless, Aquinas cannot entirely satisfy us, for two interlocking reasons. The first is 
understandable, and quite forgivable given the context of the Summa. It is clear 
from 
Aquinas' christological writings prior to the Summa that he was in heavy 
dialogue with a 
variety of positions in philosophical christology. Within this perhaps 
fairly dangerous 
debate, it is important for him to shape the material on human anthropology (in the 
first 
three-quarters of the Summa) so as to lay the foundation for describing the respects 
in which 
Christ is rightly said to be fully human (in the tertiapars). 119 
... Martin Stone, "To What Extent, If Any, Did The 1277 Condemnations 
Affect the Direction of Late Medieval 
Christology?, " (King's College London, seminar in research theology: 13th March 
2001). Stone adds that medieval 
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Of course, all good theological anthropology should be fundamentally christological. But 
Aquinas' theological anthropology could be construed either as unchristological, or 
inappropriately christological (pace Pinckaers). The structure of Thomas's argument seems 
to allow the force of no christology to be brought against regular, disordered human 
behaviour (such as my own), making the anthropology seem unchristological. Conversely, 
it can seem inappropriately christological insofar as it is tailored to account for the person of 
Christ, but without the work of Christ reciprocally being allowed to inform us about the 
nature of fallen humanity. Thus the incarnation of Christ might take precedence over the 
work of Christ in theology's epistemic task, and Augustine's christological 'hard-point'- 
the absurdity of "Christ's death in vain" (Gal. 2: 21)"O-risks being missed. 
The second difficulty follows from this-that Aquinas' account is certainly not Pelagian, 
but might invite Pelagian uses. (One such Pelagian use might be the provisional summary I 
offered, where unaided human reason was competent for moral reasoning. ) For it is also 
Augustine who reminds us that if morality were simply a matter of rightly responding to 
order, then Christ died for nothing. This is the rock upon which Julian repeatedly founders. 
Augustine uses the cross as a spectre, to show how Christian theology declares a new 
anthropological view as requisite, a view arising from a different place. 
These two slurs on Aquinas are possibly too harsh; indeed, I have phrased them tentatively 
("might", "can", "risks") because of thick defences that could be mustered from the Summa 
against them. But the slurs seem justified if only because subsequent theology did make 
some of those mistakes, and perhaps the slurs relate to a tendency to leach Augustine out of 
Aquinas. Perhaps also the slurs are substantiated just a little by Thomas himself, "strikingly 
expressed in Aquinas' verdict upon his own work in the days immediately before his 
death"", -that against the reality of God, his conceptions of humanity and its goods seemed 
very small. 
Given these concerns, a respectful and robust response, whether to Aquinas or to his 
misreadings, needs to follow. It is a response that reminds theology of Augustine's anti- 
Pelagian stance on the depths of human bondage to disordered love. In this response I am 
reminded (apropos my personal example) that whatever I made of the divinely ordered 
natural situation within which I found myself, and however powerfully self-evident was my 
account of reality in that moment, and however effectual or ineffectual my reconstruction 
thought until the fifteenth century often sought to match theological anthropology with christology. 
See above, 93f 
53 ' Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988), 193. 
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amidst vacillating self-justification and shame, I amfinally claimed by God He claims me 
in his love; he claims my love; and I am therefore claimed by his command. On this basis, 
the response will reiterate (with Aquinas and Augustine) the greatness of divinely reordered 
love. 
The response finds a voice three hundred years later, in John Calvin. 
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Chapter VI: The Loving Embrace of Their Beauty 
(Calvin's ethic) 
Half way along the road we have to go, 
I found myself obscured in a great forest 
Bewildered, and I knew I had lost the way. 
It is hard to say just what the forest was like. 
How wild and rough it was, how overpowering; 
Even to remember it makes me afraid. 
But when I had arrived at the foot of a hill, 
Which formed the far end of that menacing valley 
Where fear had already entered into my heart, 
I looked up, and saw the edges of its outline 
Already glowing with the rays of the planet 
Which shows us the right way on any road. 532 
We have seen Augustine integrate ethics and emotion by way of a 'logic of love', and 
Aquinas' completion, in the finest possible detail, of what Augustine began. While 
marvelling at the brilliance of Aquinas' achievement, I suggested that it may lend itself to 
readings that do not deal seriously enough with Augustine's anti-Pelagian concerns. In this 
chapter I will describe a counter- statement by Calvin as follows. 
The human condition is so painful and confused that any prospect of successful moral 
reasoning seems bleak (Section One). In the Institutes of the Christian Religion, Calvin 
indicts humanity's faithless unconcern towards God, which Thomas called malitia, as 
completely distorting human access to the moral field (Section Two). But a divine love 
toward humanity claims people even when their discernment of the moral field is least 
clear. The fundamentally christological restoration that follows brings a new governance for 
the affections and opens the way to a heartfelt enjoyment of people and a new, humble 
access to virtue (Section Three). I will now pause to outline these sections in slightly more 
detail. 
I will reflect in Section One upon Calvin's melancholy about the human condition, as found 
in his Institutes. Looking to the various conundrums and the painful experience of the 
previous chapter, I find evidence that such melancholy is warranted. The view that reason 
unmolested by emotion is sufficient for ethics therefore seems trite, and it is against such a 
view that Calvin makes his urgent assaults. 
532 Dante, The Divine Comedy (1308-20), tr. Charles H. Sisson, with a foreword by David H. Higgins, Oxford 
World's Classics edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 47 (Inferno 1.1-6,13-18). 
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Section Two begins my treatment of Calvin's Institutes. In this section I will argue that 
Calvin's urgency comes from a sustained examination of what Aquinas called malitia, 
which Calvin presents as a faithless unconcern towards God that warps humanity's 
apprehension of the moral field. The complicity of reason in this faithless unconcern is 
Aquinas' malitia writ large-so large, in fact, that I will pause to examine whether Calvin 
has drifted into Manicheism in his emphatic treatment of it. 
In Section Three, I will show how love is 'commended' and 'poured in' according to 
Calvin. Instead of faithless unconcern toward God, the affections begin to serve in a 
ýrighteous' role. Divine love toward humanity makes a claim upon people, even when they 
do not discern the moral field in a way that elicits their love. New governance for the 
affections occurs in the recognition of this divine love claim. The pneumatological 
restoration that follows is fundamentally christological in various respects, entailing a 
certain kind of knowledge of Christ that alters the affections. (The divine claim of love, and 
the christological orientation of divine restoration, are conceptions in which Calvin differs 
from Aquinas. ) The heartfelt enjoyment of people that follows becomes Calvin's basis for 
ethics-a 'loving embrace' of various neighbours' 'beauty'. The account opens the way for 
virtue to be understood humbly. In the first-person, each virtue becomes a statement of aim 
(but not self-description). Each can also be a statement of description and affirmation 
towards second- and third-persons. 
1. Failure in theforest 
I will reflect in this section upon Calvin's melancholy about the human condition. Looking 
to the various conundrums and the painful experience of the previous chapter, I find 
evidence that such melancholy is warranted. The view that reason unmolested by emotion is 
sufficient for ethics therefore seems trite, and it is against such a view that Calvin makes his 
urgent assaults. 
There is a degree of impertinence in using Dante of all people (quoted above, page 169), to 
illuminate Calvin, of all people. But Dante's first steps on his epic netherworld journey 
aptly allegorise a contrast between Calvin's anthropology and medieval anthropology. The 
ý4 great forest", the "menacing valley", represents sin and ignorance, where there stalk the 
wild animals of vice. The sunlit hill is a virtuous life, lit by divine wisdom. "' 
Aquinas writes of this life from the flanks of that hill, looking down, as it were, upon the 
forest. He knows this forest to be real, and would have travellers escape its confines. But 
113 Ibid., 501; cf 15 (Higgins' introduction and note). 
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these confines are largely confined to Summa Theologica I a2w. 71-89-a thicket, as it were, 
viewed from a hillside, watching the sunny topside of its canopy. In Karl Barth's 
appreciation of medieval theology, 
we are surprised again and again by the great harmony, the mixture of 
boldness and sagacity, of profundity and common sense, that we find there, It 
is the harmony of the monastery garden with its rows of cherry trees ... 
[or] 
of the Gothic cathedral ... 
We are astonished at the certainty about life that 
the authors display and spread abroad in spite of opposing symptoms. ... What a waltz it dances in its investigations out from the centre to every side! 
Everything is important, everything has to be elucidated and discussed ... 
We 
come away with the happy impression that we have really heard everything 
that we might want. 534 
But "what a dark and threatening forest [we have] in Calvin's Institutes! ""' Calvin travels 
with every human traveller in that "great forest". He takes it to be no mere thicket for 
whomever wanders, stalked, within it. Any search of the Institutes for 'treatises' on sin is 
quickly overwhelmed. The ubiquity of voracity and selective sight reverberates with 
Augustinian melancholy on practically every page where there appears humanity. For this is 
a people "blinded and drunk with self-love" (Inst. 11. vii. 6). 536 
"[N]ot only did a lower appetite seduce [Adam], but unspeakable impiety occupied the very 
citadel of his mind, and pride penetrated to the depths of his heart" (11.0). The 
disagreement with a certain form of medieval Thomism is blunt. "fflt is pointless and 
foolish to restrict the corruption that arises thence only to what are called the impulses of 
the senses". Calvin adduces here the Pauline indictment of both appetite and mind 
(Rom. 1: 1 -20,8: 6-7), so that exhortations to transformation of mind (Eph. 4: 23, Rom. 12: 2) 
prove the same point by negation. The case is put repeatedly and extremely: "[T]he whole 
man is overwhelmed-as by a deluge-from head to foot, so that no part is immune from 
sin and all that proceeds from him is to be imputed to sin" (11J. 9). 
There are enough disavowals of Manicheism here to off-balance a Nietzschean attack. 
Calvin 'affirms life', and attacks certain kinds of religion aggressively enough to defend 
against any charge of Manicheism. The Nietzschean charge of 'bad conscience' is 
predictable enough, since Calvin's radically emotional theology certainly tells of fear (of 
... Karl Barth, The Theology ofJohn Calvin (1922), tr. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, (Grand Rapids; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 
1995), 36-37. 
Ibid., 41. 
536 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion Vols. 1-2 (1559), tr. Ford Lewis Battles, Library of Christian 
Classics edition, vols XX-XXI, (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960). This translation will be used throughout. 
For 
readability, references will be included in the main text. Pagination will only be given in reference to Battle's 
introduction and apparatus. 
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the wrath of God), despair (given ludicrous human pride and self-deception)-and 
concomitantly, relief (in the Spirit and by Christ's salvation). 
But I will withhold judgment over whether Calvin exhibits 'bad conscience', for if there is a 
problem with Calvin, it is far more pressing than Nietzschean concerns. Calvin will never 
allow us to forget the fear, despair and deceptions of the "menacing valley", giving rise to 
the possibility that there is no hope of any moral change for anyone traversing the 'valley', 
nor any possibility of finding release from the kinds of outburst that I described of myself in 
the previous chapter. Is such melancholy warranted? Does the melancholy entail a 
hopelessness about moral change? 
The melancholy would certainly seem to be warranted, given difficulties that were apparent 
in the previous chapter. I did not strive to make these difficulties apparent at the time but 
they were certainly present. We learnt that passion resides in the sensory appetite although 
some emotion takes place in the intellect, since not all emotion is passion (in the strong 
sense), and on this basis I tried to tease out a dispute, possibly arcane, between Thomas and 
others about intellectual components in emotion. We saw that passion can mislead the 
intellect by distracting it, by binding it, and by deluding it through imagination. We further 
learnt that reason can take the form of malitia, which actively promotes a false end and 
pretends inordinate passions to be ordinate. Although we did not press Thomas on this, a 
difficulty clearly looms in arbitrating between 'resolute malice' and reason merely misled. 
Into these difficult deliberations, I inserted a personal example of my own. My problem was 
an ancient one. As an acting subject, I struggled to unravel the mystery of my own 
subjectivity-an epistemic problem of the knottiest kind, since the rational ity-warping 
fixations of emotion and the emotion-evading machinations of rationality intervene at every 
turn. This created an existential problem for me that was magnified by the responsiveness of 
my emotions, including their incredible speed. 
This should remind us of fundamental disputes about emotion in modern neurobiology. "' 
Despite the clear existence of different centres for reason and emotion in the brain, the 
extraordinarily high levels of interconnection between these make the discovery somewhat 
moot, and the brain scientist is confronted with the same ancient problems in a new form. 
The ability of modern neurobiology to measure the incredible speed in which 'ethico- 
emotional' moments occur only serves to highlight that speed rather than to comprehend its 
meaning. Aquinas and Aristotle before him knew of this speed; brain science now offers the 
5" 1 have in mind here LeDoux' and Panksepp's disagreement as to whether emotions subsist in whole-brain 
networks or are 'natural kinds' subsistent in specific, separate neurological components. See above, 2 1. 
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neurological basis for it; and I remain as perplexed by my own behaviour as were my 
ancient forebears. 
My problem, when placed alongside Thomas, Solomon, Roberts, Lyons and Panksepp, 
highlights how blurry is our discourse and how unclear are our terms as we reach through a 
kind of veil, not to some already difficult conundrum of external knowledge, but 
reflexively, to an account of the very haziness through which we reach. This is not to be 
sceptical of the worth of such deliberation, and especially not of the incisive subtlety of a 
Thomas Aquinas, whose various insights come upon us with definite force each time 
something new about ourselves is revealed. But it is to signal an existential sorrow, for so 
instantaneous and complicated was my experience that no ex post facto analysis seems 
sufficient to prevent the next such outburst. And clearly, if one such moment in a usually 
very good marriage can be so complicated, it does not augur well for our attempts to speak 
of and to work towards a wider account of these matters (and to help relationships in great 
pain). 
These profound difficulties are what make any simplistic summary of Aquinas-that reason 
and will, unmolested by emotion, are sufficient for good action-seem trite. It very much 
seems that Calvin is opposed to precisely such a summary as this. In attacking such a view, 
Calvin is urgently exhortatory. 
As to whether Calvin's melancholy entails a hopelessness about moral change, we find 
rather that his urgency makes us sharply aware of the claim upon us made by God's love 
toward us. But this is to move too quickly ahead. 
2. Unconcern towards God: an evil lack 
In this section I will argue that Calvin's urgency comes from a sustained examination of 
what Aquinas called malitia, which Calvin presents as a faithless unconcern towards God 
that warps humanity's apprehension of the moral field. The complicity of reason in this 
faithless unconcern is Aquinas' malitia writ large-so large, in fact, that I will pause to 
examine whether Calvin has drifted into Manicheism in his emphatic treatment of it. 
a) An Institutes dialectic: knowledge of God, knowledge of self 
Calvin's famous starting point is anthropology with a 'twist'. The ancient Delphic dictum to 
'know thyself is, says Calvin, an uncommon example of human agreement with "God's 
truth" (11A. 3). 111 True wisdom commences in a dialectical relationship between knowledge 
of God and of self, a theme around which much of the subsequent work is based. But it is a 
5" CE Calvin, 241 n. I (Battles' note). 
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blurred dialectic: "while joined by many bonds, which one precedes and brings forth the 
other is not easy to discern" (I. i. 1). We find that God is known partly by reference to a 
profound human lack; in turn, this lack is discovered after a certain kind of encounter with 
God. This most counter- intuitive entree to the dialectic is pressed. God could be partly 
known by reference to the self ("a workshop graced with God's unnumbered works ... a 
storehouse overflowing with inestimable riches", I. v. 4)-but the self is uninterested so to 
do. Human existence is deeply riven by this ambiguity, and this absence of concern, this 
lack of affect, will prove decisive. 
However in humanity's first awareness the dialectic had no such ambiguity. "[P]ride was 
bridled", because humanity knew its origin to be in frail matter, counterpointed by the 
Maker's "great liberality" in giving life to dust and making it home to "an immortal spirit" 
(I. xv. 1). "[A]Ithough the primary seat of the divine image was in the mind and heart, or in 
the soul and its powers, yet there was no part of man, not even the body itself, in which 
some sparks did not glow" (I. xv. 3). This is the sense in which humans were the imago dei- 
a term that expresses 
the integrity with which Adam was endowed ... when he had full possession 
of right understanding, when he had his affections kept within the bounds of 
reason, all his sense tempered in right order, and he truly referred his 
excellence to exceptional gifts bestowed upon him by his Maker. (I. xv. 3) 
'Reason' is the knowledge of God. "[T]he more anyone endeavours to approach God, the 
more he proves himself endowed with reason" (I. xv. 6). 'Affections' kept within the bounds 
of this reason were "all his sense tempered in right order. " Here is an Augustinian respect 
for the primordial goodness of creation, and a clear agreement with Thomas. 
b) Body and soul in Calvin 
Calvin does seek to distance himself from the classical views of body and soul, yet he 
nevertheless regards the soul classically. It is incorporeal substance, set in a body, and 
responsible for both the animation of the body and the rule of a person's life (I. xv. 6). This is 
a point of orthodoxy for Calvin. The soul is "an immortal yet created essence" and 
humanity's "nobler part". The scriptural language of 'soul' and 'spirit' is unreflectively 
equated with traditional Greek conceptions, and even to gesture toward alternative readings 
is dismissed as "stupidly blundering ... opinion" (I. xv. 
2). 
On this view, conscience offers episternic access to the soul's existence. When conscience 
discerns between good and evil, it is responding to God's judgment and is "an undoubted 
sign of the immortal spirit". Calvin's justification for this 'undoubtedness' (I-xv-2) is thick 
with Aristotelian categories; and as in Aquinas, the various operations of the mind are 
attributed to an inherent soul and adduced as evidence for it. 
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Yet while this fairly strong statement of dualism might seem significant for all that follows, 
subsequent dependence upon it is surprisingly light. Despite this formal dependence, we 
shall actually see a total departure from the Aristotelian tradition. 
c) Evil as ignorance and disordered affection 
God's image was not totally annihilated and destroyed in [man], yet it was so 
corrupted that whatever remains is frightful deformity ... Now God's image is the perfect excellence of human nature which shone in Adam before his 
defection, but was subsequently so vitiated and almost blotted out that 
nothing remains after the ruin except what is confused, mutilated, and 
disease-ridden. (I. xv. 4) 
This chaotic corruption results from "sense" not "tempered in right order". A 
comprehensive defect-a failure of reason's ordering-is on view, although whatever has 
happened is not yet clear. But just as Thomas knew of sense not tempered in right order, so 
also we might suspect that the comprehensive failure on view is what Thomas described as 
4malice'. 
While mounting a proof against the view that in the giving of souls God implants his own 
511 divine essence, Calvin takes another opportunity to describe human frailty, conceived in 
terms of an 'ethico-emotional' lack: 
For if man's soul be from the essence of God through derivation, it will 
follow that God's nature is subject not only to change and passions, but also 
to ignorance, wicked desires, infirmity, and all manner of vices. Nothing is 
more inconstant than man. Contrary motions stir up and variously distract his 
soul. Repeatedly he is led astray by ignorance. He yields, overcome by the 
slightest temptation. We know his mind to be a sink and a lurking place for 
every sort of filth. (I. xv. 5) 
On its own,, the 'sink' metaphor would be Manichean. But the evil of this mind is actually 
constituted by the turbulent confluence of ignorance and disordered affection, and as a 
graphic depiction of the human source of evil, Calvin has not strayed from Augustine even 
while amplifying him. 
This corruption-by-chaos makes pointless its description by any detailed taxonomy. Plato's 
'rational' and 'sensitive' souls were inferred from the contradictions between the operation 
of the soul upon the body, and its rational impulses. But Calvin finds Plato's construct to 
reduce the actual complexities that people face (such as my own response to my wife in the 
previous chapter): 
As if reason itself did not also disagree with itself and were not at cross- 
purposes with itself, just like armies at war. But since this disturbance arises 
out of the depravity of nature, it is wrong to conclude from this that there are 
... Although Battles calls this view 'traducianism' (based on Calvin's use of tradux for 'derivation'; ibid., 191 n. 
15), 
Calvin actually opposes some form of emanationism, and holds to a 'creationist' view (where God creates each soul 
de novo, not from his own essence). 
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two souls, just because the faculties do not agree among themselves in 
befitting proportion. (I. xv. 6) 
Again, if our first impulse is to predicate this "depravity of nature" as Manichean, we very 
much miss the point, for Plato's error was to miss the holism of perfect human nature-now 
chaotically divided, which is to say, "depraved"-and so to deduce the division as 
constitutive of humanity. Rather, argues Calvin, never could there be a less fertile ground 
for a complete 'natural anthropology' than the human person, since humanity is actually 
very far from what it could be. Thus many aspects of human experience coincident with our 
understanding of 'emotion' are morally indicted (with only 'conscience' somewhat exempt, 
on Calvin's view of its evidencing the soul). 
We are beginning to see a conception here of a comprehensive failure, arising ftom 
disordered affection, and affective unconcern towards God This is Aquinas' 'malice' but 
announced through a megaphone, as it were. If the complexity of the Summa, its 
presumption of Christian conversion, and its ostensive method has muted the problem of 
malitia in medieval thought, then Calvin steps forward to redress this imbalance in no 
uncertain terms. The exposition of what Aquinas called malitia-that is, the polemical 
condemnation of unconcern towards God-presages an extended debate in the Institutes. 
The philosophical tradition, anthropologically optimistic and self-referential, is brought into 
an explicit confrontation with the dialectical knowledge of self against God. 
Humanity should know itself through reflection upon its createdness, where human 
excel lences-given for a future of divine worship-generate "the nature of [our] dutyý5 
(II. i. 3). Humanity should also regard deeply its total chaotic 'ruin. "[W]hoever is utterly 
cast down and overwhelmed by the awareness of his calamity, poverty, nakedness, and 
disgrace has thus advanced farthest in knowledge of himself' (Il. ii. 10). Care is required, 
since there is "nothing that man's nature seeks more eagerly than to be flattered" (II. i. 2). 
Better to be "prostrate in extreme confusion ... reduced to nought" 
(11J. 3). 
Though mild toward Aristotelian faculty psychology, Calvin does not finally consider it 
very important, since he believes his simplification of the faculties to be an altogether more 
useful tool. The soul is just its understanding and its will, where the will desires what the 
understanding approves. "' More crucially, it is not that a reasonable faculty seeks the good 
whilst sense seeks pleasure: the 'real picture' is more blurred. Rather, sense is simply a 
facet of understanding. Thus Calvin signals his intention hereafter to substitute 'appetite' 
for 'will' (I. xv. 7). Reason, then, is not removed from a privileged citadel as such. It is rather 
540 Cf, his use of this for the further analysis of II. H. 12. 
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suggested that the citadel's walls are thoroughly porous. "Like a city breached, without 
walls, is one who lacks self control" (Pr. 25: 28). 541 Calvin's logic parallels the proverbist; 
thus philosophical taxonomies are highly suspect for him. The philosophers faced "great 
obscurity", "for they were seeking in a ruin for a building, and in scattered fragments for a 
well-knit structure" (I. xv. 8). Human disordering is so complete that there can be no easy 
distinction between concupiscence and reason, between emotion and thought. (Given 
Calvin's commitment to body-soul dualism, this is actually a surprising result. ) 
[Our] nature is not only destitute and empty of good, but so fertile and 
fruitful of every evil that it cannot be idle. Those who have said that original 
sin is 'concupiscence' have used an appropriate word, if only it be added- 
something that most will by no means concede-that whatever is in man, 
from the understanding to the will, from the soul even to the flesh, has been 
defiled and crammed with this concupiscence. Or, to put it more briefly, the 
whole man is of himself nothing but concupiscence. (Il. i. 8) 
This extreme judgment subverts medieval anthropology by massive onslaught, as if the 
swampy murk of the "forest" were to surge up over the slopes of the sunlit hill, obscuring 
any lookout there. If Galatians 5: 19 truthfully describes the "fruits" of 'flesh', no optimistic 
conception of unaided human reason can succeed as an account. The totality of this 
condition implicates both all humanity and every human, to make sin 'original' (11. i. 8). 
It is too easily presumed that this extreme judgment reflects animosity to the stuff of 
concupiscence-those desires, pleasures, and interests that are in part 'emotional'. But 
simply to deride Calvin as effectively Manichean, risks missing that he has not simply 
widened the definition of concupiscence by declaring all pleasures concupiscible. 
I will soon pause to note other respects in which he cannot be charged with Manicheism 
(below, page 180). For now, the point is rather that concupiscence cannot in any way be 
domesticated when it is understood to stand for the chaos resultant upon original sin's 
mistrust of God's love and command. Calvin extends Augustine's claim that original sin 
was sourced in pride: in rejecting the good word of God, humanity acted in faithless 
unconcern, not just upon a serpent-orchestrated delusion, and faithless unconcern opens the 
door to pride ("ambition") and subsequent disobedience. When God's love and command 
are no longer deemed trustworthy by someone, there is no sense in which reason can be said 
to rule them rightly. Rather than being an intermittent malfunction of reason, this reasoning 
takes the form of a lack of interest in the divine centre of the moral field. The resultant 
settled moral attitude involves a comprehensive failure in the orientation of the affections. 
"' The man concerned is, more literally, "without restraint over his spirit" ( V-1ý 'IýVP 11ýj ). It might 
be a mistake 
to limit this to Hellenistic tyi(pd7rEta, which is more restricted to the rational avoidance of excess. Cf. Michael 
Hill, 
"Paul's Concept of 'Enkrateia', " Reformed Theological Review 36 (1977), 70-72, who also shows that 
in Paul, the 
picture is wider than rational mastery over excessive desire. 
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Reason both complies with this failure and leads it. Here indeed is Thomas's 4malice' writ 
large. 
d) The limitations of 'natural'ethics 
Faithless unconcern towards the divine centre of the moral field, and the resultant 
comprehensive failure in the orientation of the affections, warps humanity's apprehension 
of the moral field. To sustain this argument Calvin engages with 'natural' ethics. He beings 
this engagement with an attack upon philosophical confidence in 'freedom' of the will and 
in the 'kingly' rule of reason (which in his conversation is a 'queenly' rule). There is no 
such rule, nor any such freedom, since humanity is bogged in servitude and vice 
In Calvin's summary of contemporary faculty psychology, the 'queenly' rule of reason 
mediates divine things to created human faculties. "[Slense perception is gripped by torpor 
and dimness of sight" but "can be tamed and gradually overcome by reason's rod" (11. ii. 2). 
Appetite and will operate between these two, so that when appetite becomes "molded into 
will", it can pursue virtues and "the right way", if it follows reason's rule; or, if responding 
to sense, it can be "so corrupted and perverted [by sense] as to degenerate into lust. " The 
4will' is 'free' insofar as it turns either to reason or appetite. 
But Calvin scorns this account. 'Freedom' from coercion should hardly be flattered by the 
noble term 'freedom', given the wearisome, predictably evil causes to which human agents 
regularly apply this 'freedom' (cf. 111. ii. 5). Humans have nofteedom to choose their loves, 
which is the onlyfteedom worth the name. Thus, the will "cannot strive after the right" 
(Il. ii. 12). "In discussing free will we are not asking whether a man is permitted to carry out 
and complete, despite external hindrances, whatever he has decided to do; but whether he 
has, in any respect whatever, both choice of judgment and inclination of will that are free. " 
(11. iv. 8) This judgment is reminiscent of Aquinas' judgment that "if this order [to the last 
end] be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of God 
alone" (la2x. 88. al. c; above, page 165). 
Reason is semi-competent for some 'lower' things, but has lost the ability to penetrate 
supernatural things. "[T]he natural gifts were corrupted in man through sin, but his 
supernatural gifts were stripped from him" (II. H. 12), so "wherever the Spirit does not cast 
its light, all is darkness. " (Il. ii. 21) This does not mean that darkness covers empirical 
enquiry (although in Calvin's view of common grace, the Spirit has a role in the natural 
sciences, II. H. 15). But the restoration of 'spiritual' insight by the Spirit is of an entirely 
different order. 
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This spiritual insight consists chiefly in three things: (1) knowing God; (2) 
knowing his fatherly favour in our behalf, in which our salvation consists; (3) 
knowing how to frame our I ife according to the rule of his law. (11. ii. 18) 
The third domain of this 'spiritual' knowledge is the stuff of ethics, and humanity's ethical 
performance is seen to fall halfway between the opacity that characterises human 
knowledge of God (Il. ii. 20) and the relative clarity enjoyed in scientific enquiry (11-ii-13- 
16). 'Natural' humanity entirely ignores the 'First Table' of the Decalogue, but has 
"sornewhat more understanding" of its second (II. ii. 24): 
Since reason, therefore, by which man distinguishes between good and evil, 
and by which he understands and judges, is a natural gift, it could not be 
completely wiped out; but it was partly weakened and partly corrupted, so 
that itsmisshapen ruins appear. (II. H. 12) 
Romans 2: 14-15 is uncontroversially regarded as evidence that "we surely cannot say 
[Gentiles] are utterly blind as to the conduct of life. " Concerning this conduct, "[t]he human 
mind sometimes seems more acute ... than in higher things" and there follows an 
interesting engagement over 'natural law', and pace Plato, ethical 'ignorance' remains 
culpable. "The sinner tries to evade his innate power to judge between good and evil". 
(Il. ii. 22). 
'Natural' human ethics are conspicuously arbitrary (Il. ii. 25). Calvin regards people as 
natural 'metaethicists' who fluctuate between modes of deliberation. They adhere to 
principles until specific self-interested cases make the principle 'forgotten'. 'Conscience' is 
overridden by agents fully aware of prospective evil. Other evils can be absolutely 
overcome by convictions of good intention. Yet 'incontinence' temporarily pressures people 
into a true ignorance that is regretted later. This perverse human chaos is beyond taxonomy: 
Our reason is overwhelmed by so many forms of deceptions, is subject to so 
many errors, dashes against so many obstacles, is caught in so many 
difficulties, that it is far from directing us aright. ... [T]he reason of our 
mind, wherever it may turn, is miserably subject to vanity. (Il. ii. 25) 
Does Calvin rely here upon a medieval account of reason as simply misled? Such an 
assessment would miss just how radically Calvin takes reason to be misled: in opacity, it 
refuses reflectively to assess certain 'emotional' commitments. Calvin seems to be making 
Aquinas' point about malitia to an audience which has confused that point with Aquinas' 
other discussion (of reason that is distracted, bound and deluded from what it otherwise 
knows to be true). "[I]n all our keeping of the law we quite fail to take our concupiscence 
into account. For the natural man refuses to be led to recognize the diseases of his 
lusts ... 
tak[ing] no account of the evil desires that gently tickle the mind" (Il. ii. 24). 
Calvin's 
ýnatural' man here is the man Thomas spoke of as living by certa malitia. 
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The 'tickling' reminds us of how evil simply subtracts from the good (as seen both by 
Augustine and Aquinas). Calvin might agree with Hannah Arendt's famous phrase about 
the 'banality of evil', used to devastating effect in her report on Eichmann's trial. 
Throughout his trial, Eichmann never grasped any sense of culpability, and the "grotesque 
silliness" of his self-exonerating execution speech signified for Arendt "the fearsome, word- 
and-thought-defying banality of evil. "541 Eichmann's complete absence of malevolence 
toward Jews and his entirely uninteresting reasons for sending thousands of them to death 
revolved exclusively around various mundane desires for achievement and standing within 
his own local social networks. Eichmann's petty concerns reflect the concupiscible 
'tickling' that Calvin describes. The kind of 'malice' that Thomas describes is not what we 
mean by 'malicious', and in precisely this kind of way: malitia merely elevates minor goods 
in love, and is unconcerned about divine goods-including in this case, the divine claim 
upon Eichmann to love Jews. 
e) Staunchly anti-Manichean statements 
What Calvin has presented to us is so gloomy that we should pause to remember the 
sustained anti-Manichean emphasis of the Institutes. Calvin knew how easily his far- 
reaching condemnation of humanity could be misunderstood. "[1]t is a very important 
question whether the wound has been inflicted from outside or has been present from the 
beginning" (11. i. 10). Ecclesiastes 7: 29 is used (where "God made human beings 
straightforward, but they have devised many schemes") to show how 'nature' vis-a-vis 
humanity is explicitly used in two distinct senses: of created perfection where there is no 
evil, and of humanity's current habitual state . 543 'Natural corruption' 
is an "adventitious 
quality which comes upon man" but that nonetheless "holds all men fast by hereditary 
right" This steers between a Pelagian Scylla, where "brazen confidence" is 
justified, and a Manichean Charybdis, where 'righteousness' is beyond the domain of 
human competence because of a principle of primordial dualism (H. H. 1). Against both, 
6man9 must "be instructed to aspire to a good of which he is empty, to a freedom of which 
he has been deprived" (11. ii. 1). 
Whilst arguing for the once-ordered affections of humanity, Calvin also insists upon the 
goodness of the body. 'Glowing sparks' of the imago dei are found there (I. xv. 3 
). 544 
... Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem A Report on the Banality of Evil (Revised and Enlarged) 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977; originally published New York: Viking Press, 1964), 252. 
543 Cf. U. 2; I. xiv. 3; ll. i. 10-11. See also Calvin, 38 n. 7. 
"' This is the same passage wherein occurs the "affections kept within the bounds of reason" passage, 
quoted above, 
174, which I have elided here by ellipsis: 
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Notwithstanding his body-soul dualism, this constitutes a robust defence against 
Manicheism, bolstered further by the solidly 'creationist' account of the soul's origin 
(I. xv. 5). 111 Elsewhere, restoration of the original integrity of the imago is christologically 
constituted ; 146 and a thoroughly physical final resurrection body, though perfected, is in 
direct continuity with the old order (III. xxv. 6-7). Also, Calvin easily accommodates within 
these defences a 'righteous' role for the affections, even though that they are now so 
radically disordered in a manner that he expects all readers to find obvious. 
But how might this 'righteous' role for the affections be found if "the whole man is of 
himself nothing but concupiscence"'? "In his elect the Lord cures these diseases in a way 
that we shall soon explain" (II. iii. 3). It is a 'way' that "restores us to true and complete 
integrity" and constitutes "the beginning of our recovery of salvation" (I. xv. 4) 
3. Love 'commended'and 'poured in' 
In this section, I will show how love is 'commended' and 'poured in' according to Calvin. 
Instead of faithless unconcern toward God, the affections begin to serve in a 'righteous' 
role. Divine love toward humanity makes a claim upon people, even when they do not 
discern the moral field in a way that elicits their love. New governance for the affections 
occurs in the recognition of this divine love claim. The pneurnatological restoration that 
follows is fundamentally christological in various respects, entailing a certain kind of 
knowledge of Christ that alters the affections. (The divine claim of love, and the 
christological orientation of divine restoration, are conceptions in which Calvin differs from 
Aquinas. ) The heartfelt enjoyment of people that follows becomes Calvin's basis for 
ethics-a 'loving embrace' of various neighbour's 'beauty'. The account opens the way for 
virtue to be understood humbly. In the first-person, each virtue becomes statement of aim 
(but not self-description). Each can also be a statement of description and affirmation 
towards second- and third-persons. 
a) A governance of the affections 
Humanity requires instruction in goods and freedoms unknown to it (Il. ii. 1), and this 
instruction pertains to the affections. 
[T]he likeness of God extends to the whole excellence by which man's nature towers 
over all the kinds of living creatures. ... [A]Ithough the primary seat of 
the divine 
image was in the mind and heart, or in the soul and its powers, yet there was no part 
of man, not even the body itself, in which some sparks did not glow. It is sure that 
even in the several parts of the world some traces of God's glory shine. (Ibid., 
188. ) 
CE above, 175 n. 539. 
511 In I. xv. 4, Christ is celebrated as the truest human image of God, offering epistemic 
(and even existential) access to 
those respects in which we ourselves are in God's image. 
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Here [is] the best bridle to control all passions: the thought that nothing is better than to practice righteousness by obeying God's commandments; then, 
that the ultimate goal of the happy life is to be loved by him. (11A. 4) 
This statement, although brief, "' has significant implications. 
The 'passions' were not somehow ontologically different in paradise (although there, 
they are called 'affections'). Their disordering arises straightforwardly from mistrust of 
God. Thus pre-fall humanity is not understood as being devoid of affections, and pre- 
fall humanity has 'bridled passions'. 
2. This mistrust has a proximal and an ultimate expression, which both seem to be the 
hallmarks of autonomy. Proximally, the divine command is deemed worthless. 
Ultimately, "to be loved by" God is deemed worthless. 
3. Calvin is formally eudaimonistic; but materially, we wonder (as with Augustine) if the 
label is apt, since the use of the passive ("be loved by") seems remarkable. Rather than 
locating the eudaimonistic premise in the agent's love for God, the reception of God's 
own love is integral to human happiness (reminiscent of the effect, according to 
Augustine, of God's "incorporeal embrace""'). If classical eudaimonism is 
fundamentally egoistic, here the benefit to the self is incidental to the emphasis upon 
loving interrelationship, where the focus of each is upon the excellence of the other, to 
their benefit. 
4. Apparently, divine commands are unintelligible without a divine love-relationship. 
5. Clearly, dismissal of the divine love and command creates a 'vacuum' that only the 
passions can fill. 
6. Passion 'bridled' by faith in God's love and command represents not repression, but 
rather a true 'ordering'. The passionate side of experience is given a 'home'. 
There is a net effect to be found among these implications. Returning to my painful 
personal example, I find that whatever my confusions about my place and my responses 
within the natural order of my situation, God claims me in that place, and claims me in his 
love toward me. Divine commands, for all their force, are a subsidiary element in this claim. 
Therefore whether or not I discern the moral field in a way that rightly elicits my 
love, this 
divine love (and its commands) stands so much in the foreground of the moral 
field as to 
547 "By nature, " says Calvin, I love brevity" (! ), HIM. 1. 
"' See above, page 113. 
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eclipse any misinterpretations of my place and responses within the natural order of my 
situation. In this way, Calvin's brief statement is of love both 'commended' and 'poured 
in'. 549 
Calvin therefore seeks to reveal the priority of this divine claim, which is constituted in 
God's love towards people, rather than primarily in an obligation to love God. This is a 
different kind of solution to the problem of malitia than Thomas's. Rather than only inviting 
me to a rightful response to my soul's true end, the claim of divine love upon me becomes 
the major object of attention. These two approaches to the problem of malitia are difficult to 
synthesise. It is not that they are contradictory (although one reading of divine impassibility 
will make them so). Rather, they each give a different kind of access to the moral field. In 
Calvin's case, access to the moral field becomes more obviously based upon the person and 
work of Christ. 
b) Spiritual and christological restoration 
God's redemptive agency, which "restores us to true and complete integrity" and constitutes 
"the beginning of our recovery of salvation" (I. xv. 4), is considered from ILiv. We shall find 
Christ to be central to this account. 
"[G]ood takes its origin from God alone", yet "only in the elect does one find a will inclined 
to good" (II. iii. 8), since in the language of Jeremiah 32: 39-40 and Ezekiel 11: 19, God has 
'replaced' their 'hearts'. In the restorative action of God, "man is not bome along without 
any motion of the heart, as if by an outside force; rather, he is so affected within that he 
obeys from the heart" (Il. iii. 14), for "who is such a fool as to assert that God moves man 
just as we throw a stone? " (Il. v. 14). The work of restoration, then, is not coercive (such as 
the throwing of stones) but affective, and involves the Holy Spirit's alteration of human 
values and commitments (cf. ll. ii. 7-10; ll. iii. 10,13). The logic of the replaced heart recalls 
Aquinas insofar as it is a logic of the Spirit working through the Word, but it differs by 
being more overtly christological. 
God works in his elect in two ways: within, through his Spirit; without, 
through his Word. By his Spirit, illuminating their minds and forming their 
hearts to the love and cultivation of righteousness, he makes them a new 
creation. By his Word, he arouses them to desire, to seek after, and to attain 
that same renewal. (Il. v. 5) 
Love and cultivation of righteousness, as enacted by God, solves malitia much like Thomas 
envisaged, just as the arousal to desire reminds us of the role Aquinas gave to 
Christ's 
teaching for the ordering of passion. 
"' For a further comment on "obeying God's commandments" as love commended, also see 
below (238) for Calvin's 
teleological understanding of divine command. 
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But although the instrumentality of the Spirit is the Word, it is not just Word qua Christ's 
evangelical teaching. Rather this 'Word' is understood as that which introduces us to Christ. 
Therefore the work of the Spirit is thoroughly contingent upon Christ, and although restored 
humanity is a return to the imago envisaged by the Creator, reflection upon the creation 
account is necessary but not sufficient for restoration. Christ is the truest access point for a 
true knowledge of humanity, and the Spirit's agency begins with a beholding of Christ. 
Christ is more than an point of incarnational epistemic access to the image of God in 
humanity, although he is at least that (I. xv. 4). Rather Christ is himself an active agent in the 
restoration. Hence he is introduced as the basis for humanity's salvation (11. vi) between a 
treatment of humanity's plight and a treatment of humanity's intersection with the law. 
Battles notes the significant placement of this chapter, new to the 1559 edition, as crucial to 
the Institutes' architecton iCS. 511 
[T]he focal point of the Institutes is not found in God's sovereignty, or in 
predestination, or in insistence on obedience to God's Word itself, apart from 
constant reference to Jesus Christ, whom the written Word makes known. "' 
Many modes of christological restoration are pursued, which are unfortunately beyond our 
scope. But interesting examples of these modes are found in Calvin's various uses of 
2 Corinthians 3: 18 (where Paul says that "we, who with unveiled faces all reflect the Lord's 
glory, are being transformed into his likeness with ever-increasing glory, which comes from 
the Lord, who is the Spirit"). In I. xv. 4 the text is picked up to emphasise how Christ is the 
true image of God, to whom people must look for change. In III. ii. 20 the text is used to 
show how Christ's work in the gospel, representing as it does a promise of forgiveness and 
reconciliation, reminds fearful people of God's good intention toward them to help their 
restoration, so banishing all thought of God as a "deadly enemy". Effectively, the text is 
used to reiterate how divine love toward people is revealed by Christ in his gospel. In 
Ill. iii. 9, the text is used in connection with a discussion of people participating in Christ's 
death and resurrection. Also, Paul's identification of the Spirit with "the Lord" (whom 
Calvin takes to be the Lord Christ) obviously helps to form Calvin's conception of 
pneumatological renewal as fundamentally christological. 
Understanding Christ as humanity's saviour, exemplar and telos (III. vi) entails that a certain 
kind of "knowledge of Christ" is properly "received only when it possesses the whole soul", 
and must find "a seat and resting place in the inmost affections of the hearf' (111MA). 
This 
is the substantive affective element to the Spirit's restorative work through the 
Word. The 
Calvin, 340 n. I (Battles' note). 
Ibid., lvi (Battles' introduction). 
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method and effects of this restoration are similar in some respects to what we saw in 
Thomas. But in light of the christological concerns I signalled above (page 166), we should 
note Calvin's more successful attempt to describe the restoration in christological terms, 
even if I have not examined the attempt in enough detail. 
c) The restored 'Life of the Christian Man' 
Calvin's brief personal ethic, "The Life of the Christian Man" (111-vi-x), began as a separate 
treatise. 511 It summarises 'ordered' life as "some universal rule" (Ill. vi. 1); the ethic is not 
comprehensive and readers are directed to "the homilies of the fathers" for a normative 
literature of "exhortations" and "[descriptions ofl individual virtues at length". The 
cuniversal rule' brings new intelligibility to business practice, to suffering, and to the onset 
of death. The treatise relies upon Calvin's continued treatment of the affections. 
The knowledge of Christ that "possesses the whole soul" and "finds a seat and resting place 
in the inmost affections of the heart" (III. vi. 4) is contrasted to knowledge that resides in 
64memory alone, as other disciplines are" 
No denotative definition is offered for 'heart', but ostensively, it is the domain of (what 
moderns call) commitments, values, 'will' and impulse (labels no less mysterious than 
'heart'). Calvin's language is consonant with the NT in its use of 1(ap8t'a and the OT 
antecedents in : *, terms under which Bible writers gather the cognitive, emotional and 
volitional elements of human existence. In a recurrent contrast between 'knowledge' that 
either "flits in the brain" (cerebrum, I. v. 9) or "takes root in the heart" (cor, I. v. 9), Calvin's 
emphasis upon the latter gives an "existential""' approach with clear subjective elements; 
554 indeed, knowledge that is not affective is probably not of the heart, and is suspect. The 
reordering of affection is seen in polemic against unnamed Christian opponents: the 
"efficacy" of the "gospel on the tips of their tongues ... ought to penetrate the 
inmost 
affections of the heart, take its seat in the soul, and affect the whole man a hundred times 
more deeply than the cold exhortations of the philosophers! " (Ill. vi. 4). 
However once such a reordering of "inmost affections of the heart" has taken hold, "we are 
not our own" (III. vii. 1; cf. I Cor. 6: 19-20), and in 'self-denial', new attachments form and 
old attachments ("the yearning to possess, the desire for power, and the favor of men") are 
... Ibid., x1ii. n. 19 & Ix. n. 65 (Battles' introduction and notes). Given its subsequent placement 
between two major 
discussions of faith (Ill. ii-iii and III. xi; IlLiv-v is polemical digression), abstraction 
from its theological structure 
clearly violates this ethic. 
Ibid., 62 n. 29 (Battles' note); cf III. ii. 8, Ill. ii. 33; and 111-ii-36. 
55' All the thinkers profiled in Part I of this thesis should approve, excepting 
Kant, and B. F. Skinner (who is unsure 
about actually having a heart). 
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dissolved. Unconcern towards God becomes a disposition of focussed attention upon 
"God's decision and judgment" which displaces vices from the heart (111-vii. 2 ). 
Such a displacement then affects our view of human persons, making it possible "not to 
consider men's evil intentions but to look upon the image of God in them, which cancels 
and effaces their transgressions, and with its beauty and dignity allures us to love and 
embrace them" (Ill. vii. 6). The beauty and allure of the image of God in people-not some 
emanated image,, " but one fundamentally connected to their selves as uniquely created by 
God-is that "to which we owe all honor and love" (Ill. vii. 6). Therefore Calvin rejects 
mere "perform[ance ofl all the duties of love", enjoining fulfilment of them "from a sincere 
feeling of love" (Ill. vii. 7). Thus business practise (III. vii. 8-9) ceases to be governed by the 
consequential isms of either expansion or necessity. It exists in the service of people. 
The point we have arrived at, it seems, is the enjoyment of God (but 'in Christ') and the 
enjoyment of others in God. Calvin is adamant: the enjoyment is heaqfelt. 
d) A way to humble virtue 
Karl Barth understood ethics to spring more easily from Calvin than from Luther (who 
valiantly applied himself to ethical thought nonetheless). Commenting on the Geneva 
Catechism, Barth understood Calvin to be saying that 
true knowledge of God [follows] as we come to awareness of the honor we 
owe him. But the way in which to pay this honour is fourfold, (1) by putting 
our whole trust in him, (2) by seeking to serve him with our whole lives and 
doing his will, (3) by calling upon him in need and seeking salvation and 
every good thing in him, and finally (4) by recognizing him with the heart 
and mouth as the 'sole author' of all good. "' 
I hope by now to have shown that Calvin's solution to what Aquinas called malitia entails 
something like what Barth has said. To honour the claim of God entails trust, service, and 
forms of dependence. The claims of divine commands are a subsidiary element within the 
divine claim of love. 
But the dependence includes a recognition of God as the author of all good-therefore what 
does this dependence entail for virtue? Remembering my painful example, is there any 
sense in which I can rightly describe my outburst as an uncharacteristic aspect of a 
generally ordered and virtuous life? Protestant ethics since Calvin has tended toward a very 
negative assessment here. Any such estimate of myself as generally virtuous seems 
(firstly) 
to accrue to myself some good of which 1, not God, am the putative author-which 
is 
151 See above, 175 n. 539. 
15' Barth, Calvin, 77. 
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(secondly) all the more problematic when the occasion of this assessment is the irruption of 
several vices! Such an accrual of goodness to myself, occasioned by evil, causes Protestant 
thought to suspect that I might rather be exhibiting exactly the kind of faithless unconcern 
toward God that disorients my affections and causes me to name evil as good, so warranting 
precisely the kind of polemic that fills the Institutes. It is exactly this kind of use of virtue 
which propels Calvin to say that 
when man has been taught that no good thing remains in his power, and that 
he is hedged about on all sides by most miserable necessity, in spite of this he 
should nevertheless be instructed to aspire to a good of which he is empty, to 
a freedom of which he has been deprived. In fact, he may thus be more 
sharply aroused from inactivity than if it were supposed that he was endowed 
with the highest virtues. (II. ii. 1) 
Any self-description in ten-ns of virtue risks hubris, and inveigles me from my primary call 
to love God and thereby to embrace my wife's beauty in love. Instead of pondering my 
virtues, I am to direct my attention in the first instance toward the claims of divine love 
upon me and toward the subsidiary claim of the divine command upon me, so as to displace 
vice and to cause me to look to Christ, finally to embrace my wife's beauty in love. But can 
virtue ever proceed on such an account, if I am "more sharply aroused from inactivity than 
if it were supposed" that I am "endowed with the highest virtues"? 
In the "The Life of the Christian Man", readers are directed to "the homilies of the fathers" 
for a normative literature of "exhortations" and for "[descriptions ofl individual virtues at 
length". Clearly Calvin has nothing against virtue as particularly understood, and he 
regularly uses virtue terminology in reference to third parties and as statements of aim. 
Virtue, then, can have this kind of place in an account of the relationship between ethics and 
emotion. Rather than each virtue operating as a statement of seýf-description, each virtue 
becomes a statement for affirmation given and received, or for describing a manner of life 
sought by someone. In the case of my painful example, virtue-as-aim (and correlative 
instruction to love God and to embrace others in love) frees me from a petty focus upon my 
own self-justification, just as it also frees me from habitual self-reproach over vices that 
may (or may not) have been in evidence at that time. To access virtue in the ways I have 
described here retains consistency with the virtue of humility. 
In this chapter, I have shown Calvin addressing that faithless unconcern towards 
God which 
Thomas called malitia. We have also seen how, under the claim of 
divine love the comes 
finally through Christ, a restoration can occur. This restoration effects a 
fundamental 
affective reorientation, including a heartfelt enjoyment of others. 
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Calvin and Aquinas have spoken between them to both sides of a dialectic within 
Augustine. While Aquinas emphasises the structures of love's responses within a divinely 
ordered natural situation, Calvin emphasises the claims of divine love upon people who 
exhibit faithless unconcern toward God. 
In different ways, Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin all understand that a chasm of sorts must 
be crossed. For Augustine, the heart must finally rest in God. For Aquinas, malitia can only 
be overcome by the work of God. For Calvin, faithless unconcern must come under the 
claim of divine love. For each, only when this chasm is crossed can there be a proper 
consonance between emotion and ethics. 
This chasm is the subject of Soren Kierkegaard's work. Kierkegaard understood the 
implications of it for a modern age. Though perhaps an unlikely source, he describes a 
'leap' away from both random passion and 'objectivity', toward a primal affection to God. I 
turn to him in the next chapter. 
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Chapter VII: Leaping with Kierkegaard (but 
where? ) 
[T]hough we once knew Christ from a human point of view, we know him no longer in that way. (2 Cor. 5: 16, NRSV) 
El i(al tyvwi(apEv KaTa' cra'pi(a XPLCFTO'V, dAXa' U FE W(TKOPEV. 
(2 Cor. 5: 16, NA26) 
VGV O'K'TI ylV ' 
Christianity did not come into the world (as the parsons snivellingly and falsely introduce it) as an admirable example of the gentle art of 
consolation-but as the absolute. It is out of love God wills it so, but it is also God who wills it, and He wills what He will. He will not suffer himself to be 
transformed by men and be a nice ... human God: He will transform men, 
and that he wills out of love. He will have nothing to do with man's pert 
inquiry about why and why [sic] did Christianity come into the world: it is 
and shall be the absolute. "' 
In the theologians examined so far, we have seen all senses of 'the logic of love' to have 
been apparent. "' We have especially seen how love has an ordinant logic, insofar as a good 
and ordered moral field is the substrate that elicits human love. But this ordinant logic is 
unclear to people, therefore we have also seen a 'grammar' to the divine reordering of love. 
It is a logic of love both 'poured in' and 'commended'. 
Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin all understand that a 'chasm' of sorts must be crossed. For 
Augustine, the heart must finally rest in God. For Aquinas, malitia can only be overcome by 
the work of God. For Calvin, faithless unconcern must come under the claim of divine love. 
For each, only when this chasm is crossed can there be a proper consonance between 
emotion and ethics. The purpose of this chapter is to describe how Soren Kierkegaard 
understands the 'chasm' to be crossed, and the implications of this crossing for ongoing 
moral deliberation. 
Kierkegaard describes a 'leap' away from both random passion and 'objectivity', toward a 
primal affection for God. It is a 'leap' across the 'chasm'. The quotations above hint at the 
nature and magnitude of this 'leap' that although not irrationalist, is still a 'leap' of sorts. 
The 'leap' exposes another facet of the 'logic of love' as it pertains to deliberative logic. 
Deliberative logic has a subjective nature, being imbued with love. Deliberative logic has its 
loves. 
Such an understanding of deliberative logic has been more implicit than explicit among the 
thinkers we have examined, but Soren Kierkegaard vigorously makes explicit this affective 
aspect of deliberative logic. For him, movements of the affections are always central 
to 
55' Soren Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity (1850), tr. Walter Lowrie, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
1941), 66 (hereafter Practice for the more usual ET title Practice in Christianity). 
558 See above, 70, for the two broad senses of this term each of which 
include two complementary aspects. 
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moral deliberation. Such movements should be grounded in, and will then reflect an 
ongoing expression of, the 'leap' of primal affection towards God 
In the five subsections of this chapter, I will describe Kierkegaard's 'leap of love' and his 
related exposition of affective deliberative logic as follows. I will deny existentialist 
readings while appropriating 'psychological' readings of Kierkegaard (Section One), and I 
will go on to describe his hostility to 'objectivity' (Section Two). By examining the 'stand- 
off in Either-Or between the aesthete and the Judge (Section Three), I will show how the 
stand-off is best resolved by forms of so-called 'Christian emotion', even if Kierkegaard's 
conception of these is inadequate (Section Four). Kierkegaard therefore leaves us positioned 
to outflank some major Nietzschean objections to a moral theology of emotion (Section 
Five). I will now pause to outline these sections in slightly more detail 
In Section One, I will argue against an existentialist reading of Kierkegaard. He agrees with 
our other theological protagonists that the adventitious nature of love 'poured in5 is not 
necessarily problematic. This agreement causes him to be regarded as an existentialist, but 
existentialist readings actually represent a moderation of Kierkegaard away from the 
theological grounds of his argument. Whilst rejecting existentialist readings, I will suggest 
that it remains fruitful to examine a psychological aspect of Kierkegaard's work. 
Section Two outlines Kierkegaard's objection to 'objectivity', an objection that dictates his 
odd literary methods. 'Objective' thought obscures the embodied nature of human life. 
Human thought about humanity should more properly be 'subjective', thereby requiring 
respect for the passions. For Kierkegaard, 'passion' describes both our interests, and their 
defence and promotion. 'Pass ionl essness' reduces action, and passion should arise from 
Christian truth properly understood. Kierkegaard deploys a cluster of special writing 
strategies to reengage and redirect the passions, causing finite readers to wrestle with 
'infinite' and 'absolute' concerns, and inviting readers to consider what is their own 'stage' 
of life in this wrestling. 
I will examine Either-Or in Section Three, showing how it develops a 'stand-off between 
an 'aesthete' and a judge. The aesthete proclaims frivolous abandon against 
boredom, but 
his credo merely seems horrible when the amoral aimlessness of an aesthetic 
'seducer', 
Johannes, comes to light. Judge William prises open such unliveable aspects of the aesthetic 
position, commending a life of responsible choice-making as the more meaningful. 
But the 
Judge seems too boring for the aesthete, hence there is a stand-off. 
Either-Or goes on to 
suggest that Christianity can retain the best of both the aesthete and 
the judge, and this 
conclusion heralds Kierkegaard's wider project. 
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How then is this synthesis, this 'baptising' of the ethicist's reason and the aesthete's 
passion, achieved in the 'true Christian"? In Section Four I will consider a set of 'Christian 
emotions' that Kierkegaard understands to form Christian consciousness. These emotions 
start with 'despair' and traverse 'faith' to incorporate 'love, 'joy' and 'gladness', albeit with 
some space for more negative social engagements. But in anticipation of my next chapter, I 
will suggest that Kierkegaard's conclusions as to what constitutes Christian emotion do not 
match those of the NT writers. He offers a prolegomena, as it were, to a Christian account 
of affective deliberative logic. 
But in Section Five, I will show how despite any shortcomings in Kierkegaard's account, he 
amply outflanks some major Nietzschean objections to a moral theology of emotion. The 
claim stands upon a deep agreement between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, where both 
defend subjectivity, passion, and 'self-overcoming', and where both agree that Christian 
4sin' is indeed a 'madness' when seen from the ground upon which Nietzsche stands. This 
deep agreement renders Nietzsche's arguments insufficient to discredit Christianity since 
for Kierkegaard, even emotional experiences require the recognition of a wider order. 
Nietzschean 'affirmation of life' just brings boredom, and slave morality is not finally 
Christian, just as true Christian leadership is not finally ascetic or self- interested. Christian 
faith brings joyful, alluring, relaxed responses to created order, which compete easily 
against Nietzsche's restless voracity. 
1. Looking before leaping 
Before turning to the main argument of this section, a short pause and summary will assist 
us to grasp Kierkegaard's particular contribution to our enquiry. 
In the scientific study of emotions, their ethical 'use' is at best a curiosity; while in the 
rationalist study of ethics, emotions are effluvial. 119 A 'Nietzschean alternative' places 
emotionally driven action at the centre of moral order-either an order of rank; or, less 
easily (and perhaps less coherently), a liberal political order that seeks to maximise personal 
freedoms while minimising harms. 
A moral -theological framework resembles Nietzsche 
insofar as 'emotions' are not 
considered to be unimportant, since deliberation to action continually appears at the 
interstices of emotion and reason. Thus 'emotion' and 'reason' are resoluble 
in an 
unfamiliar way, coming to be seen as facets of what humans experience as set within a 
pluriform. moral field of interlocking goods, with humanity constituted 
in this field in being, 
"' For completeness, we could almost add that in the empiricist emotivist study 
of ethics, reasons were effluvial; but 
this might be to oversimplify. 
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in knowledge, and in love. Disordered humanity responds in (Nietzschean) voracity and 
selective sight, where various goods become focal, and other emotions follow 
4consanguineously', as it were (e. g. fear and anger at the prospective loss of those goods, or 
sadness at their irremediable loss). But ordered under God, humanity learns of goods 
forgotten and begins to love these again. The mysterious work of Christ's Spirit is 
indispensable to this reordering. Again, emotions follow 'consanguineously', although 
patterns from the old (dis)order remain as this reordering proceeds. The atoning death of 
Christ guarantees that moral failure during this time of reordering does not jeopardise the 
relationship of divine covenantal love within which it occurs 
Soren Kierkegaard is "a kind of theologian"110 who stands after Kant and before Nietzsche. 
He is situated within an aesthetic discourse of expressive self-fulfilment (like our 
4emotion') and another discourse of rational contemplation (like our 'ethics'). But his 
longstanding interest in subjectivity, and a conviction that 'objectivity' could result in an 
unconcerned moral inertia, meant that he found both of these discourses to be severely 
wanting (unlike Nietzsche, who substituted the discourse of expressive self-fulfilment for 
the unsatisfying discourse of rational contemplation). 
All agree that there is a playful, ironic complexity to Kierkegaard's thought. Nonetheless, 
there emerges from it a positive program with clear parallels to Augustine, whether or not a 
debt to Augustine is overt. Kierkegaard is of interest to us precisely because his 
'Augustinian' program post-dates Kant and, as I will argue, anticipates and pre-empts 
Nietzsche. 
For Kierkegaard, people will understand neither themselves nor their world without a prior 
'leap' of love. In EitherlOr , this claim confronts 
both the emotional and wayward aesthetic, 
and the prim, boring, rationalising 'Judge'. But the 'leap' is neither into irrationality, nor to 
secure a 'castle' of faith 'in the air'. Rather, the 'leap' concerns a radical reorientation of 
love. Such a reorientation will bring changes to the workings of deliberative reason, since 
these workings are already heavily biased by various loves. In subsequent Christian works, 
Kierkegaard will go on to show how this 'leap' of love cannot proceed without 
love for God 
as its irreducible first movement of importance. 
Therefore Kierkegaard promotes a radical subjectivity that takes human emotion very 
seriously. However, he also acknowledges the wider moral 
field within which humanity is 
situated. On his account, it becomes fitting to cultivate certain 
'Christian emotions', where 
560 David J. Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 12. 
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there is deep consonance between the objective truths of this moral field, and our subjective 
evaluation of it. Kierkegaard is, therefore, more Augustinian than existentialist. 
In this section, I will argue against an existentialist reading of Kierkegaard. He agrees with 
our other theological protagonists that the adventitious nature of love 'poured in' is not 
necessarily problematic. This agreement causes him to be regarded as an existentialist, but 
existentialist readings actually represent a moderation of Kierkegaard away from the 
theological grounds of his argument. While rejecting existentialist readings, I will suggest 
that it remains fruitful to examine a psychological aspect of Kierkegaard's work. 
a) An adventitious problem 
I will comment upon existentialist readings of Kierkegaard by way of an agreement 
common to our theological protagonists. Each agrees, in their logic of 'love poured in9 that 
the reordering of affection is adventitious-that in some respect, humans do not have a 
liberty of indifference, and that a change in affection is not ours to control, requiring divine 
assistance. 
In Scripture, wind is a paradigmatic metaphor of adventitious reordering. It blows where it 
pleases (Jn 3: 8). Against the Pelagians, Augustine insisted on such adventitious change 
(alongside his emphasis on divine rescue at the cross). With Augustine, Calvin carefully 
reprises Augustinian themes of election, "' as consequent to the totality of human 
depravation and the correlative necessity of divine rescue, and as correlative to the 
phenomenon of adventitious change. The infusion of the Spirit in Aquinas also grapples 
with the adventitious, although differently. 
Correspondingly, Martha Nussbaum's attraction to the Nietzschean alternative is against 
what is, to her, the element of fluke in Augustine: 
Right willing [Augustine] insists, depends upon desire for a good object; ... a 
response of desire and love that is summoned up in us by an external call and 
is not perfectly ours to control. ... 
[T]here is no reliable relationship between 
the character of our human efforts and the likelihood of being called in the 
requisite way. "' 
This is a "world of chance encounters99,563 
w here Augustine9s prayer "to become responsive 
to ... only the right stimuli ... 
does not guarantee success . 
9'56' Thus "Augustinian love does 
561 1 
say 'carefully', given the repeated caveats and calls to epistemic 
humility of Inst. III. xxi. 1-4; and given also the 
sixteen preceding christological chapters (Il. vi-xvii) and twenty preceding chapters on 
covenantal blessing (I 1 1, i _xx). 
There is no seventeenth-century methodology here (where a 
[Newtonian] temporal primacy of election governed 
various attempts at an ordo salutis). 
Nussbaum, "Augustine and Dante, " 67. 
Ibid., 69. 
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not retain sufficient respect for the lover's freedom and choice. 
59565 In this reading of it, 
theology's adventitious reordering is regarded, self-evidently, as a problem. 
Although Soren Kierkegaard offers no prominent account of humanity's adventitious 
reordering from the divine perspective, he can nonetheless disagree that it is problematic 
from the human perspective. 
Human beings located upon the moral field we have described are finally confronted by 
God, the absolute. In Christ, God calls forth an unequivocal response. Certainly, there was 
nothing so overtly obvious about Christ that would make his contemporaries cease to regard 
him "from a human point of view" (2 Cor. 5: 16), to regard him instead as God incarnate, no 
less. This change of perception is a change toward the 'infinite'; thus no Particular chain of 
logic can bring it about. (In the same way, sinners finally require a divine revelation 
concerning their sin, if to regard it as more than merely ignorance. ) But subjectively, there 
need be nothing 'chancy' about the presence or absence of the appropriate response. It is 
not adventitious in that sense, and Kierkegaard sets about diagnosing the psychological 
dispositions that cause people not to make the response, whilst also setting these against 
161 Christian truth, which is sufficient to elicit the response. 
The massive volume of Kierkegaard's work, representing the steady output of more than ten 
years, seeks to immerse people in these psychological dispositions, to bring a deep sense of 
identification with them. Readers first 'experience' the great appeal of these dispositions, 
but eventually begin to 'discover' the profound failings inherent in each disposition. This 
opens the way for the proper response to Christian truth. Before Kierkegaard's 'treatment, 
there was resistance to this truth, given the undeniable appeal of each psychological 
disposition. But the way to truth is open when this appeal is 'deflated', in light of the 
disposition's weaknesses. 
The net effect is not to deny that the Spirit blows where he will. But it is emphatically to 
deny that the journey of a Paul or an Augustine (or even, improbably enough, a 
Kierkegaard) is unintelligible. Such a journey can be presented to whoever has not yet made 
it, in the expectation that they do finally make it (and so find their true self). 
(Here then is a 
logic of love commended in Kierkegaard. ) 
564 Ibid., 7 1. 
... Ibid., 80. 
... This paragraph is my attempt at a rough overview of 
Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments (1844), tr. 
David F. Swenson, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936); Soren 
Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death 
(1849), tr. Alastair Hannay, Penguin Classics edition, (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1989); and Kierkegaard, Practice. 
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b) Kierkegaard as existentialist 
Yet even so, Kierkegaard might be taken to exacerbate (rather than to alleviate) the 
adventitious problem, given the perception of a certain arbitrariness about his writing. 
Alastair Hannay, commenting on the despair Kierkegaard holds to be universally present in 
whoever stands wrongly before God, asks if "Kierkegaard has discovered [a] need in 
himself ... not altogether untypical of certain kinds of people with certain kinds of 
background". If so, he merely generalises a personal problem-which a "modern way" 
would treat as illness. "' Hannay, though, can acknowledge how Kierkegaard might stand on 
an alternative ground of inner consistency. 
But it is possible to look at it the other way around. ... What is exceptional about people like Kierkegaard might be not so much that they are in the 
unfortunate position of having to contend with this special problem, but that 
they are in the unusual position of being able to see that there is this 
problem. "' 
For Robert Solomon, Kierkegaard presents a psychological fait accompli. What reasons 
Kierkegaard does give for making the journey to God "are not logically compelling, but 
they may be compelling for some individual. ""' Solomon deploys a Sartrean reading of 
Kierkegaard, 110 where Christianity is Kierkegaard's personal instantiation of a more primal, 
radical free choice: 
Belief in God ... is a matter of passion, not knowledge. ... For Kierkegaard, it is the manner and intensity of one's belief, and not the object or objective 
necessity of belief, which determines truth. "' 
What counts in matters of religion and in all matters of life is personal 
passion, not knowledge or reason. ... (W]hat matters 
is what one chooses for 
oneself, and then ... 
how one chooses ... The dogmas of 
Christianity are not 
plausible; they are not even intelligible, according to Kierkegaard. ... 
Becoming a Christian is a choice of a way of life, a hard, but for some 
individuals like Kierkegaard, a psychologically (not logically) necessary 
choice. "' 
Existence [is] living passionately, choosing one's own existence and 
committing oneself to a certain way of life. ... Kierkegaard's own chosen 
way of life was Christianity ... 
I" 
In Kierkegaard, Sickness, 18. 
56' Hannay, in ibid., 18-19. 
56' Robert C. Solomon, From Rationalism to Existentialism (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 97. 
570 Cf ibid., 69, Solomon's opening comment on Kierkegaard: "[B]ecause of the respect 
bestowed on [Kierkegaardl 
by 
... Heidegger, 
Jaspers, and Sartre, he became generally recognised as the 
founder of [existentialism. It] Is nowhere 
given a more poetic or more explicit statement than in the writings of 
Soren Kierkegaard. " 
"' Ibid., 71. 
57' Robert C. Solomon, Continental Philosophy Since 1750. - The Rise and 
Fall of the Self A History of Western 
Philosophy, vol. 7 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 
89-90,91-92. 
573 Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, A Short 
History of Philosophy (New York; Oxford: 
Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 226-27. 
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Thus Kierkegaard's thought constitutes a form of irrational iSM. 574 Kierkegaard does not deal 
in reason, which "play[s] virtually no role whatever" in delineating the good human life, 575 
and "[t1he attempt to rationalise Christianity is nothing other than the attempt to make being 
a Christian emotionally empty. "571 Thus Kierkegaard becomes another rascal in Solomon's 
'Myth of the Passions', albeit that he is presented as an apologist for the feelingful side of 
the split. 
Kierkegaard, however, will not so easily succumb to the charge of irrationalism, or to the 
implication that Christianity is one radical choice among many. Anti-Climacus, for 
example, spares no quarter: 
Whether a person has been miraculously helped essentially depends on with 
what passion of mind he has grasped that help was impossible, and in the 
next instance on how honest he is towards the power which nevertheless 
helped him. But people as a rule do neither one nor the other; they shriek that 
help is impossible without ever taxing their minds on how to find help, and 
afterwards they ungratefully lie. "' 
This typically Kierkegaardian confluence of the ethical, the emotional, and the thoughtful 
("honest", "passion", "taxing their minds") prima facie commends him to our enquiry. A 
repeated juxtaposition of the 'aesthetic', the 'ethical', and the 'religious'; an exploration of 
'subjective' against 'objective' thought; an analysis of despair resolved through the 
recognition of sin, to the end of faith and love-throughout the entire corpus, these 
interrogate both unbelief, and the disconnection of passion from reason. 
Certainly, he knows how "excessively stupid" it would be to deny that pagan aesthetics 
generate "amazing feats" for inspiration and admiration, or to deny that "natural man" 
tastefully exploits "every favour granted, even letting art and science serve to heighten, 
embellish and refine the pleasure. ""' But Anti-Climacus would nevertheless reject our 
blithely 'pagan' acceptance, for example, of the rightness always to treat depression (a form 
of despair) as a merely biological plight. "[T]he aesthetic point of view with its absence of 
spirit does not provide the criterion of what is despair and what is not", for "the point of 
view which must be adopted is that of the ethico-religious". Every life where 
"capacities 
[are taken] only to be natural powers, unconscious in a deeper sense of where 
it has them 
574 Solomon, From Rationalism, 34. 
"' Ibid., 88. 
576 Ibid., 75. 
... Kierkegaard, Sickness, 70. Anti-Climacus' comment is reminiscent of 
Augustine's wry sarcasm against 
antagonistic Romans. Despite their blaming Christianity for the 
410 sack of Rome, Christ orchestrated their personal 
survival through basilica sanctuaries and pagan respect for 
Christ. Without such rescue, no Roman could make their 
polemic, being dead. (Augustine, De civ. Dei, 4-5,1.1. ) 
Kierkegaard, Sickness, 76, as for quotations following. 
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from"-"however much it can account for even the whole of existence, however intense its 
aesthetic enjoyment"-every such life, regarding itself as unaccountable, "is none the less 
despair. " 
Likewise, a 'modern way' sometimes advocates suicide. In "pagan terms", suicide is an 
inconsequential matter of freedom, except where consequentially "it involve[s] a breach of 
onCs duties to others"; but it is no crime against God. For Anti-Climacus, suicide is not 
despair as such. Rather, "one has to say that the fact that the pagan judged suicide in that 
way"-that is, as inconsequential-"was despair. ""' Thus with Augustine, pagan virtues are 
splendid vices. 110 
Kierkegaard takes no prisoners. When Hannay mildly says "it is possible to look at it the 
other way around", '" he is rightly observing that when we deal with Kierkegaard, mutually 
exclusive grounds are always at issue. In league, somehow, with Augustine, Kierkegaard 
promotes a kind of personal 'Christian authenticity' in each specific reader against the 
evasions and abstractions of an idealist Hegelianism and a complicit church. Thus the 
Sartrean reading is quite flawed in a number of directions, representing, oddly enough, an 
attempt to moderate Kierkegaard onto a ground lying somewhere between Hegelian 
rationalist idealism, and Christianity. 
But this reading will not be dealt with directly here, since it reflects an internecine war 
among Kierkegaard scholars that we do well to avoid. Indeed, a proper reading of the late- 
and non-pseudonymous Christian works leaves Kierkegaard quite well enough fending for 
himself A different choice is before us. 
c) Psychology or theology? 
Kierkegaard's psychological efforts are as deeply interesting as his efforts at Christian 
edification, and it is taxing to decide which to pursue. The former do seem more 
directly 
germane, and do represent the bulk of his output. But the psychology is 
directly in the 
service of his edifying intent, which must come finally into view. 
An interesting beginning will be to see the significance of 'the subjective', and the proper 
understanding of the subject-object relation, toward an appreciation 
that rationalist 
'objectivity' is often a delusion. Either-Or follows as a 
kind of manifesto for his entire 
project. The diagnosis offered in that work is differently presented 
in The Sickness Unto 
Ibid., 77. 
Ibid., 76. 
See above, 195. 
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Death, to which faith is the solution in Fear and Trembling and Practice. We then approach 
Works of Love (albeit out of chronological order), which presents the subjectivity that 
constitutes faith. 
Kierkegaard's psychological phenomenology, and his descriptions of strategies deployed by 
various people, occur within a realist objective order. The net effect is to endorse the main 
emphases we have seen in previous chapters. From this theological ground, Kierkegaard 
can challenge rationalist denigration of passion and subjectivity, and he can also challenge 
(proleptically) the Nietzschean alternative. 
2. Subjectivity and passion 
In this section, I will outline an objection by Kierkegaard to 'objectivity' that dictates his 
odd literary methods. 'Objective' thought obscures the embodied nature of human life. 
Human thought about humanity should more properly be 'subjective', thereby requiring 
respect for the passions. For Kierkegaard, 'passion' describes both our interests, and their 
defence and promotion. 'Pass ionle ssne ss' reduces action, and passion should arise from 
Christian truth properly understood. Kierkegaard deploys a cluster of special writing 
strategies to reengage and redirect the passions, causing finite readers to wrestle with 
'infinite' and 'absolute' concerns, and inviting readers to consider what is their own 'stage' 
of life in this wrestling. 
Kierkegaard's idealistic, abstract attacks on idealism and abstraction can mask how his 
'being' includes oft-overlooked earthy, momentary matters-bodily concerns and 
relationships and movements and transactions. (Nussbaum should approve. ) A well-known 
demonstration of the point is this satirically idealist attack upon overblown idealist accounts 
of human being: 
One must ... 
be very careful in dealing with a philosopher of the Hegelian 
school, and, above all, to make certain of the identity of the being with whom 
one has the honor to discourse. Is he a human being, an existing human 
being? Is he himself sub specie aeterni, even when he sleeps, eats, blows his 
nose, or whatever else a human being does? Is he himself the pure "I am I"? 
This is an idea that has surely never occurred to any philosopher; but 
if not, 
how does he stand existentially related to this entity, and through what 
intermediate determinations is the ethical responsibility resting upon him as 
an existing individual suitably respected? Does he in 
fact exist? And if he 
does, is he then not in process of becoming? And if he is 
in process of 
becoming, does he not face the future? And does he ever 
face the future by 
way of action? And if he never does, will 
he not forgive an ethical 
individuality for saying in passion and with dramatic truth, that 
he is an 
assT 82 
582 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), tr. David 
F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 271. 
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For Kierkegaard, human subjects regularly lose a proper understanding of their relationship 
to the objects of their thought. Objectivity is often tortured to become the 'sum total' of life, 
without reference to whatever actually constitutes the humanity of each individual human. 
But while granting appropriate uses of 'objective' thought (whether in the sciences or 
theology), ethics and religion are not, in the final analysis, about this objectivity. 
But attention to the world of the subjective brings a whole gamut of 'feelingful' 
term inology-'fear and trembling', 'despair', 'anxiety', 'dread', 'erotic9, 'delight' (to name 
just a few). These elements of the self are traditionally considered philosophically messy; 
but Kierkegaard does not care. As Rudd puts it: 
Fundamentally, what Kierkegaard is reminding us of is that we do not relate 
to the world primarily as detached rational observers, but as agents and as 
emotional beings. Hence Kierkegaard studies such moods as anxiety, irony, 
and despair as profoundly revelatory of the reality of human existence and of 
the nature of the world in which we live. Our emotions are not simply factors 
that tend to cloud or confuse the intellect; they are ways in which we relate to 
the world, and may be more reliable guides to it than the intellect at times. If 
I see someone in pain, feet compassion for him, and attempt to help, why 
should I not treat my feeling as revealing to me aspects of reality (his actual 
experience of pain and need; our common humanity; the ethical demand that 
is made on me) that would simply be missed or inadequately understood by a 
purely rational analysis of his physical or even psychological condition? In 
which case, why should it not be legitimate to speak about the truth of my 
emotion? The exclusively intellectualist interpretation of truth is a prejudice 
that has bedevilled religious, ethical, and aesthetic thinking. Kierkegaard's 
teaching that 'truth is subjectivity' is a protest against that prejudice. ... 
Kierkegaard is not saying that there is no truth, it is all subjective; but, rather, 
what is revealed through subjectivity is truth, is the real nature of things. "' 
Subjectivity is indivisible from passion, which term Robert C. Roberts elucidates. 
(However, Roberts willingly acknowledges that Kierkegaard "is sometimes more concerned 
with rhetorical force than with balance and analytical precision. 59584) When someone 'has a 
passion for' something, their 'passions' are the consistent, abiding loci of what is highly 
valued. This is passion as interest. Being 'in a passion' is the defence or promotion of these 
arenas of interest, in which sense passion is emotion. Instances of the latter logically require 
the former; the interest is the disposition to the emotion; and Kierkegaard employs 'passion' 
in both usages. "' Thus emotions, and in turn the interests they represent, are prior 
to 
deliberation over action per se. This is how and why the subjective 
is so weighty. 
... Anthony Rudd, Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1993), 66-67. 
... Robert C. Roberts, "Thinking Subjectively, " International Journalfor Philosophy of 
Religion II no. 2 (1980): 9 1. 
Cf Gouwens, 75-92 for an equally instructive investigation of emotion 
in Kierkegaard's anthropology. 
5'5 Robert C. Roberts, "Passion and Reflection, " in Two Ages: International 
Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 14. ed. 
Robert L. Perkins, (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1984), 88-89. 
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But at some times and in some places, emotions are not held to be important in this way. 
Kierkegaard indicts 1840's Copenhagen as such a place. (Roberts believes this charge can 
be put not only to Copenhagen but to humanity in general. "') At such times and in such 
places, deliberation ('reflection') proceeds in a manner that brings about individual, and 
societal, passionlessness. In an ever deadening loop, this creates more reflection, less 
passion, and less meaningful action. With passion, deliberation is a necessary step toward 
action; but without passion, deliberative reflection serves only to excuse action. 587 
Kierkegaard's lifelong goal, as a 'poet in the service of Christianity', was to combat the 
diseases of over-reflection, passionlessness and abused objectivity, toward truly Christian 
4passion': 
[S]pirituality of the sort that Kierkegaard discusses and seeks to engender 
through his writing is essentially thought-determined, essentially conceptual, 
essentially reflective. And this reflection is essentially related to passion in 
both of the senses we have determined: Passion as interest is thought- 
deten-nined in that one must have some conception of what one is interested 
in, if one is to have a passion; and passion as emotion is thought-determined 
in that any emotional assessment that the subject makes of his situation must 
be in some terms or other. "' 
It is fairly clear, then, that Kierkegaard would ardently endorse that sense of 'the logic of 
love' where logic is inescapably imbued with love. A debate is to be had, perhaps, about 
this 'inescapable', since it might be argued that the deadened, objective positions he 
opposed have enacted exactly such an 'escape'. But this need not concern us, because the 
major point stands: for Kierkegaard, all 'logic' should be imbued with love. Useless 
deliberative logic is not, and useful deliberative logic is. 
We shall return, after looking at Either-Or, to the culmination of proper passion that 
Kierkegaard envisages in Christianity. For the moment, this interest in subjectivity and 
passion makes clearer Kierkegaard's strange literary methods. In the nature of this case, 
didacticism will not do: it will not engender passion, only more reflection. 
Kierkegaard's 
'indirect communication' was to elicit responses from readers; ", and 
for Roberts, three main 
writing strategies subject readers to a kind ofprocess by which they might 
be changed. 110 
586 Ibid., 102,106. 
511 Ibid., 92-98. 
511 Ibid., 91. Original text concludes ... of other"; 
however Prof Roberts confirms the correction as quoted 
(email 
I 9th February 2000). 
5'9 Gouwens, 1-2. 
5'0 Roberts, "Passion, " 103-06. 
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By intellectual seduction, readers eventually unpack a satirical 'dialectical knot'. its 
earnest message is thereby impressed upon them more effectively than if they were 
simply told the earnest message. (However, this strategy can work only upon 
intellectuals. ) 
There is impassioned psychological analysis, where the passions of the writer actually 
'infect' the reader, and the reader is forced to uncover and confront his own passion (or 
lack of it). 
9 There is poetically varied reflection, where a small handful of truths are repeated in a 
multiplicity of ways, forcing themselves into the reader's consciousness by sheer 
repetition-and due to the inordinate amount of time that readers are forced to spend 
reading them. 
All the characters of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous "marionette theatre""' are used to 
interdict or exculpate various psychological states along much broader lines than mere 
psychological description, and variously to argue for the new, subjective view. 
Most men are subjective toward themselves and objective toward all others, 
frighteningly objective sometimes-but the task is precisely to be objective 
towards oneself and subjective toward all others. "' 
People must seriously and properly wrestle with 'infinite' and 'absolute' concerns, whilst 
remaining conscious of their concrete finitude. Such 'wrestling' ranges from attentiveness 
to the gravity of each choice (with the attendant truth that 'non-choice' and 'choice 
deferred' are actually versions of choosing); through to the enormity of the 'absolute' claim 
that comes upon one from the 'infinite' Christian God. The pseudonyms adumbrate aspects 
of this, although Kierkegaard exhibits a fondness for idealism and dialectic, probably in 
response to and in unconscious reflection of the Hegelian milieu. Kierkegaard uses the 
pseudonyms to explore the various strategies that subjective selves employ as they seek to 
locate themselves between the ambiguities of their emotion and whatever they might 
objectively know. 
Thus follow the famous 'stages' of life, where each stage represents just such a strategy. 
The 'aesthete' essentially celebrates the abandonment of himselt" to subjective unruliness. 
Subjugating this, the bourgeois 'ethical' person smugly adopts local convention. 
The term is from Thomas H. Croxall, Kierkegaard Commentary (London: James Nisbet & 
Co. Ltd., 1956), 254. 
Kierkegaard, cited in Gouwens, 3 1, n. II (from Journals and Papers). 
593 Aesthetes are consistently pictured as males, and here as elsewhere in Kierkegaard's 
thought, it seems unwise to 
substitute gender-inclusive pronouns. 
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'Religiousness A' follows, who is essentially 6ethical' but with religious sentiments-or 
who is the 'olympic athlete' of the ethical, having attained the highest form of ethical 
commitment humanly possible (such as a 'purity of heart' that is 'the will to do one thing'). 
Finally, 'religiousness B' is so profoundly converted to 'absolute' and 'infinite' concerns 
that 'finite' matters exert little leverage. 
The 'passionate' nature of this literature means more than ever that nothing can substitute 
for direct engagement with it (and that the reflections that follow shall necessarily be 
somewhat subjective! ) 
3. Either-Or 
I will examine Either-Or in this section, showing how it develops a 'stand-off between an 
aesthete (also known as 'A) and a judge (also known as 'B', 'Judge William' or 'the 
Judge'). The aesthete proclaims frivolous abandon against boredom, but his credo merely 
seems horrible when the amoral aimlessness of an aesthetic 'seducer', Johannes, comes to 
light. Judge William prises open such unliveable aspects of the aesthetic position, 
commending a life of responsible choice-making as the more meaningful. But the Judge 
seems too boring for the aesthete, hence there is a stand-off. Either-Or goes on to suggest 
that Christianity can retain the best of both the aesthete and the Judge, and this conclusion 
heralds Kierkegaard's wider project. 
The two-volume epic Either-Or, the first of Kierkegaard's works for a general public, is 
presented as a debate between a judge and an aesthete in a highly crafted, Russian doll-like 
series of texts 'by' various pseudonyms. The stolid essays of Judge William and the various 
genre-defying papers of the aesthete are edited by one Victor Eremita. In turn, A's paper's 
include writings from 'Johannes' and 'Cordelia' in The Seducer's Diary. Victor's title 
reflects a polarity: 
A's papers contain a multiplicity of approaches to an aesthetic view of life. A 
coherent aesthetic view of life can hardly be presented. B's papers contain an 
ethical view of life. ... The title 
I have chosen expresses precisely this. "' 
A cryptic quotation on the frontispiece might, by analogy with the quotation at the start of 
the Judge's papers, represent the clarion call of the aesthete: "'Is reason then alone 
baptised, 
are the passions pagans? "'191 But as we shall see, this may gesture toward the synthesis of 
A's thesis with B's antithesis. 
... Soren Kierkegaard, Either-Or (Part I) (1843), tr. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, 
Kierkegaard's Writings, 
vol. III (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 13. 
595 Ibid., 1. 
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a) A isfor Aesthete 
Kierkegaard uses 'A' and Johannes to approach important ethical concepts, such as the 
wider moral order, the folly of radical moral subjectivity, the loneliness of personal sin, the 
problem of lost telos, and the cruelty of disordered affection. These themes are evident in 
respective discussions of 'tragedy', despair, boredom, and seduction. 
A's opening Diapsalmata are a series of aesthetic 'proverbs'. The aesthete's emotional 
reactions and emotion-coloured thoughts become the central object of his attention, his 
primary source of entertainment, and the only 4category' by which to grasp his world. 596 But 
this inner world is played out against a backdrop of futility. There is no 4meaning' to be had 
even in his grander passions, and the absence of any ordering principle causes him to seem 
inconsequential and languid. 597 These jottings from life prefigure themes of tragedy, despair 
boredom, and seduction"' in the essays that follow. 
A's foray into dramatic tragedy describes the wider ordering necessary to make tragedy 
emotionally 'enjoyable'. If tragedy is to remain "infinitely gentle" and "a motherly love that 
lulls the troubled one", 119 the tragic hero must in some sense be caught by fate (our 'moral 
luck'). When dramatic tragedy makes its hero "Pelagian", he only has himself to blame, and 
his pure 'ethical' guilt is not interesting; but the tragic hero is ambiguously guiltless (thus 
aesthetically interesting). "It is, therefore, surely a misunderstanding of the tragic when our 
age endeavours to have everything fateful transubstantiate itself into individuality and 
" 600 subjectivity .A similar point is made when A opposes a 
'self-creation' reminiscent of the 
Nietzschean project: 
One would think that the generation in which I have the honor of living must 
be a kingdom of gods. But this is by no means so; the vigor, the courage, that 
wants to be the creator of its own good fortune in this way, indeed, its own 
creator, is an illusion, and when the age loses the tragic, it gains despair. In 
the tragic there is implicit a sadness and a healing that one indeed must not 
disdain, and when someone wishes to gain himself in the superhuman way 
our age tries to do it, he loses himself and becomes comic. Every individual, 
however original he is, is still a child of God, of his age, of his nation, of his 
family, of his friends, and only in them does he have his truth. If he wants to 
be the absolute in all this, his relativity, then he becomes ludicrous. "' 
... Ibid. 20 (T5); 21 (TT4,6); 23 (T2). (These paragraph numbers are counted from the first 
full paragraph at the top of 
each page in the Hong edition. ) 
... Ibid. 20 (TI); 22 (ý3); 23 (T4 11.1-4); 24 (TýI, 4); 26 (T5); 28 (T4); 36 (TT2-3). 
... Ibid. 24 (ý3); 25 (T3); 42 (T3); and perhaps 29 (T4). 
"' Ibid., 145. 
610 Ibid., 144. 
601 Ibid., 145. 
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"But if he surrenders this claim, is willing to be relative, then he eo ipso has the tragic. 602 
Of course A only asserts an objective order to secure the pleasantness of tragedy. His 
defence of the tragic is insubstantial; we later begin to suspect that he will deploy any 
argument to defend whatever mood takes him. But it remains intriguing that even 
Kierkegaard's A is no Nietzschean. Even A, for the sake of his emotional well-being, can 
stumble into declamations of a wider order and against self-creation. 
Three essays are addressed to the Y-up-ffapavEiKpCopf: voj ffellowship of the Dead'), a 
society that eulogises self-destructive, self-indulgent hopelessness. In Sickness Unto Death, 
despair will be declaimed as 'sin'. This is the hermeneutical 'key' to these strange essays. 
The 'solidarity' of original sin is abused if taken to represent a 'fellowship' in the manner of 
the Y-upiTapavEi(pCopF-vot, and the Y-upTrapccvEi(pC3pEvot instantiates precisely the error 
with which the later book is concerned. 603 
[Slin, however common to all, does not gather men together into a ... 
partnership ("no more than out in the graveyard [Kierkegaarden] the 
multitude of the dead form a society"), but splits people up into individuals 
604 
and fastens hold of every individual as a sinner ... 
Aesthetes can celebrate despair, but not boredom; and Rotation of Crops is a witty, almost 
credal statement against boredom. Just as Aristophane's two characters Chremylos and 
Karion had 'too much of everything'-love, rolls, the arts, sweets, honour, cakes, bravery, 
dried figs, fame, scrambled eggs, authority, and vegetables-so also boredom "advances" 
and "is the root of all evi 111.601 The history of civilisation consists in humanity's march 
against boredom. Therefore "a theory of social prudence" dictates that for a society to 
prosper, boredom must be banished. Society must cycle through as many diversions as 
possible (like a farmer's rotation of crops). 
The general populace engages in 'rotation' simply by switching one boredom for the next, 
even including space travel. "' But their ýrotation' forgets that boredom inheres within each 
4crop' even before it is chosen. The aesthete's 4rotation' is more refined. He adopts a stand- 
offish suspicion and 'recollection' of each activity as it proceeds, both engaging 
in it and 
being amused by it. The method "assure[s] complete suspension" and "prevents a person 
... Ibid. 
603 Intertextuality like this forms the best evidence, if it be needed, that Either-Or 
is a prolegomena for the rest of 
Kierkegaard's work. 
... Kierkegaard, Sickness, 153, citing himself. 
6" Kierkegaard, Either-Or 1,286 & passim. 
606 Ibid., 29 1. 
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foundering in any particular relationship in life". 101 Of course this method requires him to 
forswear friendships, marriage, and official posts; and the Judge's challenge will be on 
exactly this basis-the aesthete has neither consistency nor history. He has no telos, and 
without a telos, the generic order of the moral field becomes unintelligible, causing ethical 
dysfunction, despair, and boredom. 
608 
Even so, the humour of Aristophane's list derives precisely from the scrambling of generic 
order; and it has to be said that A's case is remarkably persuasive! All serious arguments 
against it are certain to fail, by being boring; and the brazen self-centredness on view is 
deflected by the wonderful hilarity of the project. In a sense all eyes are now on the 
aesthete, for his 'rotation method' stands or falls only by reference to the course of his life. 
Given his method, 'the course of his life' is precisely unavailable, either to him or us. 
But A is upset when the course of another such life does 'become' available, in the 'diary' 
of Johannes, the seducer. A's previous manic appreciation of 'first love' is fundamental to 
his views against marriage. But Johannes' vampirism, seen in his addiction to 'first love', 
leaves A professing to be appalled. The diary is both A's mirror and diviner, and A is 
suddenly unsure of himself. 
"The moment is everything, 
"609 
ponders Johannes. In his grand strategy against Cordelia, an 
engagement is necessary; but 
The bariefulness of an engagement is always the ethical in it. The ethical is 
just as boring in scholarship as in life. What a difference! Under the aesthetic 
sky, everything is buoyant, beautiful, transient; when ethics arrives on the 
scene, everything becomes harsh, angular, infinitely langweiligt [boring]. "' 
"The ethical is rigorous and hard",, " A has already declared; and like A, Johannes feeds 
upon emotions ("this state, this obscure and indefinite but nevertheless powerful emotion, 
also has its sweetness""'), and feeds off them in Cordelia ("I would love to know the state 
of her feelings . "611) The sharp prose of the 
Seducer's Diary could be quoted at length; but in 
sum, it is a rank doppelgiinger of A's sparkling flamboyancy. 
'0' Ibid., 295. 
... Cf O'Donovan, Resurrection, ch. 2. 
Kierkegaard, Either-Or 1,433. 
Ibid., 367. 
611 Ibid., 145. 
612 Ibid., 325. 
613 Ibid., 344. 
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My eyes can never grow weary of quickly passing over ... these radiating emanations of womanly beauty. ... Each one has her own: the cheerful smile, 
the roguish glance, the yearning eye, the tilted head, the frolicsome 
disposition, the quiet sadness, the profound presentiment, the ominous depression, the earthly homesickness, the unshriven emotions, the beckoning 
brow, the questioning lips, the secretive forehead, the alluring curls, the 
concealing eyelashes, the heavenly pride, the earthly modesty, the angelic 
purity, the secret blush, the light step, the lovely buoyancy, the languorous 
posture, the longing dreaminess, the unaccountable sighing, the slender 
figure, the soft curves, the opulent bosom, the curving hips, the tiny feet, the 
elegant hands. "' 
If we were discomforted by Chremylos and Karion's construal of honour alongside dried 
figs, then Johannes' ranking of "opulent bosom" and "alluring curls" alongside "quiet 
sadness" and "ominous depression" invites us to call him evil and a monster. ("I can always 
make use of a mood, and [Cordelia's] beautiful longing has really stirred me. "615 ) The clever 
credo of 'A' in Rotation of Crops, when seen lived out in Johannes, is merely horrible. Even 
A sees how Cordelia's present and Johannes' future represent ahistorical personal histories. 
In such ahistoric histories, 'moods' are the stuff of a lifelong series of aesthetic 'moments' 
and the 'ethical' must of necessity be rejected. Only Cordelia's "witch's dance" of self- 
reproach, 616 and Johannes' "sterile restlessness", "' can remain. 
b) B isfor Bore 
A has stated his case, but in living it, Johannes shows how emotions and aesthetics require 
governance by prior ethical commitments and a life-direction. The Judge has been handed 
the highest of moral ground from which to reply. 
The titles of his two long treatises, Aesthetic Validity of Marriage and Balance between the 
Aesthetic and the Ethical, straightforwardly speak for themselves. William seeks to 
convince A that ethics offers the best of the aesthetic, and more. There are certainly 
different emphases in the two treatises, but a summary of William's overall strategies will 
suffice. His withering attacks upon A are regular and extreme, though affectionate. 
No 
disadvantage in A's position is omitted, and if Johannes' deficiencies were unclear 
in any 
way, William will relentlessly meet the lack. "' 
Ibid., 428-29. 
Ibid., 384. 
... Ibid., 307. 
117 Ibid., 309. 
"' The attacks repeatedly list the deficiencies, but to quote them all 
here is too much. For examples, see Soren 
Kierkegaard, Either-Or (Part 11) (1843), tr. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. 
Hong, Kierkegaard's Writings, vol. IV 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987) 17; 49; 140; 147; 160-61; 
165-66; 197-98; 203-07 (presaging 
Sickness Unto Death? ); & 326. 
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In his strongest attack, William recounts the story of Myson the misanthrope, who laughed 
when alone because he was alone. 619 William ironically acknowledges A as Myson's 
successor. He then moves to other matters-friendship, A's favourite playwright, ethical 
theory. Then suddenly, an ambush: 
I do have just one question to ask you ... For once answer me very honestly 
and without beating around the bush: Do you really laugh when you are 
alone? ... If you do not, then I have won. 110 
As the Diapsalmata have already told us, this aesthete does not laugh when alone. 
Throughout, the Judge is severe toward A's melancholia, which he believes to be a 
phenomenon of aesthetic self-indulgence. "' 
But if the Judge's critique is strong, his solutions amount to less. His key themes are that 
duty is valuable, and need not be seen in a sour Kantian light ; 
622 that one's choices are a key 
definer of the self and bring with them the offer of a personal history; 621 and that one's 
vocational calling, marriage relationship and accomplishments all bring personal meaning. 
On this view, "the aesthetic in a person is that by which he spontaneously and immediately 
95624 is what he is; the ethical is that by which he becomes what he becomes. And little is lost, 
for the ethical brings a host of aesthetic goods, such as delight, beauty, and friendsh ip. 625 
Here is a finale of sorts for the Judge's arguments: 
What I wanted to do was to show how the ethical ... is so 
far from depriving 
life of its beauty that it expressly gives it beauty. It gives life peace, safety, 
and security, because it continually calls out to us: Quodpetis, hic est [What 
you are seeking is here]. It rescues from any fanaticism that would exhaust 
the soul and gives it health and strength. It teaches us not to overrate the 
accidental or to idolize good fortune. It teaches us to be happy over good 
fortune, and ... 
it teaches us to be happy in misfortune. "' 
However, this does sound a little 'thin'. A discussion of beauty, for example, seeks to 
counter the charge that "the ethical view deprives us of any beauty"; "' but William only 
argues a psychological fait accompli, as if simply to say 'I find beauty, therefore you can 
too'. While true for the Judge, we remain unclear how it might apply for others, other than 
"' Ibid., 320-31. 
620 Ibid., 326. 
621 Ibid., 25,185,189-90. 
622 Ibid., 59; 149; 153; 254-55. 
... Ibid., 167-68,213-16; 230; 240-54 esp. 250-5 1; & 262. These choices can even 
banish moods (230). 
624 Ibid., 178; cf 225 & 253. Cf also the argument that marriage 
'historicises' first love (139). 
625 Ibid., 297; 277f & 323; & 321-22 (respectively). 
626 Ibid., 323. 
627 Ibid., 277. 
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through their radical free choice. And it becomes pungently clear how far William is from 
denying the charge of boredom: 
[P]ull yourself together, stifle every rebellious thought that would have the 
audacity to commit high treason against your better nature, disdain all the 
paltriness that would envy your intellectual gifts and desire them for itself to 
put them to even worse use; disdain the hypocritical virtue that is unwilling 
to carry the burden of life and yet wants to be eulogized for carrying it; but 
do not therefore disdain life, respect every decent effort, every modest 
activity that humbly conceals itself, and above all have a little more respect 
for woman. "' 
When we consider the charge of boredom alongside the nearly four-hundred pages of page- 
length paragraphs of similar tone and style, it is hard to see how A might be convinced. 
Indeed, it is hard to imagine what could have induced him to read the Judge's great effort. 
c) Both-And 
Victor Eremita is certainly correct to signal that neither A nor William win the 
engagement; "' but the problem is more of mutual destruction than stalemate. For whatever 
else is said, William is boring and A does not laugh when he is alone. Whatever else comes 
out of Either-Or, this result is an intractable truth against each position. Rudd's account of 
the 'stalemate' is instructive: 
For the aesthete, in his individualism and his scepticism about the possibility 
of finding real fulfilment in the rather complacent conventionalism of Judge 
William, has some conception of real and important values that are beyond 
the Judge's ken. For Kierkegaard, individuality and self-formative 
commitment to projects can only be held together at the religious level. The 
aesthete neglects the latter, and his soul is dissipated in multiplicity. The 
ethical neglects the former, and he vanishes into the mass of the 
conventionally respectable. Only the religious man can combine the two in 
his life. "' 
The frontispiece of Either-Or includes the cryptic "Is reason then alone baptized, are the 
passions pagan? " While this is most naturally taken as a 'mission statement' for A 631 Oust as 
there is a corresponding motto at the start of the second volume for B), Michael 
Banner 
wonders if it points forward to suggest that both the case of the aesthete and the 
judge are 
found to be wanting, and that the concerns of both can only be resolved 
by the 'religious 3.632 
This may at first seem tenuous; after all, it is most naturally A's 'mission statement'. 
But 
... Ibid., 207. 
62' Kierkegaard, Either-Or 1,14. 
63'Rudd, 121-22. 
"' So e. g. Croxall, 39. 
632 Michael Banner, "Sexualitdt 11, " in Theologische Realen2yk1opidie, vol. 
XXXI (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000) 
205 11.52-57. 
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given Kierkegaard's devious pseudonymity, it is certainly plausible for this to be the last 
'Russian doll'-Kierkegaard's final joke, as it were, upon both protagonists. 
The claim hardly stands or falls just by divining the 'correct' hermeneutic for the 
frontispiece, since the Judge's gesture toward some further resolution within the 'religiousý 
is fulfilled in the Jylland pastor's Ultimatum. The piece is a dialectical and existential 
version of justification by grace through faith, but oddly half-put, as it were. Of greater 
oddity is William's commendation of the pastor as "having grasped what I have said and 
what I would like to have said", "expressed ... better than I am able to. 11633 In fact we 
suspect the Judge not to have grasped what the pastor has said, not at all: 
[Pastor: ] [D]id not a terrible anxiety seize you when the thought could 
momentarily arise in your soul that you could be in the right ... Therefore this, that in relation to God you are always in the wrong, is not a truth you 
must acknowledge, not a consolation that alleviates your pain, not a 
compensation for something better, but it is a joy in which you win a victory 
over yourself and over the world, your delight, your song of praise, your 
adoration, a demonstration that your love is happy, as only that love can be 
with which one loves God. "' 
If Banner is right to suspect the Judge of self-satisfaction concerning his marriage, 635 so also 
might we suspect of the Judge in his response to the Jylland pastor. If against the aesthete is 
held the need for wider ethical commitments, then against the ethical person is held the 
need for a certain kind of divine 'absolute'. The ethical person forgets that the moral good is 
not a finite entity to be fully grasped and held complete. If the Jylland Pastor's message is 
integrative in this way, Roberts shows how: 
Being a person at all requires that one have emotions and what kind of person 
one is is determined by which emotions are central or integrative for an 
individual. Directly and indirectly in his writings Kierkegaard develops a 
cpsychology' in which it holds that an individual has not become fully a 
person until his concerns have been integrated by peculiarly ethical and 
religious cares. This means that the person's central emotions, the ones he 
could not give up without psychologically losing his identity, are such ones 
as the desire to do right by his neighbor, to please God, to have motives 
which are untainted with counter-moral motives, and so on. "' 
Against this claim, Kierkegaard's dismissal of objectivity becomes all the clearer: 
[O]bJectivity is precisely the tendency to turn away psychologically from 
these concerns, by turning away from the self- implicating use of ethical and 
religious concepts which is necessary if these concerns are to be exercised 
and fostered. To anyone who accepts Kierkegaard's psychology, then, 
objectivity is a disease, and indeed a deadly one. To become objective 
is to 
... Kierkegaard, Either-Or H, 338. 
... Ibid., 351. 
13' Banner, 205 1.39. 
... Roberts, "Thinking, " 90. 
Page 209 
lose one's self; it is to shrivel and die at the very core of one's being as a person. 
637 
(For Rudd, Kierkegaard "is certainly a Hegelian"-not formally but materially, insofar as 
these are stages that are to be lived through rather than contemplated dispassionately. 638 But 
the Jylland Pastor's 'both-and' is also non-Hegelian, obviously enough: it concerns 
individual responsibility; the infinite is no world-spirit; and there is no addendum to faith. 
of course Kierkegaard often 'looks' Hegelian, but we need not be overly concerned with 
debate about this. ) 
Either-Or displays a powerful inclusio formed by the frontispiece and the Jylland pastor, 
and heralds Kierkegaard's subsequent corpus. The subjectivity of the aesthete and the 
Judge's ethical commitments matter. Properly understood, Christianity gives both. 
4. 'Christian emotion' 
How then is this synthesis, this 'baptising' of the ethicist's reason and the aesthete's 
passion, achieved in the 'true Christian"? In this section I will consider a set of 'Christian 
emotions' that Kierkegaard understands to form Christian consciousness. These emotions 
start with 'despair' and traverse 'faith' to incorporate 'love, 'joy' and 'gladness', albeit with 
some space for more negative social engagements. But in anticipation of my next chapter, I 
will suggest that Kierkegaard's conclusions as to what constitutes Christian emotion do not 
match those of the NT writers. He offers a prolegomena, as it were, to a Christian account 
of affective deliberative logic. 
a) The objective basis of Christian emotion 
Kierkegaard's program for a properly passionate subjectivity is all the more spectacularly 
true for Christianity. The absolutes of Christianity make it disturbing to approach at all 
('fear and trembling'), but the right kind of grasp of its central message gives a passion (as 
interest) that relativises all other concerns. Orthodox Christian dogmas are not disputed by 
Kierkegaard; his point is that they must "shape Christian emotion" : 639 
Upon [the] common basis of more universal emotion the qualitative 
difference must be erected and make itself felt, for the more universal 
emotion has reference only to something abstract: to be moved by something 
higher, something eternal, by an idea. And one does not become a Christian 
by being moved by something indefinitely higher, and not every outpouring 
of religious emotion is a Christian outpouring. That is to say: emotion which 
is Christian is checked by the definition of concepts. "' 
637 Ibid. 
13' Rudd, 22. 
63' Kierkegaard, On Authority and Revelation; cited in Gouwens, 5 3. 
"' Kierkegaard, On Authority and Revelation; cited in Roberts, "Passion, " 91. 
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There is, then, a properly objective element to the dogmatic basis of Christianity; not just 
any emotion will do. The subjective point, though, is finally that Christian action be altered: 
[T]he basic confusion in Christianity has been to make it a doctrine. With a doctrine one has to take care first to master it all. Just the opposite with the N. T.; it has solely to do with the ethical, and wants you simply to begin, 
therefore, with some particular 
Christianity, as it is in the New Testament, focuses on man's will; everything 
turns on that, on transforming the will; all the phrases (renounce the world, 
deny one's self, die from the world, etc.; similarly, hate oneself, love God, 
etc. ), everything relates to this fundamental idea in Christianity, what makes 
it what it is: transformation of the will. 642 
The same passage goes on to decry the translation of Christianity into a matter of 
intellectuality-which makes the theologian a favourite target. In the following invective, 
'Strandvej' is the coastal road running north from Copenhagen, the main route to Bakken, 
and passing through Dyrehaven, a large wood with many deer. A big amusement park at 
Bakken would be the destination on a Sunday: 
To me the learned theological world seems like the Strandvej on a Sunday 
afternoon in the season when everybody goes to Bakken in Dyrehaven: they 
tear past each other, yell and scream, laugh and make fun of each other, drive 
their horses to death, overturn, and are run over. Finally, when they reach 
Bakken covered with dust and out of breath-well, they look at each other- 
and go home. "' 
That is, they have no idea of how, finally, to enjoy the park. Enjoyment of the park is 
constituted by a complex of (we might say) 'obedience' and attachment to Jesus. The 
contrast between Christ and Socrates in Philosophical Fragments highlights a particular 
'qualitative disjunction' in Christianity. If a disciple of Christ ceases his attachment to Jesus 
(in the way that a disciple of Socrates must), then for that person, Jesus' core message is 
necessarily annulled. Therefore passions and emotions are not only 'checked' by 'concepts' 
about Jesus: "For these are not just views; they are life views-concept clusters whose logic 
is such that if their user's emotions and passions are not shaped by them, the concepts are 
violated even if they are impeccably clearly thought". 644 
b) Some exam les of Christian emotion P 
I will now elucidate four kinds of Christian emotion, which Kierkegaard thought to result 
from the shaping of emotion and passion by the 'concept clusters' of Christianity. 
I will also 
641 Soren Kierkegaard, Papers and Journals: A Selection tr. Alastair 
Hannay, Penguin Classics edition, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1996), 497 (50 x3A 169). 
Ibid., 618 (54 xi 2A 86). My thanks to Brian Brock for drawing these quotations 
to my attention. 
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suggest that Kierkegaard's version of 'Christian emotion' falls seriously short of the NT's 
account of the matter. 
(i) Despair 
The journey to obedient attachment to Jesus, foreshadowed in Either-Or, is opened up in a 
series of works where the 'communication' is increasingly 'direct'. The multi-layered 
analysis of despair in Sickness Unto Death could do with closer scrutiny than we can afford, 
but it may suffice to note how both aesthete and judge are seen to be in despair. 
[T]he only life wasted is the life of one who so lived it, deceived by life's 
pleasures or its sorrows, that he never became decisively, eternally, conscious 
of himself as spirit, as self [nor] that there is a God there and that 'he', 
himself, his self, exists before this God, which infinite gain is never come by 
except through despair. 645 
We might wonder if this insight is somewhat akin to St Paul's: 
[G]odly grief produces a repentance that leads to salvation and brings no 
regret, but worldly grief produces death. (2 Cor. 7: 10, NRSP) 
R yap KaTa ov 7T)7, u, -Tavoiav ciý orw7-)7piav quETapZA)7Tov cpyciýEmi -R 
, 51 ToO Koopou Au7Tr7 Oavarov KaTcpydýcTal. (2 Cor. 7: 10, NA26) 
For Kierkegaard, as for St Paul, despair (like 'grief, AUTrq) is somehow either just a 
disease, or a propellant towards a cure. One of many forms of diseased despair is the 
'fantastic', where someone is caught frivolously amongst the 'infinite'. 
But to become fantastic ... and therefore to 
be in despair 
... 
does not mean 
that a person may not continue living a fairly good life, to all appearances be 
someone, employed with temporal matters, get married, beget children, be 
honoured and esteemed-and one may fail to notice that in a deeper sense he 
lacks a self Such things cause little stir in the world ... 
The bigger danger, 
that of losing oneself, can pass off in the world as quietly as if it were 
nothing; every other loss, an arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife, etc. is bound to 
be noticed. 646 
Both the judge and the aesthete have lost themselves, for in the language of Sickness Unto 
Death, they do not relate 'themselves' rightly to the proper 44synthesis of the infinite and the 
finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity""' that constitutes true 
humanity. Christian teaching comes against this despair and names it as sin-44not as 
something that can be comprehended, but as a paradox which has to be 
believed. "648 
Language such as this opens Kierkegaard to charges of irrationalism and existentialism, 
but 
that simply misreads the force of the dialectic. Subjectivity is such that a mere argument 
... Kierkegaard, Sickness, 57. 
... Ibid., 62-63. 
647 Ibid., 43. 
64' Ibid., 130. 
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will not convey someone from this 'despair' to the regard of it as sin. To name despair as 
sin represents an insertion from a different ground, which is of course why the naming is, in 
NT terms, so easily experienced as the 'offence' that Christ repeatedly urges his hearers not 
to take . 641 To be oneself is to cross over to this alternative ground, where despair is named as 
sin, properly relating the "synthesis of the infinite and the finite" 5611SO that finally, "the self 
[is] grounded transparently in the power which established it. [This] is the definition of 
faith. ýý651 
But is 'despair' rightly to be regarded as a Christian emotion? Were Kierkegaard to follow 
the logic of St Paul, despair is 'pre-Christian'. As an account of Christian emotion, we await 
more. 
(ii) Faith 
Faith may not itself be an 'emotion'. If Christianity is regarded as a "response" to a 
Christian "news-narrative", 652 then there are enough cognitive elements at work in 'faith' to 
suggest that it is more than an emotion. (The suggestion that faith is more than an emotion is 
made in full awareness that so far, I have conceded a generously cognitive element to 
emotion. ) Nevertheless, it is useful to list faith here among Kierkegaard's Christian 
emotions, since Kierkegaard is very interested in a range of emotional components he 
believes to be integral to faith. The range extends from a certain 'fear and trembling' to the 
serene joy of a so-called 'knight of faith'. This range assists us to see how faith bridges the 
gap between the despair we have seen and the love we will go on to examine. 
"Looked at from any other point of view Christianity is and must be a sort of madness or 
the greatest horror. Only through the consciousness of sin is there entrance to it". 653 If such a 
comment effectively reiterates Kierkegaard's views on despair, then Fear and Trembling 
concerns the faith resultant upon this consciousness. The heavy sarcasm toward Hegelian 
intellectualism (which 'goes further') is contrasted to Paul, who trembles in a confidence 
that is not Hegelian: 
Today nobody will stop at faith; they all go further. it would perhaps be rash 
to inquire where to, but surely a mark of urbanity and good breeding on my 
part to assume that in fact everyone does indeed have faith, otherwise 
it 
would be odd to talk of going further. In those old days it was 
different. For 
then faith was a task for a whole lifetime, not a skill thought to be acquired 
in 
Ibid., 161-65. 
650 Ibid., 43. 
"' Ibid., 165. 
"' Roberts, "Emotions Among the Virtues, " 42. See below, p. 241, for a fuller quotation of 
Roberts. 
Kierkegaard, Practice, 71. 
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days or weeks. When the old campaigner approached the end, had fought the 
good fight, and kept his faith, his heart was still young enough not to have forgotten the fear and trembling that disciplined his youth and which, 
although the grown man mastered it, no man altogether outgrows-unless he 
somehow manages at the earliest possible opportunity to go further. When 
these venerable figures arrived our own age begins, in order to go further. "' 
It is no accident that an attack on Hegelian 'faith' is entitled Fear and Trembling, and it is a 
mistake to forget the title's reference to the most profoundly unpleasant form of emotion. 
Fear and Trembling highlights the inadequacy of the 'ethical' to make Abraham 
intelligible; but in seeing this, we might overlook how 'fear and trembling' is precisely that 
which is generated by the requirement upon Abraham to reject ('teleologically suspend') 
the ethical, and that the ethical presents itself to Abraham as 'temptation' precisely in its 
offer to alleviate Abraham's 'fear and trembling'. 
The title's appropriation of the phrase from Philippians 2: 12 recalls the apostle's most 
paranaetic (therefore 'ethical') epistle, and professedly Christian readers are reminded that 
they stand under its aegis, not under some metaethical 'going beyond', which is actually a 
pathetic falling-short. Its use in reference to Abraham also recalls him as 'the father of all 
who believe' . 651 Thus the title cunningly checkmates any professed 
Christian reading in 
abstraction, claiming against them that authentic religious life is Abrahamic and Pauline. 
That the phrase is taken from Philippians 2: 12 serves also to recall the strangely reassuring 
Philippians 2: 13 ("it is God who is at work in you, enabling you both to will and to work for 
his good pleasure"). Therefore all who 'fear and tremble' may yet complete the "good 
fight" (Kierkegaard's evocation of 2 Tim. 4: 7) by divine assistance. Against this, the 
conventionally ethical is a lame substitute. This was the point of the Jylland pastor's strange 
sermon. 
Gouwens reminds us of Johannes de silentio's intention so to immerse us in this text that we 
imaginatively engage in Abraham's trek, feeling with Abraham his "dialectical dilemma 
and his consequent terror: that God calls him to sacrifice the child of promise. Imagining 
that terror includes even more: placing oneself on such a trek. " This is a kind of reading that 
shapes "the reader's beliefs, emotions, judgments, policies and a ctions. 
ý9656 
To place readers alongside Abraham in this way is similar to the 
"contemporaneousness 
with Christ" that Kierkegaard commends in Practice. Kierkegaard 
introduces us to this 
654 Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (1843), tr. Alastair Hannay, Penguin 
Classics edition, (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1985), 42-3. 
Ibid., 5 1; cf Rom. 4: 11 & Gal. 3: 6-9,14. 
Gouwens, 23. 
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ý contemporaneousness' in an unnerving way, by surveying all the 'human' ways that Christ 
could have been, or was, dismissed by his contemporaries. But Christ's "come hither" both 
confronts all of these human objections, and acts to erase the two millennia intervening 
since the call was first issued. 657 Christ thus invites people to join alongside him in a 
suffering that could easily be avoided. This suffering is 
an even greater torment and misery and pain than the greatest human torment, 
and hence also a crime in the eyes of one's neighbours. And so it will always 
prove when becoming a Christian in truth comes to mean to become 
contemporary with Christ. ... For in relation to the Absolute there is only one 
tense: the present. 658 
Again, there follows here the language of fear and trembling, and of the possibility of 
offence at the claims of the lowly Jesus. But once this is navigated (in "[c]andour before 
God"659), there is a surprising result: 
And what does all this mean? It means that everyone for himself, in quiet 
inwardness before God, shall humble himself before what it means in the 
strictest sense to be a Christian, admit candidly before God how it stands with 
him, so that he might yet accept the grace which is offered to everyone who 
is imperfect, that is, to everyone. And then no further; then for the rest let him 
attend to his work, be glad in it, love his wife, be glad in her, bring up his 
children with joyfulness, love his fellow men, rejoice in life. "' 
Faith, then, is at once about 'fear and trembling', yet is also about 'gladness', 'joy' and 
'love'. Despite tilts at Luther elsewhere, Kierkegaard is aware of his Lutheran debt here. 
Externally, a person such as is described in the last sentence of the quotation seems no 
different to the judge. But the judge has actually 'lost himself, and was no "knight of 
faith", in the term Kierkegaard uses for a figure described in a long passage within Fear and 
Trembling. 661 (The passage bears close reading since it is too long to quote here. ) This 
"knight" is someone who has so come to terms with the infinite, that he is truly at home in 
the finite. His enjoyment of the everyday aspects of the finite is very relaxed and attractive. 
Rudd grasps the point that Kierkegaard is making through the "knight". 
("Infinite 
resignation" here is Kierkegaard's term for something less relaxed and attractive, and 
less 
laudable than faith. ) 
According to the attitude of infinite resignation, the relationship to God 
is 
something quite distinct from all other goods, and must be pursued 
if not by 
rejecting them, at least by radically relativizing them. But 
in the attitude of 
These two millennia were an advantage in Hegelian belief, rather than seeming 
deleterious to belief. 
"' Kierkegaard, Practice, 67. 
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faith, after having made the infinite resignation, I receive back all that I 
offered up. Instead of abandoning the finite to struggle painfully towards the infinite, I live with contentment and joy in the finite-precisely by virtue of my relationship to the infinite. This seems to suggest an outlook in which the 
relationship to God is not one good among others-even if the highest, for 
which the others have to be renounced. It becomes incommensurable with 
other goods. "' 
For this kind of person, ethics are properly relativised and given a narrative temporality by 
Christian doctrines of forgiveness and divine grace, with individuality existing prior to all 
social roles and grounded in a proper relation to God. 663 On this view, "[w]hen by reason of 
silence and obedience the morrow is non-existent, today is, it is-and then there is joy". 161 
Thus the "knight of faith" differs from the "knight of infinite resignation", who tries to 
accept the supremacy of God, but is without joy. 
The "knight of faith", then, knows the enjoyment of God, of one another in God, and the 
appropriate use of things. The Augustinian nature of Kierkegaard's project should be 
readily apparent. 
(iii) Love 
Hence it seems that for Kierkegaard, a despairing consciousness of sin gives way to a 
faithful trembling before God, and then a gladness and joy towards others. In this way, a 
kind of emotional 'leap' has taken place. But it is not a 'leap of faith' in the irrationalist 
sense usually predicated of Kierkegaard. Rather, Kierkegaard understands Christian faith to 
involve changes in a person's loves. 
That is, if a 'leap' in Kierkegaard is by now evident, then equally clearly, it is not a leap 
into irrationality, or into self-definition through the radical act of choice. Rather, it is an 
Augustinian 'leap'-a leap of the affections, away from the moral primacy of the self 
toward the infinite 'otherness' of God. We do not properly live, claims Kierkegaard, until 
we undergo this leap. 
This was the clear trajectory of EitherlOr. The terrible aesthete was entertained 
by the 
caprice of his quirky moods, irrespective of others; and the judge's solution was 
boorish in 
its self-justifying conventionality, in its smugness toward others (particularly 
his wife), and 
in its poor account of emotion. Only the Jylland pastor pointed a way 
forward, calling upon 
his hearers for a kind of view that overturns the judge's confidence, and gives 
the aesthete's 
yearnings a home. His strange proclamation, that "in relation to 
God you are always in the 
Rudd, 15 1. 
Ibid., 173. 
Ibid., citing Kierkegaard, Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the 
A ir. 
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wrong, " was not offered as "a truth you must acknowledge, " nor as "a consolation that 
alleviates your pain, " nor as "a compensation for something better", each of which would 
simply be for the subject to continue his or her self-referencing, self-fulfilling course. 
Rather, 
it is a joy in which you win a victory over yourself and over the world, your delight, your song of praise, your adoration, a demonstration that your love is 
happy, as only that love can be with which one loves God. 665 
This astonishing sentence can make no sense unless an affectational 'leap' is on view-that 
is, a wholesale transference of the affections to an object other than the self. Only such a 
'leap' can account both for "your love is happy" and the "victory over yourself'. The leap 
radically downgrades the moral primacy of the self in relation to God, "as only that love can 
with which one loves God", in a movement that "is a joy ... your delight, your song of 
praise, your adoration". 
That the Jy1land pastor is not mad, and that Kierkegaard is not toying with us again, is clear 
when this trajectory straightforwardly continues into Works of Love-an extended, overtly 
Christian meditation on the divine command to love, some four years and nine works later. 
There, God is what Kierkegaard calls the "middle term" of our relationship with others: 
For ultimately love to God is the decisive thing; from it stems love to the 
neighbour, but paganism never suspected this. They left God out; they made 
earthly love and friendship into love, and abominated selfishness. But the 
Christian commandment of love commands men to love God above all else, 
and next to love the neighbour. In earthly love and friendship partiality is the 
middle term. In love to the neighbour, God is the middle term; if you love 
God above all else, then you also love your neighbour and in your neighbour 
every man. Only by loving God above all else can one love his neighbour in 
the other man. "' 
Properly to 'see' others is somehow to see them 'through' God-we see and estimate them 
with God's estimate. This cannot be done until God is for us this 'middle term'. Anything 
less is mercilessly targeted by Kierkegaard as so much bourgeois ethical trash. Liberal 
Christianity's penchant for earthly love, friendship, and benevolence-but without 
fearful 
trembling before the absolute God-is as thin for Kierkegaard as moral philosophy's 
emaciated categorisation of love as 'altruism'. 
This transference of affection results, as Ronald Marshall puts it, in an exposition of 
'self- 
hatred' in Works of Love that "excluded all self-destructive impulses while 
including all 
self-effacing ones", a therapy-of-self that results not in inertia, 
but in the focal love of God 
665 Kierkegaard, Either- Or 11,3 5 1. 
... Soren Kierkegaard, Works of Love (1847), tr. David F. Swenson and 
Lillian M. Swenson, with a foreword by 
Douglas V. Steere, (Princeton: University Press, 1946), 48. 
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and neighbour . 66' Thus Works of Love is 'news from the graveyard5 because in that place, in 
our regard for dead loved ones, supremely unselfish love is Put to the test. To love in that 
way there, requires the right kind of 'self-hatred' in order to succeed. 
Everywhere where Christianity exists there is also self-abnegation, which is Christianity's essential form. In order to live as a Christian, one must first 
and foremost become sober; but self-abnegation is exactly the transition 
through which a man, in the meaning of the eternal, becomes sober. "' 
The language might seem dangerous, and despite qualifications ("there is a legitimate self- 
love but it is not about liking oneself. Just so there is also a bad self-hatred but it is not 
about disliking onese lf`ý669), might risk drawing attention away from God as the new and 
final terminus for love and affection. But the main point here is to notice the extraordinary 
nature of this leap, and how intrinsically it concerns the affections. In this connection, a 
word on Kierkegaard's treatment of social relationships now seems appropriate. 
c) Love, truth and social relationships 
The alliance of Kierkegaard with Augustine is by now clear, as are the debts of both to 
I John 4: 7-11 (which concerns loving God and each other in response to God's love for us). 
A human being cannot know herself as a 'self, until she grasps that 'selves' actually have 
'otherness' at the base of their 
'SoUl'. 670 Kierkegaard's language differs from Augustine's- 
compare "you made us for yourself and our hearts find no peace until they rest in yOU"'67 
I to 
"[t]he self is a relation which relates to itself ... a synthesis of the infinite and the 
finite, of 
the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity. 
"672 But the result is the same. For 
Kierkegaard, modem contentions for self-identity, -realisation, -esteem, -actualisation, are 
despair, as is mere 'altruism'. These fail by not locating the primary focus of attention 
toward the otherness of God, and then by extension, to the otherness of the world and its 
people. Consider the similarity between Mathewes' assessment of Augustine, and what we 
have seen in Kierkegaard: 
This is the ultimate theological Point of Augustine's analysis of selfhood- 
that the self finds itself, in fact it is a self, only insofar as it is engaged 
by 
another, a divine other. This is at least as much a matter of affective and 
conative realities as cognitive; for the whole of De trinitate is meant to teach, 
in Lewis Ayres' felicitous phrase, "the education of desire, " to educate the 
... Ronald F. Marshall, "News From The Graveyard: Kierkegaard's Analysis of Christian Self-Hatred, 
" Pro Ecclesia 
9 no. 1 (2000): 2 1. The title is also intended, of course, as a pun on the original meaning of 
Kierkegaard's surname. 
... Kierkegaard, Love, 46. 
669 Marshall, 21-22. 
670 See above, 112. 
67 1 Augustine, Conf., 21 (1.1). 
672 Kierkegaard, Sickness, 43. 
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agent's desires toward right love of God, and to teach the agent that their desires, however crooked, have always already had God as their final end all along. 
... Augustine offers a picture of selfhood inextricably intertwined with otherness and community. Augustine's anthropology affirms that we are most 
ourselves when we are most fully related to others, indeed, that otherness and 611 self-hood intermingle at every level of the self s reality. 
But various concerns might intervene. To locate 'moral primacy' in 'the other' might entail 
the obliteration of valid personal interests. 'Personal identity' or 'self-esteem' might suffer. 
Anyone with these concerns will react negatively on hearing Kierkegaard's 'graveyard 
news' about proper Christian 'self-hatred' bringing a kind of release. 
674 
Such concerns might seem to be confirmed when we find the attractive 'knight of faith' to 
differ sharply from the prophetic 'witness to the truth' in Kierkegaard's final literature. 
There seems to be the frank exchange of joy for suffering, and of delight for asceticism. 
Whereas the 'knight of faith enjoyed his social relationships, Kierkegaard's later social 
concerns are expressed in hostility and polemic. 'Religiousness B', then, is expressed both 
as "demand[ing] a thoroughly social ethics", but also "in a radically individualistic and 
ascetic fashion, as a negation of all 'worldly' commitments" . 611 However Rudd interprets the 
tension not as contradiction, but as dialectic: 
The dialectic of the stages thus concludes with a synthesis of the two 
factors-social commitment and individuality-which hitherto had been 
played off against one another; and with each being raised to its highest 
intensity by the Christian demands for agape and for personal responsibility 
before God. "' 
Kierkegaard believed himself to be called to polemical 'witness' after Bishop Martensen's 
eulogy of the 'accomodationist' Bishop Mynster. Kierkegaard's attack on Mynster, and his 
calls for people to leave the Danish church, provokes debate over the degree to which 
Kierkegaard's views changed during this time. 677 (Matters are complicated by Kierkegaard's 
encroaching illness). Kierkegaard would seem vindicated by Martensen's interesting failure 
to engage with any of Kierkegaard's charges, preoccupied as the Bishop was with 
Kierkegaard's threat to Church membership and Church public-relations. ("We may regard 
... Charles T. Mathewes, "Pluralism, Otherness, and the Augustinian Tradition, " Modern Theology 
14 no. 1 (1998): 
99-100. See further Mathewes, "Anthropology, " 196-202 & 213-216. 
674 See above, 218, n. 667. 
675 Rudd, 25-26. 
676 Ibid. 
677 Gouwens, 209-20, esp. 210; contra Rudd, 164-69. Gouwens 
defends fundamental continuity and integrity in 
Kierkegaard's final phase, against Rudd's picture of a decline. 
Nonetheless, Gouwens acknowledges and recounts 
with Rudd this shift from 'knight' to 'witness'. 
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it as felicitous that he died when he did, or the whole thing might have ended up by being 
extremely annoying. 
"678 ) 
it seems that Kierkegaard's own 'religiousness B' required an inevitable social collision. 
The passion at work here-both as 'interest' in God and as resultant 'emotion 3 -accounts 
for both the joy of the 'knight' and the suffering polemic of the 'witness'. 
d) Shortcomings in 'Christian emotion'? 
An account of 'Christian emotion' hardly seems to be exhausted by the categories of 
Kierkegaard's account. He seems mainly to consider the negative experiences that propel 
and follow the 'leap' of love (e. g. 'despair', 'fear and trembling', 'suffering'). Alongside 
these, his references to more positive experiences (e. g. 'love', 'joy', 'gladness') seem too 
general, and function almost only at an emblematic level, since we do not find there any 
deeper structures of affective deliberative logic to assist us in an ongoing, everyday manner. 
Gouwens, who is not particularly interested in 'passion', argues from the emergent 
'historicity' aspect in Kierkegaard that "the development of personal emotional and ethico- 
religious capacities ... will link Kierkegaard much more strongly with the virtue tradition in 
moral philosophy and theology than the stereotype of 'the existentialist Kierkegaard' will 
alloW. "619 The Sartrean existentialist 'leap' emphatically opposes any notions of virtue. But 
if Kierkegaard seeks for an Augustinian 'leap' of the affections, then he is a friend of virtue. 
Therefore perhaps Kierkegaard should best be seen as offering a prolegomena, as it were, to 
a Christian account of affective deliberative logic as embodied in a theological theory of 
virtue. I will consider virtue in the next chapter-not with special reference to Kierkegaard, 
since he is hardly a leading exponent. I will rather suggest that the NT steers its discussion 
of 'Christian emotion' in a more positive direction, as a set of lively virtues. Treatments of 
virtue in the NT give a more satisfying and 'fine-grained' account as to what properly 
constitutes Christian emotion. 
5. Nietzsche? 
Despite any shortcomings in Kierkegaard's account, he assists us to form a moral theology 
of emotion that amply outflanks major Nietzschean objections. In this section, 
I will outline 
how Christian theology's ability to outflank Nietzsche stems from a 
deep agreement 
between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, where both defend subjectivity, passion, and 
'self- 
overcoming', and where both agree that Christian 'sin' is indeed a 
'madness' when seen 
678 Martensen; cited in Croxall, 243. 
Gouwens, 26. 
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from the ground upon which Nietzsche stands. This deep agreement renders Nietzschels 
arguments insufficient to discredit Christianity since for Kierkegaard, even emotional 
experiences require the recognition of a wider order. Nietzschean 'affirmation of lifeý just 
brings boredom, and slave morality is not finally Christian, just as true Christian leadership 
is not finally ascetic or self-interested. Christian faith brings joyful, alluring, relaxed 
responses to created order, which compete easily against Nietzsche's restless voracity. 
passage from each writer highlights their basic agreement: 
Christianity is a system, a consistently thought out and complete view of 
things. If one breaks out of it a fundamental idea, the belief in God, one 
thereby breaks the whole thing to pieces: one has nothing of any consequence 
left in one's hands. Christianity presupposes that man does not know, cannot 
know what is good for him and what is evil: he believes in God, who alone 
knows. Christian morality is a command: its origin is transcendental; it is 
beyond all criticism, all right to criticize; it possesses truth only if God is 
truth-it stands or falls with the belief in God. "' 
In all moments of laxness, sluggishness, dullness, when the sensuous nature 
of man predominates, Christianity seems madness, since it is 
incommensurable with any finite wherefore. What is the use of it, then? The 
answer is: Hold thy peace! It is the absolute! "' 
These assessments of Christianity differ in one key respect, since unlike Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche has a voluntarist understanding of Christianity. 611 But there is deep agreement 
here about the extent to which Christianity claims the subject. 
That Nietzsche objects to the extensive claim of Christianity is seen in his response to the 
Christian conception of sin-the "madness" of it, to which "whole masses ... fall victim". "' 
Kierkegaard agrees with this assessment. Given Christianity's claim upon people, such a 
response to Christianity entirely befits the ground upon which Nietzsche stands. When upon 
this ground, there is indeed a certain "madneSS11114 and "horror"685 to Christianity. 
But once someone has surrendered to the divine claim upon them, key arenas of experience 
are enjoyed in a new way. For Kierkegaard, true Christianity makes emotional experiences 
intelligible, and slave morality is thereby critiqued. Christian leadership is brought to proper 
order, and restless voracity is eclipsed by joyful responses to reality. Whereas 
Nietzsche's 
system attempts to appropriate intelligibility in these arenas, Kierkegaard simply undercuts 
... Nietzsche, Twilight, 80-81 (Expeditions §5). 
"' Kierkegaard, Practice, 66. 
611 See further below, page 22 1. 
683 Nietzsche, Daybreak 1,77; in Nietzsche, Genealogy, 150. 
684 Kierkegaard, Practice, 66. 
611 Ibid., 66,71. 
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such claims. Therefore given their basic agreements, Kierkegaard can 'outflank' Nietzsche 
by rendering his argument insufficient to discredit Christianity. I will now amplify the mode 
of this undercutting and outflanking by way of Solomon's Nietzschean agenda for the 
passions. 
We noted how Solomon sought to defend subjectivity in the interests of a passion-led ýself- 
overcoming' and self-change. On this view, passions are chosen, changed, nurtured, 
respected, and generally perceived by subjects as the centre of personal meaning and the 
primary locus for harmony between thought, will and action. This was toward the 
maximisation of personal dignity and self-esteem, exemplified (disconcertingly) in 
drunkenness, 'self-torture' and promiscuity. 'Reality' impinges upon the agent's internal 
ýsurreality'-an inner world mediated by constitutive ly-j udging emotions-and emotionally 
derived intentions commit the agent to courses of action that alter 'reality' (and thus the 
agent's own 'surreality'). 
Obvious points of similarity arise between this Nietzschean approach and some 
Kierkegaardian themes. Kierkegaard explicitly defends and commends a certain use of 
subjectivity; a certain kind of 'self-overcoming' and change; and a profound respect for 
passion (particularly understood). The co-ordination of passion, thought, will and action is 
massively central, as are the epistemic implications of 'emotion' in service of this co- 
ordination. 
It seems odd that Kierkegaard's concern for subjectivity and passion does not meet with 
more respect in Solomon. For Peter Mehl, Solomon is "exceptionally askew" in holding 
Kierkegaard to be an irrationalist whose psychology can only convince the morally inclined. 
Indeed, Solomon "seems to have a narrower view of rationality than does Kierkegaard", 
whose "reasons are existential reasons; that is, they are founded in his anthropology, in his 
picture of the universally human, the subjective. "686 As we have seen, this anthropology 
(with its subjective dimensions) echoes Augustine in its contingency upon a network of 
human and divine relationships. 
We have also seen how Kierkegaard's project concerns the individual's ongoing subjective 
4wrestle' to locate the self within the objective world. "There is, to speak with a 
contemporary voice, a more 'holist' conception of rationality being employed 
by 
Kierkegaard 
. "611 Therefore, not only 
does Kierkegaard not merely write for the morally 
611 Peter J. Mehl, "Kierkegaard and the Relativist Challenge to Practical Philosophy, 




inclined; indeed, not only does he not merely write for ; any rational creature' (as Hegel or 
Kant)-"it is Kierkegaard's claim ... that he is writing truths holding for any rational and at 
the same time existing and accountable creature. "688 Of course, Kierkegaard's insistence on 
the 'leap' towards a new love, requiring the deepest recognition of personal sin, is a most 
basic rejection of Enlightenment objectivity (as applied to the self, not to the natural world). 
Such a recognition and rejection elicits, unsurprisingly, the ire of the academy (and sadly, of 
apostate parts of the Church). 
Whereas Roberts saw with Kierkegaard how passion as emotion is actually contingent upon 
passion as interest, 689 it would appear that Solomon makes no such distinction. (Passion as 
interest might equate to those 'affections' that for Dixon are lacking in Solomon. ) Perhaps 
Solomon has, ironically, fallen victim to his own 'Myth of the Passions' by not seeing 
Kierkegaard's 'holism', and by treating Kierkegaard's distinctive rationality as that 'mere 
emotion' to which he objects. If Mehl, Rudd, Roberts (and GouwenS691) are correct, then 
Solomon has certainly missed how deeply coincident Kierkegaard's concerns are with his 
own, and Kierkegaard's obvious significance to his own (and Nietzsche's) project. 
By extension, Kierkegaard would have much to say against Nietzsche's project. We could 
summarise some of these proleptic critiques as follows: 
(i) When the passions are ordered (as in Solomon) only by 'self-esteem' and without a 
wider order, even the aesthete is dubious. Kierkegaard's 'A' proleptically critiques 
the Nietzschean ideal in his acknowledgement that emotional life requires a wider 
order. 'Self-creation' is thus a pitiful, stultifying enterprise. 
The ennui experienced by the aesthete, even given the 'rotation of crops', puts a 
first-order question against any simplistic 'affirmation of life'. 
(iii) The rejection of the Judge's ethic presages Nietzsche's attack on slave morality, 
certainly by an agreement over the pusillanimity of bourgeois ethics. The rejection 
of it as not, finally, Christian, must deflect much of Nietzsche's claim 
(that slave 
morality constitutes Christian life). 
Ov) Nietzsche's 'ascetic priest' was intended to 'unmask' all Christian 
leadership as 
self- interested. Kierkegaard's relentless critique of degenerate, self-interested 
Ibid., 265. 
6" Roberts, "Passion, " 88-91. 
... Gouwens, 26,35,44,51-53 & passim, whose observations about subjectivity etc. closely 




Christian leadership (such as Mynster's) agrees that there is often a serious problem 
with such leadership; nevertheless, the force of Nietzsche's attack is deflected, since 
Kierkegaard's frank polemical demand for reform implies the possibility of 
excellent forms of Christian service. (Nietzsche, we recall, also blunted his own 
attack by his spec ial-p leading against 'life-enhancing' Christian service. ) 
(V) The vision of the knight of faith's life of joy is alluring enough, in its relaxed 
responses to created order, to compete easily against Nietzsche's restless voracity. 
Kierkegaard's 'leap of love' is effectively a prolegomena to a Christian account of affective 
deliberative logic that can be embodied in a theological theory of virtue. Virtue theories 
attempt to do justice both to the habits and to the emotional dispositions of agents, and 
do 
not rate objectivity over subjectivity (even if virtue theories 
differ in their objective points 
of reference). A theological theory of virtue has the capacity to retain the 
best aspects of 
'Christian emotion', while giving us more detail for the task of deliberation. I will now turn 
to such a theological theory of virtue, with special reference to the 
'virtue lists' of the NT. 
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Chapter VIII: Emotion and ethics in a theological 
theory of virtue 
So far in the thesis, I have outlined three approaches to the relationship between ethics and 
emotion. An Enlightenment approach admits of no relationship (except in emotivism). A 
Nietzschean approach only endorses action that springs from passion. In a theological 
approach, a logic of love governs responses to the moral field, shapes deliberative logic, and 
requires divine reordering both adventitiously and by participation 
But how might the logic of love translate into normative practises for the individual? While 
I do not claim to canvas all possible answers to this question, what piques my curiosity is 
the degree to which virtue, in various guises, has appeared and reappeared during this 
investigation. Clearly, the logic of love implies some account of virtue, and I will in this 
chapter seek to discern such an account. I will proceed by bringing the account of virtue 
entailed by theology's logic of love into conversation with some other modern accounts of 
virtue. I make no claim exhaustively to have engaged all modern accounts of virtue. 
In Section One I recount two older approaches to virtue. These require 'something more' 
than virtue for their fluency; we suspect this 'something more' to be theology's 'logic of 
love'. In Section Two,, I describe a neo-Aristotelian project that understands virtue 
generically and universally, and seeks a common rational ground for virtuous conduct, 
perhaps to supplant all prior deontic conceptions. I show how it also relies upon 'something 
more' (despite some claims to the contrary), which turns out to be an ordered moral field. 
Moreover, the 'something more' it usually assumes of theological ethics (the divine 
command) is not in fact considered by Christian theology to be its entire organising 
principle. 
Section Three begins to organise, and extend insights about virtue that have been glimpsed 
throughout Part Two. Aquinas' virtue produces ordinate passion and requires love for its 
intelligibility. Augustine's virtues are teleological. Virtues in Calvin and Augustine seem to 
function as statements of aim, and perhaps of affirmation given and received-but not of 
seýfldescription, which can inveigle agents from proper scrutiny of their acts. 
In Section Four, to adjust the theological account, I associate a modern analysis of 
Christian 
virtue with NT 'virtue catalogues'. The NT catalogues offer a nuanced 
descriptive language 
for various correspondences between an agent's affections and the order of reality, 
thereby 
providing a language brief enough for quick deliberation (even 
if subsequently, the act 
proves erroneous). Secondly, this language does not direct specific acts, offering 
instead a 
degree of creative freedom to 'invent' action most befitting specific 
loved others. Thirdly, 
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Christian communities become places for participants to learn by craft-skill, and from 
careful evaluations of them by others. I suggest, by way of postscript, how conscience 
becomes intelligible not as a basis for deliberation, but as a window for reflection on my 
(perhaps disordered) loves. 
In sum, this chapter outlines how the logic of love generates a unique conception of virtue. 
Virtues are multifaceted responses to the complexities of reality; they are richly emotional, 
and they are instrumental to action within the moral field rather than being instrumental to 
the discernment of moral order. 
1. 'Something more'than virtue: a longstandingfluency 
In this section, I will recount two older approaches to virtue. These require 'something 
more' than virtue for their fluency, and I will suggest that this 'something more' is perhaps 
theology's 'logic of love'. Although my emphasis in this section will be upon these older 
approaches, I will first pause to make an observation about the modern resurgence of virtue 
theory. 
The modern resurgence of virtue theory seems correlative to a growing interest in the 
emotions. There are rumblings of agreement that emotional consonance is to be expected 
within virtue's intentions, as a constitutive element of virtue . 69 1 The broadly neo-Aristotelian 
MacIntyre is representative: 
Virtues are dispositions not only to act in particular ways, but also to feel 
particular ways. To act virtuously is not, as Kant was later to think, to act 
against inclination; it is to act from inclination formed by the cultivation of 
the virtues. 692 
Not all agree that Kant and Aristotle are so mutually exclusive '611 but our purpose 
is not to 
arbitrate over that (although we have already seen Kant's respect for emotion, against his 
refusal to give them epistemic priority. ) Of greater interest is this emotional component to 
virtue-that somehow, virtues pertain to affections. 
Only those whose desires, passions, and emotions have been properly molded 
can see. They have disciplined [in Iris Murdoch's phrase] the fat, relentless 
ego. And then, in turn, since their character is virtuous, there will 
be no 
conflict between what they see and what they do. "' 
" For this insight, and some of the references that follow, I am indebted to Rufus 
Black, "Towards an Ecumenical 
Ethic: Reconciling the Work of Grisez, Hauerwas and O'Donovan. " (D-Phil., 
Oxford University, 1996), ch. 5. My 
thanks to Luke Bretherton for drawing this thesis to my attention. 
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 149. 
693 Hursthouse, passim. 
Gilbert C. Meilaender, The Theory and Practice of Virtue (Notre Dame: University 
Press, 1984), 62. 
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We shall see that the virtues of Christian theology have such a component. But given the 
logic of love, a theological account of virtue will proceed differently from an Aristotelian 
account. Two older writers exhibit a fluency about virtue and an understanding of virtues as 
varied, richly emotional and instrumental within a wider moral order. Both of them work 
from a theological theory of virtue. 
a) Anne Elliot and Mrs Smith 
Anne found in Mrs. Smith the good sense and agreeable manners which she had almost ventured to depend on, and a disposition to converse and be 
cheerful beyond her expectation. Neither the dissipations of the past-and 
she had lived very much in the world, nor the restrictions of the present; 
neither sickness nor sorrow seemed to have closed her heart or ruined her 
spirits. 
In the course of a second visit she talked with great openness, and Anne's 
astonishment increased. She could scarcely imagine a more cheerless 
situation in itself than Mrs. Smith's. She had been very fond of her 
husband, -she had buried him. She had been used to affluence, -it was 
gone. She had no child to connect her with life and happiness again, no 
relations to assist in the arrangement of perplexed affairs, no health to make 
all the rest supportable. Her accommodations were limited to a noisy parlour, 
and a dark bedroom behind, with no possibility of moving from one to the 
other without assistance, which there was only one servant in the house to 
afford, and she never quitted the house but to be conveyed into the warm 
bath. -Yet, in spite of all this, Anne had reason to believe that she had 
moments only of languor and depression, to hours of occupation and 
enjoyment. How could it be? -She watched-observed-reflected-and 
finally determined that this was not a case of fortitude or resignation only. - 
A submissive spirit might be patient, a strong understanding would supply 
resolution, but here was something more; here was that elasticity of mind, 
that disposition to be comforted, that power of turning readily from evil to 
good, and of finding employment which caff ied her out of herself, which was 
from Nature alone. It was the choicest gift of Heaven .-- 
"' 
Jane Austen's characterisation of Mrs. Smith is just another example of her usually 
penetrating insight. But here, there is also a strikingly effortless facility to cluster thought 
forms that modems approach with difficulty. 
Mrs. Smith's response to her own wretched condition is as surprising now as it would 
have 
been then, and Anne's admiration for her is reasonable enough. But it would 
be entertaining 
to imagine a thoughtful modern Anne's account of Mrs. Smith's unusual demeanour. 
f Moderns live in an age that seeks for control, leisure and material bene its 
but is beset by 
melancholy. Modern Anne, then, would also be astonished by Mrs. Smith's 
"moments only 
of languor and depression" against "hours of occupation and enjoyment". 
"How could it 
be? " remains the most apposite question. 
vol. 72 (London: 695 Jane Austen, Persuasion (1816), with a foreword by Judith Terry, Everyman's 
Library edition, 
David Campbell Publishers, 1992), 153-54. 
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Modern Anne's answer might include 'courage'. Less clearly, Mrs. Smith might possess 
ýstrength% or more mysteriously, inner 'resources'. Modern Anne, in tacit admission that 
without actual explanation, a thin description must do, might even resort to Mrs. Smith's 
4positive attitude'. The complimentary mood would find its nadir in those lamest of modern 
accolades for the elderly, that Mrs Smith is an 'inspiration'--or sadly, even a 'resource'. 
(By this stage, modern Anne is frankly signalling her unconcern to understand Mrs Smith. ) 
Conversely, she might feel forced to assert Mrs. Smith's basic irrationality, as if the older 
woman should be angrier, having adopted a passive acceptance of her situation that is at 
best misguided. 'Submission' would certainly only occur to modern Anne as a pejorative. 
But Austen's Anne sees differently, having seen how Mrs. Smith sees differently. Although 
Mrs. Smith has little power to change her overall situation, in Anne's account she remains 
proactively at its centre. Mrs. Smith's activity includes a form of thought, an ethical stance, 
and an approach to the world, where each informs the others. This issues forth in what first 
interests Anne: Mrs. Smith's "good sense and agreeable manners" and her "disposition to 
converse and be cheerful". Hours of watchful observation and reflection give way to a final 
determination that this is "not a case of fortitude or resignation only"-an intriguing 
rejection that passes subtle judgment on the classical tradition, although artful irony ("not a 
case of') makes it a quite firm one. At some level, both Anne and Mrs. Smith remain deeply 
unpersuaded that either Aristotle or the Stoics can help. 
The next sentence could be a quick dialogue between Georgian Christian and 
Enlightenment virtues: "A submissive spirit might be patient, a strong understanding would 
supply resolution". Neither Anne nor Jane Austen are simply choosing among historic 
alternatives, as if this boring pastime mattered. Rather, Anne's internal reflection and 
deten-nination exhibits an advanced capability to question and critique available conceptions 
of personal virtue. Fortitude and submission do seem more workable, but at best offer only 
a partial answer to the conundrum of Mrs. Smith. 
For "something more" is needed. There is no need here of virtue for virtue's sake, 
just as 
Anne does not reject these virtues as ridiculous, since they are not. Various virtues may or 
may not be helpful: patience and understanding account for more than 
fortitude and 
resignation. But more importantly, they highlight their own inadequacy: there needs 
be a 
44 something more" to make sense of Mrs. Smith, and for Mrs. 
Smith to make sense of her 
world. 
And the extra is a fascinating cluster: "here was that elasticity of mind, 
that disposition to be 
comforted, that power of turning readily from evil to good, and of 
finding employment 
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which carried her out of herself'. To expound the elasticity, disposition, power and 
employments that constitute Mrs. Smith would not improve what Jane Austen has already 
laid before us with clarity. Suffice to note that Mrs. Smith's proactivity, which Anne 
respects so much, is pictured as a lively dialectical engagement between an inner thought 
world, and an external reality broadly understood as good enough to be worth persistent 
interest. Mrs. Smith has 'leapt', it seems: she rejects interiority as a satisfactory resting 
place, and carries herself "out of herself'. Her 'movement' parallels that 'leap I which 
acknowledges 'otherness' at the 'base of the soul'. 
Thus Anne completes the account with a twinned assertion. Mrs Smith's demeanour was 
"from Nature alone. It was the choicest gift of Heaven". This final determination is a 
succinctly formed theological anthropology, and its two clauses sum up complementary 
aspects of our investigation. 
9 On the one hand, a proper engagement between the ethical and the emotional is "from 
nature alone". Like Mrs Smith, people respond viscerally, emotively and with action, to 
the goods (and evils) of the reality in which they are located. To denigrate this 'natural' 
response might presage a Manichean dualism. The deliberative logic of Mrs Smith's 
virtue has its love(s): she responds in love to a moral field surrounding her. We can 
even suspect she participates in the logic of love commended. 
9 And yet, to be like Mrs. Smith is "the choicest gift of heaven", for such responses 
cannot succeed without radical, and divine, intervention. For how else can we explain or 
reduplicate the Mrs. Smith who goes beyond herself-who, in Austen's memorable 
phrase is "carried ... out of 
herself'9 To underrate this 'going beyond' is Pelagian. 
Moderns too easily gesture toward selfless People in either pious non-comprehension or 
in open contempt. Such responses fail to reckon with the "choicest gift[s] of heaven", 
and fail also to consider the actual mode of inherence of selflessness in a person when 
their subjective report-as in the case of our four theologians-is of a new view 
based 
upon the love of God. According to Anne, Mrs Smith's virtue also shares the 
logic of 
love 'Poured in'. 
This passage from Austen points us toward virtue as a kind of 
'middle term' in our 
investigation. It has kept reappearing in various guises, and requires some attention. 
it is a 
middle term' insofar as on the one hand, it can embrace aspects of emotion and 
action: 
through it, 'eth ico- emotional' positions become intelligible 
in a new and non-punctiliar 
way. But on the other hand, it is a 'middle term', because 
it cannot alone make sense of a 
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life. If someone is not to degenerate into "a case of' some virtue, then "something more" is 
needed. The 'something more' seems to be theology's logic of love. 
b) Aelred of Rievaulx 
Aelred of Rievaulx' Spiritual Friendshi 696 describes the operation of virtue in reference to p 
the prosaic daily good of friendship. His recourse to virtue seems at first to be intelligible by 
reference to the natural virtues. Even so, he finds it necessary further to describe the virtues 
of friendship by reference to "something morC. 
The Cistercians were a reformed Benedictine order, and as abbot of one of its Yorkshire 
houses, Aelred enforces Benedict's Rule. The uniquely Christian tension of universal love 
against particular affection is highlighted in the Rule chapter 54 (against gifts and letters 
from family) and chapter 69 (against monks defending one another, particularly if blood- 
related). Benedict sought to minimise natural bonds of family, since as an eschatological 
witness, the new community was to constitute itself along the lines of that place where 
"they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are like angels" (Mt. 22: 30; Mk 12: 25-, 
Lk. 20: 34-36). However, the strictures of the Rule were eventually taken to interdict 
friendship. As one who enjoys friendship, Aelred seeks to reinstate friendships harmonious 
to the Rule and within the monastery. 691 Appropriately enough, his investigation is pursued 
as three dialogues with his friends. 
Disordered affection disorders friendship. 'Puerile' friendship derives from "a wandering 
and sportive affection" that powerfully draws people together but without discernment 
between "the licit and the illicit" (11.57). Such friends "catch fire together as one" in 
4ý wretched agreement[s]" that justify all acts, because for both, "nothing is sweeter than 
their friendship and ... nothing more 
just" (1.40). 
For Aelred this typifies the incandescent friendship of youth (11.58). This is the form of life, 
we might say, among not just one but now two of Kierkegaard's aesthetes. Such friendships 
"follow no [Aristotelian] mean", nor consider judgment nor honour; they 
follow "the 
impetus of emotion" without ethical discrimination (1.41). "[T]here is nothing certain, 
nothing constant, nothing secure" in these friendships (1.42). Affection and emotion are 
present in this form of life, but are without a 'home', as it were. 
'96Aelred, Spiritual Friendship (c. 1164), tr. Mark F. Willams, (London and Toronto: Associated 
University Presses, 
1994). 
611 Cf Mark F. Williams' opening comments in his appendix (ibid., 91). 
This appendix proceeds to gives a good 
account of and response to recent speculation over Aelred's sexuality, which will 
not be considered here. 
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But 'disorder' is not constituted by some evil intrinsic to affection, desire or emotion. 
'Disorder' is just disorder, nothing more, and Aelred has understood all there is to 
understand of its 'banality'. Here is a shared voracity and selective sight, where reason fails 
to discriminate between goods. ("[01ften affection precedes friendship, but it ought never to 
be followed unless it is led by reason, moderated by a sense of honour, and ruled by 
justice", 11.57. ) This is why affection and desire repeatedly attract metaphors of fire, and are 
seen to be in a kind of war with fundamental elements of virtue. This, of course, will not do 
for the monastery, and suggests why the Rule closely regulated friendship. 
But such friendships can become the start of something good (1.44), for even in disorder the 
natural good of friendship is never erased. Interestingly, even disordered friendships 
generate unconscious versions of virtue-a kind of loyalty at least, and even a kind of 
'justice'. Such inadvertent emergence of virtue suggests that friendships rely upon virtue, 
and are somehow 'governed' by it. 
Aelred is clearly in dialogue with Cicero here. In Cicero's De Amicitia, Laelius defines 
friendship (the definition is repeatedly deployed by Aelred), and then compares friendship 
to the other goods that humans might enjoy. He concludes that "there are those who place 
the 'chief good' in virtue and that is really a noble view; but this very virtue is the parent 
and preserver of friendship and without virtue friendship cannot exist at all. ""' That is, 
friendship both establishes and relies upon virtue. 
Aelred and 1vo hold that "Cicero was unaware of the excellence of true friendship, since he 
was unaware of Christ, who is friendship's principle and goal" (1.8). But they do not at first 
proceed much further than Cicero. "Friendship establishes all the virtues by means of its 
own charm, and strikes down vices by its own excellence" (11.10), and enduring friendships, 
"formed in Christ, advanced according to Christ, and perfected by Christ" (1.10) are 
consciously informed by the four classical, 'natural' virtues. "Where friends love each other 
[rightly], they can desire nothing which is not fitting ... 
Surely prudence guides this 
friendship, justice rules it, courage watches over it, and moderation tempers 
it" (1.48-49). 
Intentionally virtuous friendship is a step beyond the inadvertent emergence of virtue; 
but 
little about friendship seems particularly formed by Christ as 
its "principle and goal". 
Friendships, whether ordered or disordered, generate and become governed 
by forms of 
natural virtue, since natural virtue is simultaneously regulatory and emergent 
by its very 
constitution. 
... Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Amicitia (c. 44 AD), tr. William Armistead Falconer, 
Loeb Classical Library, 28 vols. 
vol. 20 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1929), 131 (vi. 
20). 
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Yet as the dialogues develop, Aelred argues that formation and advancement "in Christ" 
requires "something more" than natural virtue. This "something more", which both orders 
friendship and establishes virtue, is explicated in terms of a salvation history, of friendship. 
Friendship is finally contingent upon God's creative imprint and God's redemptive 
intention (1.51-61). An angelic community, where "the sweetest love created a unity of will 
and affection" (1.56), is also humanity's telos; and in a fallen world, the "authority of law" 
(1.51,61) redemptively orders friendship toward this telos, "regulat[ing] the same friendship 
which nature begins and custom strengthens" (1.61). (Certainly Aelred has in mind the 
'laws' of Christ and the Scriptures, but we wonder if here he also salutes the Rule. ) If 
4'sweetest love" and "unity of will and affection" constitute true friendship, Aelred's second 
and third dialogues develop Christian love, rather than natural virtue, as the interpretative 
key to such friendship (11.18-2 1). 
"Love is the source and origin of friendship, for although love can exist without friendship, 
friendship can never exist without love" (111.2). For Aelred, aspects of love range from 
natural affection (a form of positive love), to rational love (such as 'love' toward an enemy, 
in obedience to the divine command, and in view of their value, 111.2). Friendship blends 
positive, benevolent and rational aspects"' of love: 
Love comes simultaneously from reason and affection when someone 
ingratiates himself in the mind of another through the attractiveness of his 
character and the delight one takes in his honourable life; the mind urges us 
to love this person simply because of the merit of his virtue. Thus reason is 
joined to affection, so that love is pure because it comes from reason, and 
agreeable because it comes from affection. (111.3)... 
Here, then, is how friendship establishes virtue. A happy consonance occurs between 
excellences already inherent in a person, and the universal requirement to love them; and all 
the calls of friendship are measured against a prior (cosmic) love between each friend and 
God (111.5). Within these boundaries, friendships fundamentally require faithfulness (111-88- 
90), and thrive upon "love, affection, security and delight": 
Friendship involves love when there is a show of favor that proceeds from 
benevolence. It involves affection when a certain inner pleasure comes 
from 
friendship. It involves security when it leads to a revelation of all one's 
secrets and purposes without fear or suspicion. It involves 
delight when there 
is a certain meeting of the minds-an agreement that 
is pleasant and 
benevolent-conceming all matters, whether happy or sad, which 
have a 
bearing on the friendship ... 
(111.51) 
'99 See above, 117-118. 
700 This quotation shows the place of rational and positive love- 




Aelred goes on to describe the daily moments in which his friendships have assisted him to live virtuously (111-103)-an effect of friendship unintelligible to 'puerile' friendships of 44sportive affection". Aelred's friendships are grounded in love for God and governed by 
virtue; yet they 'establish' virtues. There is room in Benedict's virtuous community even 
for friendship, and instead of a monastery eschewing or fearing friendship, its friendships 
can actually strengthen its eschatological witness. "' 
In this 'spiritual friendship', "something more" gives place to deep affection and a 
multitude of virtues. The 'something more' prevails to order ethical commitment, affection, 
virtue, and love into a fluent and seamless whole. Possibly in Jane Austen, and certainly in 
Aelred of Rievaulx, the 'something more' is theology's logic of love. (This claim probably 
only reiterates O'Donovan, where "virtue is the conformity of love to the structure of 
reality. "101) The logic of love brings fluency to moral discourse about virtue. 
2. A new quest 
This fluency, though, is easily lost. Modernity critics have long alleged a general loss of 
moral fluency, citing the collapse of 'virtue' into 'value'; 101 the dichotomy of fact against 
701 Consequent to this account are corollaries that moderns might challenge. Friendships are not to be formed lightly, 
nor broken lightly, except in the sad case of a friend who has "permanently departed from that foundation of 
friendship which we have agreed upon" (111.7), and from whom a careful, thoughtful withdrawal might become 
appropriate (111.57-58). But modern friendships cover a wide variety of relationships and rarely begin with explicit 
foundational agreements. Moreover, in a pluralist setting, friendships across boundaries of religious belief will seem 
problematic on Aelred's view. We might call Aelred's a 'high' view of friendship, as against a modern, more 
'relaxed' view. Without necessarily adjudicating between these, a pause for clarification (and limited defence) of 
Aelred is in order. 
Aelred's Ciceronian debt includes an ancient consensus that friendships were to be few, loyal and long-lived, and 
thus chosen carefully in light of their subsequent political ramifications, including a requirement of mutual political 
assistance. In Aelred's monastery, the 'political' given is that the monks, and therefore particularly monks who are 
friends, will together seek ends consonant with those of the kingdom of Christ. 
This should at least make overt some features of modern friendship which are usually covert. Modern friendships 
retain elements of foundational agreement, which may remain unnoticed until one friend changes their mind on 
something the other considers to be crucial. (The religious plurality of modern settings might simply mask other 
domains of agreement that friendships rely upon as crucial. ) Moreover, modern friendships arguably require a 
degree 
of exchange, which parallels ancient exchanges of political favour, even if not much is at stake 
in comparison. (That 
is, if ancient friends expected exchanges of political favours, modem friends expect exchanges e. g. of 
household 
favours. ) 
If Aelred is right to suspect that friendships require various foundational agreements, and then 
involve some degree 
of mutual assistance, then to choose a friend carefully is neither callous nor mercenary 
but is simply illustrative of the 
governance of friendship by prudence. Aelred might as easily question modems, who often amass 
large numbers of 
'friends' without thought about any agreed 'basis' in each of these relationships, nor about 
the expectations for 
mutual exchange that are brought to the friendship. (it follows from this absence of 
thought that the demise of a 
friendship presents itself just as a matter of circumstance, rather than of explicit consideration. 
) 
Neither Aelred's 'high' approach, nor the 'relaxed' modern one, is self-evidently superior. 
702 O'Donovan, "Augustinian Ethics, " 47; see above, 117-118. 
703 Cf Gertrude Himmelfarb, The De-Moralization of Society: From Victorian 
Virtues to Modern Values (London: 
IEA Health and Welfare Unit, 1995), 10-12,18-19. 
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value (and its corollary in the alleged 'naturalistic fallacy');... and the passage of ýpassion' 
and 'affection' into 'emotion'. 101 But a burgeoning 'virtue ethics', whilst springing from 
disillusionment with modernist approaches, does not therefore look to " something more - 
for a recovery of fluency. (At least, virtue theorists seem often to think they do not look to 
44something more". We shall go on to find that in fact, they do. ) 
In this section, I will recount a modern writer's lament over the modern loss of fluencý 
about virtue. She heralds a neo-Aristotelian revival that seeks for virtuous conduct based in 
generic rationality. The project seeks also to supplant prior deontic conceptions, which are 
assumed to derive paradigmatically from a theological ethics where the divine command 
dictates all. But not only will I argue that the divine command is not considered by 
Christian moral theology to be its entire organising principle, I will also show that the neo- 
Aristotelian project relies (despite some claims to the contrary) upon 'something more'- 
which is to say, upon an ordered moral field. Since Christian theology also conceives of 
morality as responses to an ordered moral field, and not merely as a response to divine 
commands, a theological theory of virtue can therefore offer at least as robust an account of 
virtue as other virtue theories. 
a) Miss Anscombe's revolt 
A new mood has been instigated by G. E. M. Anscombe's seminal attack upon analytical 
approaches to act and obligation. 706 Since this attack, Aristotle has been the usual point of 
departure for theorists interested in virtue. 
Anscombe has plenty to say about Christian ethics, since for her all concepts of obligation 
arise from a Judeo-Christian forensic conception of morality. But insofar as modern moral 
theology does not accept a lawgiver, all ethics of obligation are rendered baseless. Also, in 
her estimate, moral philosophy since Sidgewick is consequentialist, sharing among 
its 
exponents the justification of what would formerly be called 'temptation'. A repeated motif 
is the execution of an innocent person, often used by these thinkers to demonstrate the 
possibility of 'moral rightness' in such an act. For Anscombe, any such justification 
is only 
possible where there exists the emaciated shell of Judeo-Christian 
law (now stripped of 
... Cf George Grant, Technology and Empire: Perspectives on North America 
(Toronto: Anansi, 1969). 118-20, 
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 57-59,84; and Taylor, 53-62. For more on the distinction, the 
'fallacy' and the history of 
their discussion, cf. J. Laney, "Characterization and Moral Judgments, 
" Journal of Religion 55 (1975), 41-)-13, - 
Porter, 43-48; R. Crisp, "Fact/value distinction, " in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward Craig, 10 
vOls., vol. 3 (London: Routledge, 1998); and A. Thomson, Critical Reasoning 
in Ethics: A Practical Introduction 
(London: Routledge, 1999), 36-44. 
701 See above, page 62. 
716 G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy, " Philosophy 33 no. 124 (1958). 
Page 234 
I 
content and of any 'giver'). Substitute, she says, for 'moral rightness' th t e erm 'justice . and this kind of consequential ism cannot succeed: if it is possible somehow to make deliberate 
executions of the innocent 'morally right', it is never possible to make them JUSt'. 707 
This points toward Aristotle, whose account of how to live had no recourse to any lawgiver, 
and where virtue observably resides within "the activity of thought and choice in regard to 
the various departments of life-powers and faculties and use of things needed". 708 Virtues 
reflect and extend humanity in its operation qua humanity "(and not merely, say, qua 
craftsman or logician)". 709 In the absence of any agreed moral ontology, Aristotle's virtue 
offers to rescue modern moral philosophy from its post-theistic hangover, and from its 
consequential ist interlopers. Anscombe's project, which she confessed herself unable to 
complete, was toward a new psychology. Not all virtue theory is comprehended by it, but 
Solomon, Nussbaum and MacIntyre represent the challenge taken up. 
b) A virtuefor all? 
Daniel Statman recognises versions of virtue where aretaic and deontic concepts are 
complementary, or where deontology is thought an appropriate derivative of virtue. 
Anscombe's call altogether to eliminate the deontic, is an "extreme" "replacement" version 
of virtue ethics, where aretaic notions gain priority once deontology is abandoned. "' 
Solomon's neo-Aristotelian business ethics are difficult to place in this respect, since he 
avoids abstraction in the interests of accessibility for business readers. "' Nonetheless, a 
version of Aristotelian virtue is offered in preference to all other ethical systems 
(particularly Kantian and Christian), "to bring out what is best in ourselves and our shared 
enterprise. ""' Functionally, it is a 'replacement' thesis. 
Virtue is "an exemplary way of getting along with other people, a way of manifesting 
in 
one's thoughts, feelings and actions the ideals and aims of the entire community. 
"713 
Traditions or communities or narratives or roles have elsewhere been offered as epistemic 
"' Ibid., 16. 
... Ibid., 14. 
... Ibid., 6. 
"0 Daniel Statman, "Introduction to Virtue Ethics, " in Virtue Ethics, ed. 
Daniel Statrnan, (Edinburg 
I 
h: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1997), 8-9. Bernard Williams is tentatively named as representative 
of the 'extreme' replacement' 
approach, but this is simply incorrect (cf. below, 237 n. 720). 
71 ' Robert C. Solomon, "Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues : An Aristotelian 
Approach to Business Ethics, " n 1irtue 
Ethics, ed. Daniel Statman, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1997). 
712 Ibid., 210. 
713 Ibid., 218. 
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substrates from which virtue might spring, but Solomon wants to "distance" himself "from 
"the rather dangerous nostalgia for 'tradition' and 'Community' [Ofl Alasdair Maclntyre and 
Charles Taylor among others. " Corporations are pluralist, like the wider culture; but unlike 
wider culture, they share a telos. 1 14 Thus they are amenable to an Aristotelian ethic, offered 
as an antidote to the individualistic, negating deontology ('thou shalt not') of Judeo- 
Christian virtue. 715 
Likewise, for Nussbaum, Aristotle offers a way toward some centrally human "grounding 
experiences" of human need and capability, and a "universalist" liberal ethic based upon 
them. 716 Elsewhere these "grounding experiences" are listed as eight spheres of human life 
717 that are unavoidable "so long as one is living a human life", to which various virtues 
correspond. As we saw, these generate rival answers involving cultural variation and 
prejudice ;7 11 nevertheless, she hopes that debate might produce a virtue-system to which 
rational persons can agree. 
c) The implicit moralfield 
I will now outline four criticisms of Solomon's and Nussbaum's appropriation of Aristotle. 
The criticisms are interesting in their own right, but serve finally to show that modern virtue 
theory is indeed reliant upon 'something more'-a conception of an ordered moral field that 
elicits our loves. (This conception remains implicit in various virtue theories. ) 
1. We could examine (but will not do so here) the inner coherence of seeking for 
Aristotelian virtue whilst drawing heavily upon Nietzsche. The former is used for social 
ethics, and the latter for personal ethics; but to what extent is each inimical to the other? 
Perhaps the synthesis is defensibly coherent, but only by heavily scything both thinkers, 
and whatever principles govern this scything, need to be made overt. 
2. The approach is not clear about how emotional consonance becomes partly constitutive 
of virtue's intentions. But perhaps we came closest to seeing how this proceeds when 
Nussbaum's ascents of love finally become an enjoyment of everyday life. 
"4 Ibid., 212-13. 
"' Ibid., 220-21. 
716 Nussbaum, "Comparing, " 353-55, for this and quotations following. 
717 Roberts, "Emotions Among the Virtues, " 63, citing Martha C. Nussbaum, "Non-Relative 
Virtues: An Arlstotellan 
Approach, " in Ethical Theor eter A, French, et al., 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 
y. - Character and Virtue, eds P 
13 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 36. 
71 ' Nussbaum's logic about these cultural variations was outlined above 
(34). it is also found in her earlier work 
according to the summary of it by Roberts, "Emotions Among the 
Virtues, " 63. 
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3. When for Solomon business 'toughness' is a "legitimate part of a certain kind of 
obviously legitimate activity", 119 we might wish to know how legitimacy, kinds and 
obviousness are generated by virtue. Either virtue must self-referentially generate these, 
as if discovery of the virtues of this (business) community can make its community 
virtuous; or, by sleight of hand, a prior moral ontology is at work. 
4. The 'replacement' thesis gives an 'epistemological priority' to virtue, which many 
suspect is impossible.,,, 
These criticisms are based upon the same objection as theological ethics makes when it 
disagrees with secular virtue ethics. When virtue theory thinks it is replacing the deontic, 
the opponent replies that virtue is either being generated from a vacuum, as it were, or is 
covertly trading upon existing moral capital. Indeed, Statman notes that "even the 
replacement version does not eliminate all non-aretaic concepts"", since the good of others 
in a community seems to require a wider moral order. Hursthouse emphasises the point: 
[V]irtue theory is not committed to ... defining all of our moral concepts in 
terms of the virtuous agent. ... Charity or benevolence, for 
instance, is the 
virtue whose concern is the good of others; that concept of good is related to 
the concept of evil or harm, and they are both related to the concepts of the 
worthwhile, the advantageous and the pleasant. "' 
Thus "emotions involve ideas, or thoughts, or perceptions of 'good and evil"', and any 
similarity here to the theological position we have espoused is underlined by Hursthouse's 
appeal to Aquinas for "discriminating detail" and "a plausible and illuminating thesis" on 
the matter. "' Despite the protestations of some of its theorists, virtue theory certainly 
requires 'something morethan virtue, and should understand itself to be makingjudgments 
about a real moral order external to the self, even if it is reticent to form these judgments 
into rules or principles. 
Thus concerning abortion, to think the killing insignificant would be: 
callous and light-minded, the sort of thing that no virtuous person and wise 
person would do. It is to have the wrong attitude not only to foetuses, but 
"' Solomon, "Corporate Roles, " 222. 
121 Cf O'Donovan, Resurrection, 211 on Hauerwas. This is also general thrust in Bernard A. 0. Williams, "Virtues 
and Vices, " in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig, 10 vols., vol. 9 (London: Routledge, 1998), 
passim: virtue cannot itself serve as the foundation of an ethical theory. 
721 StatMan, 9. 
722 Rosalind Hursthouse, "Virtue Theory and Abortion, " in Virtue Ethics, ed. Daniel Statman, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1997), 230. 
72' Hursthouse, "Virtue Ethics, " III& 116 n. 25; she cites the Summa I a2w. 22-30 and 2a2w passim. 
Page 237 
more generally to human life and death, parenthood, and family 
relationships. "' 
For others in situations of perhaps justifiable abortion, such as the Victorian women who 
hauled coal through tunnels, the need is also to recognise that "something is terribly amiss 
in the conditions of their lives, which make it so hard to recognise pregnancy and 
childbearing as the good they should be" and "which [make] it impossible for them to live 
really well. ""' Hursthouse evidentially conceives of a moral field comprising manifold, 
sometimes conflicting goodS, 
726 
which elicits recognition and emotional responses from us. 
d) Virtue and the divine command 
Against neo-Aristotelians, then, we can now reply that their dispute with Christian ethics is 
not as much to do with divine command deontology as they suppose. The ethics of 
Christian theology sees no discontinuity between the 'law' of the 'lawgiver' and a proper 
account of humanity qua humanity. Anscombe's conception of a Christian ethics reliant 
upon a theory of divine command is not properly Christian. 
It is perhaps worth pausing to offer a Christian account of the divine command. For 
O'Donovan, the divine command is not an adequate organising principle for a Christian 
ethic, "' although to say so "is not intended as a repudiation of the notion of divine 
command, which is deeply embedded in biblical ethics. ""' 
O'Donovan argues against accounts where the divine command functions as some kind of 
'stepping-stone' between theological knowledge and action. The place of command "is not 
indispensable to an intelligible sequence of thought moving from revelation to ethics", 119 for 
divine command theories along these lines fail to take into account that human goods are 
pluriform aspects of generic and telic order, to which love represents a conformity, and into 
which rules offer epistemic access. "A command cannot evoke rational obedience unless it 
discloses some aspect of morality. "110 Hence the divine commands of the Bible are, in a 
... Hursthouse, "Virtue Theory, " 236. 
121 Ibid., 238. 
126 Cf "we are, after all, in the happy position of there being more worthwhile things to do than can be fitted into one 
lifetime. " Ibid., 239. 
727 Cf. O'Donovan, "Augustinian Ethics". 
728 Oliver M. T. O'Donovan, "How Can Theology Be Moral?, " Journal of Religious Ethics 17 no. 2 (1989), 85. 
729 Ibid. 
730 Ibid., 88. 
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sense, revelatory: "they were not, when they were first given, arbitrary expressions of a 
naked will, unrelated to the Gospel, but were always expressions of the Gospel". "' 
Christian theology asserts, then, that divine commands are intelligible in the light of other 
divine words of revelation about God and about the world. ("Give me understanding, that I 
may keep your law and observe it with my whole heart", Ps. 119: 34. ) An important aspect 
of divine commands is to offer 'limit' or 'boundary conditions' for life, within which are 
areas of 'freedom', 'wisdom' and 'understanding', for which other kinds of moral language 
are required. "' Thus there has never been any fundamental contradiction between Christian 
theology, its interest in divine commands, and an ethic of virtue. The error of deontology, 
whether Christian or otherwise, is to ignore or even suppress the wider moral order, known 
by 'understanding', that is named and borne witness to by (say) the Decalogue. 
Such an approach to the divine command has not figured highly among interested 
commentators. In a collection that proceeds in the thin manner of analytic philosophy, few 
of the contributors consult a theologian. "' Indeed the collection highlights this form of 
philosophy as unconcerned with the formation of character, and as not interested in 
providing any logic of love. But if a thesis anything like my own is correct, no discussion of 
divine command as understood by Christian theology can proceed without such a logic, 
which is deeply interested in the formation of character. 
In a more recent treatment, Richard Mouw briefly endorses something like my suggestion 
when he observes that "narrative is basic to biblical morality" and that God's commands 
derive their intelligibility from biblical narrative, which in turn assists us to discover God's 
character and intention in giving commands. He asserts that neither God's commands nor 
our obedient actions should be considered a series of "disconnected" entities; rather, the 
commands are "intimately connected to a concern for developing moral character". 734 MOUW 
bases much of this, with acknowledgement, upon Calvin: 
God has so depicted his character in the law that if any man carries out in 
deeds whatever is enjoined there, he will express the image of God, as it 
were, in his own life. ... Now the perfection of that 
holiness comes under [the 
two great commandments]. It would, therefore, be a mistake for anyone to 
believe that the law teaches nothing but some rudiments and preliminaries ... 
and does not also guide them to the true goal, good works ... From this 
is 
confirmed that interpretation of the law which seeks and finds in the 
"' Ibid., 89. 
... Cf. also MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, 139-41. 
733 Paul Helm, ed. Divine Commands and Morality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 198 1). Helm's introduction is 
the exception. 
734 Richard J. Mouw, The God Who Commands (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 129. 
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commandments of the law all the duties of piety and love. For those who follow only dry and bare rudiments ... do not at all understand its purpose ... "I 
The "bare rudiments" are clearly a deontic conception of commands. Calvin's conception 
relies upon a logic of love, and is teleological. The commands are, therefore, part of a wider 
account of reality, and he would agree with O'Donovan that divine command alone is not 
an adequate organising principle for a Christian ethic. 
Virtue theory might object to the possibility of divine commands as revelatory and as 
'boundary conditions', but that is a disagreement about what constitutes moral order rather 
than with rules per se. Given the acceptance of a realist moral ontology, rules need not be as 
inimical to virtue theory as is often supposed. Indeed, when Hursthouse uses the young to 
show, with Aristotle, that the young lack wisdom, 736 we might wonder why so many young 
are at first reliant upon rules for moral formation. By analogy, people new to Christianity 
often orient themselves by reference to rules; yet over time, their common experience is that 
realities governed by these rules come to seem self-evident, commanding their deepest 
allegiance and affection (in the manner of the Psalmist, who thinks of honey). The rule has, 
in a sense, become redundant, which is not to say unimportant. 
An old coherence 
e, [T]this is my pray r that your love [aycxTm] may overflow more and more 
with knowledge and full insight [F-1TtyvwcYEL Kat Tracyij, atcj0qcYEL] to help 
'paq T' Sta#J)OVTa], SO you to determine what is best [EIq To' 8ompciýELv 0a 
that in the day of Christ you may be pure and blameless [E'LXtKpLvE7tq mxt 
diTpoo-KoTrot], having produced the harvest of righteousness that comes 
through Jesus Christ for the glory and praise of God. (Phil. 1: 9-11, NRSV. ) 
Deontology alone cannot make St Paul's prayer intelligible. A new seeing brings a virtuous 
life, somehow contingent upon ayaiTq, conditional upon Christ and ordered to "the glory 
and praise of God". For the theologians we have seen, virtue is predicated upon this logic. 
Christian virtues are constituted in, then derivative of, the 'leap' of love; and "emotions 
play an especially central role" in them, since some are named after emotions, others govern 
disordered affection, and yet others (such as humility) are "complex emotional 
disposition[s]". 111 Subsistent to this distinctiveness is Christianity's unique structure as 
response ... to a news-narrative which, 
if accepted ... will elicit a range of 
emotional responses [and which] centers on a personal relationship: it is news 
735 Calvin, 415-16,11. viii. 51. 
736 Hursthouse, "Virtue Theory, " 232. 
717 Roberts, "Emotions Among the Virtues, " 37,60 & passim. 
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about reconciliation, forgiveness, and a new community-the kingdom of 
God. 738 
This is the manner in which emotions are intrinsic to Aelred's friendship, where "reason is 
joined to affection, so that love is pure because it comes from reasoni and agreeable because 
it comes from affection", 739 with allegiance to the person of Christ bringing order and virtue 
to friendship. This 'logic of love' will come into further focus by revision and expansion of 
what we have seen so far. 
In this section, then, I will begin to organise and extend insights about virtue that have been 
glimpsed throughout Part Two. Aquinas' virtue produces ordinate passion and requires love 
for its intelligibility. Augustine's virtues are teleological. Virtue in Calvin and Augustine 
seems to function as statements of aim, and perhaps of affirmation given and received-but 
not of self-description, which can inveigle agents from proper scrutiny of their acts. The 
logic of love governs all of these approaches. 
a) Augustine 
We saw Augustine in sustained dialogue with the classical tradition, at first modifying it, 
and later radically questioning aspects of it. The broad point of agreement among ancients 
was that "the mind is master of all [emotional] disturbances, and, by withholding its consent 
from them and resisting them, exercises a reign of virtue . "740 Even the more philosophically 
oriented early Augustine attempts a 'leap'-like emphasis toward love's all-embracing claim, 
away from classical confidence in the ability of the virtuous human agent, in a 
'christianised' account of the four classical virtues, where each was an aspect of the 
'greatest commandment' to love God . 74, This emphasis 
is amplified through Augustine's 
career: virtue cannot properly be understood as an end in itself, and rather requires a certain 
primary kind of love directed elsewhere. 
[T]he man of true godliness, who loves, believes and hopes in God, attends 
more to those things in himself which displease him rather than to those, if 
there are any, which are pleasing to him or, rather, to the Truth. Nor does he 
attribute what is now pleasing to him to anything other than the mercy of 
Him Whom he fears to displease. To Him he gives thanks for what is healed 
in him, and pours out his prayers for those things which are as yet 
unhealed. 742 
"' Ibid., 42. 
7" See above, 232. 
74' Augustine, De civ. Dei, 365 (IX. 5); see above, 81. 
74 ' Augustine, De mor. ecc. cath., 48 (§ 15). See above, I 10. 
142 Augustine, De civ. Dei, 227 (V. 20). 
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In agreement with the tradition this reign of virtue is a hallmark of true humanity, and virtue 
(in league with truth-veritate atque virtutel") contends with passion for the affections. But 
emphatically and explicitly unlike the tradition, something 'leap'-Iike-signified here in the 
'incorporeal embrace'-is needed for their proper formation: 
For our good, concerning the nature of which there has been such contention 
among the philosophers, is nothing other than to cling to Him, by Whose 
incorporeal embrace alone the intellectual soul is, if one may so put it, filled 
up and impregnated with true virtues. 744 
Augustine proceeds to show that virtue must be understood as an affective, teleological 
expression of the command to love God and neighbour. Otherwise, virtue becomes a 
Pelagian vice: "If only you had known him; if only you had entrusted yourself to him for 
healing, rather than to your own virtue which, being human, is fragile and infirm". "' The 
movement away from the classical tradition is complete when the four classical virtues are 
shrewdly used to highlight life's decrepitude. 746 
Or almost complete. Contra Julianum, like all the anti-Pelagian works, will finally throw 
the issues into the very starkest relief. In Augustine's handy five-point summary of the 
points at issue, 747 discussion about virtue derives from the fifth point, concerning 'natural 
faults'. Julian, sympathetic to Aristotelian and Ciceronian accounts of virtue, seeks to show 
that virtue inheres naturally in all, since whatever ought to be done can be done. 
But "[t]his is rather to be asked of the Lord than presumed of our own strength, that not 
human virtue but divine grace may establish harmony between flesh and spirit". 748 Classical 
natural virtue is assailed by I John 1: 8 ("if we say that we have no sin, we deceive 
ourselves, and the truth is not in us"), and Matthew 6: 12 ("forgive us our debts"). Therefore, 
"we rely on the true mercy of God; you, on your own false virtue. "749Nonetheless, "all 
covetings must be restrained with every force of virtue according to the grace of God which 
is given to men. " Augustine neither wages war on virtue nor sows despair among those 
seeking to combat personal vice. "I do not say the forces of lust are so great that human 
See above, 80. 
744 Augustine, De civ. Dei, 395 (X. 3). 
745 Ibid., 432 (X. 27). The quotation is not specifically targeting Pelagians, but is of a piece with later attacks upon 
them. 
746 See above, 91. 
747 Augustine, Against Julian (42 1), tr. M. A. Schumacher, (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc, 1957), 92-93 (11.9 
§3 1). 
Ibid., 63 (11.3 §6). Cf 149 (111.21 §47). 
749 Ibid., 149 (111.21 §47). 
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reason, divinely helped and aroused, cannot rule and restrain it. "110 The effect, rather, is to 
show that Augustine differs with Julian over virtue's grounds, content, manner of unity, and 
mode of inherence in a person. "' 
The argument culminates in a ma or critique. "' To carry the claim that virtue is a natural 
human 'affection' inherent in all, Julian must construe moral failure merely as a variance in 
relative effectiveness of virtue. "' But if so, says Augustine, misers are virtuous since "it is 
well known to what great efforts and pains lovers of money will patently subject 
themselves, " displaying at least courage, prudence, temperance and wisdom in the pursuit. 'ý, 
Julian's defence, that the miser's virtues are only defective in the tragic lack of their result 
(earthly treasure, rather than heavenly reward), will not do for Augustine. Julian overlooks 
the way virtue and vice are not always antitheses, but are often alarmingly similar. Next to 
constancy is stubbornness; next to prudence is cleverness. Without the 'leap', disorder in 
sight and appetite makes virtue indistinguishable from vice. How then should virtues be 
distinguished? "[N]ot", as with Julian, "by their functions, but by their ends. " "God forbid 
that true virtues serve anyone but Him to whom we say: 'Lord of virtues, convert us. 119755 
Virtue, then, is fundamentally teleological, and the 'leap' necessary for what Augustine will 
allow as Christian virtue is clear. Admittedly, in this particular treatment the affectational 
aspect of virtue seems less clear, "' since Augustine's criterion of judgment is that the 
subject has faith in Christ. We might surmise that Augustine would not distinguish between 
'faith in' and 'love for' Christ; which proves resoundingly to be the case when Augustine 
closes the discussion. "' 
Augustine seems to accept virtue along the same lines as were suggested for Calvin. "' 
Instruction primarily proceeds from God's call upon people to love himself and to embrace 
others in joy, and virtue is a derivative element of that call. Hence virtues can effectively 
describe a manner of life toward which one might aim, and are useful for affirmations given 
Ibid., 164 (111.26 §65). 
"' The four categories are from Williams, 627. 
752 Augustine, Cont. JuL, 176-199 (IV. 3). 
"' "All virtues are affections through which we are good either effectively or ineffectively", 
in Augustine's 
paraphrase. (Ibid., 187. ) 
... Ibid., 183. 
755 Ibid., 186,187. 
... Ironically, it is at first clearer in Julian's "[a]ll virtues are affections ... 
" (above, 243 n. 753). 
757 Augustine, Cont. JuL, 198. 
158 See above, 'A way to humble virtue', 186f, 
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and received concerning character and behaviour, but are not primarily for seýfldescription. 
Understood in this light, the language of virtue can assist me to discern my character and 
behaviour, and perhaps to celebrate the work of God, but without inveigling me from the 
primary call to attend to others (as the introspection associated with self-descriptive virtue 
might do). 
One of O'Donovan's more surprising points about an ethic of character is that "by 
condemning us it drives us to seek the grace of God. "759 Perhaps this claim requires the view 
of virtue I have espoused here, since on this view, the subject is better placed to scrutinise 
his acts. Despite the dispositional element of virtue, there is a sense in which I am only as 
'friendly' or 'patient' or 'generous' as my last friendly etc. (or unfriendly etc. ) moment. 
However any such realisations will tend to be hindered where virtue is regularly used self- 
descriptively. 
Meilaender has likewise shown how an account of virtue might cohere with Luther's anti- 
Pelagian concerns . 
760 Briefly, Christians inculcate the virtues in a kind of salvific 'safety 
net', where the focus is not upon the self, nor upon 'possession' of virtue or self-mastery. 
Instead, such a 'safety net' emphasises "the Word which announces that the end of the story 
is present now in hope-the Word which makes present the grace of One who sees us 
whole and has both the authority and power to transform character and shape SOUIS. 
"76 I 
Leap-like virtue can do this; Augustine's point was that 'natural' virtue cannot. 
b) Aquinas? 
Aquinas' engagement with virtue might seem single-handedly to commit Christian theology 
to a view that the natural 'cardinal' virtues remain largely undisputed, that religious and 
secular difference remains over the three theological virtues only, and that beyond this, 
moderns only need to rediscover and fine-tune an Aristotelian consensus. Perhaps 
MacIntyre, by championing and refining Aquinas' synthesis"' in response to Anscombe's 
call for an Aristotelian renaissance, might seem to confirm that Aquinas simply represents 
the fine tuning of an Aristotelian consensus. 
759 O'Donovan, Resurrection, 225. 
... Meilaender, 100-26. 
761 Ibid., 126. 
762 Macintyre, After Virtue, 53 & passim. 
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But such a conclusion would represent a serious misunderstanding of MacIntyre (whose 
position has shifted since After Virtue), and a deep misunderstanding Aquinas, whose 
thought is notjust a reworked Aristotelianism. MacIntyre describes Aquinas' project: 
Augustinianism and the Aristotelianism of the Islamic commentators were 
systematically at odds [and] no rational way could be found to settle the 
differences between them. ... Aquinas decisively showed this conclusion to be false 
... 
"I 
The matter of whether Aquinas' thought is merely a reworked Aristotelianism hinges on 
whatever the 'rational' nexus between Augustine and Aristotle turns out to be. As it 
happens, Maclntyre knows that Aquinas' virtue is based on an affectational 'leap', even if 
Aquinas did not describe the 'leap' very dramatically. 
Charity is the form of all virtue; without charity the virtues would lack the 
specific kind of directedness they require. And charity is not to be acquired 
by moral education; it is a gift of grace, flowing from the work of Christ 
through the office of the Holy Spirit [Summa 2a2w. 23-44]. "' 
Christian virtue is decisively shaped by love, therefore it is no mere development of, nor a 
711 footnote to, Aristotle's virtue. Moreover, MacIntyre notices an Augustinian tenet, retained 
by Aquinas in the Summa and championed by MacIntyre as necessary for moderns: "' that 
texts interrogate readers and form communities of readership who are fit to read texts aright. 
At the outset, readers inculcate "certain attitudes and dispositions, certain virtues' 5767 before 
knowing why they are so, in a "prerational reordering of the self' required before there 
exists adequate criteria of judgment over what constitutes good moral reasoning. "The key 
texts were of course those of sacred Scripture", and "like any learner within a craft- 
tradition", the learner begins with a degree of trust in the formative tradition and in the 
teachers' competency to express it. 
The learner needs to discover "how to order the passions so that they may serve and not 
distract reason in its pursuit of the specific end, the good. ""' To order passion in this way 
entails an understanding of the relationships between passions, reason and will, and this 
understanding includes a growing awareness of "the different dispositions to judge and act 
which exhibit a right ordering of the passions. " When these dispositions are properly 
possessed, they are "the distinctively human perfections, the virtues. " 
763 MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, 173. 
764 MacIntyre, Whose Justice, 205. 
765 Cf the quotation from MacIntyre which began Chapter IV, above, 75. 
766 MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, 130,226-7,235-6. 
767 Ibid., 82-3, and for quotations following. 
761 Ibid., 139, and for quotations following. 
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When the learner involves himself in the S cripture- reading community, undergoes an 
affectational leap, and orders his passion into virtuous dispositions, implications follow for 
theological morality. Rules are simply a subset of the overall approach. They set limits that 
only partly define the good, and are incomplete when abstracted from their community 
setting. 769The acknowledgement of sin "is a necessary condition for one's acceptance of the 
virtues of faith, hope, and charity"-which, in turn, are requisite to "provide the other 
virtues with what they need to become genuine excellences" . 710 God's seýflrevelation and 
grace enables people to recognise the genuineness of the classical virtues and the 
correlative necessity for correction of the moral life. 
"So a Pauline and Augustinian account retrospectively vindicates that in Aristotle which 
had provided a first understanding of the moral life. " To summarise, 
In the best accounts of the virtues to be given so far, inadequacies are 
remedied by using the Bible and Augustine to transcend the limitations not 
only of Aristotle but also of Plato ... and by using Aristotle as well as Augustine to articulate some of the detail of the moral life in a way that goes 
beyond anything furnished by Augustine. "' 
Elsewhere MacIntyre draws out Aquinas' ability to make sense of the moral field in highly 
discriminating detail, but from within indispensable commitments to reverence and love for 
God, and where even justice requires charity. "' Space forbids our recounting his "bare 
catalogue" of Aquinas. "' The point here is that neither MacIntyre nor Aquinas supports the 
suggestion that Aristotle has somehow swept the field, with no new word from Christianity. 
Rather, for Aquinas (and Maclntyre), an affectational leap of love decisively orders passion 
and forms virtue. 
To augment MacIntyre's exposition of Aquinas on virtue, I will now briefly summarise the 
discoveries about virtue made in my own investigation of Aquinas. 
Intellectual virtue assists the subject to target right ends, and moral virtue assists his 
passions to attain right end s. "' Lively discussion follows over how various virtues might 
supervise various passions, and although 'distilled' into the four cardinal virtues, there 
... Ibid.; cf, MacIntyre, Whose Justice, 194-96, where this is put more fully. 
770 MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, 140. 
771 Ibid., 140-41. 
772 MacIntyre, WhoseJustice, 183-208. 
773 Ibid., 202. 
774 See above, 150. 
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remains a flexibility in imagining what kind of virtue might govern a given passion"' (and 
later, given situations. 776 ) Aquinas' grand view is of the command of reason's governance 
under God, and in concert with virtues that amplify ordered passions. Thus the agent is 
powerfully propelled toward the very best goods of life. The theological virtues 'lock' 
development of virtue into a 'net' that relies on God's graceful agency. The "something 
more" in Aquinas' Christian virtue is the 'leap' being lived. Phronesis alone will not 
suffice. 
c 1"" ) Culvin 
The extraordinary moral depths at which Calvin places humanity might make him a kind of 
'acid test' for the validity of virtue. Of all people, we might expect him to be one of those 
"ideological heirs" of Luther who (according to MacIntyre) strip Aristotle from Thomas, 
"leav[ing] the despair of moral achievement and the gratuitousness of grace" which renders 
virtue, and by extension the moral life, unintelligible. "' Indeed, the paucity of virtue's 
appearance in the material we have surveyed, and Calvin's unrelenting Augustinian 
suspicion of it in its natural occurrence, does not bode well. 
Yet when expounding the Christian life, Calvin airily directs readers to homilies of the 
fathers for "exhortations" and "[description ofl individual virtues at length". "' This hardly 
need be a light use of 'virtue', as if Calvin was distracted into a slip of the pen. Better rather 
to say that unlike the Summa, Calvin's Institutes is not a work that is primarily concerned to 
explicate virtue. Yet Calvin agrees with the Augustinian expectation of virtue springing 
from a renewed love of Christ and an understanding of right ends. Certainly nothing in 'Life 
of a Christian Man' disagrees with the wider vision of reordered affections that we are now 
familiar with. Calvin rejected mere "perform[ance ofl all the duties of love" and enjoined a 
falfilment of them "from a sincere feeling of love" (111. vii. 7) . 771 This 
is the same 'leap'-like 
revolution of the moral life. 
Calvin knows that the most important part of creating virtuous people is the laying out of a 
moralfield, rather than focusing upon virtue itself (which is the practice of taking that field 
seriously over time). 110 
... See above, 152. 
... Macintyre, Whose Justice, 195-96. 
... Macintyre, Three Rival Versions, 141. 
778 See above, 185. 
779 See above, 186. 
780 My thanks to Brian Brock for this insight. 
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4. The emotions of Christian virtue 
In this section I will adjust the theological discoveries of the previous section by associating 
a modern analysis of Christian virtue with NT 'virtue catalogues'. The NT catalogues offer 
a nuanced descriptive language for various correspondences between an agent's affections 
and the order of reality, thereby providing, firstly, a language brief enough for quick 
deliberation (even if subsequently, the act proves erroneous). Secondly, this language does 
not direct specific acts, offering instead a degree of creative freedom to 'invent' action most 
befitting specific loved others. Thirdly, Christian communities become places for 
participants to learn by craft-skill, and from careful evaluations of them by others. I suggest, 
by way of postscript, how conscience becomes intelligible not as a basis for deliberation, 
but as a window for reflection on my (perhaps disordered) loves. 
a) ATT lists: general 
When Burton Easton collated the so-called virtue- and vice-lists of the NT, 
781 stylistic 
similarities between these and other ancient-world lists were thought more interesting than 
their differing grounds and content. But the eleven virtue-catalogues and seventeen vice- 
catalogues represent lives that derive from the Christian proclamation. 
The more extensive vice-catalogue might suggest a deontological supremacy, since it is 
almost entirely action-specific (albeit with some highly localised actions, such as 
matricide). But in contrast stands the almost entirely attitudinal virtue-catalogue. The 
overall presentation is of vice as 'boundary condition', with virtues doing a more daily 
moral work that promotes moral freedom and creativity (since action-specific behaviours to 
achieve, are few). Innovative, practical expressions of virtuous attitudes invite the interest 
of virtuous people, who 'invent' ways to live these attitudes, as appropriate to their own 
place amongst telic and generic order (their 'vocation'). Calvin notices the difference 
between this and philosophical taxonomy: 
As philosophers have fixed limits of the right and the honorable, whence they 
derive individual duties and the whole company of virtues, so Scripture is not 
without its own order in this matter, but holds to a most beautiful 
dispensation, and one much more certain than all the philosophical ones. The 
only difference is that they, as they were ambitious men, diligently strove to 
attain an exquisite clarity of order to show the nimbleness of their wit. But 
the Spirit of God, because he taught without affectation, did not adhere so 
exactly or continuously to a methodical plan; yet when he lays one down 
anywhere he hints enough that it is not to be neglected by us. (Inst. HIM. 1) 
78 ' Burton S. Easton, "New Testament Ethical Lists, " Journal of Biblical Literature 51 (1932). The lists are Mk 7: 2 1- 
22; Rom. 1: 29-31; 1 Cor. 5: 9-11 & 6: 9-10; 2 Cor. 6: 6-7; Gal. 5: 19-23; Eph. 4: 31,5: 3-5 & 6: 14-17; Phil. 4: 8; Col. 3: 5, 
3: 8 & 3: 12-14; 1 Tim. 1: 9-10,3: 2-3,6: 4-5 & 6: 11; 2 Tim. 3: 2-4; Ti. 1: 7-8 & 3: 1-2; Jas 3: 17; 1 Pt. 4: 3; 2 Pt. 1: 5-8; 
Rev. 21: 8 & 22: 15.1 shall attempt to group the virtue terms given there in the footnotes that follow. 
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Grouping these NT virtues offers insights about the moral order of Christian theology. (In 
proceeding this way, I risk the apoplexy of Bible scholars. I will touch upon their concerns 
shortly. "') This grouping can be amalgamated with a classification offered by Robert C. 
Roberts, who is interested in the richly emotional nature of Christian virtue. 
b) Roberts'classification 
Roberts begins by noting just how amenable to moral language are the emotions 
themselves. They regularly take moral predicates; they produce actions; they include 
impulses that are adverse to moral life; they reflect deep concerns of the subject; they carry 
4cultural content', which is to say that their constructions reflect the tradition in which the 
subject stands; and their presence in perception make them constitutive to wisdom's 
discernment. "' Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, the degree to which they resist our control 
reflects a unique aspect of human morality: serendipitous attraction and repulsion by 
various concerns augurs better for an account of character, than does some conception of "a 
pure agent ... who acts but never re-acts". Human agency "takes, in large part, the form of 
emotions. 19784 (This recalls our point of basic agreement with Nietzsche. ) 
Virtues do have generic similarity, else diverse traditions would not share similarly named 
virtues; however, this does not imply nor require that there are generic virtues. 785 Although 
emotions are episodic and virtues dispositional, the amenability of emotions to moral 
language forms part of the generic features in virtue. (Interestingly, this conclusion matches 
Williams' analysis. Despite the fourfold basis of difference between virtue-theorieS, 786 there 
can be thin agreement over the genera of virtues-that they are "dispositions of character, 
acquired by ethical training, displayed not just in action but in patterns of emotional 
reaction" and "are not rigid habits, but are flexible under the application of practical 
reason. 11787 The thin agreement is what commences the quest, largely misguided, for a set of 
per se natural and universal virtues. ) 
Roberts loosely groups Christian virtue as supervening, emotional, behavioural, self- 
managerial, and attitudinal. Emotion is variously implicated in these categories. 
"' See below, 252. 
... Roberts, "Emotions Among the Virtues, " 38-40. 
784 Ibid., 40. 
715 Ibid., 37-38. 
786 See above, 243 & n. 75 1. 
787 Williams, 627. 
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Roberts acknowledges supervening concepts, such as NT love, which is neither a distinct 
emotion nor a distinct virtue but is rather "a kind of summary term for virtually the whole 
range of proper attitudes and action dispositions with respect to God and neighbour" (to 
which I Cor. 13 bears witness)"'-paralleling the observation made elsewhere that "[flove 
is the unitary orientation that lies behind all the uniquely varied responses to the generic 
variety of the created order. "119 This is the mode in which Christian virtue is unified, 
reflecting a substantial difference from classical versions of unity 
Roberts does not consider other overarching terms for 'goodness'. 1911 These most general 
descriptors are 'coloured' by the content of the other terms, as in any ethical system. But 
conversely, another group of terms shows the unique manner in which divine relationship is 
integral to the conception of virtue. 191 
Central to Christian logic are emotional responses to a divine approach. 191 Joy, hope, 
gratitude, peace and contrition are emotional dispositions to the approach, and 
conspicuously, these virtues are named after those emotions. "' To describe something like 
'joy' as 'Christian' is to specify its distinctive Christian object(s). 794 Roberts notes how these 
are exemplified in this order in various ways, such as when emotional responses to local 
circumstances (e. g. grief, anxiety, sorrow) are conditioned by them, or when puzzling 
differences emerge between Christian and secular emotional response (e. g. joy in suffering). 
His logic precisely parallels Augustine, 191 just as he echoes Aquinas in noticing how 
negative emotions are derivative of the valuations implicit in the positive ("anger at 
"' Roberts, "Emotions Among the Virtues, " 43. Cf dyaiTTI (Gal. 5: 22; 2 Cor. 6: 6; Col. 3: 14; 1 Tim. 6: 11; 2 Pt. 1: 7). 
711 O'Donovan, Resurrection, 223-24. 
'9' In the lists, there are: 8n<atocv6vT1, righteousness (2 Cor 6: 7; Eph. 6: 14; 1 Tim. 6: 11); &yvog, pure, purity (Phil. 
4: 8; Jas 3: 17; 2 Cor. 6: 6); Ocrtoq, devout, holy (Ti. 1: 8); CCVETftXrJV1TTOq, above reproach (I Tim. 3: 2); C1VEyi<Xr1-roq, 
blameless (Ti. 1: 7); 'ETratvoq, praiseworthy; E4rlpoq, admirable, commendable; -rrpocyýtXT'q, pleasing; CyEpv6q, 
honourable, noble (all Phil. 4: 8). 
791 In the lists, there are: f: t3cYF_'Pf: ia, godliness (I Tim. 6: 11; 2 Pt. 1: 6); 8uvaPEt OEoG, power of God (2 Cor. 6: 7); 
-rrvf: UpaTt &ytw, 'in the Holy Spirit' (or, 'in holiness of spirit'? ) (2 Cor. 6: 6); yv@cytq, knowledge, understanding 
(primarily of doctrine) (2 Pt. 1: 5; 2 Cor. 6: 6). Possibly ambiguous is TTI'a-riq, faith, faithfulness (2 Pt. 1: 5; Eph. 
6: 16; 
Gal. 5: 22; 1 Tim. 6: 11), which obviously refers to trust in God, but which also picks up the sense of trust or loyalty in 
human relationships. 
792 See above, 240. 
793 Roberts, "Emotions Among the Virtues, " 44. In the lists, there are: Xapd, joy (Gal. 5: 22); and EipTIM1, peace, 
peaceable (Jas 3: 17; Gal. 5: 22; cf. Phil. 4: 7,9). These are the only 'emotion' terms to occur 
in the virtue lists! This of 
course only shows the inadequacy of restricting ourselves to these lists, since other terms of emotion are prolific 
in 
discussions that do not take a list form. 'Peace' is ambiguous, since it could be a 'behavioural' quality of 
relationships, not merely a free-standing emotion. But these different senses are so 
deeply interconnected as to defy 
arbitration between them. 
794 Ibid., 49. 
715 Augustine, De civ. Dei, 365 (IX. 5) & 597 (XIV. 9). 
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injustice to God's children presupposes the gospel [while also] directly ... a response to an 
injustice . "796) 
Dispositions such as kindness, hospitality, gentleness, peaceableness, justice, and 
truthfulness represent to Roberts a behavioural readiness to act in certain ways. 191 
Obviously enough, such behaviours logically derive from God's high estimate of other 
human beings. But mere assent to this will not suffice to make a virtue: 
To be motivated in [this] special Christian way is not just to believe in God's 
kingdom, but to love it, to find it attractive, and thus to find its activities and 
members attractive ... to see, in a genuinely perceptual sense, that a person is 
worthy to receive benefits from oneself just for his own sake, and this 
concern-drenched vision is just what an emotion is, on my account. "' 
Meilaender has contrasted the corrective function of virtue, helping to control and direct our 
emotions, with its role as a restrainer of passion and an expression of new affection. The 
ýstrenuous control' of 'continence' differs from the 'effortlessness' of 'temperance'. "' 
Likewise Roberts denotes a class of Christian self-management virtues (typified by 
patience, perseverance, and courage'00) as 'virtues of will-power', which are not natural and 
must be learnt in the context of the moral tradition with which they are associated. In 
Christianity these are informed by other behavioural and emotional virtues, and by "the 
more general disposition to prize and seek God's kingdom in its various dimensions. "10 1 One 
problem here is conflict between 'selves'-with, we might imagine, a Nietzschean 'self 
and an Augustinian 'self presenting 'themselves' as equally viable. But "Christianity, as a 
moral orientation, offers rich guidelines for distinguishing the self that is to do the 
controlling from the one that needs to be controlled. "802 
Roberts, "Emotions Among the Virtues, " 47. 
... In the lists, there are: &q0rýq, true, truthful (2 Cor. 6: 7; Eph. 6: 14; Phil. 4: 8); dvf: )(oVE: voq, forbearance (Col. 
3: 13); ddpETýq, excellence, goodness (Phil. 4: 8; 2 Pt. 1: 5); XPTJG-rOTllq, kindness (Gal. 5: 22; Col. 3: 12; 2 Cor. 6: 6); 
81-KaLOq, just, upright (Phil. 4: 8; Ti. 1: 8); d8taKpi-rog, impartial (Jas 3: 17); F-tpq'vq, peace, peaceable (Jas 3: 17; Gal. 
5: 22; cf, Phil. 4: 7,9); ETTtEtKTIý, gentleness (I Tim. 3: 3; Ti. 3: 2; Jas 3: 17); TTpau-Tqq [TFPC(OTTdOE1a], gentleness, 
meekness (Gal. 5: 23; Col. 3: 12; [1 Tim. 6: 11]; Ti. 3: 2); ýiX04F_voq, hospitable (I Tim. 3: 2; Ti. 1: 8); K6optoý, 
respectable (I Tim. 3: 2); KTO I pOq, ready (to proclaim or do good) (Eph. 6: 15; Ti. 3: 1); 6TTOTOCYýIýWq, submissive (to 
authorities) (Ti. 3: 1); TrE t OapXjcjaq, obedient (Ti. 3: 1); ctyaOoq, &yaOwGUvq, good, goodness (or generosity? ) (Jas 
3: 17; Gal. 5: 22). 
7" Roberts, "Emotions Among the Virtues, " 5 1. 
799 Meilaender, 12. 
'0' In the lists, there is: ýyKpa`TEta, self-control (Gal. 5: 23; 2 Pt. 1: 6; Tit. 1: 8; cf, above, 177 n. 541); paKpoOupta, 
patience (2 Cor. 6: 6; Gal. 5: 22; Col. 3: 12); vqýatoq, temperance (I Tim. 3: 2); u-aopovTj, endurance 
(I Tim. 6: 11; 2 
Pt. 1: 6); cr4pwv, sensible, prudent (I Tim. 3: 2; Ti. 1: 8). 'Courage', infrequent in these 
lists, is well-represented 
elsewhere (e. g. the 'bold' speaking of Acts, Rom. and 2 Cor. ); but a version of 
it is a vice in 2 Peter 2: 10 where 6 
TOXPTJ'rlq is a reckless and audacious man. 
Roberts, "Emotions Among the Virtues, " 55. 
ibid., 65 n. 18. 
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"For lack of a better name", Roberts calls such virtues as humility, meekness, mercy, 
forbearance and forgiveness'01 attitudinal, "because despite all the things that they are not, 
they are at least attitudes towards oneself and others. "101 Roberts' disquiet in naming these is 
because they are "complex emotional disposition[s]" often concerned with how not to 
respond in a situation. His difficulty here is interesting, since it reflects the way in which 
these terms do a quite startling amount of moral work. They connote key aspects of 
Christian moral order. They bespeak ongoing emotional dispositions, and in this speaking, 
picture an ethically oriented form of affection. As such they name a highly discriminating 
mode of moral response. 
We previously noted Callahan's difficult "fully extended, fully inclusive, circular, parallel 
processing of the dynamic interplays of consciousness". 101 We have now seen the 
theological alternative. These virtue terms are a descriptive language for the confluence of 
an agent, his or her affections, and the order of reality-voiced in a supple, varied and 
creative language. 806 Importantly, it is a brief language, which in the heated moment of 
decision offers a statement of aim. "' Subsequent act-evaluation may discern that the act was 
still in error (since virtue is not episternically prior to act); but in the heuristics of 
deliberation, the attitudinal virtues do at least as much or more than "circular, parallel 
processing". 
c) ATT lists: specific 
Of course the Bible scholars' apoplexy over my grouping of NT virtues is somewhat 
justified, since the occasion of each list is highly specific. Four examples must suffice: 
0 The list in Philippians 4: 8 has always been of particular interest, with interpretations 
ranging from a Pauline affirmation of local secular virtue to the contemplation of 
abstract goods. A third reading is more plausible: that given the dispute of 4: 2, warring 
'0' In the lists, there are: cmA ' )(va oh(Tippoo, 'bowels of compassion'; TalTEivoýpociuvrl, humility; )(aptý%tF-voý, cty 
AEoq, mercy (Jas 3: 17); E6TrEtO jq, willingness to yield (Jas 3: 17); ýtXa&Xýta, mutual forgiveness (Col. 3: 12-13); E0 Ti I 
affection (2 Pt. 1: 7); ýtX ' aOoq, lover of goodness (Ti. 1: 8); -afto-rig, faith, faithfulness (see above, n. 791) (2 Pt. 1: 5; (XY 
Eph. 6: 16; Gal. 5: 22; 1 Tim. 6: 11). 
Meilaender, 60. 
See above, 13. 
No attempt has been made to include in our classification every concept in the virtue lists. For completeness, they 
are: TýV ITEPIKFEýaAataV TOO OWTTJPtOU, "helmet of salvation"; and Pa)((XtpaV 
TOU TrVEUPOCTOq, 0 ECYTIV rl 
PTIPOC 
OF_oO, "sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God" (both a form of yvCjcjtq? ) (both Eph. 
6: 17); ptar, yuvawk 
Mpa, "husband to one wife"; 8t8aKTtI<Oq, apt to teach (both I Tim. 3: 2); and a-privative vices: a'Pa)(oý, not 
quarrelsome (I Tim. 3: 3 Ti. 3: 2); #iAapyupoq, not a money-lover (I Tim. 3: 3); avUTTOKPiToq, not 
hypocritical (Jas 
3: 17); and PAacyýrlpEltv pqHva, "to speak evil of no one" (Ti. 3: 2). The use of these among the virtues 
indicate how 
the task is incomplete without the vice lists, which are beyond our scope. 
See above, 243. 
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parties are exhorted to find 'whatever' of these excellences reside in the other, to the 
end of the 'peace' of vv7 and 9.101 This instantiates the evaluative use of virtue primarily 
in reference to others, rather than as a self-descriptor. (Likewise other applications of 
virtue language to the self are, as we have also suggested, often a statements of aim 
rather than of present status-Eph. 6; Col. 3; 2 Pt. 1; and possibly Ti. 3, and Jas 3. ) 
* It will seem odd to include qualities of Christian community leaders as per the Pastorals, 
since these are indeed tailored to a role-description. Nevertheless, if NT virtues promote 
a latitude for moral creativity, then in the logic of NT community, leaders model 
virtuous behaviour and thereby assist the unimaginative, in the manner of the taught 
'craft-skill'. Leaders are to provide a behavioural (and attitudinal? ) template, beyond 
which the community might improvise (within the vice-list 'boundary conditions'). 
Interestingly, the few behaviour- specific virtues (such as 'hospitality') appear in this 
connection. They will form part of an answer to bewildered questions (such as 'how can 
I be kind? '). 
0 Other virtue lists seem specific to the difficulties of local addressees as sometimes 
revealed by the vice-lists addressed to them. Thus for example Galatians 5: 22 is (in 
part) reciprocal to factional element of vvl9-21, which in turn reflects the occasion of 
the letter. Thus while such lists contribute toward a wider NT profile, they are 
illustrative, with particular pastoral emphases, rather than exhaustive. 
0 Conversely, some lists elucidate a more global response to the Christian proclamation. 
Thus the 'ladder' of 2 Peter 1: 5-7 is actually no such thing, since each term 
conceptually corresponds to the divine person and work of vvl-4. The 'faith' to be 
supported is already given (vl); 'goodness' (C(PETTI')parallels divine excellence (aPETT),, 
v3); 'knowledge' increases that already given (0); 'self-control' responds to the divine 
release from 'corruption' due to 'lust' (v4); 'endurance' is a response to promises (v4); 
'godliness' reflects 'participation' in the divine nature' (v4), and 'mutual affection' 
follows from the participants (i(otvwvoI) being a group, not a monad. The ladder is in 
fact a mirror, a pattern of fitting response to divine reality. 
Interestingly ayaTTq-with no obvious correspondence to what precedes-seems rather 
to reflect its typically Christian role as "the unitary orientation" behind, in this case, a 
variety of responses that include self-control, endurance, knowledge and mutual 
affection. Again, the difference from classical versions of unity is substantial. 
This was the subject of my unpublished M. Th. dissertation (St Paul's Ethic, with Special Reference to 
Philippians 
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However, these manifold 'virtues' are not yet distilled into overarching 'natural' or 
'theological' virtues (with the exception of dydimq). That they are consistent with a good, 
theocentric universe might make them distillable in principle. But in their variance, they 
subtly describe agents in various confluences of affection toward aspects of that reality. 
Each 'virtue' sparkles as a facet of the same diamond. 
This virtue-catalogue is so centred (in a 'leap'-like way) upon the good of others divine and 
human, that little is logically achievable without reference to others. Furthermore, a 
Christian creative task is the invention of behaviours appropriate to specific others. That is, 
creativity resides in the 'person-specific' aspect of the task: acts of 'kindness', for example, 
differ according to the recipient. In this respect, the virtue catalogue reflects a form of 
freedom, including its deontological boundary conditions; and communities become a place 
participants can learn by craft-skill, and where I might learn from the evaluation of others 
about me. 
d) Conscience 
If there is a logic of love such as this thesis describes, then conscience is conceptually 
integral to virtue. We notice, with emotivists, that ethical discourse is often in the nature of 
an emotional outburst. But against emotivism, we retain a 'realist' mood, and humbly seek 
to clarify what aspect of generic or telic order is being affirmed or pursued or protected or 
defended in the outburst. This was handled by Aquinas in the language of the 'irascible' and 
the 'concupiscible', which offer insights into defences or pursuits of the soul's loves. 109 
Wherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the passions 
of the concupiscible appetite: since the concupiscence, on being aroused, 
diminishes anger; and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many 
cases. This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, as it were, the 
champion and defender of the concupiscible when it rises up against what 
hinders the acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, 
or against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for this 
reason all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the 
concupiscible appetite and ten-ninate in them; for instance, anger rises from 
sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy. For this reason 
also the quarrels of animals are about things concupiscible-namely, food 
and sex ... 
(Summa la. 81.2) 
Some modern counselling theory has arrived at a similar conclusion, and goes about its task 
by the suspension of evaluative judgments and advice-giving, and seeks with a client to 
determine those 'loves' to which a negative emotion might pertain. Thus sadness or grief 
might be a lost 'love'; helplessness the agent's inability to protect something loved; 
hopelessness the inability to attain something loved; despair all loves denied. In such 
4: 8 [Sydney: Australian College of Theology, 19971). 
"9 See above, 128,143 & 147. 
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models, anger can represent either a kind of secondary arousal to ward off one of these 
emotions; or a final, fundamental and powerful assertion of the moral worth of something, 
against serious denial of this worth-therefore akin, perhaps, to divine wrath. 
(Of course, when modern counselling attempts this suspension indefinitely, it deludes itself 
and tortures its language accordingly to maintain a non-evaluative pretence. Wherever there 
is emotional conflict,, ethical conflicts will lurk nearby. Counselling communities are 
committed in force to some vision, whether warped or sound, of moral order. Honest 
appraisals of this can only assist counselling; pretensions to modernist 'objectivity' cannot. ) 
The theological ethicist might then do well to borrow the skills of such a counsellor, 
seeking both to grasp the perceived importance of whatever is pursued or defended, and to 
convey our acceptance of the emotion so generated. This would be a clarificatory 'service 
of elucidation, perhaps preparatory to argumentative disagreement, or not, depending on 
the circumstance. 
In Christian thought, this clarification has traditionally overlapped with assessments of 
conscience. But the affective dimension to conscience has hovered elusively in 'peripheral 
vision'. as it were, possibly because the main focus has often been to establish or 
disestablish its epistemological authority. 
When God created man, he breathed into him something divine, as it were a 
hot and bright spark added to reason, which lit up the mind and showed him 
the difference between right and wrong. ... [T]he prophet bewails Ephraim 
and says, "Ephraim prevails against his adversary and treads down 
judgment. " The adversary here is conscience. Here the Gospel says, "Come 
to an agreement with your adversary ... " Why 
does he call conscience the 
adversary? It is called the adversary because it always opposes our evil 
desires and tells what we ought to do and we do not, or what we ought not to 
do and we do. "' 
In this early account (as in some later versions), the epistemic process relies on the presence 
of anxiety, hovering in an awareness peripheral to the actual problem. But such epistemic 
optimism misses humanity's improperly ordered loves, which render conscience a fatally 
flawed basis for deliberation. Nevertheless, our investigation accords great value to 
conscience in the task of reflection, to help elucidate what I love. The ordering of those 
loves will need to be evaluated from elsewhere however. 
"' Dorotheos of Gaza (6 th c. ), Didaskaliai 3. Cited by Oliver O'Donovan, 22 November 2000, 
in 'The Subjective 
Measure', a seventh lecture of eight in a series entitled How To Think About How To Act, 
for Oxford Honour Schools 
and B. Th. papers in Christian Moral Reasoning. 
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it is at this point that the attempt by Callahan, already briefly touched upon, "' is intriguing. 
We already observed the complexity of his "fully extended, fully inclusive, circular, parallel 
processing of the dynamic interplays of consciousness. " To his credit, what he has also 
noticed (and which to a very large extent accounts for the complexity of the process), is the 
moral ambiguity of the emotions since "the best strategy would include both trusting and 
skeptical awareness of all of one's capacities and reactions", such that there are "fleeting 
negative feelings that may be most in danger of defensive suppression" and emotions that 
are to be "rationally and emotionally assessed for appropriateness, or for their infantile or 
qualitative characteristics. Deficits and numbness should also be considered. " This looks 
altogether like a reinvention of older discussions of conscience for a new language. But 
what it lacks (and what it must lack, given our complaints over 'emotion') is any decision 
about the moral ordering of the decision-maker's loves. Callahan offers an interesting 
summary of recent views about expressions of emotion in reference to ethics, largely in an 
uncontroversial descriptive mode. But the language of science starts to crumble under its 
own weight (like Stevenson's emotivism, which it reflects) when deployed even for 
elementary ethical concepts: 
[T]he building blocks of moral thinking are imbued with emotion. The 
human mind gives evidence of actively creating units consisting of fused 
thoughts and emotions and then storing these constructions in long-term 
memory. These cognitive-affective constructs, the thing and the feeling- 
about-the-thing, appear to be encoded in complex networks of memory, some 
of which may be complex or extensive enough to be called narratives, 
4scripts', 'scenes' or 'scenarios'. Moral sentiments consist of such fusions of 
things joined with feelings about the thing, as for instance, 'torture == [sic] 
wrong, disgusting, ' or 'truthtelling = good. ' As we think through a moral 
conflict or question we call up memory stores and inevitably have our 
thinking shaped by linked associations. "' 
Elsewhere, the cumulative effect of this leads him to employ another language: 
[E]motional responses, especially moral sentiments, indicate the achievement 
of self-development and those 'habits of the heart, known as moral character. 
As the philosopher Iris Murdoch has expressed this ... I" 
But 'other' language must sometimes be unavailable to him: 
All of the 'defenses' enumerated in psychoanalytic thinking are activations of 
cogn iti ve -affective structures to deploy attention away 
from painful reality, 
or if that fails, to distort what is perceived and felt. Persons who constantly 
and rigidly use these strategies to avoid pain finally so cripple their emotional 
capacities that their cognitive and emotional functioning becomes 
See above, 13. 
Callahan, 10- 11 
113 Ibid., II- 
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maladaptive by any standards, whether one talks about neurosis, regression, 
or moral immaturity. "' 
Or perhaps more obviously, for the Christian reader, 'a seared conscience' or 'hardness of 
heart'! "' What Callahan struggles to join, Biblical virtue language speaks as one, encoding a 
normative ethic with certain emotive postures. In this way emotions and ethical 
commitments become intelligible alongside one another, in a manner that is more quickly 
accessible and understandable to people than are most modem modes of discourse over 
ethics (or over emotion for that matter). Various virtues emerge as the mind fuses' an 
emotion to an ethical commitment. But the possibility of so joining the virtue's components, 
inheres already within the order of reality. 
They are certainly so 'fused' in the minds of those who speak the 'ethico-emotional' 
language of Scripture (and likewise perhaps, that of other older traditions). Biblical 
language, and the theology formed out of it, comes well equipped to elucidate the 
relationship between ethics and emotion, and to diagnose its confusions. 
In this chapter, I have shown that theology's 'logic of love' is 'something more' than virtue, 
generating a unique conception of it. Virtue is richly emotional, and is instrumental to 
action within the moral field (rather than being instrumental to the discernment of moral 
order). This is as opposed to a neo-Aristotelian project that understands virtue generically 
and universally, and seeks a common rational ground for virtuous conduct, perhaps to 
supplant all prior deontic conceptions. 
Virtue can act as a statement of aim, and of affirmation given and received. It is not a 
suitable predicate for se4f-description. Theological virtue-language names various 
confluences of affection to the order of reality, and various virtues emerge as the mind 
brings emotions and ethical commitments together. Virtues thereby provide a language brief 
enough for quick deliberation, and since this language does not direct specific acts, it gives 
a 'space' for creative freedom to 'invent' actions befitting specific others. Christian 
communities become places for the learning of virtue by craft-skill, and from others' 
evaluation of them. Conscience is related insofar as it provides a means for reflection on the 
current state of an agent's loves. 
814 Ibid. 
"' For the former, see I Tim. 4: 2. For the latter see Mk 3: 5 & 10: 5; Rom. 2: 5; Eph. 4: 18-19 (and quotations of 
Is. 6: 9-10 in the gospels and in Acts 28: 26-27). 
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The Macintyre of After Virtue wistfully hoped for an ethic of virtue founded on community 
practise. "We are waiting ... for another-doubtless very different-St. Bened 
ict. 119 16 
Meilaender's retort is apt. "Perhaps ... the St. Benedict for whom we wait is not so different 
from the first one. ""' We turn, finally, to the account best served by a new Benedict. 
816 Meilaender, 2, citing Maclntyre, After Virtue, 245. 
"I Meilaender, 17. 
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PART III: 
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOGIC OF LOVE 
Having shown how the logic of love culminates in a theological theory of virtue, the final 
chapter will consider some implications for the logic of love in a modern polis-a situation, 
of course, already deeply considered in Augustine's metaphor of two cities "mixed 
indistinguishably together in every earthly State""', where "[e]ach desires its own kind of 
peace, and, when they have found what they sought, each lives its own kind of peace. "'19 
In this chapter, I will engage with one form of modern 'peace', the consumer economy. 
Theology's logic of love reveals that in this vision of 'peace', one 'aspect' of love is excised 
from the others, to serve a dubious end in a state of constant voracity. In turn, this warps the 
consciousness brought to modern ethical discussions, causing the problems under 
consideration (and even the interpersonal relationships with which they are concerned) to be 
construed as problems of consumption. I bring the logic of love to this warped 
consciousness to recover aspects of the moral field that have been missed. 
I end the thesis with a collection of briefer comments. I flag a series of discussions (and a 
non-discussion) that could be pursued with liberal political philosophy, but I make no 
attempt to have these discussions. I show how the logic of love might explain the scenarios 
and answer the questions asked in the introduction to Part One. I suggest that theology's 
logic of love makes the best sense of moral identity. 
818 R. W. Dyson, The Pilgrim City: Social and Political Ideas in the Writings of St. Augustine of Hippo (Woodbridge: 
Boydell Press, 2001), 211. 
"' Augustine, De civ. Dei, 581 (XIV. I). 
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Chapter IX: The Logic of Love and the Earthly City 
Having seen an Enlightenment and a Nietzschean approach to the relationship between 
ethics and emotion, a 'logic of love' has been offered as the theological alternative to 
account for the relationship. Theology's account of virtue includes this logic (in all its 
senses), giving a varied, nuanced language by which agents can relate their affections to the 
moral field. In this orienting role, virtue assists agents to participate in the divine reordering 
of their loves (in concert with other 'boundary conditions' that delimit what is good in the 
moral field). The subtle brevity of this language assists in quick deliberation, and variously 
assists Christian communities. 
In this chapter, I will go beyond the domain of Christian communities to consider some 
implications of the logic of love for the modern polis. Basic to this account will be 
Augustine's conception of two entangled cities, each seeking their own form of peace 
according to their own logics of love. 
In Section One, I examine the consumer economy, where an emaciated teleology strips 
desire of telic order, to maximise the transfer of capital. Social relations are displaced by 
commodity fetish, making ethics marginal and incoherent. I expand on these ethical 
implications in Section Two, where I show that relationships are construed as commodities, 
with ethical questions taking the form and structures of the consumer economy. 
Section Three uses theology's logic of love to 'audit' the consciousness of the consumer 
economy. I will utilise O'Donovan's analytic of love's 'aspects' for assistance. The logic of 
love brings intelligibility to envy; names modern Pelagianism (and its ruinous outcomes); 
'decodes' the disorders of parental love; and offers a true 'identity' in place of false ones. 
Section Four gestures toward some directions for future conversation amidst the complexity 
of liberal political philosophy, and I will finish the thesis by suggesting in Section Five that 
theology's logic of love makes 'the best sense' of moral realities that surround us. 
It is in the nature of disorder that some forms of thought will refuse to participate in the 
reordering of its loves. Ever since NT Christians lived in tangled proximity to pagan 
neighbours, Christian theology knew that openness about its logic of love neither harmed its 
cause nor swept all before it. Cognisant of this, Augustine extended upon biblical metaphors 
to tell pagan Rome of two 'cities' or societies, competing for cultural space, whose citizenry 
live respectively 'for self (in disordered love) or 'for God' (participating in the divine 
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reordering of love). "Each desires its own kind of peace, and, when they have found what 
they sought, each lives its own kind of peace. "10 The uneasiness of their coexistence 
follows from differing 'logics of love' concerning 'peace'. 
The competition of these 'entangled' cities for cultural space is affirmed by Nietzsche, 
whose concern is clearly to 'free' people from the Augustinian city. Any surprise that there 
are two such cities come only to 'dwellers' in the 'no man's land' between thern-contested 
zones over which the influence of each 'city' ebbs and flows. This territory was extensively 
colonised during the Enlightenment. 
But for those consciously 'dwelling' in either 'city', the metaphor uncontroversially names 
the estimate formed by 'citizens' of each 'city' toward the postures of the other, regarding 
them as lifeless, boring, dull, futile, or whatever. The uneasiness of their coexistence is 
constituted by the regard each 'city' has of the other as a tragic aberration of its glorious 
self. Nietzsche's egoistic naturalism decried what he construed as Christianity's 
pusillanimous, degenerate draining of humanity's birthrights. Similarly, when Augustine 
views the Nietzschean aspects of Rome (through what Calvin would later call the 'lenses' 
of Scripture), there straightforwardly follows denunciation of humanity as deprived, 
deluded, and beset by conflicting impulses. 
In this respect the two cities cannot help but be missionary states, and at various times and 
in sundry places, each 'city' employs a variety of strategies to woo those on the fringe of 
the other. They know the logic of their love. (Unlike, I suggest, the Enlightenment's 
'objectivity', which imagines its pitted, blasted and very temporary 'no man's land' to be an 
enduring park of permanent residence). 
"' Here is the full quotation: 
Though there are many great nations throughout the world, living according to 
different rites and customs, and distinguished by many different forms of language, 
arms and dress, there nonetheless exists only two orders, as we may call them, of 
human society: and, following our Scriptures, we may rightly speak of these two as 
cities. The one is made up of men who live according to the flesh, and the other of 
those who live according to the spirit. Each desires its own kind of peace, and, when 
they have found what they sought, each lives its own kind of peace. (Ibid., XIV. 1) 
This concept is evident from the start of De div. Dei (3, Lpref); but the second half of the work sees particular 
emphasis upon this 'entanglement' of one among the other: e. g. 448 (X. 32); 450 (XIA); 
498 (XILI); 511 (XII. 9); cf. 
587 (XIVA) & 632 (XIV. 28). 
The view is not confined to one biblical author. Cf Ps. 119: 19-20 & v54; 
Mt. 5: 13-16 (perhaps); Rom. 12: 2-, 
2 Cor. 6: 14-18 (but noting 'entanglement' as a given in I Cor. 5: 10); 2 Cor. 10: 2-3; Eph. 2: 19; Phil. 3: 20; 
1 Pt. 1: 1,17; 2: 9-11; Heb. 11: 13. 
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1. 'Peace'by consumption: desire as meaning 
What, then, is the peace of the modern earthly city, and what is its logic of love? There are 
various ways to answer this. Charles Taylor's Sources of the Se4f, which I will examine 
below, shows that there may be a number of competing answers. But here I will consider a 
nakedly pursued and aggressively defended vision of peace and love: the consumer 
economy. 
a) Questioning 'consumer economy' 
"The dissociation of sensibility, which T. S. Eliot so confidently claimed was the hallmark 
of modern life, returns to a unity in the consuming life. Reason and passion unite in the 
metaphysics of the brand. ""' James B. Twitchell promotes a liberal and middle-class 
domestication of Nietzsche that is joyfully exuberant over the act of consumption. Peter 
Stearns, a historian of emotion, cites five studies which find that in our century, "[g]rowing 
approval of envy has adjusted to the needs of a consumer economy. 59822 Historical enquiry 
seeks only to notice and document 'adjustments' such as these, leaving others-such as 
ourselves-to ask whether the change is sustainable or defensible. We might also wonder if 
approved-envy would remain 'envy', or whether it would become something else. A more 
searching question asks if the 'adjustment' points to any other ethical 'adjustments'. 
Of 'consumer economy' itself, we might ask: what is it, and what are the 'needs' toward 
which the adjustment has taken place? John Milbank's account of the drift from 
'Christendom' to modem secularity suggests that the beginnings of the 'adjustment' are to 
be found long before we might ever have suspected: 
Montesquieu ... suggest[s] that, 
for the beginnings of a capitalist economy, it 
was not sufficient that the old guild and corporation restrictions on 
production, trade and usury be lifted. This merely negative picture assumes 
that the 'desire for wealth' is natural and unproblematic. Instead, the 
capitalist take-off presupposed a shift in the very economy of desire. 
Previously, modes of public style and behaviour were regarded as desirable 
or otherwise because they were ultimately related to accepted standards of the 
common good. Now, by contrast, public style and behaviour becomes the 
subject of fashion and of an endless 'diversion'. What now matters, as 
thinkers like Montesquieu and Helvetius noted, is not the 'proper' object of 
desire but rather the promotion of desire itself, and the manipulation and 
control of this process. Only this reversal of the order of priority between 
desire and goal permitted a new code of social practice where people could 
start to see themselves as primarily 'producers' and 'consumers'. For to 
cabstract desire' corresponded a new 'abstract wealth', meaning the 
821 James B. Twitchell, Lead Us Into Temptation: The Triumph of American Materialism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999), 177-78. 
... Peter N. Stearns, "History of Emotions: Issues of Change and Impact, " in Handbook of Emotions: Second Edition, 
eds Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, (New York; London: Guilford Press, 2000), 23. 
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maximum diversification and increase of production, and the maximum 
circulation of products and their representative species through exchange. 823 
None of Milbank's citations in support"' actually form this point, seeming mainly to 
concern the rise of what Foucault discusses as 'mercantilism'. But by drawing upon their 
scattered references to desire, Milbank has made a semi-intuitive leap that seems most 
helpful. If the ordered desire of Aelred and Jane Austin's "something more" seem 
unintelligible to us, then an account of the unintelligibility is required. This can in part be 
found in a modern collusion between desire and mass consumption. 
Whether there were ever "accepted standards of common good" is debatable, but Milbank's 
main point stands, even if what was generally accepted in debates about common good was 
the existence of a realist moral order with generic and telic dimensions (although various 
accounts of this order may have been given). 
Perhaps the impoverished teleology that engendered "reversal of the order of priority 
between desire and goal", was in train for Montesquieu to observe; but now, this 
impoverishment renders 'ordered' desire unintelligible. The 'bottom line' and 'cash value' 
of this "rotation of crops",,, is precisely a bottom line and a cash value, a social mandate to 
produce and consurnefor the creation of wealth. 
b) Commodityfetish as displaced social love 
This is Marx's point. "In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, 
we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and 
climes. 
"826 
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all 
feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley 
feudal ties that bound man to his 'natural superiors, ' and ... has left no other 
bond between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash 
payment. ' It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of 
chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of 
egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, 
and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms has set up that 
single, unconscionable freedom-Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, 
veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, 
direct, brutal exploitation. ... The 
bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every 
John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 33. 
824 Montesquieu, "The Spirit of Laws, " in The Political Theory of Montesquieu, ed. Melvin Richter, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977), 190,199; Eric Voeglin, "Helvetius and the Genealogy of Passions, " in From 
Enlightenment to Revolution, ed. Eric Voeglin, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1975); Michel Foucault, The 
Order of Things (London: Tavistock, 1970), 166-214. 
82' This is Kierkegaard's phrase for an endless parade of diversions from boredom. See above, 204. 
826 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848), tr. Samuel Moore, Great Books of the 
Western World edition, including Capital, vol. 50 (Chicago: Encyclopwdia Britannica and the University of Chicago, 
1990), 421. 
Page 263 
occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has 
converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage labourers. 111 
Of course Marx unfolds this to propound the fundamental basis of capital as the commodity, 
which "by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another. The nature of such 
wants, whether, for instance, they spring from the stomach or from fancy, makes no 
difference. ""' Marx distinguishes commodities from objects made by people who are 
known to each other in, say, a village. "' These ob ects are not commodities, even if they j 
meet needs, for in the commodity there inheres a form of 'fetishism'. His somewhat 
counter- intuitive claim (especially so when reading him from within modern capitalism), is 
that the fetish we bring to the commodity does not inhere in some raw, natural 'value' of the 
thing, but is present to the extent that humans have worked it. "This fetishism of 
commodities has its origin ... in the peculiar social character of the tabour that produces 
them. " In this way commodities take on an air of mystery, "because in it the social character 
of men's tabour appears ... as an objective character stamped upon the product of that 
tabour", and social relations begin to be expressed as something else-the products of 
labour. 110 Money is of course based upon this valuable social good, but serves precisely to 
conceal it. "' 
Sadly, here is not the place to watch Marx's account of capital unfold, nor to discourse upon 
its subsequent history. Suffice to note the simple power of the initial observation. Its 
intriguing corollary would seem to be that in acts of purchase and consumption, there often 
resides a form of emotion that might more properly belong to the world of social 
relationships. Anyone who has indulged in 'retail therapy' might recognise this fetishistic 
emotion. (As shoppers, we do well to ask if such self-administered 'therapy' is in lieu of 
some failure in our own social relationships. ) 
On Marx's account, the 'proper home' of this fetishistic emotion-the world of social 
relationships-is essentially lost, even down to the level of the family, since capitalism has 
"torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a 
827 Ibid., 420. 
82' Karl Marx, Capital (1883), ed. Friedrich Engels, tr. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, Great Books of the 
Western World edition, including Manifesto of the Communist Party, vol. 50 (Chicago: 
Encyclopwdia Britannica and 
the University of Chicago, 1990), 13. 
829 Ibid., 34. 
131 Ibid., 3 1. 
831 Ibid., 33. 
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mere money relation. "", Jijrgen Habermas believes that since Marx, the only change to this 
critique is the mode of alienation: 
[I]n advanced capitalist countries the standard of living has ... risen to such an extent, at least among broad strata of the population, that the interest in the 
emancipation of society can no longer be articulated directly in economic 
terms. 'Alienation' has been deprived of its palpable economic force as 
misery. At most, the pauperism of alienated labor finds its remote reflection 
in a poverty of alienated leisure-scurvy and rickets are preserved today in 
the form of psychosomatic disturbances, hunger and drudgery in the 
wasteland of externally manipulated motivation, in the satisfaction of needs 
which are no longer 'one's own'-the more sublime form of deprivation is 
no longer even specific to one class. The 'deprivations' have become more 
secret, even if as consuming as ever. "' 
934 Thus against the bourgeoisie and with "a world to win", the workingmen of the world did 
not unite. With the world now on offer to consume, collusion with the bourgeoisie seemed 
rather more sensible. "Consumerism is not forced on us. It is not against our better 
judgment. It is", asserts James B. Twitchell, "our better judgment. ""' 
c The ethical incoherence of 'consumer economy' 
On the Habermas account, this "better judgment" is our undoing. But Twitchell aligns 
himself with those liberal defenders of American commercialism who are dissatisfied with 
the negativity of Marxist interpretations originating in the Frankfurt school, and who find 
them to be lacking as an account of actual consumerist behaviour. 836 His repeatedly asserted 
(if not exactly argued) thesis is that contrary to the Frankfurt school, no 'false 
consciousness' is at work in consumers, since they know exactly what they are doing: they 
consume precisely in order to bring meaning to their lives. 
in the way we live now, it is simply impossible to consume objects without 
consuming meaning. Meaning is pumped and drawn everywhere throughout 
the modem commercial world, into the farthest reaches of space and into the 
smallest divisions of time. Commercialism is the water we all swim in, the air 
we breathe, our sunlight and shade. Currents of desire flow around objects 
like smoke in a wind tunnel. "' 
Because of this, Twitchell is impressed by sociological functions in consumption that he 
understands to replace those of a previous generation's religion (which, in turn, are only 
intelligible to him as an alternative version of consumption). 
832 Marx and Engels, Manifesto, 420. 
833 Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice tr. John Viertel, (Cambridge: Polity, 1988; originally published 1971), 
195-96. 
834 Marx and Engels, Manifesto, 434. 
835Twitchell, 11. 
816 Ibid., 41-43 & nn. 11,12. 
837 Ibid., 283. 
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As Max Weber first argued ... much of the Protestant Reformation was 
geared toward denying the holiness of many things that the Catholic Church 
had endowed with meanings. From the inviolable priesthood to the sacrificial 
holy water, this deconstructive movement systematically unloaded meaning. 
Soon the marketplace would capture this offloaded meaning and apply it to 
secular things. Buy this, you'll be saved. You deserve a break today. You, 
you're the one. We are the company that cares about you. You're worth it. 
You're in good hands. We care. Trust in us. We are here for you. We have 
grown not weaker but stronger by accepting these self evidently ridiculous 
myths that sacralize mass-produced objects; we have not wasted away but 
have proved inordinately powerful; have not devolved into barbarism, but 
seem to have marginally improved. Dreaded affluenza notwithstanding, 
commercialism has lessened pain. Most of us have more pleasure and less 
discomfort in our lives than most of the people most of the time in all of 
history. "' 
In the nature of this case, where desire, consumption and 'meaning' are celebrated as 
resident within each other, ethical questions are marginal at best. Thus in his largely 
celebratory account of consumption, the "intractable poor" who remain visible (and yet 
who,, at 4% of the United States, represent a number of people equal to roughly double the 
population of Sydney, Australia) are only at a disadvantage in that they cannot join in to 
consume more than they do. 119 Similarly, those in serious debt impress Twitchell only by 
their relative rarity, since 95.5% of consumer debt gets paid. There are a "few" who 
"become delinquent and default, 110 even if the 4.5% default rate of this "few", calculated just 
from the $US600 billion credit card debt that Twitchell mentions elsewhere '841 would cover 
what the United Kingdom government spends on housing and the environment in a year. 
There are moments when he notices some negatives in consumerist culture, such as inherent 
wastefulness, recklessness and the encouragement of gambling. 841 Although "shopaholics" 
and kleptomaniacs are discussed, of the former Twitchell can say I admit it is hard to take 
this affliction seriously. 11843 Overall, consumerism makes for "a more democratic world, a 
more egalitarian world, and, I think, a more interesting world. 11844 A cynical, or non- 
sequential, use of 'should' is offered in support-in either case, ethics is marginal: 
"While 
this is dreary and depressing to some, as doubtless it should be, it is liberating and 
11841 democratic to many more. 
"' Ibid., 30-3 1. 
... Ibid., 32. 
840 Ibid., 34. 
841 Ibid., 250 n. 8. 
842 Ibid., 284. 
843 Ibid., 252 n. 10. 
844 Ibid., 285,286. 
845 Ibid. 
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But for some observers within the market, ethical incoherence is not as easily side-stepped. 
The Redefining Progress organisation 846 finds ethical incoherence intrinsic to standard 
economic indicators, with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) under fire as main target. 
In John Ruskin's nineteenth-century neologism, an economy produces "illth" as well as 
wealth, but conventional measures of well-being simply collapse these two into the one 
indicator. Transfers of funds for, say, weddings, are added together in the same GDP that 
includes fund transfers for divorces and the rehousing of divorcees. GDP might rise when 
measuring, for example, growth in public infrastructure and reduction of poverty, but it also 
rises when family relationships deteriorate (whether from the over-watching of television or 
from divorce), and when illness, habitat destruction and crime rise. GDP also fails 
adequately to reflect goods such as volunteer work or evils such as chronic unemployment. 
Our point about desire and consumption is well-made: 
Then there's the question of addictive consumption. Free-market 
fundamentalists are inclined to attack critics of the GDP as 'elitists. ' People 
buy things because they want them, they say, and who knows better than the 
people themselves what adds to well-being? It makes a good one liner. But is 
the truth really so simple? Some 40 percent of the [U. S. ] nation's drinking 
exceeds the level of 'moderation, ' defined as two drinks a day. Credit-card 
abuse has become so pervasive that local chapters of Debtors Anonymous 
hold forty-five meetings a week in the San Francisco Bay area alone. Close to 
50 percent of Americans consider themselves overweight. When one 
considers the $32 billion diet industry, the GDP becomes truly bizarre. It 
counts the food that people wish they didn't eat, and then the billions they 
spend to lose the added pounds that result. The coronary bypass patient 
becomes almost a metaphor for the nation's measure of progress: shovel in 
the fat, pay the consequences, add the two together, and the economy grows 
some more. 847 
Against this, a new measure of progress is proposed-the 'Genuine Progress Indicator' 
(GPI), which accounts as either plusses or minuses an array of factors, including the 
household and volunteer economy; crime and defensive expenditures; distribution of 
income; resource depletion and habitat degradation; and loss of leisure. Cobb et. al. are not 
unaware of the opposition they face in this: 
Economists have couched their resistance to new indicators mainly in 
philosophical terms. A measure of national progress must be scientific and 
value-free, they say. Any attempt to assess how the economy actually affects 
people would involve too many assumptions and imputations, too many 
value judgments regarding what to include. Better to stay on the supposed 
terra firma of the GDP, which for all its faults has acquired an aura of 
hardheaded empirical science. "' 
84' Details of the group are published at , 
http: //NN! ww. rpi-o(-)res,.,. oi, (-.,, (accessed April 2003). A manifesto of sorts is 
Clifford Cobb, et al., "If the GDP is UP, Why is America Down, " Atlantic Monthly 276 no. 4 (1995). 
847 Ibid., 67. 
848 Ibid., 70 
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Perhaps we should pause to observe that the authors may be too close to their subject for 
complete clarity. As a measure of total monetary exchange, GDP simply quantifies another 
aspect of reality, as in the manner of any science. It is the unwarranted conclusion that this 
measure represents progress which demands refutation. These authors imply that all 
economists make this unwarranted conclusion, when it is equally possible that economists 
only seek to defend GDP as a simple measure of monetary exchange. Of course, we suspect 
that economists vary in the degree to which they are clear on the difference between GDP 
and progress; and the authors have certainly named a confusion in popular and political use 
of the GDP. Their own GPI should not replace the GDP, but should rather complement it. 
The authors would also need to accept that robust ethical debate is needed over the 
constitutive elements of a GPI (including whether 'progress' is even the correct metaphor in 
which to speak of a society's well-being). There may even have to be different GPIs, each 
reflecting different visions of the good in liberal society. 
Nonetheless, these authors are in a better position to judge (concerning American society, at 
least) the degree to which there is hostility to a GPI, even as a complementary index. 
Resistance as high as they claim is consistent with a free-trade milieu where 'freedom' is 
constituted in the maximum possible license accorded to desire, in order to maximise the 
transference of capital. In such a milieu, the detriment to free-trade of any prior moral 
ordering for 'emotion' would preclude any recognition of it. Any personal or social moral 
governance of desire, where expressed as consumption, will be vigorously challenged. 
These, obviously, are the real stakes when (for example) social censorship of sexually 
explicit material is discussed. Opposition to censorship is (to borrow from a different 
discussion) probably "born not of the logic of argument but of the logic of capital 
iSM. "849 
We should, therefore, begin to wonder whether these stakes are also at issue, more covertly 
perhaps, in other arenas of ethical debate. 
2. Relationships as modes ofconsumption 
I have suggested that in consumer economy, an emaciated teleology excises desire from any 
teleological ordering, to maximise the transfer of capital, and social relations are displaced 
by commodity fetish. This makes ethical questions marginal, and creates an ethical 
incoherence that must largely be regarded as incidental to the transfer of capital. 
"I Michael Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 128. 
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I will now expand on the ethical implications. Not only are social ethics incoherent and 
ethical questions marginalised: relationships themselves are construed as commodities, and 
ethical questions take the form and structure dictated by consumer economy. 
a) Relationships as commodity 
In a final twist to the displacement of social relations by commodity fetish, social relations 
themselves-by now so much subject to alienation that they have ceased to be intelligible 
as social relations-become commodified into zones of consumption. "After all, we are all 
consumers now, consumers of everything-consumers of health services, consumers of 
things and ideas, consumers of political representation, even consumers of what high 
culture there is left. "851 The market's institution and endorsement of disordered desire 
transparently invites consumption of each other in various ways. Ample demonstration 
could be given by reference to advertising, although there is no controversy here and the 
point would be wearisome. 
Of far greater import is that within this kind of consciousness, consumption of the other 
becomes plainly evident in modern ethical discourse, which inexorably patterns itself as if 
everything is an act of free-market consumption. When embryo research is legitimated by 
its benefits 'for medicine' (and we might pause to ask, 'for whom? '), the consumptive act is 
no mere metaphor. (Michael Banner's related argument wonders if the practise of abortion 
"is the practice of competition, born not of the logic of argument but of the logic of 
capitalism. ""') Or, when the main legitimisation for sexual behaviour is sexual self-identity, 
sexual 'rights' are an adjunct to consumer 'rights', with a correlative 'sex industry', where 
people may consume each other as required. (When the liberal circumscription against 
'harm to others' is invoked to limit this consumption, the 'resource' becomes renewable. ) 
When an occasional pious paean to the elderly remembers them as not merely an 
'inspiration' or a 'national treasure', but as a 'resource', the best that is being said of them is 
that some unused residue in them befits our munificent consumption. Or, the crossover of 
desire and consumption into thought about marriage, can manifest itself in no other way 
than reduced rates of marriage and increased rates of divorce, as 'partners' become 
intelligible as at best, a kind of accessory. Or as Wendell Berry puts it: 
Marriage, in what is evidently its most popular version, is now on the one 
hand an intimate 'relationship' involving (ideally) two successful careerists 
in the same bed, and on the other hand a sort of private political system in 
which rights and interests must be asserted and defended. Marriage, in other 
words, has now taken the form of divorce: a prolonged and impassioned 
Twitchell, 23. 
"' Banner, Christian Ethics, 128. 
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negotiation as to how things shall be divided. During their understandably temporary association, the 'married' couple will typically consume a large 
quantity of merchandise and a large portion of each other. "' 
Two more examples illustrate the point. 
b) Children andwantedness-' 
Certain kinds of childbirth, where "parents who begot a child did so for the sake of the 
parents who were to care for it", have long been observed "implicitly [to convert] the child 
from a person to a commodity" (presence or absence of payment notwithstanding), since a 
parental relationship is incurred only to alienate 
it. 851 
Such commodification might also inhere in the 'wanting' of children. But this claim seems 
problematic when at least one point of happy agreement between Christian theology and 
most other forms of thought has been that for people to want children is an uncontroversial 
example of something both 'right' and 'natural'. In Christian thought, the joyful recognition 
of God's gracious gift of new life exemplifies right desire. The sin of Onan (irrespective of 
later abuses of Gen. 38: 8-9) was the refusal to assist in begetting offspring who, under laws 
of levirate marriage, would not legally be his own. His action is unheard of, biblically 
speaking, and its malevolence lies in his refusal to see new life ordained by God as a good 
far surpassing his own political concerns. In biblical thought about children, disordered 
desire manifests as the failure so to 'want'. 
However, there is a newer version of 'wanting', intelligible only given the modern rationale 
of desire, which understands itself actually to grant moral status as a fief. Peter Singer is a 
well known advocate of this view, 854 arguing that a new-born child "who is clearly not a 
person in the ethically relevant sense" somehow acquires her moral status later. This moral 
status derives from her emerging capacities, from the degree to which both parents attach to 
her, and from her acceptance into a wider moral community. "Could we return to a view of 
infants more like that of ancient Greece, in which a public ceremony a short time after birth 
marked not only the parents' decision to accept the child but also society's conferral on it of 
the status of a person? " Until such a ceremony, the child's moral status remains provisional, 
for it waits to be "accepted as having the same right to life as others. " This provisional 
status can summarily be withdrawn, it is suggested, up to (an "admittedly ... arbitrary") 
"' Wendell Berry, What are People For? (London: Routledge, 1990), 180. My thanks to Brian Brock for this 
quotation. 
Oliver M. T. O'Donovan, Begotten or Made? (London: Oxford University Press, 1984), 37. 
854 Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 216-17, and for quotations following. 
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twenty-eight days after birth; but thankfully, since "a right to life is a more serious matter" 
than rights to vote or drive, Singer avers that: 
The strongest argument for treating infants as having a right to life from the 
moment of birth is simply that no other line has the visibility and self- 
evidence required to mark the beginning of a socially recognised right to life. 
This is a powerful consideration; maybe in the end it is even enough to tilt 
the balance against a change in the law in this area. On that I remain 
unsure. 855 
I will return shortly to Singer's uncertainty. 
c) Identity and unwantedness 
In apotemnophilia, the apoternnophiliac wants to be an amputee. A new epidemic of this 
condition also seems to reflect the consciousness-shifting that has taken place in the 
consumer economy. Carl Elliott describes the language of self used by these people: 
I have been struck by the way [apotemnophiliacs] use the language of 
identity and selthood in describing their desire to lose a limb. "I have always 
felt I should be an amputee. " "I felt, this is who I was. " "It is a desire to see 
myself, be myself, as I 'know' or 'feel' myself to be. " This kind of language 
has persuaded many clinicians that apotemnophilia [is] a problem of body 
image. What true apotemnophiles share ... is the feeling [says surgeon Robert Smith, who amputates for apotemnophiliacs] "that their body is 
incomplete with their normal complement of four limbs. " Smith has 
elsewhere speculated that apotemnophilia is not a psychiatric disorder but a 
neuropsychological one, with biological roots. Perhaps it has less to do with 
desire than with being stuck in the wrong body. 
Yet what exactly does it mean to be stuck in the wrong body? For the past 
several years I have been working with a research group interested in 
problems surrounding the use of medical interventions for personal 
enhancement. One of the issues we have struggled with is how to understand 
people who use the language of self and identity to explain why they want 
these interventions: a man who says he is "not himself' unless he is on 
Prozac; a woman who gets breast-reduction surgery because she is "not the 
large-breasted type"; a bodybuilder who says he took anabolic steroids 
because he wants to look on the outside the way he feels on the inside; and- 
perhaps most common-transsexuals whose experience is described as 
"being trapped in the wrong body. " The image is striking, and more than a 
little odd. In each case the true self is the one produced by medical science. 856 
The collusion of desire and consumption is disclosed in the surgeon's vicarious 
consumption of the limb. In Bernard Mandeville's provocative Grumbling Hive, the human 
'hive' thrives on the basis of meeting the basest human desires, but then in an about face, it 
attains honesty and banishes vice-thus losing its status as a great and comfortable nation- 
state. Mandeville's "moral" is plain enough: 
THEN leave Complaints: Fools only strive 
To make a Great an honest Hive. 
T'enjoy the World's Conveniencies, 
Ibid., 217. 
856 Carl Elliott, "A New Way to Be Mad, " The Atlantic Monthly 286 no. 6 (2000): 74. 
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Be famed in War, yet live in Ease 
Without great Vices, is a vain 
Eutopia seated in the Brain. 
Hunger's a dreadful Plague no doubt, 
Yet who digests or thrives without? 
Nay, where the People would be great, 
As necessary to the State, 
As Hunger is to make 'em eat. 
Bare Vertue can't make Nations live 
In Splendour; they, that would revive 
A Golden Age, must be as free, 
For Acorns, as for Honesty. 857 
In an older comment by W. R. Sorley, Mandeville "was clever enough to detect the luxury 
and vice that gather round the industrial system, and perverse enough to mistake them for 
its foundation. ""' A decision has to be made for or against Sorley's quip, since by some 
modem estimates, Mandeville is a visionary. But Mandeville's 'hive' has produced 
apotemnophiliacs, surgeons willing to cut them, and a society puzzled over how otherwise 
to help them (and worried that 'help', other than by amputation, is a violation). This result 
should cause us wonder how such a consuming society became possible. Harvey Cox, not 
usually noted for his rigorous Augustinianism, laments: 
I am usually a keen supporter of ecumenism. But the contradictions between 
the world views of the traditional religions on the one hand and the world 
view of the Market religion on the other are so basic that no compromise 
seems possible, and I am secretly hoping for a rebirth of polemics. "' 
Theology's logic of love willingly contributes to this rebirth. 
3- Consumer society in the perspective of love's 'aspects' 
A consumer society emaciates teleology and orders desire to the maximisation of wealth. In 
the resultant shift in consciousness, ethical questions become construed as problems of 
consumption. I will now show how the logic of love 'audits' this consciousness and I will 
return to the analytic of love's 'aspects' for assistance. The logic of love brings 
intelligibility to envy; names modern Pelagianism (and its ruinous outcomes); 'decodes' the 
disorders of parental love; and offers a true 'identity' in place of false ones. 
4ý Y 
a) Aspects of love in consumerist perspective 
I have suggested a consuming society to have become possible because in 'consumer 
economy', "the promotion of desire itself'1860 mandates the maximum transference of capital, 
... Mandeville, 11.409-14,417-18 & 427-33. 
"I Sorley, 302. 
"9 Harvey Cox, "The Market as God, " The Atlantic Monthly 283 no. 3 (1999): 23. 
"I Milbank, 33. 
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but that this represents an emaciated teleology. However, further specificity is required in 
reference to theology's logic of love, and in this instance, O'Donovan's analysis of love's 
logic into a set of aspects is helpful. 16, 
This is a society for whom positive love (where subjects self-direct toward ends chosen for 
happiness) is radically excised from cosmic, rational and benevolent love (which 
respectively respond to the telos, order, and persons of the moral field). The latter three 
loves are privatised and considered optional; but a general agreement on the pre-eminence 
of positive love orders public life by sustaining 'consumer economy'. Clearly, only voracity 
and selective sight can follow, when positive love is robbed of the ordering it finds 
alongside the other aspects of love. (Consequently, voracity attains a highly respected status 
in ethical debate, as we have seen. ) 
A question above asked whether the 'approved-envy' of 'consumer economy' would remain 
6 envy' . 861 The 'aspects' of love also cast light on this question. In a milieu where positive 
love is generally the only aspect of love to receive general endorsement, then envy will 
seem churlish, because after all, people should be allowed to pursue their positive loves. But 
the approval will have a hollow ring, as people find themselves still to be envious. The 
force of Nietzsche's condemnation of ressentiment lies precisely in this kind of 
construction. When positive love is the only true love, envy is simply a physiological 
reaction at my own failure to achieve my positive loves against someone else's excellence. 
Thus ressentiment has no real moral claim. 
But within the logic of love, envy becomes intelligible. The presence of rational love and 
benevolent love may be at work if in 'envy' we are noticing someone (perhaps ourselves) 
who lacks necessary goods amidst the excess of the consumer economy, and (perhaps 
angrily) seeks justice for them. Conversely, envy may the absence of rational and 
benevolent love-and therefore truly a vice (rather than mere 'physiological' 
ressentiment)-since under divine reordering, these two aspects of love celebrate the 
enjoyment of various goods by precious others. In both cases, cosmic love (admittedly an 
odd way to speak of love for God) responds to telic order: God's ordering of others to 
himself makes people so precious that we care about them. We 'enjoy them in God'. 
861 See above, 117-118. 
862 See above, 262. 
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b) 'Consumer economy'as Pelagian 
To question this pre-eminence of positive love is generally taken by Nietzscheans as a 
denial of it. This erroneous fear is understandable. By calling for a reduction of the status of 
the only good they acknowledge, we appear, in their selective sight, to be emaciating 'life' 
rather than enhancing it. The usually pursuant charge is that theology is Manichean: it must 
hate desire, the body, and so on. 
This strategy, curiously, is reminiscent of ancient Pelagians, who also accused theologians 
of being Manichean. I will examine what follows from this parallel, showing that just as 
ancient Pelagians made facile diagnoses of miserable human problems, so also do 
proponents of 'consumer economy'. Yet this is done in the name of the enhancement of life. 
Like ancient Pelagians, Twitchell repeatedly attempts to characterise opponents as 
Manichean . 861 The allegation is that his opponents condemn desire itself Accordingly, 
44materialism" is said always to have been "fiercely denigrated" in Christian thought. 864 "At 
the heart of Christian orthodoxy is a fierce condemnation of the material world", and an 
apparently Manichean Christ is pronouncing against "commercialism" in Luke 6: 20-21, 
16: 13b, and 18: 18-25.161 Similarly, leftist sympathisers to the Frankfurt school are 
lampooned ad hominem by their enjoyment of the material order (they drive Volvos etc. ); 
the lampoon can only succeed if the targets are understood to be Manichean ascetics (who 
should therefore spurn material comforts). 
This construal of opponents as Manichean is significant, not because Twitchell is a poor 
scholar, but because his strategy typifies the Nietzschean ploy commonly used against 
Christian thought. (We have also seen such a ploy used by Nussbaum against Augustine . 866) 
Thus it becomes important for Twitchell's thesis (that consumption brings meaning) to 
deride an unnamed Archbishop of Canterbury, who said I do not read advertisements-I 
would spend all my time wanting things" on the basis that this Archbishop "quite forget[s] 
that indeed he does 'read advertisements' and that he does spend much time 'wanting 
things' as well as exchanging them. 
"867 
... Cf Augustine, De nupt et conc. 11 chapters 9,15,38,49 & 50-51 for the ancient Pelagian strategy to characterise 
orthodox opponents as Manichean. 
Twitchell, 61. 
865 Ibid., 62. Quite aside from the Manichean charge, a robust debate should ensue over this reading of these passages. 
The first reply would be that Twitchell's thesis must have made it impossible for him not to see "commercialism", 
and modern American consumption, everywhere. 
866 See above, 103f 
86' Twitchell, 6 1. 
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A Manichean Archbishop, though novel, is conceivable: suspicious of his desire, he would 
seek never to want things. But the episcopal advert-reading habits are also consonant with 
the logic of love's view of things and the desire for them as constitutive elements of God's 
good reality, where understanding and praxis is needed in view of the greater goods also 
resident in that same reality. Thus a Christian Archbishop would say that he chose not 
solely to want things, since he understands his wants finally to find their proper home 
elsewhere. (That is, he participates in love divinely commended, seeking within a 
consumerist society that only knows positive love, to learn responses of rational, benevolent 
and cosmic love. His virtuous advert-reading habits assist to produce this ordinate passion; 
but rather than calling himself virtuous, he deals with each opportunity to read, or not read, 
adverts, as it arises. ) 
Ancient Pelagianism and modern liberalism would be merely analogous if the only parallel 
between them were this tarring of opponents with a Manichean brush. But the parallels 
extend further than mere analogy. When Twitchell describes consumption as an unmixed 
good, the desire to consume is not problematic despite whatever problems are faced by the 
poor, the indebted, the kleptomaniacs and the 'shopaholics'. Likewise, ancient Pelagians 
believed no evils to arise from goods; and since no natural faults inhered within human 
nature, sin was merely dysfunction. 868 
Marxist and Puritan naysayers notwithstanding, the desire to consume is deep 
and abiding. We have not been tricked into desire. We have led ourselves into 
temptation because there is something so pleasurable about it. Like other 
behavior carried to excess, gathering stuff may even have had evolutionary 
rewards. It is well to remember that such behavior only becomes a sickness, 
an addiction, an affliction, when your debits exceed your credits. "' 
The uncomplicated, approving use of evolutionary naturalism, and restriction of moral 
failure only to dysfunction (such as we saw in Julian's objection to Augustine"O) continues 
the many parallels with ancient Pelagian argument. But against Twitchell's Pelagianism, the 
Christian Archbishop would assert what Twitchell strenuously denies: that advertising is no 
unmixed and liberating blessing, since mysteriously, our desires can somehow take on lives 
of their own. Advertisers are hardly displeased with this; in every sense, they bank on it. 
The burden of Twitchell's thesis makes it important for him to avoid the deeper problems of 
Pelagianism. Unsurprisingly then, he fails to notice how poorly it bodes for the thesis (that 
... Cf Augustine, Cont. Jul., 92-93 (11.9 §31), where Augustine's five-point summary outlines both Julian's 
Pelagianism, and the form of his own refutation. That evil does not arise from good, and that 
humanity possesses no 
natural faults, broadly paraphrases of two of these five points. 
Twitchell, 252. 
See above, 243. 
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consumption brings meaning) when he recounts a study of 'meaning' among happy and 
unhappy families. When psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi asked members of eighty- 
two families which household objects the family members most cherished, "adult members 
of the [five] happiest families picked things that reminded them of other people and good 
times they'd had together", as distinct from members of unhappy families; and "happy 
family members often described the times their family had spent on a favorite couch, rather 
than its style or color. " Then, a striking non sequitur: "Although objects might change, it 
was clear that both happy and unhappy families found great meaning and sense [sic] from 
the consumption and interchange of manufactured things. 53871 
But this simply collapses the experience of the happy into that of the unhappy, to sustain the 
thesis. Twitchell's own recounting of the study highlights an opposite. Where the goods of 
family life brought 'meaning', this other, different, and greater good gave the manufactured 
objects whatever 'meaning' they had. Perhaps the 'happy' families have seen how fetishism 
over these 'goods' risks displacement of their own social relations. The five unhappiest 
families seem not to recognise this greater good-yet Twitchell's Pelagian faith 
misdiagnoses their misery, failing even to notice it. 
In Augustinian terms, the modern Nietzschean agenda we have seen throughout this thesis 
is hostile to Manicheism, but hopelessly Pelagian. 
c) Children and the 'aspects'of love 
In Singer's 'dilemma', "' the uncertainty hinges on the belief that desire establishes the 
moral order. To 'confer' moral status upon a child by its 'wantedness' is tantamount to a 
simple declaration by a parent (and, by extension, a society), that 'I want what I want. ' This 
is also the logic of the shopping mail. 
Consequential ist critiques of Singer seem plain. What if a child, wanted at first, becomes 
unwanted at six weeks? What of children where parent or society felt ambiguously: is the 
child's provisional status to continue indefinitely? This provisional status might prove 
useful if the limitations of childhood should, like the limitations of foetal life, also cease to 
deliver personhood in any "ethically relevant sense". The "arbitrary" line might extend by 
years, grounding the 'wantedness' of slavery. (Singer's exemplars of infanticide, the ancient 
Greeks, easily sustain this other form of 'wantedness'. ) Other en masse agreements about 
unwantedness are not without precedent and action: only later are they called mass-murder. 
"I Twitchell, 44. 
"I See above, 27 1. 
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But as in any consequential ist dispute, every speculation has its plausible opposite: a new 
age of happy children where each child is a wanted; parents impressed by the enormous 
responsibility of their choice, strenuously taking it seriously; medical personnel driven 
harder by the evident care in every parent; and so on. Consequential ist debate founders in 
scenario and counter-scenario. Empirical research becomes ideologically suspect to the 
point of becoming unusable, and an ideological battlefield turns on prior commitments to 
the essential goodness, or flawed 'depravity', "' of the human spirit; and no 'conservative 
counter-consequential ism' can stand for long against historicist visions of progress. 
Even so, moderate liberals will wonder about the security of this morality. With something 
like 'rights', even disregarding their notorious intangibil ity, 874 it is difficult if not impossible 
to determine how they might accrue to the child simply because a parent wants what the 
parent wants. (Singer himself is vague on exactly this point, as to how the crossover from 
wantedness to rights might actually occur. ) There is no way imaginable in which 'rights' 
can somehow appertain to a commodity, just because someone experiences a fetish toward 
it. When wantedness takes its place alongside rights as another criterion for moral status, 
the development is mere sleight-of-hand. Perhaps moral status resided elsewhere all along. 
Obviously, these problems disappear under a more avowedly Nietzschean stance: 
Involuntarily, parents turn children into something similar to themselves- 
they call that 'education. ' Deep in her heart, no mother doubts that the child 
she has bome is her property; no father contests his own right to subject it to 
his concepts and valuations. Indeed, formerly it seemed fair for fathers ... to 
decide on the life and death of the new-born as they saw fit. And like the 
father, teachers, classes, priests, and princes still see, even today, in every 
new human being a unproblematic opportunity for another possession. "' 
This is breath-taking, but not because these adults are difficult to imagine. Chances are that 
we know such parents, with concern that their parenting is more like sport or incarceration, 
quite incommensurable with parenting understood even partly as the nurturance of an other. 
We recognise in Nietzsche's description a clear (if common) aberration. But the stakes are 
high, and our breath is taken when this kind of parenting appears as an outcome of 
Nietzsche's moral order. Nietzsche hardly seems to offer the best account of life affirmed. 
For the sense in which we mean this term, see above, 176. 
"I Cf. Maclntyre, After Virtue, 69, for whom modern 'rights' are a convenient fiction, "and belief in them is one with 
belief in witches and unicorns", notwithstanding the defence that they exist undemonstrably. 
(So also might witches 
and unicorns. ) 
... Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (1886), tr. Walter Kaufmann, 
(New York: Vintage, 1989), 107-08 (§ 194). 
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In Augustine's logic of love, we want to have children because we are beings constructed 
with 'othernessý at the base or core of ourselves: "if they come, we cannot help but love 
them. 55876 But we couch the matter as being about our wants, because in a tragic turn to the 
self, we make a commodity of the other. Thus we are a welter of conflicting affections and 
passions. (In the logic of love, this could be represented as a disordered tussle between 
positive and benevolent love, possibly in the absence of ordered rational and cosmic love. ) 
This is why consequential ist calculations on all sides quickly imagine the parent who wants 
one day but not the next, who wants while baby is sleeping but not when she is screaming. 
With a child who is wanted just because she is wanted, it is hard to see how the relationship 
is not fundamentally subverted and destroyed at the core. 'Wantedness' might be 
appropriate for a shopping mall, but children are wanted because preciousness inheres in 
them from another ground entirely. This pathetic, strange new way of 'wantedness' should 
direct our attention toward children's 'unwantedness'. What 'treasure' in the heart does this 
bizarre notion protect? What disordered affection impels someone to banish a child from 
their lives in this way? Rational, benevolent and cosmic love ask: what positive love could 
possibly be worth this banishment? 
Conversely, parenting makes bad Nietzscheans when in the act of parenting, people nurture 
children, and principles of possession become softened into something else. Indeed, 
children can so become the locus of visions of the good that different distortions of the 
moral field follow, Placing burdens upon children that are incommensurable with 
childhood. (Children as 'hope for the future', for example, are expected to solve the 
disputes or errors of adults, by proxy as it were. "') Nonetheless, this turn toward children 
reflects some tacit rejection of Nietzsche's account of the moral field, as wanting. It is not 
the best account. 
d) ' ources'of the self and modern moral identity 
Charles Taylor's account of 'sources' of the modem 'self complements my account of the 
logic of love. He also helps explain why modern contemplation of apotemnophilia should 
seem so very difficult. I will introduce his account and proceed to a theological comment on 
apotemnophilia, which will require a further comment about 'identities' sexual and true. 
In Taylor's thesis, modern moral identity is grounded in a variety of somewhat 
contradictory historical sources, two of which I will briefly recount. "' Modern good 
Augustine, Conf, 72 (IV. 2). See also above, 112. 
"' In this distortion, children become tools. Benevolence is displaced by positive love for some future vision. 
Taylor's other 'sources' include the affirmation of 'ordinary life', nature, and imaginative self-expression. 
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thinking is conceived procedurally rather than substantively. That is, modern good thinking 
is interested only to demonstrate the veracity of its process, "not in the first instance by 
whether the outcome is substantively correct. "119 But ancient good thinking was 
fundamentally substantive. 
Modern identity also relies upon a stance of disengagement. 110 In Taylor's understanding of 
modern identity, a disengaged self employs procedural reason, to give a conception of 
values projected upon a mechanistic order. The ancient view to which he contrasts this is 
not dissimilar to the moral field that grounds theology's logic of love. On this ancient view, 
an engaged self employs substantive reason, in response to a real, already morally ordered 
order. Ideas and values are, on the ancient account, already located in the cosmos, not just 
in subjects. "' Thus 'ontology' is an 'ontic logos' (like the logic of love, it seems); and 
Taylor seeks to defend this ancient view against the modern view. 'Sources of the self 
drive the rejections we have seen, particularly the expulsion of limbs and the unwantedness 
of children. Because reason is procedural, not substantive, there is no answer to the 
apotemnophiliac. Because values are projections, not responses, the question against 
Onan-of whether 'unwantedness' is ever appropriate-never arises; indeed, it seems 
incomprehensible. 
O'Donovan orients us to the moral field that apotemnophiliacs do not see. "Whatever the 
surgeon may be able to do ... he cannot make self out of non-self 
"I" "The first obligation 
of every human being is to hail [the] giveness [of bodily structure] as a created good and to 
thank God for it, even though he or she may then have to acknowledge that for him or her in 
particular this created good has taken on the aspect of a problem. " 
Clearly though, any culture that finds this difficult as regards apotemnophilia will, in 
matters of non-married and same-sex sexual intercourse, be opaque to Christian substantive 
reason. O'Donovan's discussion derives from the Christian theology of marriage: 
[I]n sexual relationships ... the projects of the 
human spirit are most 
immediately grounded in the structure of the body. To have a male body is to 
have a body structurally ordered to loving union with a female body, and vice 
versa. ... Freedom 
in relationships is ordered by this opposition. This is the 
Taylor, 86. 
... Cf. ibid., 163. The terrain here is similar to our discussion of Kierkegaard above, 198f. Any contradiction with the 
consumer economy's highly engaged loves is explained by the contradictory nature of the 'sources'-and 
by the 
confusion of disordered love. 
"' Ibid., 163 & 186-87 for brief summary statements. 
882 Oliver M. T. O'Donovan, Transsexualism and Christian marriage vol. 48 (Bramcote: Grove, 1982), 16; also next 
quotation. 
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recognition from which every person must begin to think about his or her 
sexuality ... 
"I 
But John Finnis' natural law argument against homosexuality, similar in some specifics to 
O'Donovan, seems easily defeated by Martha Nussbaum's appeal to "a [homosexual] 
community of love and friendship, which no religious tradition would deny to be important 
human goods", even if this entails the denigration of "procreative community" (which 
might "not be based on the best sort of friendship and the deepest spiritual concerns. ")"' 
Nietzsche observed that Christianity is a "system"-a "consistently thought out and 
complete view of things". "' Of course, he had in mind that Christian thought is a voluntarist 
system, as if its view of the body were "esoteric, meaningful only to those who ... have 
placed themselves within the closed [ecclesiastical] circle. "886 Clearly, theology's logic of 
love admits no place for this kind of voluntarism. But it will assert with O'Donovan, and 
against Finnis, that O'Donovan's comment about the body makes little sense without its 
reference to the 'system' of Christian thought. 
Calvin's reiteration of Augustine makes this plain. Reason, when allied to some set of loves 
that excludes the cosmic love of God, simply finds any substantive Christian reason to be 
unreasonable. Its desires have alighted, voraciously and selectively, elsewhere. 
Theology's logic of love appeals to Christian revelation as part of the "system"-not in an 
act of 'blind' faith, but as a form of 'seeing' faith. Revelation unveils the moral order, 
sometimes by command but often through other genres (e. g. wisdom, narrative, etc. ); and 
these unveilings are consonant with natural order. The revelation that sex is for marriage, 
and marriage for many things, coheres with what we see to be liveable. Indeed, Nussbaum's 
protestations against marriage are required precisely because marriage so often prospers. 
But even the unveiling of marriage as consonant with the natural order is subsidiary to 
wider aspects of the Christian 'system'. Nussbaum does not fancifully point to wearisome 
failures of marriage; yet marriage finally succeeds because of God's greater 'yes' to people 
(despite their disorder), which supervenes. Theology records God's first word to humanity 
as a word of blessing (Gen. 1: 28a). The intention to bless is consistently retained in divine 
... Ibid. 
... John Finnis and Martha C. Nussbaum, "Is Homosexual Conduct Wrong? A Philosophical Exchange, " New 
Republic 209 no. 20 (1993): 13. 
... See above, 221. 
"' O'Donovan, Resurrection, 16. 
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promises to forgive, reconcile and restore. Paul refers to this supervening context when he 
can say of various disordered lovers, both sexually so and otherwise, that 
this is what some of you used to be. But you were washed, you were 
sanctified, you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God. (I Cor. 6: 11) 
This relationship in Christian thought between affections, natural order, marriage and God's 
great 'yes', is elegantly summarised (with special reference to same-sex sexual activity) by 
the St Andrew's Day Statement: 
We must be on guard ... against constructing any other ground for our identities than the redeemed humanity given us in [Christ]. ... Our sexual affections can no more define who we are than our class, race or nationality. 
At the deepest ontological level, therefore, there is no such thing as 'a' 
homosexual or 'a' heterosexual; there are human beings, male and female, 
called to a redeemed humanity in Christ, endowed with a complex variety of 
emotional potentialities and threatened by a complex variety of forms of 
alienation. ... The [Christian's] struggle against disordered desires, or the 
misdirection of innocent desires ... will be crowned at last by a character formed through patience to be like Christ's. "' 
To the extent that anthropological theories miss the Gospel's proclamation of redeemed 
human nature, they "can only imprison the imagination by foreclosing the recognition of 
emotional variety and development. ""' The Statement proceeds to describe how in marriage 
and singleness, two vocations for life "point forward to [the] fulfilment" of all creation in 
Christ, constituted in "the fellowship of God with his redeemed creation. "119 When human 
life is understood in this framework of creation, redemption and reconciliation, "we are 
freed from human constructs to search out and discover the richness of creation that is 
opened to us by God's redeeming work. " The searching will embrace a variety of goods, 
including friendship, finally to be fulfilled in the hope of Christ's final appearing. 
In theology's logic of love, the primary declaration toward people is not, finally, that they 
are 'apotemnophiliac' or whatever. God's love for them as persons is radically 
demonstrated at Christ's cross. 110 The 'pouring in' of this love is not adventitious to God, 
whose stance toward humanity remains, as always, the settled intention of his holy affection 
to bless. 191 When God's 'yes' is met with our 'yes', there follows our participation in the 
... Timothy Bradshaw, et al., The St Andrew's Day Statement: An Examination of the Theological Principles 
Affecting the Homosexuality Debate (Crowborough: Church of England Evangelical Council, 1995), 5 ('Application' 
§I). The full statement is also accessible at hiti. ),. //ý, ý, -wNv. episcopaliaii. org/cclec/ýpaper-st-, andre\, ý, ýs-dav, 
httli (accessed 
April 2003). 
... Ibid., 6 ('Application' §11). 
"I Ibid., 7 ('Application' §111), as for quotation following. 
"0 This extends Augustine's 'christological hard-point' (above, 93-96) which relied upon 
Galatians 2: 21. (Cf. also 
Rom. 5: 8. ) 
"' For Augustine on this 'holy affection', see above, 106-108. 
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logic of love commended; and old labels of identity fall from us, into decrepit desuetude- 
as when Paul observes, "this is what some of you used to be. " 
4. The logic of love and liberal political philosophy 
Given these critiques, and since theology's logic of love denies voluntarism, I should 
perhaps proceed to describe theology's engagement with liberal political philosophy (meant 
as an account of life together, rather than specifics over law or government). But space 
forbids this. Liberal political philosophy is complex, therefore any application of the logic 
of love will give a variety of conversations. I will now flag some examples. 
a) A debate to be had 
The best practises of church communities give a vision of life together that bespeaks the 
best aspirations of liberal order, 191 and hostility to this comment probably reflects what 
Taylor calls "filiation to the radical Enlightenment. "191 Taylor's deep concern about radical 
modern thought is phrased as four tentative questions. 894 With apologies to Taylor, I will list 
them in a stronger negative form: 
e Moderns are "living beyond [their] moral means" in continuing allegiance to justice and 
benevolence. 
0 The naturalist moral project cannot "survive the demise of the religion it strives to 
abolish". 
0 Enlightenment affirmations cannot "be sustained in face of our contemporary post- 
Schopenhauerian understanding of the murkier depths of human motivation ... without 
paying Nietzsche's price". 
0 Naturalist affirmations, "conditional on a vision of human nature in the fullness of its 
health and strength", cannot move people to help the irremediably broken. 
Taylor has a 'hunch' that "the potential of a certain theistic perspective is incomparably 
greater"191 than the resources of naturalist humanism, to deal with these concerns. But in an 
appreciative and otherwise sympathetic review, Nussbaum takes exception to this 
... This comment is drawn from the thesis of Oliver M. T. O'Donovan, The Desire of the Nations: 
Rediscovering the 
Roots of Political Theology. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), which unfortunately cannot 
be outlined 
here. 
Taylor, 506; but he uses this phrase in reference to the Frankfurt school. 
894 Ibid., 517. 
Ibid., 518. 
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'hunch'. 896 Taylor's view that secularism has brought meaninglessness is "unfair ... Surely 
Nietzsche is right that this despair is a pernicious legacy of that [theistic] legacy. " 
Nussbaum also rejects Taylor's thought that modem humanism seeks to thrive on the 
corpse, as it were, of Christianity, since this critique does not apply "to an Aristotelian 
morality", such as she sees her own to be, "based on ideas of virtue. " On Taylor's 'murkier 
depths', Aristotle's vision of people "raised with love, with material support, and with good 
education [who are] capable of virtue" has not yet had a chance: 
Have those happy conditions ever been realised on a large scale? And what 
sort of evidence should we require before concluding that the human heart is 
radically defective, that it is insufficient to its own highest hopes? My own 
hunch is that the best work on the 'murkier depths' of the human heart shows 
something rather different: that love proves to be, in the end, a more powerful 
source of motivation than hatred, and that even ugly childhood feelings of 
aggression, and guilt at one's own aggression, can frequently become 
powerful promptings toward benevolent action in adult life. ... So the discussion has barely begun. "' 
Barely indeed (which was Taylor's intention). Christian theology welcomes Nussbaum's 
comments, pointing to God's love shown in Christ's cross and poured out by the Spirit, and 
appearing amongst humanity as the powerful cause of many restored lives. 
Her comment is also more prosaically welcome. When moderns start reaching past the 
Enlightenment to ancients for a new view, then Christianity finds itself in a milieu strikingly 
similar to that in which it first thrived. Nussbaum knows this, and for her, "tensions" 
between culpability and freedom "internal to the Christian view", are best supplanted by 
Aristotelian optimism over human capability against human vulnerability. She recognises 
that Christians believe the Aristotelian view "cannot explain all the ways in which life goes 
badly. " If Christians are impressed by early Christianity's increasing ascendancy, she 
suspects the auspices of "church power". "There are many ways to adjudicate this 
situation", she concludes; 191 a discussion is surely to be had. 
Whether or not the "happy conditions" have been realised on a large scale (though in fact 
they obviously have been, since 'a large scale' need not be universal), they were certainly 
realised in Augustine's life, who not only found that the depths of his heart remained murky 
but who also found Nussbaum's Pelagian prescriptions for it to be entirely inadequate. 
And one might ask, moreover, whether it is actually possible to turn to 
religious sources of motivation without also going in for religious authority, 
and putting that authority ahead of reason. The low likelihood of such an 




outcome, given our cultural arrangements, is yet another motive one might have for choosing the secular view, even if all else were equal. "' 
The Christian respondent can only stare incredulously at liberal perceptions of what it is to 
4go in for religious authority' (as if agreement with God's revelation in Christ banishes all 
thought), and at liberal perceptions of how Christendom actually works (as if secular 
arrangements are not gradually overwhelmed by the cumulative effect of innumerable 
personal decisions against them). In any case, surely Taylor's point (and the matter for 
discussion) is that all else is not equal; and that even if it were, the choice is somewhat more 
than a matter of siding with the 'city' that seems most likely to attain political prosperity. 
b) A conversation with scientistic objectivity 
Airgen Habermas' study900 of politics, ethics and praxis describes an Enlightenment 
dichotomy between a positivistic, value-free rationality, and what he calls 'commitment' 
(the mode of thought that believes, values and desires). If the dichotomy remains 
unchallenged, 
the danger of an exclusively technical civilization, which is devoid of the 
interconnection between theory and praxis, can be clearly grasped: it is 
threatened by the splitting of its consciousness, and by the splitting of human 
beings into two classes-the social engineers and the inmates of closed 
institutions. "' 
By this he seems to imagine a society where scientists and technologists labour in happy 
isolation, imagining their endeavours to be morally neutral ("the inmates of closed 
institutions"), who are co-ordinated by elite manipulators ("the social engineers"). In place 
of this, he argues for a closure of the dichotomy: "Today the convergence of reason and 
commitment ... must be regained, reflected, and reasserted". 
902 A kind of reason is 
envisaged that can incorporate its commitments, while allowing the positivistic reason of 
technological science to do what it does best. ('Science' is broadly inclusive of social, 
economic, physical and political sciences. ) Historically, positivistic science critiqued 
ideology and dogma. But the price paid is 
monstrous enough: from the mainstream of rationality the pollutants, the 
sewage of emotionality, are filtered off and locked away hygienically in a 
storage basin-an imposing mass of subjective value qualities. Every single 
value appears as a meaningless agglomeration of meaning, stamped solely 
with the stigma of irrationality, so that the priority of one value over the other 
... simply cannot 
be rationally justified. "' 
899 Ibid., 31-32. 
... Cited above, 265 n. 833. 
"' Habermas, 282. 
Ibid., 281. 
Ibid., 265. 'Decisionism' is Habermas' term for praxis that advances various societal projects, but which admits of 
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Habermas greatly values science. His objection concerns the erroneous belief that its 
objective methods can order our life together. Much more could quoted from his interesting 
analysis; unfortunately, it must suffice to see Nietzsche's version of the same objection: 
From now on, my philosophical colleagues, let us be more wary of the 
dangerous old conceptual fairy-tale which has set up a 'pure, will-less, 
painless, timeless, subject of knowledge' ... 
here we are asked to think an eye 
which cannot be thought at all, an eye turned in no direction at all, an eye 
where the active and interpretative powers are to be suppressed ... 
There is 
only a perspective of seeing, only a perspective of 'knowing'; the more 
affects we allow to speak about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are 
able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our 'concept' of the 
thing, our 'objectivity'. But to eliminate the will completely and turn off all 
the emotions without exception, assuming we could: well? would that not 
904 mean to castrate the intellect? ... 
Here is the point of agreement between Nietzsche and theology (for deliberative logic has 
its loves). Thus Taylor objects to Habermas' Frankfurt school, which "still remains too 
narrow. It is still entirely anthropocentric, and treats all goods which are not anchored in 
human powers or fulfilments as illusions ... In this it shows its filiation to the radical 
Enlightement. "901 
c) A range of variously disposed conversation partners 
Liberal political philosophers debate about objectivity, which in that arena, is referred to as 
'neutrality'. John Rawls is the most obvious proponent of this neutrality; but the neutrality 
actually requires "a certain conception of the good", 906 according to Joseph Raz (in 
anticipation of his own account of a substantive liberal morality). It should quickly be noted 
that Raz criticises Rawls' early formulation, and more recently, Rawls is careful to explain 
this 'neutrality' in terms of the overlap of 'reasonable comprehensive doctrines'. (In this 
treatment, Rawls seems to de-emphasise the importance of 'the original position', the 
ýneutral' starting point that generates Raz' critique. ) That is, people of widely differing 
traditions, religions, and so on, can come together and share a body of reasonable 
commitments, which are end positions in their own systems, for co-operation and fairness. 
To say this, Rawls distinguishes between reasonable persons, who "desire for its own sake" 
a society "in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can 
accept ... 
insist[ing] that reciprocity should hold ... so that each 
benefits along with the 
no real self-understanding. 
904 Nietzsche, Genealogy, 92 (§111.12). 
Taylor, 506. 
906 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 118; cf 117-120. 
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others"; 911 and rational persons, who pursue their own ends "lackfing] ... the particular 
form 
of moral sensibility that underlies the desire to engage in fair cooperation". 908 
In this version of his theory, then, Rawls is clear about a certain 'moral sensibility' and 
'desire'. Yet the commitment to neutrality is retained: Rawls' 'justice as fairness' hovers, as 
it were, above all 'reasonable comprehensive doctrines', refusing to be drawn into 
conversation with any of them. Intentionally, it absorbs these, but without comment. 
But on Raz' view, liberal political philosophy is committed to a strong moral conception of 
well-being, which "consists in the (1) whole-hearted and (2) successful pursuit of (3) 
valuable (4) activities. "101 He seeks to name what Rawls, in neutrality, will not. Yet Raz 
admits that behind his "pivotal ethical precept of public action" there exists a "puzzling" 
ethical backdrop. Well-being cannot be as pivotal to ethics as it is for public action-910 
The contrast between these positions points to an obvious truth. Liberal governments 
continually promote and police various desires. Such efforts are pursued within a 
Kierkegaardian myth of 'objectivity', as if the moral rationality of the modern liberal state 
has no fundamental commitments. When hidden under a mantle of feigned neutrality, 
proper discussion of properly ordered desire is pre-empted, while at the same time 
specifically orderings (or disorders) of desire are established at the centre of public 
morality. 
This brief digression is simply to illustrate, without engagement, how theology's logic of 
love will address different discussions. Its conversation with Rawls will not be 
conversation, since he will appropriate many of its loves without acknowledging its logic. A 
conversation with Raz would concern our respective substantive conceptions of the good, 
and might go further. But these engagements must be held over for a different investigation. 
d) Conversation as attention 
Charles Mathewes notices that "the best recent accounts of political liberalism and 
pluralism ... are grounded on 
fear" of the alternatives. (Here he names Judith Shklar's 
Ordinary Vices and Jeffrey Stout's Ethics After Babel. )911 In this sketch, he surnmarises the 
907 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 50. 
"' Ibid., 5 1. 
... Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 
3. This is his own summary of his argument in Morality. 
"' Ibid., vi. 
911 Mathewes, "Anthropology, " 214; & 213-14 for discussion of Mathewes following. 
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liberal dilemma. How can our subjective experiences of valuing be legitimated in a world of 
plural subjectivities? To answer this, modern liberalism defuses subjectivity by 
scientistically reducing subjects to objects. Concurrent with this objectifying move is a 
relativising one, where 'pluralism' is minimally affirmed as "a simple capitulation to 
difference". Pluralism is barely recognised since there is no real grasp of what actually 
makes people different. 
This pre-emptively disbars the cognitive status of religious claims from moral rationality, so 
that discussions over religious claims and moral rationality can only perpetually "wobble" 
between this dichotomy of objectivism and relativism-even though "most" (Mathewes 
should say who) recognize the dichotomy "as misleading, if not downright pernicious". But 
no conciliation is possible, for fundamental to the dichotomy is a certain ontology of life 
together, which "pictures the world as an archipelago of alterities, each negotiating its way 
around the others. " But there is an alternative to this 'archipelago of alterities': 
Suppose ... we undertake to 4get at' moral and religious rationality from the 
platform provided by Augustine's theological anthropology, which assumes 
that otherness is already at the base of the self This would seem to me to 
alter the case in two important ways: To begin with, it suggests that the 
attempt to engage one another most fully as particular and historical 
persons-up to and including 'rational' debate (whatever that may turn out to 
be)-may yet allow us to have an account of genuinely universal moral and 
religious reason. In the interim, we are in no way required to give up our own 
local rationalities (as if it were some mark of neighborly respect to put 
everyone at an equal disadvantage). Furthermore, Augustine's account 
understands reason not as an autonomous critical-transcendental evaluative 
device ... but rather, most 
basically, as a forrn of attention, attending to the 
ends that the agent desires, and deciding how best to pursue those ends. 
Reason really is, or truly ought to be, the slave of the passions. "' 
So Augustine's logic of love actually offers a way forward that modernity cannot afford to 
ignore (although the hoped-for "universal" is over-optimistic, given the reality of the 'two 
cities'. 911) Modern discourse needs to honour committed reason so that we may properly 
attend to each other. This may simply be to recognise that two parties can accept each other 
without agreement. 914 Of course, the praxis of rational and benevolent love grounds such 
acceptance securely, in contrast to the Nietzschean hegemonic commitment to voracious 
positive love. (Anyone caught in the Enlightened 'no man's land', will have to choose. ) 
"' Ibid., 214. 
91' Unless I have misunderstood, with Mathewes referring to Christian theology. 
I" My thanks to Rev. Michael Corbett-Jones for helping me to see this distinction; others debts to him are too 
numerous to mention. 
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I also suggested9 15 that theological ethicists might borrow a counsellor's skills, seeking to 
grasp the perceived importance of whatever is pursued or defended, and to convey our 
acceptance of the emotion so generated. This clarificatory 'service of elucidation' might 
precede argumentative disagreement, or not, depending on the circumstance. This was 
indebted to Aquinas' account of anger, and principle passions, generated by various ends 
and the paths toward them. Theology's grateful acceptance of all the elements of the moral 
field (and its account of evil only as a form of lack) gives it nothing at all to fear in 
discovering the passionate loves, even if disordered, of others. The logic of love gives deep 
acceptance of the other, without requiring agreement with them. 
5. The logic of love: making best sense of our lives 
I will now suggest that theology's logic of love makes the best sense of moral realities that 
surround us. I will go on to answer the questions put at the start of the thesis, and will finish 
the thesis with a summary of major elements in the logic of love. 
a) 'Making sense'of morality 
What better measure of reality do we have in human affairs than those terms 
which ... make the best sense of our lives? 'Making the best sense' here includes not only offering the best, most realistic orientation about the good 
but also allowing ourselves best to understand and make sense of the actions 
and feelings of ourselves and others. For our language of deliberation is 
continuous with our language of assessment, and this with the language in 
which we explain what people do and feel. ... What are the requirements of 
'making sense' of our lives? These requirements are not yet met if we have 
some theoretical language which purports to explain behaviour for the 
observer's standpoint but is of no use to the agent in making sense of his own 
thinking, feeling, and acting. "' 
In contrast, the sciences marginalise important phenomenological aspects of being human, 
'changing the subject' so that lives actually lived cannot be explained within scientific 
terms of reference. 911 For Taylor, if actual life falls outside of a given account of human life, 
then the account is not making best sense of life. "The terms we select have to make sense 
across the whole range of both explanatory and life uses. "911 The "various theories of moral 
judgments as projections, and the attempts to distinguish 'value' from 'fact', fall afoul of 
this [best account] principle", since we regularly deny such distinctions in our praxis. 
Of course, the terms of our best account will never figure in a physical theory 
of the universe. But that just means that our human reality cannot be 
911 See above, 255. 
916 Taylor, 57. 
917 1 have shown something similar in my first chapter, on the scientific account of emotion (above, 27-3 1), and 
in this 
chapter, with Habermas' critique of science (284-285). 
"' Taylor, 58; also next quotation. 
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understood in the terms appropriate for this physics. This is the complement 
to the anti-Aristotelian purge of natural science in the seventeenth century. 
Just as physical science in no longer anthropocentric, so human science can 
no longer be couched in the terms of physics. Our value terms purport to give 
us insight into what it is to live in the universe as a human being, and this is a 
quite different matter from that which physical science claims to reveal and 
explain. The reality is, of course, dependent on us, in the sense that a 
condition for its existence is our existence. But once granted that we exist, it 
is no more a subjective projection than what physics deals with. "' 
Ontology should be discerned through the best account that can retain such terms as 
'courage' and 'generosity'; for these are features of the real world, enabling deliberation 
and personal assessment. "' "My perspective is defined by the moral intuitions I have, by 
what I am morally moved by. If I abstract from this, I become incapable of understanding 
any moral argument at all. "911 Is this "introduction of the word 'intuition' by a moral 
philosopher ... a signal that something has gone badly wrong"9911 No, since Taylor seeks to 
'make sense of those intuitions (rather than using them as epistemological foundations). 
b) Scenarios of love 
A conception of many basic goods is sometimes derided as 'intuitionist', 911 and moral 
philosophy asserts that moral theories should centre upon some single concept. But moderns 
assert this in order to "find their way through the dilemmas of modernity by invalidating 
some of the crucial goods in contest. 99924 In contrast, theology's logic of love embraces 
subjective responses and an ob ective field of basic goods. Consider the everyday scenarios j 
921 that began this thesis. 
The compassion of "let's bandage it" reflects 'enjoyment' of the other. Such benevolent 
love might be expressed within family life, and rational love seeks for its expression 
across any boundaries that prevent the 'loving embrace of their beauty'. 
Rational love grounds the justice that forbids attack in "you make me so mad I could hit 
you". But the intrinsic value of both parties, affirmed by this same 
justice, might 
likewise cast light on what good was loved so much as to cause the outburst. 
"' Ibid., 59. 
920 Ibid., 69. 
921 Ibid., 73. 
922 Maclntyre, After Virtue, 69. 
92' Taylor, 76. 
924 Ibid., 503; cf 511. 
925 See above, 17. 
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"Let's make love" becomes understood as a positive love for marriage (with marriage 
being for many things). The vocation of the single person is freed for the 'enjoyment of 
others', liberated now from the requirement to make love as a consumer. 
Consumptive disordering is reflected in the voracity and selective sight of "I must have 
it! How much do you want? ", and "she'll pay-I'll destroy her. " Positive love, when 
love's other aspects are suppressed, distorts the moral field into the consumer economy 
and the will to power. 
In contrast, the gospel seems at first incomprehensible: "More to be desired are they 
than gold ... sweeter also than honey". This reflects a primary reordering of love's 
cosmic aspect, then its other aspects. Divine love poured in begins adventitiously, but is 
continued with an invitation (by command) to participate in love commended. The limit 
conditions of Christian 'law', once accepted in the context of God's great 'yes', 
gradually resolve into virtues producing ordinate passion. 
It should also be clearer how Christian theology addresses other questions. 
926 
0 "Are emotions subject to moral evaluation? " Aquinas said yes, on the understanding 
that emotions are an aspect of wider moral visions that certainly are subject to moral 
evaluation. Emotions themselves are part of the good of creation; but like all goods, can 
be disordered to improper ends (thus 'inordinate passions', or 'disordered affections'). 
0 "When should emotion help direct my action? " and "Should action ever 'go against' an 
emotion? " become questions wrongly framed, since modern conceptions of emotion are 
incommensurable with directed action. More fruitfully, I would begin to clarify what 
constitute my 'affections', the 'treasures of my heart', determining if these displace or 
are formed by the love of God in Christ. Only then will emotional consonance, or 
dissonance, with action, become intelligible-respectively, as 'virtue' or 'conscience'. 
0 "In acts highly charged with emotion, are agents always responsible? " Augustine's 
dialogue with Pelagius gives a decisive yes, but is capacious enough to acknowledge 
that agents can be as completely 'out of control' as is possible to imagine. But however 
wild the disorder, there remains the persistent offer of divine grace to forgive and to 
reorder. 
927 
926 See above, 17. 
91' This is the true basis for mercy within a just social order. 
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"Do 'virtues' and 'vices' involve emotional dispositions? ", "Should certain emotions be 
cultivated? ", and "Can one's desire be shaped by oneself, and can desire's emotional 
dimension so be shaped? " Virtue includes emotional dispositions, but requires 
"something more"-namely, the framework of Christian theology, and its logic of love. 
Virtue is love's conformity to the moral field; it is a gift of divine love poured in; and in 
the logic of love commended, it is a first-person statement of aim and a tool for second- 
person affirmation. On these conditions, it can 'produce ordinate passions'. 
c) The logic of love as the 'best account 
This thesis is an imperfect account of the logic of love; yet the logic of love gives Taylor's 
'best account' of morality and moral identity. 
God sustains a plurality of goods, ordered telically and generically, where humanity is 
constituted in being, knowledge and love. Humanity responds in love to the moral field, 
which elicits love, and gives love its logic. This love generates 'passions' such as joy, 
sadness, hope and fear, and anger. Emotion can therefore point to loved goods. 
But in voracity and selective sight, humanity perceives the plenitude of the moral field as a 
problem of scarcity. In faithless unconcern towards God, reason and love is 
comprehensively misdirected to ends less than the 'enjoyment of God and of one another in 
God', giving instead a concupiscent will to power. Humanity is powerless to change this 
orientation: divine love 'poured in' by the Spirit is required. This seems adventitious, but 
the settled intention of divine holy affection is indicated by the cross of Christ; and the 
adventitious is made accessible in the invitation (by command) to love commended. The 
Spirit uses the teachings of Christ, the 'Old Law', and other aspects of revelation to shape 
our participation. Under this reordering, all love's 'aspects' find their proper home. 
Consequently, goods from justice to friendship to marriage and singleness are sustained. 
Indeed all the goods of ordinary life are affirmed, when loved appropriate to their place in 
the moral field. Han-nonious communities can form who live in like-mindedness concerning 
these goods. Journeying together in joyful affections, and participating in the reordering of 
their passions, they hold forth God's 'yes' to a disordered world. They show forth God's 
forgiveness and help, where voracity towards scarcity becomes contentment with 
abundance. Their restless hearts, which once found no rest, now find their rest in him. 91, 
"' Cf Augustine, Conf., 21 (1.1). 
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